Albert L. Peia, Pro Se
(213)219-7649
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
----------------------------------------------------------
Albert L. Peia, )
Plaintiff
) CASE NO.
-vs- )
)
Richard M. Coan,
Coan, )
Lewendon ,Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC.)
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
John Doe Surety
1, John Doe Insurer 2, ) UNDER THE
RACKETEER
John Does 3 –
10,
) INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT
) (RICO)
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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Albert L. Peia, of full age, residing at 611
E. 5th Street #404, Los Angeles, in the
against defendants sets forth the following
averments under penalty of perjury and
says:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This action arises out of a scheme to
defraud plaintiff of money and assets perpetrated by defendants/co-conspirators
herein, injuring plaintiff in his business and property within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), also damaging plaintiff’s bankruptcy estate and creditors
thereof. Annexed hereto and incorporated herein by reference thereto is the Affidavit
of Albert L. Peia
dated April , 2005, setting forth under penalty of perjury the
factual predicates of the crimes/wrongful/illegal conduct herein.
2.
Through their conduct as detailed below, defendants conducted or participated,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c), and/or conspired to do so
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c),
in violation of said provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq..
PARTIES
4. Plaintiff,
Albert L. Peia, Debtor of the Chapter 7 proceeding of
which defendant(s) Coan is Trustee, currently resides
in the State of California, County of Los Angeles, City of
5. Defendant
Richard M. Coan has at all times relevant hereto been
the Chapter 7 Trustee in the District of Connecticut, and a principal and/or
employee of the firm Coan, Lewendon,
Gulliver and Miltenberger, LLC, whose acts appear to
be within the scope of his authority and/or employment.
6.
Whitney Lewendon has at all times relevant hereto
resided in or transacted his affairs or business in the state of Connecticut,
and a principal and/or employee of the firm Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver and Miltenberger,
LLC, whose acts appear to be within the scope of his authority and/or
employment.
7.
Timothy Miltenberger has at all times relevant hereto
resided in or transacted his affairs or business in the state of Connecticut,
and a principal and/or employee of the firm Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver and Miltenberger,
LLC, whose acts appear to be within the scope of his authority and/or
employment.
8. Defendant Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver and Miltenberger, LLC, upon information and belief is incorporated
in and whose principal place of business is the state of
9. Defendant
John Doe Insurer1, upon information and belief is licensed to do business in
and transacts its affairs in the state of
10. Defendant
John Doe Surety2, upon information and belief is licensed to do business in and
transacts its affairs in the state of
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
11.
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(a)(2), in that plaintiff is a citizen of a foreign state,
defendants Richard M. Coan, Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC., are citizens of Connecticut, and the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs. This court also has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Sections 1331 and 1367, in that the RICO claims arise under the laws of the
United States, and the state law claims are so related to the RICO claims that
they form part of the same case or controversy.
12.
Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(a),
since defendants reside in the District of Connecticut and a substantial part
of the acts and omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the District of
Connecticut.
FACTUAL
BASIS FOR CLAIMS – WRONGFUL CONDUCT
13. Plaintiff has been injured in his business and property by reason
of defendants’ wrongful/illegal conduct within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c).
14. The fraudulent scheme of defendants/co-conspirators includes
offenses involving fraud connected with a case under Title 11 U.S.C. within the meaning
of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(d) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
15.
Defendants/co-conspirators, at times relevant hereto, said
conducted
and/or participated in the affairs of an
enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, affecting
and
having a nexus to interstate commerce thereby, with the
intent
to damage and defraud plaintiff and obstruct justice
thereby,
by reason of which violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections
1961 et seq., plaintiff sustained
injury to his property and
business.
Specifically, Alan Shiff
purported Chief Judge at
USBC fraudulently misrepresented the
date of dismissal
of
a proceeding over which he himself had presided perpetrating a fraud
connected
with a case under Title 11 as proscribed in Title 18 U.S.C.
Section 1961(1) (D); and further,
brought a (retaliatory against a
witness/victim/informant violative of Section l5l3)
spurious contempt
proceeding
against plaintiff, obstructing justice thereby in
violation
of Section 1503 (and additionally was without
jurisdiction
to legitimately do so). Quite simply, he lied
(materially
false fraudulent representation); knew he lied
(scienter); lied with the intention of
deceiving; that the lies
were
relied upon (ie., government, courts, etc.); said fraud
in
connection with a case under Title 11 directly causing damage
to
plaintiff’s property and business (and as well to plaintiff’s
estate
and creditors thereof) .
16.
Defendants did utilize the mails in
perpetrating
said fraud (on courts, creditors, plaintiff, etc.)
constituting
the RICO predicate violation of mail fraud thereby,
violative of Section 1341 (discussed infra).
Defendants/co-conspirators utilized
false hearing
dates
to wrongfully dismiss adversary proceedings, defrauding
plaintiff
and creditors thereby, Exhibit
“C”, and violative of Section 1503, utilizing the mails
in
perpetuating said scheme in violation of Section 1341
did
feloniously remove filed federal court documents for the purpose of
defrauding
plaintiff, covering up various crimes connected thereto, obstructing
justice
in violation of Section 1503 thereby, causing damages to
plaintiff’s
property and business. Exhibit “B”.
17. In addition to the foregoing, federal
employee
Maryanne Trump (Barry) (and
corrupt
the federal judicial process obstructing justice in
violation
of Section 1503 thereby, and Section 1510 as a conse-
quence thereof, even as substantial sums of
(drug) money were
being
laundered, in violation of Section 1956, through
her
family’s/brothers’ casinos by RICO defendants before her,
said
“quid pro quo” in the form of drug money flows
constituted a violation of
Section
201 relating to bribery.
18. At or around the
time of the retaliatory
and
spurious contempt proceeding, late 1992/early1993 , Trump had “retained”
the
brother of then
discovery
may have yielded a similar conclusion consistent with
said
Trump modus operandi.
19. Federal employee (and
then
and
on
(bribe) retainer by RICO defendants Dilena
and companies,
violative of the predicate act of bribery,
Section 201, as well
as
obstructing justice, Section 1503, consistent therewith.
20. Facts giving rise to what a trier of fact
could reasonably infer from same,
particularly
when coupled with similar scenarios herein (a more
direct “
bribe deal”,
Section 201) vis-a-vis
federal employee (and then
Sam Allito, federal employee (and then Assistant
thereby) who did “cut a bribe deal” (Section 201)
and
as well, did obstruct justice (Section 1503) by removing
from
the Office of the
concerning
drug money laundering (Section 1956) and other
federal
law violations.
21.
Jonathon Lacey did “cut a bribe deal” (Section 201)
and
as well, did obstruct justice (Section 1503) by removing
from
the Office of the
concerning
drug money laundering (Section 1956) and other
federal
law violations.
22.
Federal employees in
the Chapter 7 proceeding in
for
the purpose of defrauding plaintiff (fraud in connection
with
a case under Title 11), and as well, obstructing justice
(Section 1503) thereby, by reason of
which plaintiff sustained
damage
to his property and business (also damaging creditors,
and
committing bankruptcy fraud thereby).
23.
Defendant Coan did
consistent with the aforesaid perpetrate
a
fraud (connected with a case under Title 11) upon the estate
of
plaintiff and purposefully and with the intent to damage
plaintiff
did cause the dismissal of proceedings, obstructing
justice
(Section 1503) thereby, by reason of which plaintiff
sustained injury to his property
and business.
and
Exhibit “A”. The same violations apply to the adversary
proceeding
concerning junkie and thief, David George Swann
(DOB 4-6-60; three guilty pleas to
theft in less than 5 years
residence
in
other
assets of plaintiff and against whom default (judgment)
was
ripe for entry (violations of Sections 1513, 102 and that
concerning
extortion would also have been appropriate) . Defen-
dant Coan
has neither abandoned nor re-brought same, violating
Section
1503 and (defrauding) damaging plaintiff thereby.
24.
The aforesaid defendants also did violate Section 1962(d) by
conspiring
to violate Section 1962(c) by and during during
the
course
of the conspiracy, consistent with the object of the
conspiracy
in relation to the overt acts in furtherance thereof,
did
conspire to commit a fraud in connection with a case under
Title 11 and obstruct justice thereby,
with knowledge of
the
commission of predicate acts as set forth herein, were
a
part of the pattern of racketeering activity by which plaintiff
sustained
injury to his property by reason of said overt pre-
dicate acts. It should be noted that in
conspiring to violate
section
1962 (c) by reason of which violations plaintiff
sustained
injury to his business and property, defendants evinced
intent to injure plaintiff and
benefit (former) RICO/adversary
proceeding
defendants, and as well did obstruct justice (and
criminal
investigations thereof). It should be noted as documented
therein
that co-conspirator
engaged
in innumerable enumerated acts of racketeering
activity
as
set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section(l), most notably subpart (A),
viz., dealing in a controlled
substance or listed chemical (as
defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act), which
is
chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment
for
more than one year, and the concomitants of said
racketeer-
ing activity set forth in said subpart,
namely, murder, bribery,
and
extortion. In furtherance thereof, as is relevant herein,
USA/John Does
also have been engaged in and violated the predicate
acts
of obstruction of justice (Section 1503), obstruction of
criminal investigations (Section
1510), laundering of monetary
instruments
(Section 1956) , use of interstate commerce facilities
in
the commission of murder-for-hire (Section 1958), obstruction
of
state or local law enforcement (Section 1511), retaliation
against
a witness, victim, or informant (Section 1513), subpart
(D) as regards the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving,
concealment,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled
substance
or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act),
punishable under any law of the
the
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
25. Multiple and distinct
injuries to multiple parties have been caused by defendants' violation of Title
18 U.S.C. § 1962.
26. Plaintiff has been injured in his business and property by reason
of defendants' violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
27. The pattern of racketeering activity includes violations of the
following provisions of Title 18 U.S.C. as further detailed immediately
thereafter with factual specificity:
(illegal drug)money laundering[Title 18
U.S.C. § 1956], bankruptcy fraud [Title 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D)], obstruction of
justice, [Title 18 U.S.C. § 1503] , offenses involving fraud connected with a
case under Title 11 U.S.C. [Title 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D)], extortion[Title 18
U.S.C. § 1951] , mail fraud [Title 18 U.S.C. § 1341], bribery [Title 18 U.S.C.
§ 201], retaliation against a witness/victim/informant [Title 18 U.S.C. §
1513], and racketeering [Title 18 U.S.C. § 1952], along with other substantive
causes sounding in (continuing) negligence/breach of fiduciary duty and
Misprision of Felony [Title 18 U.S.C. § 4], fraudulent concealment thereof and
contract.
A. Felonious removal of filed federal court documents by
federal employees of the bankruptcy court over
which Alan Shiff
presides, among others; viz., on or about March
4, 1993 a motion
to file nunc pro tunc pre-trial memoranda was illegally removed
from the court file; the courtesy copy
delivered by hand said
day to defendant Shift’s law secretary who
identified himself
as David and who indicated same would be given
to defendant
Shiff that same day, Exhibit “ B ”;
B. Fraudulent and otherwise false statements by federal
employee, Alan Shiff
concerning a dismissal date upon which
spurious contempt proceedings were predicated
and which caused
great damage to plaintiff before said spurious
proceedings were
dismissed on the government’s own motion owing
to mistake
of fact and law; specifically, on or about
January 18, 1993
defendant Shiff did
make a false representation regarding the
date he dismissed a prior
stating said date to have been October 8, 1992,
upon
which a spurious contempt proceeding against
plaintiff was
predicated (false representation); defendant Shiff knew that
said representation was false since he had presided
over the
hearing on June 3, 1992 when he had dismissed
same (which fact
was ultimately confirmed by counsel on my
behalf, Robert Sullivan
of
materially (relating to the 180 day bar to
re-filing a bankruptcy
petition but for which there could not have
been a contempt
charge against plaintiff) false representation
to defraud
plaintiff by the sums wrongfully and illegally
extracted from
plaintiff as sanctions imposed by Shiff himself as well as the
dismissal of meritorious adversary proceedings
for which service
had been effected, some of which matters were
without defense
(intent); the department of justice justifiably
(it would be
a criminal and impeachable offense for Shiff to have made the
materially false representation he had made)
relied upon the
false representation of Shiff
in bringing the contempt action
against
plaintiff (reliance); plaintiff was damaged not only
by the sanctions wrongfully and illegally
(extracted) imposed,
but as well by dismissal of meritorious
adversary proceedings,
some without defense, regarding property, both
real and personal,
surplus funds from purported (wrongful) sales
of real property,
and substantial money damages owed to plaintiff
(causing damage);
C. On or about June 4, 1996, relying upon the false
representations of defendant Shiff as set forth in part B, supra
the
proceeding here in
had already been consummated causing plaintiff
damages.
D. On or about August 17, 1987, I initiated a
R.I.C.O. action
Dkt. #87-2433(MTB) in the
the theft by RICO defendant Dilena
of funds from a pension fund
to which plaintiff had a fiduciary duty -
brought to my atten-
tion by and confirmed
by then bookkeeper Peter Baratta (upon information,
they/RICO co-conspirators had Baratta committed to a mental institution)
- and other
illegal acts relative to a 401K plan for the benefit of employ-
ees, although said
causes are not part of the instant action).
Said matter was transferred to Maryanne Trump Barry, a new appointee
to said district court, despite hundreds of
thousands of dollars
(of drug money being laundered) per month
flowing from RICO
defendants Dilena and
companies through the casinos of Maryanne
Trump Barry’s brother(s) Donald (and Robert). After conflicting
improper decisions (dictated by either
potential loss of said illicit
funds or an increase) said matter was stalled
and I was
constrained to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy on
5-14-88 since
a substantial sum of money was owed to me and
sought in said
action. Said matter was stayed by Magistrate
owing to said bankruptcy filing. In preparing a
motion to recuse
Maryanne Trump Barry in or around the summer of 1988 I met with
and apprised United States Trustee Hugh Leonard
of said
illegal activity and sought his office to join
in my
motion to recuse
Trump Barry, which he refused despite the obvious
and egregious conflict of interest. Hugh
Leonard left his
position as
and Bernstein) in
with whom he was on retainer being RICO
defendants Dilena and
companies. Said RICO action was dismissed
without prejudice
in or around early 1989, upon my best
recollection.
E. In or around the filing of the RICO action in 1987 I contac-
ted the
Assistant
federal building in
or around late summer, early fall of 1987. I
explained the RICO
action, the drug money laundering among other
illegal activities,
and turned over to him supporting documents
(relevant documents
corroborating substantial sums owed to me and
as well, the
various illegal activities of said defendants,
coincident to
“break-ins” at my offices and theft of various
documents)
were being illegally held by RICO defendants’
lawyers Woodcock,
Kingman, and Winkler of Hackensack, N.J.- upon
information, they
had had a “falling out” with the Dilenas who were contem-
plating litigation against said firm) . Lacey
indicated they (the documents)
would be reviewed and I would be contacted.
After some time had passed,
I inquired as to the status of the investigation and forthcoming
action from said office. I was told that Lacey
was no longer
with said office and that no file or documents
could be located.
I thereupon in or around late 1988, early 1989 delivered by
hand a package to Sam Allito,
then
said inculpating documents, the recipient at
his
office indicating that said documents would be
turned over to
Sam Allito. I was also told once again that I
would be contacted
concerning same. After some time had passed my
inquiry revealed
that Allito had been
moved to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Ciruit and that neither a file nor said
documents could be
located. I thereupon went to the FBI office in
where I was “tauntingly greeted” by an agent
uninterested in
said matter who smurkingly
asked me “whether I was going to
the disco that night”.
F. In filing the subsequent
the interests of the estate and creditors
thereof only to find
a corrupt Shiff
court, and thereupon sought an orderly
liquidation of assets (including three real
properties in N.J.
with substantial equity (approximately $290,000
based on
actual comp. values & bank appraisals)under
a chapter 7 proceeding
in
filed in September, 1989, just prior to the
dismissal of said
Said proceeding was not consummated according to law, and (conflic-
ting) statements that I had been granted a
discharge were given
to an inquiring creditor who subsequently
presented same to
the
to me were listed as assets and were neither
abandoned nor was
a marshalling of assets and distribution
consummated according
to law. Said wrongful, negligent, illegal and
culpable acts
of employees of
the United States of America(‘s) bankruptcy/
federal court (as well as those of
have caused my estate and creditors thereof substantial
damage;
G. A Notice of Federal Tort Claim was served upon then
Attorney General William Barr via Fedex
in late 1991. Having
received no response I filed a R.I.C.O. and
damage action
in the
on April 14, 1992 to preserve (for statute of
limitations
purposes) my contractual claims for sums owed
to me by RICO
defendants Dilena and
companies and for other causes of action
consistent
therewith. The Docket # of said case was 92cv0l66(TGD)
and was assigned to Judge T. Gilroy Daley who
had handled a
substantial organized crime case in said
district. Said case
was stayed owing to the pending bankruptcy
proceeding in the
District of Connecticut where the adversary proceedings focused
primarily, though not exclusively, on the RICO
defendants in
light of the substantial amounts involved and
the position of
same as a substantial asset of the estate. Upon
Judge Daley’s
passing, said matter was transferred in or
around 1995 to Judge
Alvin Thompson and transferred once again to Judge Janet Bond
Arterton in early 1996. Within weeks following the dismissal
with prejudice of those matters (among others)
set forth in
Exhibit “A” annexed hereto, Judge Arterton
dismissed the RICO
action, Dkt. #
92cv0166, without prejudice indicating in her
Order that (it was her understanding) that said matters were being
resolved in the bankruptcy proceeding, viz.,
case # 95-51862
in the District of Connecticut, further
compounding the collusive
and corrupt, wrongful, negligent and illegal
conduct causing
plaintiff
substantial damage. This is especially so given the
fact that many of the subject defendants were
in default on
the verified complaints, with some small
partial settlements effected
with some of said defendants;
H. The use by the Shiff (
conflicting notices of hearing, ie., as set forth in Exhibit “C” is
another way RICO coconspirators acted and
conspired to fraudu-
lently conceal the
various illegal, wrongful, and tortious
acts, including the drug money laundering,
theft of surplus
funds for distribution to the estate and
creditors, as well
as theft of property, both real and personal,
defrauding
plaintiff and
creditor’s of plaintiff’s estate. The San Bern-
adino Court also
similarly used such ploy regarding a hearing
noticed for 9-9-95 when in fact same was
actually 9-7-95.
I. The dismissal with prejudice by Alan Shiff, bankruptcy
court judge in the district of Connecticut, of
adversary
proceedings on 12-5-96, all meritorious
including some for
which the entry of default/default judgment was
appropriate,
some without defense, defrauding plaintiff and
creditors thereby,
in violation of the RICO Act and the commission
of a predicate
act thereunder; as
well as to cover-up said predicate acts and
other crimes within the ambit of RICO and under
State and
Federal law, constituting misprision of
felony thereby.
J. J. Matz
in
Judge, in 1999 did fraudulently misrepresent the record of
proceedings, obstructing justice thereby, and
to cover-up
predicate acts under RICO among other crimes,
committing
misprision of felony thereby. [FEDEX Corp. is
also in contempt
of a subpoena regarding transmissions by
plaintiff to Attorneys
General (former) Barr and
sanctions/enforcement].
FIRST COUNT – RICO
28. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the averments contained in paragraphs 1 through
27 as if set forth at length herein.
29. At
all times relevant hereto, plaintiff was a “person” within the meaning of RICO,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c).
30. At all times relevant
hereto, defendants Richard M. Coan, Timothy Miltenberger,
Whitney Lewendon, Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger,
LLC., John Doe Surety 1 and John Doe
Insurer 2, and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Connecticut were “persons” within the meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and
1964(c).
31. At all relevant times, defendants Richard M. Coan,
Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon,
and Coan, Lewendon,
Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC.,
and the
32. At all relevant times, this enterprise was engaged in, and its
activities affected, interstate and foreign commerce, within the meaning of
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
33. At all relevant times, defendants Richard M. Coan,
Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon,
and Coan, Lewendon,
Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC., the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut and the other conspirators
associated with this enterprise, conducted or participated, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of this enterprise's affairs through a "pattern
of racketeering activity" within the meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5),
in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Specifically, Defendant Richard M. Coan, in his capacity as successor plaintiff was ordered by
the court to file papers consistent with his capacity and duty as successor
plaintiff and Trustee, in a number of adversary proceedings brought by
debtor/plaintiff herein for which the entry of default had been requested and
the entry of default judgment appropriate inasmuch as proper service had been
made with some matters being without defense, ie.,
properties (outside the state of Connecticut, ie.,
New Jersey) sold during the pendency of the automatic
stay pursuant to §362 of Title 11, U.S.C., unaccounted for substantial funds
(in New Jersey) generated from said wrongful acts, theft of personalty/business
assets (in California, New Jersey, and Connecticut), loss of rents (in New
Jersey, California, and Connecticut), among other causes and damages, including
a substantial fraud on debtor/plaintiff herein perpetrated by R.I.C.O.
defendants/co-conspirators involved in laundering drug money through the Trump
(of New York) casinos (in New Jersey) along with other criminal activities
covered by and violative of federal law. All of said
matters were meritorious, substantial, some without defense, as well as some
for which partial settlements and/or payments had been made. Defendant Richard
M. Coan, in his capacity as Trustee, and Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC., thereby, and to cover-up various
criminal activities including, inter alia, illegal
drug money laundering, bribery, fraud, theft, other violations of federal law
including §362 of Title 11, U.S.C., and
the illegal, wrongful and culpable failure to conclude the 1989 Virginia
Chapter 7 proceeding under Title 11 in accordance with federal law, among
others, wrongfully, negligently, and culpably failed to file any document whatsoever.
34. At all relevant times, defendants Richard M. Coan,
Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon,
and Coan, Lewendon,
Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC., the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut and the other conspirators engaged
in “racketeering activity" within the meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
by engaging in the acts set forth above. The acts set forth above constitute a
violation of one or more of the following statutes:
bankruptcy fraud [Title 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D)], obstruction of justice, [Title 18 U.S.C. § 1503] , offenses
involving fraud connected with a case under Title 11 U.S.C. [Title 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(D)], extortion[Title 18 U.S.C. § 1951] , mail fraud [Title 18 U.S.C. §
1341], bribery [Title 18 U.S.C. § 201], retaliation against a witness
/victim/informant [Title 18 U.S.C. § 1513], and racketeering [Title 18 U.S.C. §
1952] .
35. Defendants Richard M. Coan, Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon, Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC., the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Connecticut and the other conspirators each committed and/or
aided and abetted the commission of two or more of these acts of racketeering
activity.
36. The acts of racketeering activity referred to in the preceding
paragraph constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity" within the
meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The acts alleged were related to each
other by virtue of common participants, a common victim (plaintiff Albert L. Peia), a common method of commission, and the common
purpose and common result of damaging/defrauding plaintiff and benefitting/enriching the conspirators to plaintiff’s
detriment while concealing the conspirators’ fraudulent/wrongful
activities/conduct. The aforesaid defendants/conspirators and defendant Coan since becoming Chapter 7 trustee in May, 1996, have
continued their fraudulent scheme, attempting to evade legal process and
accountability for their wrongful and illegal conduct.
37. As a result of defendant Coan’s
and the other Conspirators’ violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), plaintiff has
been damaged in his business and property as a direct consequence of said
offenses involving fraud connected with a case under Title 11, U.S.C..
38. As a result of their misconduct, defendants Richard M. Coan, Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon, Coan,
Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC., are liable to plaintiff for damages in an
amount to be determined at trial.
39. Pursuant to RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), plaintiff is entitled to
recover threefold his damages plus costs plus reasonable attorneys’ fees from
the aforesaid defendants.
SECOND COUNT – RICO CONSPIRACY
40. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the
averments contained in paragraphs 1 through 39 as if set forth at length
herein.
41. At all times relevant hereto, defendants Richard M. Coan, Timothy Miltenberger,
Whitney Lewendon, Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger,
LLC., John Doe Surety 1 and John Doe Insurer 2, and the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut were “persons” within the
meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1964(c).
42. At all relevant times, defendants Richard M. Coan,
Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon,
and Coan, Lewendon,
Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC.,
and the
43. At all relevant times, this enterprise was engaged in, and its
activities affected, interstate and foreign commerce, within the meaning of
RICO,18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
44. At all relevant times, defendants Timothy Miltenberger,
Whitney Lewendon, and Coan,
Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger,
LLC., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, and
the other conspirators associated with this enterprise, conducted or
participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of this enterprise's
affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activity" within the
meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c).
45. At all relevant times, defendants Richard M. Coan,
Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon,Coan,
Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger,
LLC., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, and
the other conspirators each were associated with the enterprise and agreed and
conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), that is, conduct and participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
46. Defendants Richard M. Coan, Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon,Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver,
and Miltenberger, LLC., and the other conspirators
committed and caused to be committed a series of overt acts in furtherance of
the conspiracy and to affect the objects thereof, including but not limited to
the acts set forth above.
47. As a result of defendant Coan
and the other Conspirators’ violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), plaintiff has
been damaged in his business and property.
48. As a result of the conspiracy, defendants Richard M. Coan, Timothy Miltenberger, Whitney Lewendon, Coan,
Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger, LLC., are liable to plaintiff for damages in an
amount to be determined at trial.
49. Pursuant to RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), plaintiff is entitled to
recover threefold his damages plus costs plus reasonable attorneys’ fees from
the aforesaid defendants.
THIRD COUNT -
NEGLIGENCE/BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
50. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the
averments contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 as if set forth at length
herein.
51. On or about May 1, 1996, defendant Richard M. Coan
succeeded to the interests of the estate of plaintiff herein in his capacity as
Chapter 7 Trustee, said case having originated under Chapter 13 of Title 11,
U.S.C., and designated as Case No. 95-51862, United States Bankruptcy Court, in
the District of Connecticut.
52. At all times relevant hereto, Richard M. Coan
had a fiduciary duty to said estate, creditors thereof including the U.S.
government, which duty he breached through
wrongful and otherwise negligent and culpable conduct.
53. To wit, Richard M. Coan, in his capacity
as successor plaintiff was ordered by the court to file papers consistent with
his capacity and duty as successor plaintiff and Trustee, in a number of
adversary proceedings brought by debtor/plaintiff herein for which the entry of
default had been requested and the entry of default judgment appropriate
inasmuch as proper service had been made with some matters being without
defense, ie., properties (outside the state of
Connecticut, ie., New Jersey) sold during the pendency of the automatic stay pursuant to §362 of Title
11, U.S.C., unaccounted for substantial funds (in New Jersey) generated from
said wrongful acts, theft of personalty/business
assets (in California, New Jersey, and Connecticut), loss of rents (in New
Jersey, California, and Connecticut), among other causes and damages, including
a substantial fraud on debtor/plaintiff herein perpetrated by R.I.C.O.
defendants/co-conspirators involved in laundering drug money through the Trump
(of New York) casinos (in New Jersey) along with other criminal activities covered
by and violative of federal law.
54. All of said matters were meritorious, substantial, some without
defense, as well as some for which partial settlements and/or payments had been
made.
55. Richard M. Coan, in his capacity as
Trustee and to cover-up various criminal activities including, inter alia, illegal drug money laundering, bribery, fraud,
theft, other violations of federal law including §362 of Title 11, U.S.C., and the
illegal, wrongful and culpable failure to conclude the 1989 Virginia Chapter 7
proceeding under Title 11 in accordance with federal law, among others,
wrongfully, negligently, and culpably failed to file any document whatsoever.
56. As a direct consequence of the aforesaid negligent, wrongful and
culpable breaches of fiduciary duty the subject adversary proceedings were
dismissed with prejudice as set forth in Exhibit “A“, annexed hereto and
incorporated herein by reference thereto, causing and resulting in great damage
to plaintiff herein.
57. Defendant Richard M. Coan is liable to
plaintiff for the damages caused by said negligent, wrongful and culpable
breaches of fiduciary duty, in amounts compensatory and punitive, to be
determined at trial.
FOURTH COUNT - FRAUD AND
AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD
58. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the
averments contained in paragraphs 1 through 57 as if set forth at length
herein.
59. Defendants aided and abetted the
aforesaid fraud inasmuch
as
(1) they were associated with the wrongful conduct;
(2) participated in it with intent to bring it about; and
(3) sought by their actions to make it succeed, which efforts
continue to this day and are a sham and fraud upon the court causing plaintiff
damage thereby.
60. As a result of defendants’ and the other
coconspirators’ aiding and abetting the aforesaid fraud and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),
plaintiff has been damaged in his business and property as a direct consequence
of said offenses involving fraud connected with a case under Title 11, U.S.C..
61. As a result of their misconduct, aiding and abetting the aforesaid
fraud and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),
defendants are liable to plaintiff for damages in an amount to be determined at
trial.
FIFTH COUNT – JOHN DOE
SURETY 1 AND JOHN DOE INSURER 2 /
CONTRACT
62. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the averments contained in paragraphs 1 through 61 as if set forth at
length herein.
63. At all times relevant hereto defendants JOHN DOE SURETY 1 AND JOHN
DOE INSURER 2 provided contracts/policies of surety/insurance insuring
defendants herein for the types of culpably wrongful conduct as set forth and
documented under penalty of perjury herein.
64. Plaintiff at all times relevant hereto was a third-party
beneficiary of the contracts/policies of surety/insurance insuring defendants
herein.
65. Despite reasonable diligence and inquiry,
plaintiff has been able to discern only the existence of said applicable coverages, but not the names of the subject companies
providing same.
66. At all times relevant hereto,
defendants JOHN DOE SURETY 1 AND JOHN DOE INSURER 2 are in technical
though not, upon information and belief, willful breach of said
contracts/policies of surety/insurance insuring defendants herein for the types
of culpably wrongful conduct as set forth and documented under penalty of
perjury herein.
67. As a direct consequence of the aforesaid breaches of contract
plaintiff has sustained substantial damages as set forth herein.
68. Defendants JOHN DOE SURETY 1 AND JOHN DOE INSURER 2 are liable to
plaintiff for the damages caused by said breaches of contract in amounts to be
determined at trial.
SIXTH COUNT -
JOHN DOES 3 - 10
69. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the
averments contained in paragraphs 1 through 68 as if set forth at length herein.
70. At all relevant times, plaintiff has been reasonably diligent but
unable to discern other co-conspirators owing to the culpable cover-ups and
culpably wrongful conduct as set forth and documented under penalty of perjury
herein.
71. At all relevant times, defendants
JOHN DOES 3 – 10 along with the other conspirators associated with the
subject enterprise, conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of the subject enterprise's
affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activity" within the
meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c).
72. Defendants JOHN DOES 3 – 10 aided and
abetted the aforesaid violations of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and fraud inasmuch as (1) they were
associated with the wrongful conduct (2)
participated in it with intent to bring it about and (3) sought by their
actions to make it succeed, which efforts continue to this day and are a sham
and fraud upon the court causing plaintiff damage thereby.
73. As a result of defendants JOHN DOES 3 – 10 and other Conspirators’ violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c), plaintiff has been damaged in his business and property as a
direct consequence of said offenses involving fraud connected with a case under
Title 11, U.S.C..
74. As a result of their misconduct, defendants JOHN DOES 3 – 10 are
liable to plaintiff for damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
75. Pursuant to RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), plaintiff is entitled to
recover threefold his damages plus costs plus reasonable attorneys’ fees from
the aforesaid defendants JOHN DOES 3 – 10.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff
prays for judgment against defendants for:
(A) compensatory damages in the amount of $5 million ($5,000,000),
trebled pursuant
to
RICO;
(B) punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
(C) costs, fees, and other expenses, including attorney's fees, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §
1964(c);
(D) such other and further relief as may be just and proper.
Albert L. Peia, Pro Se
DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL
I, Albert L. Peia, plaintiff in the within action hereby demand trial by
jury.
Albert L. Peia, Pro Se
CERTIFICATION AND
VERIFICATION
I, Albert L. Peia,
hereby certify that the averments in the foregoing Complaint are
true under penalty of perjury.
Albert L. Peia, Pro Se