

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 00583104 5



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation



Very truly yours,
William H. Hinkley

THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR

A History by
THE WAR LEADERS

ILLUSTRATED
With numerous original engravings, maps and diagrams



NORWICH, CONN
CHAS. C. HASKELL & SON

22 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND, LONDON, ENGLAND
GAY & BIRD

1899

286451
28-4-33

COPYRIGHT, 1899, BY
CHAS. C. HASKELL & SON.


REGISTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL, LONDON, ENGLAND.

All rights reserved.

Half-tone Plates by
Walker Eng. Co.

Printed in U. S. A.





Alfred L. Woodford

INTRODUCTION.

BY

GEN. STEWART L. WOODFORD, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Spain.

IT is an honor which I deeply appreciate to be asked to write these introductory words to such a noteworthy collection of papers as this volume contains.

The island of Cuba suffered during many years from unrest, disorder and civil war. For about half the time between 1868 and 1898 it was the theatre of struggles which wasted its resources and destroyed nearly one quarter of its population. So continuous had been these struggles and so dreadful their results that in our last Presidential canvass both our great political parties practically pledged themselves to such action by our Government as should restore order and compel peace in Cuba. Spain was three thousand miles distant and Cuba was less than one hundred miles from our coast. The burden and the duty of humanity were upon us, and our people of all sections and all parties recognized this duty and accepted this burden.

In March, 1897, President McKinley was inaugurated. As soon as the more pressing needs of internal administration and revenue legislation had been met, he addressed himself to the settlement of the Cuban question. He recognized that it was, in the largest and broadest sense, a national question and was not to be considered and solved upon partisan considerations or through party agencies alone. He retained at Havana as Consul-General a distinguished Democrat, appointed to

that pivotal post by President Cleveland. This was Fitzhugh Lee, who had been a gallant soldier of the Confederacy during our own Civil War and after that war a Governor of Virginia. He sent as Minister to Madrid a citizen of New York, who had served in the Union Army and who was in his personal politics a Republican. The new American Minister started for his post on the 28th of July, 1897. Shortly after his arrival at London, he learned of the assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister, Señor Canovas. There were short delays at London and Paris, and on the 1st of September the American representative reached San Sebastian, where the Queen Regent of Spain was holding her summer Court. His formal presentation to Her Majesty soon followed, and his negotiations with the Spanish Government in relation to Cuba were promptly begun. Those negotiations, whether oral or written, were, from the beginning to the end, straightforward, open and direct and were conducted on the lines of what has come to be known as the "New American Diplomacy." At the outset the American Minister authorized the Spanish Government to publish freely and fully whatever communication he should make to them.

The instructions of the President were firm, yet friendly, and were sincerely in behalf of justice and peace. Those instructions the American Minister sought to carry out to the best of his ability. When war at last came, it was because war was inevitable. The President had done all that a strong and wise man could do for peace, with justice to Cuba and with due regard to the great American interests in that island. At the beginning the President sought the establishment of those conditions in Cuba which should make permanent peace possible and tendered to Spain the good offices of the United States for securing this result. That offer was unfortunately never accepted.

The first formal note from the American Minister was delivered on the 23rd of September. Within a few days thereafter the members of the Spanish Conservative Cabinet resigned. They were succeeded early in October by a Liberal Ministry under the presidency of Señor Sagasta. This seemed a distinct gain for the cause of peace.

General Weyler had been in absolute command of Cuba since the spring of 1896. It was generally understood that he had received assurance from the Spanish Government that he should be given at least two years, or until the spring of 1898, within which to work out his own policy of suppressing the Cuban insurrection. His administration as Captain-General in Cuba was not acceptable to the conscience of the American people and was disapproved by American public opinion. His well-known *bandos* or military decrees, in regard to the *reconcentrados* and the export of tobacco, were believed by our people to be directly responsible for much of the horrible suffering then known to exist in Cuba. I did not then believe and I do not now believe that it would have been possible to keep peace between Spain and the United States until Christmas, 1897, had General Weyler remained in command of Cuba until that Christmas. The change of Ministry therefore seemed to me at the time a distinct gain in the interest of peace.

Señor Sagasta during the preceding month of June, before the assassination of Señor Canovas and while Sagasta was only the leader of a party out of power, had issued a proclamation or manifesto in the name of the Liberal Party. In this document he had discussed very freely and fully the condition of affairs in Cuba and had promised, if the Liberal Party were again entrusted with the Government of Spain, that General Weyler should be recalled and that an enlarged and efficient system of autonomy should be established in

Cuba. The Sagasta Ministry came in. General Weyler was recalled. Decrees granting enlarged autonomy were prepared and promulgated.

The President dwelt upon these things in his message to our Congress when that body met in December, 1897, and expressed his earnest hope that humane methods of warfare and sincere and effective autonomy might bring rest, order and enduring peace in Cuba.

The American Government and people waited with patient benevolence. Meanwhile the war continued. Order was not restored in the rural districts. The disease was too deeply rooted. It was the result of methods four centuries old, and mutual distrust and hatred could not be eradicated or even assuaged in weeks or months. Possibly they may not be in years. The camps of the *reconcentrados* were not broken up. Disease and starvation kept on in their deadly work of decimating the people. Peace did not come, and the necessity for action by the United States grew each day more evident and more imperative.

Then occurred an incident which had immediate, serious and far-reaching effect. Some time during the winter, a private letter from the then Spanish Minister at Washington to a prominent Spaniard, who was visiting Cuba, was discovered at Havana. It was published by the American press and its authenticity was admitted by its writer. It contained expressions of opinion with regard to autonomy and concerning our President which caused natural, immediate and widespread doubt among many of our most conservative people, whether Spain was acting with sincerity and in good faith in this vital matter of autonomy. These suspicions may have been unjust, but they were natural and even inevitable. So far as the Sagasta Ministry and her Majesty the Queen Regent were concerned I am sure that they were unjust. I

believe that both the Ministry and the Queen Regent tried loyally and in good faith to grant and enforce such autonomy as they thought would secure peace and order. This statement is due to them and to history. In practice the autonomy which they offered proved insufficient. Revolutions never go backward, and events in Cuba were not to be an exception to this historic rule. But if the trusted representative of Spain at Washington thought what he wrote about autonomy, it was natural and inevitable for all Americans to fear that the Spanish authorities in Cuba might think the same and that thus in practice autonomy might prove a delusion and a snare. The mischief had been done, and a grave element of doubt and distrust had been added to a situation already very tense and difficult. One private letter from a public man seems a little matter but there is large truth and enduring application in the old adage that "it is the last straw which breaks the camel's back."

The Spanish Minister at Washington at once telegraphed his resignation to his Government at Madrid. He did this before any communication had been received by our Minister at Madrid from our Government at Washington. Immediately on receiving a communication from our Government, the American Minister sought an interview with the Spanish Foreign Office, but before such interview was accorded, the Spanish Government had accepted the resignation of the Spanish Minister at Washington. Serious interviews and correspondence followed, and finally the Spanish Government made representations and explanations of such a character that they were accepted as being full and ample reparation, and this unfortunate and untimely incident was diplomatically declared to be satisfactorily closed. But the mischief had been done and its evil effect remained to the end.

Meanwhile there had been a second and far more serious

matter, and one whose seriousness was aggravated by what had just occurred. The United States Steamer *Maine* had gone on a friendly visit to the Harbor of Havana. The Spanish cruiser *Vizcaya* had been ordered on a return visit of courtesy to the Port of New York. On the night of February 15, while anchored in the Harbor of Havana, at a buoy, indicated by the Spanish authorities, and while under the protection which the ships of a friendly Government are entitled to enjoy from the Government in whose waters they lie, the steamer *Maine* was blown up and destroyed with the loss of 266 of our sailors. In the excited and tense condition of public opinion there came at once the horrible suspicion of foul play and of an external cause for the awful catastrophe. With a wisdom that cannot be too highly commended, Captain Sigsbee at once telegraphed the Navy Department reporting the loss of his vessel and asking suspension of judgment as to its cause. The American people are just and waited to know the facts before they should form a final opinion and fix the responsibility. A Naval Court of Inquiry was ordered, and the report of that body was that the explosion of the ill-fated *Maine* was due to external causes. If any doubt still remained, that doubt was finally and forever removed when the phenomena of the internal explosions of iron-clad war-vessels were so clearly shown in the Spanish ships which were run ashore in the sea fight off Santiago Harbor and which, having been set on fire, were destroyed by the explosion of their own magazines. The ribs of these vessels were bent outward, while the ribs of the *Maine* were bent inward.

Negotiations continued, but the end was drawing nigh. Patriotic people and thoughtful people sought peace. The Queen at Madrid and the President at Washington were alike earnest in their desire and in their efforts for peace. The

Spanish Government had recalled General Weyler, and had offered as large autonomy to Cuba as military and political opinion in Spain would permit. It was the misfortune of Spain that Spanish statesmen did not believe that they could do or ought to do the only things that would have assured peace. Those things were the declaration and enforcement of an immediate armistice and the prompt taking of steps looking to the removal of the Spanish flag from Cuba. According to the best judgment I could then form, the leaders of Spanish opinion believed that the granting of independence to Cuba meant immediate and possibly successful revolution in Spain. They chose between war with us and the overthrow of the Alphonso Dynasty. It might be possible to have war with us and thereby lose Cuba and yet save the Dynasty. While, should Spain grant freedom to Cuba, she must lose the Island and possibly her King. It is not for me, a stranger to Spain and an American, to decide as to the wisdom or unwisdom of this judgment. Whatever any may have thought then, it is now evident that no compromise as to Cuba was possible. The forces bred and born of four centuries of Spanish rule and of nearly three centuries of American neighborhood and example were at work. Cuba could not remain Spanish. She must become independent or American, and war was the last and only possible solution.

As I look back I can see that the incident of the *Maine*, coming close on the heels of the discovered letter, created conditions which made peaceful solution practically impossible. I did not then so believe. I did then believe that immediate and effective armistice would be followed by such negotiations as would secure local independence and the final and peaceful removal of the Spanish flag from Cuba. Whether this belief was right or wrong I did not succeed in obtaining such armistice in time to be of any effect. The

wishes of the American Government, as finally presented on March 29, did not receive satisfactory reply in the final and formal interview with Ministers Sagasta, Gullon and Moret on March 31, and, in accordance with the directly expressed purpose of our President, the entire Cuban question was shortly laid by him before Congress.

What was done thereafter is matter of public history. On the nineteenth of April, 1898, Congress took final action. Its resolutions were approved by the President on April 20, and a copy was at once communicated by our Secretary of State to the Spanish Minister at Washington. This latter official immediately asked for his passports and left Washington en route for Canada. A copy of these resolutions with appropriate instruction was telegraphed in open English and not in cipher to the American Minister at Madrid. He received this telegram at half-past two o'clock on the morning of April 21. At half-past seven o'clock on that morning he received the following note from the Spanish Foreign Office. As this note has been published by the Spanish Government in their official Red Book of April, 1898, it can be given here without any violation of diplomatic usage or courtesy.

Extract from Spanish Red Book, page 198:—

EL MINISTRO DE ESTADO
AL MINISTRO PLENIPOTENCIARIO
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS.

PALACIO, 21 de Abril de 1898.

EXCMO SEÑOR :
MUY SEÑOR MIO :

En cumplimiento de un penoso deber, tengo la honra de participar a V. E. que, sancionada por el Presidente de la Republica una Resolucion de ambas Cáma-

ras de los Estados Unidos que, al negar la legitima soberania de España y amenazar con una inmediata intervención armada en la Isla de Cuba, equivale á una evidente declaración de guerra, el Gobierno de S. M. ha ordenado á su Ministro en Washington que se retire, sin pérdida de tiempo, del territorio norte-americano, con todo el personal de la Legación.

Por este hecho quedan interrumpidas las relaciones diplomáticas que de antiguo existian entre los dos paises, cesando toda comunicación oficial entre sus respectivos Representantes, y me apresuro á ponerlo en conocimiento de V. E. á fin de que adopte por su parte las disposiciones que crea convenientes.

Ruego al propio tiempo á V. E. se sirva acusarme recibo de esta Nota, y aprovecho, etc.

Firmado : PIO GULLON.

It is translated as follows :—

THE MINISTER OF STATE :
TO THE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY
OF THE UNITED STATES.

PALACE, April 21, 1898.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR :
MY DEAR SIR :

In fulfilment of a painful duty, I have the honor to make known to Your Excellency that, a resolution of both Houses (Chambers) of the United States, having been approved by the President of the Republic, which, by denying the legitimate sovereignty of Spain and by threatening with an immediate armed intervention in the island of Cuba, is equivalent to an open (evident) declaration of war, the Government of his Majesty has ordered his Minister in Washington to withdraw without loss of time, from the North American territory, with all the members of the Legation.

By this fact the Diplomatic relations, which from of old have existed between the two countries, are found to be interrupted, all official communication between their respec-

tive representatives ceasing, and I press myself to put this in the knowledge of Your Excellency to the end that you may adopt on your part the arrangements which you may believe convenient.

I ask at the same time that Your Excellency may be pleased to acknowledge to me the receipt of this note, and I avail, etc.

(Signed) PIO GULLON.


Spain had thus deliberately decided that the passage of the resolutions by Congress and their approval by the President constituted an Act of open war (*evidente guerra*) and had broken off diplomatic relations between the two countries. As it had been the duty and the desire of the American Minister to do for peace all that was possible, so long as anything was possible, so now it was his duty to act promptly as the honor of his country required. He accepted at once the challenge to arms which the Spanish Government had tendered; asked for his passports; received them at one o'clock that afternoon, and at four o'clock started by express train for Paris. The Spanish authorities showed him all possible courtesy on leaving and furnished him with an efficient military escort to the French frontier. Except for slight disorders by a mob at Valladolid and an unsuccessful attempt to arrest his chief clerk before reaching the frontier, his journey from Madrid to Paris was pleasant and free from annoying incidents.

The war which followed lasted but little more than a hundred days. It has sometimes been compared to Napoleon's hundred days in Italy. But the resemblance is only in duration of time. Napoleon did not greatly change the map of Europe for more than twenty years. The war with Spain has changed the map and the future of the world forever.

That the final results of this war will be of real blessing to

Spain, I firmly believe. She has marvelous opportunities. Her area embraces many varieties of soil and climate. Indian maize and the potato grow in the Basque Provinces and the orange and the olive on the shores of the Mediterranean while grapes are abundant everywhere. Her hills are rich with iron, quicksilver, silver and gold. Her wheat fields were the granary of Rome centuries ago and are, with like irrigation, as fertile to-day. On the Bay of Biscay, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean she has a coast line of nearly three thousand miles with sufficient and good harbors. The peasant population are singularly patient, industrious, frugal and even abstemiously temperate. When they shall secure actual freedom and just opportunities for general education, Spain should again become one of the most productive countries of Europe. She ought also to be a successful manufacturing and commercial nation.

I shall never forget the many acts of kindness and courtesy everywhere and always received, alike from the Court and from the plain people of Spain, and now that the war is over and peace has come, I pray most earnestly that happiness and prosperity may be and abide upon the people and the land of Columbus.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Thomas L. Woodford". The signature is written in dark ink and features a large, sweeping flourish at the beginning that extends across the top of the line.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER.	PAGE.
INTRODUCTION, <i>Gen. Stewart L. Woodford.</i>	3
I. HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS, <i>Brig.-Gen. Carlos Garcia.</i>	17
II. CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895 TO 1898, <i>Brig.-Gen. Carlos Garcia.</i>	45
III. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE, <i>Lieut. Geo. F. W. Holman, U. S. N.</i>	91
IV. THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY, <i>Lieut. C. G. Calkins, U. S. N.</i>	103
V. STATEMENT OF THE SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC, <i>Francis Kelly, U. S. S. New York, Flagship.</i>	129
VI. THE STORY OF THE TEXAS, <i>Cyrus S. Radford, Lieut. U. S. Marines.</i> <i>R. K. Crank, Asst. Engineer, U. S. N.</i>	143
VII. THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, <i>Capt. Robley D. Evans, U. S. N.</i>	155
VIII. THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON, <i>Lieut. W. H. Allen, U. S. N.</i>	165
IX. THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN, <i>Maj.-Gen. Wm. R. Shafter, U. S. V.</i>	179
X. MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO, <i>Capt. Henry H. Whitney, A. A. G.</i>	199
XI. THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA, <i>Capt. H. C. Taylor, U. S. N.</i>	219
XII. THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII, <i>Hon. Shelby M. Cullom.</i>	239
XIII. THE MANILA CAMPAIGN, <i>Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A.</i>	263

CHAPTER.	PAGE.
XIV. { THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT, <i>Hon. Perry S. Heath.</i>	281
XV. WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE, <i>Hon. J. W. Daniel.</i>	297
XVI. PROVIDING THE "SINEWS OF WAR," <i>Hon. Nelson Dingley.</i>	325
XVII. THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR, <i>Hon. John D. Long.</i>	339
XVIII. WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT, <i>Hon. Lyman J. Gage.</i>	367
XIX. U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO, <i>Maj.-Gen. Leonard Wood, U. S. V.</i>	393
XX. THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION, <i>Gen. T. Estrada Palma.</i>	403
XXI. THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR, <i>Hon. John E. Wilkie.</i>	423
XXII. WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR, <i>Mrs. Amos G. Draper.</i>	437
XXIII. ARMY AND NAVY CHRISTIAN COMMISSION, <i>Maj.-Gen. O. O. Howard.</i>	457
XXIV. THE TREATY OF PEACE, <i>Hon. John Bassett Moore.</i>	471
XXV. { WHAT ENGLAND FEELS, <i>Hon. Justin McCarthy, M. P.</i>	487
XXVI. THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE, <i>Maj.-Gen. Nelson A. Miles.</i>	509
ADDENDUM, <i>Speech of Senator Redfield Proctor.</i>	541
APPENDIX, <i>Messages, State Papers, etc.</i>	555
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.	599



Carlos Garcia Vela
Coronel de E. M.
General de Brigada 1.º pto.
E. L. 6

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS.

BY

CARLOS GARCIA VELEZ, Brigadier-General

SINCE Columbus discovered Cuba, in October, 1492, that beautiful Island of the world has been unceasingly the arena of a wonderful struggle for freedom.

It is strange that Spain should have treated the natives of all her extensive colonies with equal cruel barbarism, since the Spanish people are not prejudiced against marrying and mingling with all sorts of races. All the famous Spanish captains married native women, regardless of birth or color, as soon as they arrived at the colonies, and certainly the soldiers followed their example. Thus the colonies, after some generations, were composed of Indians, Creoles and Spaniards. The first of these people, Aborigines, were the real owners of the land; the second, descendants of native women and Spaniards; the third, new employees and officials, mostly adventurers of the worst class, who kept coming from Spain.

In Cuba the native Siboney Indian was a good type of a physically well-developed race, with amiable and innocent character, hospitable and graceful. In 1511, Columbus's son sent 300 men, with Velazquez commanding, to take possession of the Island. The Spaniards never employed kindness or diplomacy to gain control over the natives, but by brutal force established Spanish sovereignty, trampling on their natural rights and slaughtering those who resented their domination. The Indian Siboney Chief Hatuey preferred to die at the stake rather than submit to Velazquez's tyranny. When Hatuey was dying, a Catholic priest approached him and talked about the Almighty in Heaven, and urged him to pre-

pare his soul for the other world. The noble Chief had listened attentively to the priest's exhortation, but suddenly he asked him if in Heaven he would find any Spaniards? To which the priest replied—"Oh, yes!" "Then, father," Hatuey said, "I would rather go to Hell."

The Indian slave trade was, from the outset, established in the markets of Spain. Thousands were carried away from their country to distant climes, and thousands were butchered in the Island, to plunder them of their property. It is estimated that over half a million perished thus in a short term of years, and Cuba was rapidly depopulated. About this time, Philip the second, the great monster and tyrant of the Escorial, issued, through his counsel, fourteen laws for the government of the Indians. To augment the decreasing population of Cuba, it was determined to take Africans there, and the barbarous slave trade was established and carried on until the latter part of the fifties of this century. Otherwise there was no intercourse between Cuba and other parts of the world. She was kept intellectually and commercially isolated under the absorptive power of colonizing Spanish officers.

In the last third of the sixteenth century, a Captain-General was ordered to the Island. From that time until recent years, the most despotic military rule has prevailed. According to the personal characters of the different Spanish commanders, so was it governed well or ill, as it happened.

What marks a great change in Cuba's inhabitants is the opening of the port of Havana to foreign trade in 1762. The English attacked and captured the city from the Spanish and immediately opened its port to commerce. This brought the Cubans in contact with the world, particularly with the United States; and although the city was a year later surrendered to the Spaniards, who lost no time in re-establishing the old system, the seed had been sown, and the well-to-do natives began to send their children to American schools and colleges, for in Cuba there were no suitable ones. The Government of Madrid, advised of this tendency among the rich classes to educate their children in foreign countries of different institutions and customs from the effete Castilian type, published in the *Gaceta* of Madrid, in 1799, a Royal Decree

ordering that all Cuban parents should be advised and persuaded not to send their children away, on the ground that only evil consequences could be expected from it.

Charles IV, King of Spain, busy with his hunting parties at El Pardo, did not believe that the people should be taught anything to their benefit, and his obliging and perfidious Ministers took good care to encourage his hunting mania, so as to be more at ease in managing government affairs. In 1808, Spain was invaded by the armies of Napoleon and the King and Royal family were held prisoners in France. The Spanish people named a National Junta that should take the place of their sporting King, and, in 1810, the Junta issued a decree convening the Cortes, authorizing and directing the people of Spanish possessions in America to elect deputies to represent them.

Cuba sent two representatives. A Constitution was adopted by the Cortes of Cadiz, in 1812, the first article of which declared that the Spanish nation was composed of all the Spaniards of both hemispheres and that all the inhabitants of those countries were entitled to representation in the Cortes. The war to liberate themselves from the French was waging, and the Spanish people fought hard and bravely for their Independence. It could hardly be expected that such people should deny to the Cubans what they so dearly cherished for themselves! The cynical and treacherous Fernando VII was put on the throne in 1814, and his first act of sovereignty was to abolish the Constitution. Six years later he was compelled to re-establish it, and then Cuba elected and sent to the Cortes four deputies.

Again Fernando suppressed the Constitution in 1823. Naturally, all the provinces and colonies became irritated because of the King's despotism, and conspiracies began to be the Cubans' only hope for throwing off the yoke of such a ruler. Local passions were greatly excited also on account of the unconditional partiality and extremely unjust policy observed by the Government, protecting, as it did, the corrupted Spanish monopolists against the interests of the people. In that same year, 1823, a conspiracy was betrayed to the Spanish authorities at Santiago, and the famous Cuban poet Heredia, one of

the conspirators, was exiled for life, sentenced by the Audiencia of that city.

The King trusted only in coercive power to maintain the integrity of the Spanish dominions. On the 28th of March, 1825, the *Gaceta de Madrid* published the following Royal Decree :

“ His Majesty the King, our Señor, desiring to obviate the inconveniences which might result in extraordinary cases from a division of command and from the interference of powers and prerogatives of the respective officers, for the important end of preserving in that precious Island his legitimate sovereign authority and public tranquillity through proper means, has resolved, in accordance with the opinion of his Council of Ministers, to give to your Excellency the fullest authority, bestowing upon you all the powers which by the Royal Ordinances are granted to the Governors of besieged cities. In consequence of this, his Majesty gives to your Excellency the most complete and unbounded power, not only to send away from the Island any persons in office, whatever be their occupation, rank, class or condition, whose conduct, public or private, may alarm you, replacing them with persons faithful to his Majesty and deserving of all the confidence of your Excellency; but also to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever, or any general provision made concerning any branch of the Administration, as your Excellency may think most suitable to the Royal Service.”

Thus Fernando VII placed in Cuba a man invested with power to dispose of life and property,—that is, his representative; for in Spain, although the Royal Decree was not enforced, still the King put to death thousands of people arbitrarily and without the knowledge of the courts of justice. And, consider, such an infamous document as that Decree has been in full force in the Island of Cuba until these very civilized days, for it had not been revoked when the late war broke out on the 24th of February, 1895. It seemed as if in issuing the Decree, the Crown predicted the loss of the ever-faithful Island forever to Spain, for in that same year, the United States of America refused to guarantee Spain the perpetual possession of Cuba in exchange for commercial concessions.

In 1826, Francisco Agüero revolted with a small number of

men. All were captured and paid with their lives the penalty of daring to repulse the Captain-General's despotism. From that date, the Cubans have not rested one moment from working and fighting for their independence; uprisings, revolts, conspiracies and revolutions have year after year burst out, to be quenched in a bloody, barbarous manner by the Spaniards.

The higher classes were greatly annoyed in 1828 with another Decree, issued by the King, ordering that all students then abroad should be at once called back to Cuba, that parents disobeying it should be punished, and that all those having received education in the North should be held in surveillance by the police and a careful record be kept of their opinions and movements. That year there was an uprising; in 1830 another, and in 1834 the Madrid Government sent, as Captain-General of Cuba, General Tacon, a man of energetic temper. He proved to be a despotic and brutal ruler, who did his utmost to establish differences of classes. He made two divisions of the inhabitants; those that were born in the Peninsula he called *Españoles* and those born in the Island, he termed *Cubaños*. He sustained the idea that these *Cubaños* were inferior people to the Spanish born, and consequently treated them as such, and behold the real masters of the country, the heirs and descendants of the conquerors and founders of Cuba, converted into an inferior race, without civil privileges of any kind and deprived of the personal consideration due to them! The adventurer from Spain, the new-comer fresh from the mother-land, the starved office-seeker or the degraded and reckless member of an aristocratic Spanish family was invariably considered and treated as of a superior race, enjoying always the most prominent positions and receiving the highest honors, in payment, no doubt, for complicity in the numberless crimes perpetrated and sanctioned by the Administration.

In 1835, General Narciso Lopez matured a conspiracy to overthrow Spanish power in Cuba, attempted a revolt and was unsuccessful. He was born in Venezuela; had been first under Bolivar, but afterwards joined the Spanish Army and fought in the Carlist war; there he was made General of

Division and sent to Cuba, where he resigned his commission and revolted.

In 1836, the Constitution of 1812 was revived and Cuba was allowed to elect four deputies to the National Cortes. In the following year, three of the deputies presented to the Cortes at Madrid certificates of election, but they were not recognized. General Tacon had informed the Government that if the laws were to be changed in the Island, it would be the loss of Cuba to Spain. The Spanish Treasury was very poor and the Colonies were badly needed to build it up. Besides, a Cuban representation in Cortes meant that the level of the Cuban people must be raised higher and necessarily the deputies, after being admitted to the Cortes, would open the eyes of their people, candidly informing them what was expected of Cuba and what would be done with it. The Minister of Finance, in the Cortes on March 25, 1837, protested against any change "that may endanger the considerable contributions with which those countries are helping the mother-land." The Cuban deputies received the following reply from the Spanish representative, Señor Sancho, on April 3:—

"It is said that the Government has changed its opinion. Some of the deputies may believe that such a change has taken place. I believe that it is not so, and no one is better informed than I am. The Government never entertained the opinion that the American deputies should be called. On the contrary, it has always looked upon this as an evil which should be remedied as soon as possible."

The Government was consulted and decided that the Constitution should not be extended to those countries, and that as few deputies as possible should come from them. The Cuban deputies filed a protest against their exclusion, and the Cortes appointed a Committee to look into the matter; its report was as follows:—

"In future, the American and Asiatic provinces should be governed by special laws, and their deputies should not be admitted into the Cortes." This resolution was adopted by the Cortes, and Cuba was deprived of her right of representation in them.

Placido, colored, the most popular Cuban poet, was arrested in 1845, tried and accused of conspiracy. He pleaded innocent of the charge—he really was not implicated in the affair—but the Spanish sentenced him to die by garrote. His celebrated and well-known “Plegaria,” composed just before his death, proves his innocence. He was executed on the 27th of June, 1845.

Cuban refugees in the United States had greatly increased in these years, owing to the active persecution of the Spanish authorities in the Island. All the uprisings were secretly aided by the refugees, and when General Narciso Lopez, in 1849, went to the States, he was received by many sympathizers and was helped effectively alike by Cubans and Americans.

This fact gave occasion for the issuing of a Proclamation by President Taylor, on the 11th of August of that year, which read as follows:

By the President of the United States :

A PROCLAMATION.

There is reason to believe that an armed expedition is about to be fitted out in the United States with an intention to invade the Island of Cuba or some of the provinces of Mexico. The best information which the Executive has been able to obtain points to the Island of Cuba as the object of this expedition. It is the duty of this government to observe the faith of treaties and to prevent any aggression by our citizens upon the territories of friendly nations. I have, therefore, thought it necessary and proper to issue this proclamation, to warn all citizens of the United States who shall connect themselves with any enterprise so grossly in violation of our laws and our treaty obligations, that they will thereby subject themselves to the heavy penalties denounced against them by our acts of Congress, and will forfeit their claim to the protection of their country. No such persons must expect the interference of this government, in any form, on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct. An enterprise to invade the territories of a friendly country set on foot and prosecuted within the limits of the United States, is, in the highest degree, criminal, as tending to endanger the peace and compromise

the honor of this nation; and, therefore, I exhort all good citizens, as they regard our national reputation, as they respect their own laws and the laws of nations, as they value the blessings of peace and the welfare of their country, to discountenance and prevent, by all lawful means, any such enterprise; and I call upon every officer of this government, civil or military, to use all efforts in his power to arrest, for trial and punishment, every such offender against the laws providing for the performance of our sacred obligations to friendly powers.

Given under my hand the eleventh day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine, and the seventy-fourth of the independence of the United States.

Z. TAYLOR.

By the President :

J. M. CLAYTON, *Secretary of State*.

General Lopez sailed from New Orleans in 1850, with an expedition composed of 400 Americans and 200 Cubans, and landed and captured the city of Cardenas, a port on the northern coast of the Island. The Governor of the city was taken prisoner and Lopez proceeded on his march inland, where he was defeated and driven back by the Spanish. The Cubans had not been fully prepared for the movement, and it was rumored throughout the Island that Lopez was an annexationist to the United States, which kept many revolutionists from lending him valuable aid in the field. The great enthusiasm roused by Lopez in the States, the constant applications of men wanting to enlist with him and the protests of the Spanish Minister, caused President Fillmore to give the following proclamation :—

By the President of the United States of America :

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas, there is reason to believe that a military expedition is about to be fitted out in the United States with intention to invade the Island of Cuba, a colony of Spain, with which this country is at peace ;

And, Whereas, it is believed that this expedition is instigated and set on foot chiefly by foreigners who dare to make our shores a scene of their guilty and hostile preparations against a friendly power, and seek by falsehood and misrepresenta-

tion to seduce our own citizens, especially the young and inconsiderate, into their wicked schemes—an ungrateful return for the benefit conferred upon them by this people, in permitting them to make our country an asylum from oppression,—and in flagrant abuse of the hospitality thus extended to them ;

And, Whereas, such expeditions can only be regarded as adventures for plunder and robbery, and must meet the condemnation of the civilized world, whilst they are derogatory to the character of our country, in violation of the laws of nations, and expressly prohibited by our own ; our statutes declaring “that if any person shall, within the territory of jurisdiction of the United States, begin or set on foot, or provide or prepare the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, every person, so offending, shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding three thousand dollars, and imprisonment not more than three years ;

Now, Therefore, I have issued this, my Proclamation, warning all persons who shall connect themselves with any such enterprise or expedition in violation of our laws and national obligations that they will thereby subject themselves to the heavy penalties denounced against such offenses, and will forfeit their claim to the protection of this government, or any interference in their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their illegal conduct. And therefore, I exhort all good citizens, as they regard our national reputation, as they respect their own laws and the laws of nations, as they value the blessings of peace and the welfare of their country, to discountenance, and, by all lawful means, prevent any such enterprise ; and I call upon every officer of this government, civil or military, to use all efforts in his power, to arrest for trial and punishment every such offender against the laws of the country.

Given under my hand, the twenty-fifth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, and the seventy-fifth of the independence of the United States.

MILLARD FILLMORE.

By the President :

W. S. DERRICK, *Acting Secretary of State.*

General Lopez went to Key West after his defeat and set to work immediately on the organization of another revolu-

tionary movement. On the 12th of August, 1851, he disembarked at Las Pozas, Pinar del Rio. The Spanish General engaged him in a fight shortly after and a fierce battle took place. Lopez fought bravely, but was again defeated and captured. He was executed as a common outlaw by the garrote. On the scaffold, he cried out these words, that are still ringing in every Spaniard's ears: "Tyrants! My death in nothing changes the destinies of Cuba!"

In 1854, an American, General Kitman, attempted to lead an expedition to Cuba, aided by Betancourt, but was not successful. The conspiracies continued to work their way, and occasionally some one captured would be plunged into an African dungeon or banished to the insalubrious island of Fernando Poo, or publicly executed as an outlaw. But heedless of banishment or death, the desire for independence was clearly manifested throughout the country and the Cubans felt it deeply rooted in their hearts. With hopes for the future, they persevered in their great ideal.

Much worriment was produced in the guilty consciences of the Spanish Ministers, when it was asserted that the symptoms of a near-coming revolution in Cuba were plainly seen and felt by every one. To appease their own discomfort, more than with intentions of yielding to a suffering people's entreaty, the Spanish Government ordered that the Cubans should elect Commissioners to go to Madrid, and recommend there to the Government such reforms and laws as, in their judgment, would satisfy the people. In 1866, the Minister of Ultramar, Don Antonio Canovas del Castillo, called to Madrid the Committee of Information, as it was termed, composed of sixteen prominent Cubans chosen by election. The Committee reached Madrid and gave the report of their people's wants. The Cabinet dismissed the Committee, with the promise that due study would be given to the claims presented. In 1867, taxes were largely increased, so much so that the farmers and land-owners, unable to pay the exorbitant dues, presented themselves in a body to the authorities for the purpose of giving up their property instead. The Government never answered one word to the petitions made by the Committee of Information, and at last the Cubans realized the fact that, if

they wanted their rights, they must fight for them. Members of the principal Cuban families began to conspire against the Government throughout the Island, the following being the names of the principal conspirators; from the province of Oriente:

Francisco Vicente Aguilera, of a distinguished family and a wealthy land and slave owner of Oriente.

Francisco Maceo Osorio, of a distinguished family and a man of uncommon intellectual ability (not connected with Generals A. and J. Maceo, afterwards so famous as leaders).

Manuel de Jesus Calvar, planter.

Tomas Estrada Palma, of a distinguished family and a rich land proprietor.

Bartolome Maso, of a prominent family and a rich land proprietor.

Luis and Pedro Figueredo, of a rich and distinguished family.

Calixto Garcia Yniguez, of a prominent family of merchants and a rich land proprietor.

Vicente Garcia, rich proprietor of Tunas, and

Carlos M. de Cespedes, of a prominent and rich family.

All these were native-born Cubans.

Besides these well-known gentlemen, others no less distinguished took part in the secret meetings held in Bayamo, namely, Juan Hall, Luis Marcano, Elijio Yzaguirre, Julio Grave de Peralta and Manuel Codina. At a secret meeting held at the plantation El Rosario, it was decided that the revolutionary movement should take place on the 14th of October, and Cespedes was elected leader. The plot was betrayed to the Governor of Manzanillo and the conspirators were compelled to anticipate the day of the uprising. Orders were hastily issued to that effect everywhere, and although the opportunity was considered hopelessly lost, Carlos M. de Cespedes, at Yara, on the 10th of October, 1868, with about 120 men, badly armed and equipped, revolted against the tyrannical oppressors. He was quickly followed by Cubans from every part of the country, regardless of class or standing, and the heroic struggle for independence was commenced between Cuba, the beautiful little Island, the most noble and

generous country on earth, driven to frantic desperation, and the powerful, cruel and surly Spain. History does not register in its pages a more heroic struggle with such great odds. On one side a handful of patriots, unarmed and unskilled in warfare, foodless and nude, with all the weight of international laws applied against whatever help they might expect to receive from foreign countries; and on the other, an army of veterans, well armed and equipped with all the resources that money could secure, backed by 17,000,000 of people and honored by all the nations of the world.

An idea of the noble character of the men of the revolution can be obtained by considering that Francisco V. Aguilera, one of the leaders, after refusing a foreigner, shortly before the uprising, six hundred thousand dollars for his slaves on the plantation Santa Gertrudis, when the war broke out, summoned all his blacks and spoke to them thus:

“Until this glorious day, you have been my slaves. From now hence you are to be my friends. I give to each of you your liberty, so that you may choose the mode of life that may suit you best, and by so doing I relinquish all dominion over you; but those that would accompany me to battle are welcome; you, to struggle for your civil liberty, and we for our political rights.”

Those six hundred slaves followed Aguilera to the revolution and fought and perished for Cuba's freedom.

On the 4th of November, 1868, the province of Camaguey seconded the Yara movement, Ignacio Agramonte, a rich and distinguished gentleman of Puerto Principe, commanding the revolted party. The revolution abolished slavery with the decree of the 27th of December, 1868. More than half of the Island joined the revolution. Old and young, women and children, all swarmed to the country, to fields and woods, and fled from towns and villages held by the Spaniards. They carried but scanty garments with them; they left everything behind, abandoning comfort and luxury for the sake of being near their sons, husbands and brothers. What these families suffered during the ten years war, is difficult to describe, even if it be done hurriedly and in a condensed manner. Thousands perished from famine, disease and exposure; many were barbar-

ously sacrificed by the Spanish guerrillas. At times they were a great benefit to the patriots, but afterwards were a burden to them. At any rate, it was preferable to know that they died of famine, honorably, in the country of the noble and brave, rather than to live in the prostituted garrisoned cities where honor had to be traded for bread.

It has been unjustly said by some writers, that the revolution did not succeed because it was the product of the plans of a few gentlemen, and that it had not risen from the lower classes of the inhabitants. The fact is, that the revolution was felt and yearned for by the majority of Cubans in the Island, long before the uprising. The Guajiro in his character and habits is a model of the conservative, old-fashioned farmer; but he loves dearly the independence of his country, never hesitates to give up his peaceful occupation to lead the roaming and dangerous life of the soldier and to die fighting for Cuba Libre. He has been the constant sufferer in Cuba's revolts and he feels very proud to be able to say so.

The ten years war was not successful, not only because all the Cubans did not go to the field, many being bribed by the Spanish to remain during all the struggle with them, directly or indirectly harming the success of the revolution—but other important features besides those mentioned have to be considered, to appreciate fully the situation.

The conspiracy was not sufficiently extended and organized throughout the Island, with appointed leaders in each locality or zone, to rise powerful and menacing from the very first day. Nearly every one was a partisan, individually, of the revolutionary movement, but he had no understanding or connection on the subject with his neighbor. The conspiracy was betrayed before the necessary arrangements had been made. When Cespedes, fearing that all was lost, anticipated the plans and revolted in Yara, the news took the majority of the initiates by surprise.

It must be remembered, too, that Cuba is a narrow strip of land, without the necessary war resources and conveniences. It has never had manufactures of any kind. Being an island with numerous ports and harbors which have to be defended or protected by ships and sailors, it has not had artillery and

ammunition, and provisions to feed the army. True, the Cubans could have obtained all these, if they had been recognized as belligerents by one or more of the strong powers; but they failed to get recognition, and it may be said with astonishment and admiration, that they have fought gallantly and tenaciously, the largest colonial war on record, to obtain their independence.

A few battles of that war, which will be mentioned in the course of this narrative, will show that the Cubans, besides being good, enduring patriots, were plucky, intelligent, self-made soldiers, with many good commanders to lead them to victory.

A garrison of over 300 Spanish regulars held the City of Bayamo when the war broke out. Cespedes marched toward the city with about 500 men, mostly unarmed, their weapons being shot guns, revolvers, machetes and farming tools. The revolutionists made their way into the city and drove the Spaniards to a fort, where the defeated garrison took refuge. The inexperienced patriots were thronging the streets in wild joy at their success, when suddenly the Spanish cavalry, protected by infantry, made a sally which caused considerable confusion; the commanders, however, promptly checked it and a hand-to-hand fight took place. The Spaniards were defeated with heavy loss; nearly all their casualties were made with the machete.

The first town liberated from the Spanish was Jiguany, situated inland about seventy-five miles from Santiago; it was captured by the patriots, under Calixto Garcia and Donato Marmol.

Another important victory was reported on the 27th of October, 1868, for the Cuban forces. Donato Marmol, at Baire, had had a successful engagement with the enemy. Marmol from that time became very popular, singularly so with the colored Cuban troops. He deserved the popularity because the Baire victory gave much prestige to the Yara Revolution. Thousands of patriots followed and obeyed him and called him their general, and the leader became the principal fighting figure of the war. He commanded about 4,000 poorly armed men, blacks being in the majority. Prominent officers

have subsequently stated that Marmol's command was considered in those days the only hope for the success of the revolution. He was ordered to occupy an advantageous and strategic position on the Bayamo bank of the Cauto river, at Cauto Embarcadero, about eighteen miles from that city, whence any approach of the enemy could be readily seen and checked, whether it came from Holguin, Tunas or Manzanillo.

Furthermore, it was known that the Spanish General Valmaceda was marching toward Bayamo, 2,000 men strong, for the purpose of attacking and routing the revolutionary forces before they had time and opportunity to become organized. Cauto Embarcadero was the best position imaginable to fight with advantage a strong, well-armed, disciplined foe. The river was not passable without the aid of pontoons or canoes. The position held by Marmol was therefore impregnable, having, as he had, the enemy on the other side of the river. Valmaceda had camped between the rivers Salado and Cauto, being harassed by General Modesto Diaz, with another Cuban column, from the opposite bank of the Salado river—a very tight place for the Spaniards indeed, considering that they could not retreat or proceed without suffering positive defeat. General Marmol had strict orders not to move from Cauto, but having been informed that General Diaz might at any moment make a formal attack on the Spanish, and ambitious not to lose an opportunity to rout the enemy, not stopping to consider the disadvantages of a reckless attack and its probable fatal consequences, he abandoned his Cauto camp, advanced and attacked the Spanish lines at Saladillo with extraordinary vigor and bravery. The Cubans had their few archaic fire arms, machetes and spears of Yara; the Spaniards, modern rifles, plenty of ammunition and artillery. The result was easy to imagine. Marmol's first line advanced furiously against Valmaceda's force, which met the advance steadily, and after a bitter contest the Spaniards brought their artillery fire to bear so successfully upon the Cubans that they fell back in confusion. The second line then entered the fray and stood its ground more determinedly than the first. Some of the Cubans were pierced with bayonets just when they had reached the enemy's artillery pieces. But the effect of

Spanish musketry fire and the accuracy with which it was delivered caused the assailants to fall back in utter dismay. Assault upon assault was repelled and the day ended, giving the victory to Valmaceda, while Marmol, badly defeated, made his retreat with heavy losses.

Valmaceda then proceeded unchecked to Bayamo, where the news of the disaster had spread. The inhabitants determined to burn every house in the city and join the Cubans, so that the Spaniards should find only ashes as they entered. When Valmaceda arrived at Bayamo, he marched through the streets blocked by ruins and ashes, and decided to camp amid them. At one end of the city an antique structure named Torre de Zarragoitia lay untouched by fire, having escaped the conflagration. Valmaceda, in order to take vengeance on the fleeing inhabitants, erected over it a fort which became famous during the war for the crimes that were perpetrated from it.

The disaster of Saladillo was the severest blow that the struggle for freedom could receive. Marmol's defeat was the defeat of the rising revolution. After that it rallied several times, but never again recovered the probabilities of success that it had prior to the battle of Saladillo.

Then Valmaceda issued that inhuman Bando, giving to his soldiers full power to kill and plunder all those that should be captured about the country, and ordering the persecution of families in order to compel the inhabitants to return to the towns under his rule. A period of terror in the Island was inaugurated by the Spanish. All prisoners were shot and the property of the revolutionists or suspects was confiscated without right of appeal. Caballero de Rodas, Montaner, Weyler and Gonzalez Boet, all of fiendish character, were Valmaceda's satraps. The narrative of their crimes and victims would cover many hundred pages. All these infamies were committed with the knowledge and approval of the Spanish Peninsular Revolutionary Government, who professed to be fighting for freedom and citizenship in Spain.

The representative of the Cubans in the United States, Señor José Morales Lemus, protested against the Bando of Valmaceda and the arbitrary confiscation of property. Although he was not recognized in his official capacity, the Ad-

ministration took notice of the Spanish general's Ukase, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Hamilton Fish, wrote to the Spanish Minister to the United States, Señor Lopez Roberts, the following letter :

“In the interest of Christian civilization and common humanity, I hope that this document is a forgery. If it indeed be genuine, the President instructs me, in the most forcible manner, to protest against such mode of warfare.”

But the Spaniards continued their villainies, and old and young were slaughtered every day. The attitude of indifference observed by the nations during this special period of terror in Cuba, can be qualified only as cowardly, mean and criminal. The poor families suffered greatly without food or shelter, pursued across fields and woods, and lacking garments to cover their naked bodies. The patriots too, were suffering from lack of food and ammunition to cope with the enemy, being compelled to eat their horses and mules. When these gave out, they lived on fruits and herbs. The lack of salt to season their frugal and unwholesome food caused disease to spread, with fatal results, all over Bayamo, Holguin and Santiago. More than forty per cent of the population died of fevers, smallpox and cholera. It seemed as if all the calamities of the world had agreed to strike simultaneously at the patriots, but they continued to fight hard, notwithstanding their great suffering.

On the 10th of April, 1869, a Constitution was proclaimed at Guaimaro, and was signed by :

CARLOS M. DE CESPEDES,	ARCADIO GARCIA,
MIGUEL GUTIERREZ,	EDUARDO MACHADO,
SALVADOR CISNEROS,	ANTONIO LORDA,
MANUEL VALDEZ,	ANTONIO ALCALA,
HONORATO CASTILLO,	JESUS RODRIGUEZ,
MIGUEL BETANCOURT,	FRANCISCO S. BETANCOURT,
JOSÉ M. YZAGUIRRE,	IGNACIO AGRAMONTE,
ANTONIO ZAMBRANA.	

The American Confederate General, Thomas Jordan, gives a very interesting report of an engagement. Nobly and disinterestedly he had come from the States to help the Cubans

by his experience as a soldier, which he had gained during the American Civil War, under General G. T. Beauregard, the brave and skillful defender of Charleston. The report is transcribed to show what he thought of the patriots as soldiers :

..... the number of our forces did not exceed 548 men all told, with one artillery piece. Circumstances beyond my power to control prevented me from concentrating more men in time for the battle. The enemy had a trifle less than 2,000 troops of infantry, cavalry and artillery.

..... there were at least 100 cavalry and three artillery pieces. On the battlefield were found 200 dead, many officers amongst them, and 45 horses. The engagement lasted seventy-five minutes, and in that time, one after the other, three assaults of the Spanish regulars were repulsed. They advanced in compact columns of 500 metres. Then a thicker column charged on us, and it would have been defeated also had the reserve ammunition been at hand; unfortunately it was not there, and from lack of cartridges I was compelled to withdraw my force from the position. The retreat was performed with a coolness and precision that would have done honor to veterans of a hundred battles.

All the line of trenches that measured 490 paces was under my view, and I did not see one single case of reproachable conduct on the part of any officer or private. On the contrary, I remarked that they displayed superb spirit and gallantry.

By request of the officers and soldiers, I ordered a machete charge against the sharpshooters of the enemy at our left flank. It was made in a brilliant manner and with great effectiveness, yielding some booty to those that took part in it.

..... With twenty rounds more of cartridges the enemy would have been stampeded; they rallied only when our ammunition gave out.

..... I am proud of having had the opportunity to command such troops; their noble example has given great enthusiasm to all those that have joined us, and all are equally anxious to engage the enemy. This will be very soon, and I am sure the most satisfactory results will be obtained. After the battle the enemy were so down-hearted that, not daring to

advance towards Camaguey, they have countermarched three miles on the road and have entrenched themselves there, never moving from camp more than a few hundred yards, and even then with not less than 300 men.

Certainly this situation cannot last long and the column will have to move in one direction or another, burdened with 300 wounded, besides their arms and those of the dead.

The enemy has been reduced one-third of its total effective force, for the dead and wounded cannot be less than 500.

THOMAS JORDAN, *Major-General Commanding*.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SAN AUGUSTIN, Jan. 12, 1870.

The Revolutionary Congress, in session April 11, 1869, at Guaimaro, passed a resolution presented by a member, Eduardo Machado, for the adoption of the Cuban flag: ground, red triangle with a white five-pointed star in the center; three longitudinal blue stripes and two white ones. It was the same flag that Gen. Narciso Lopez raised. Considerable discussion went on before its adoption. Antonio Lorda had proposed that the triangle be blue with red and white stripes. In the same session Carlos M. de Cespedes was elected President, Manuel Quesada Commander in Chief, and Francisco V. Aguilera Secretary of War of the Republic. Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Peru extended recognition of belligerency to the Republic of Cuba almost immediately after. Unfortunately, these republics were weak and poor, and their sympathy, although greatly esteemed, did not aid the patriots.

In 1869 the Secretary of State offered the intervention of the United States to General Prim, representative of the Spanish Government, on the basis of a purchase by the Cubans of their independence, under a guarantee by the United States, to which the General replied:

"We can better proceed in the present situation of things without even this friendly intervention. A time will come when the good offices of the United States will be, not only useful, but indispensable in the final arrangements between Spain and Cuba. We will ascertain the form in which they can be employed and confidently count upon your assistance."

The United States answered that its good offices for that

object would be at any time at the service of the parties to the conflict.

A long and interesting diplomatic correspondence, treating of Cuban affairs, was kept up between the two Governments, the Americans tendering their good offices to stop the war, the Spaniards cunningly deferring a definite answer—the diplomacy of Rome foiling Anglo-Saxon diplomacy. The following document issued in the next year proves it:

By the President of the United States of America:

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas, divers evil-disposed persons have, at sundry times, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begun, or set on foot, or provided, or prepared the means for military expeditions or enterprises to be carried on thence against the territories or dominions of powers with whom the United States are at peace, by organizing bodies pretending to have powers of government over portions of the territories or dominions of powers with whom the United States are at peace, or by being or assuming to be members of such bodies, by levying or collecting money for the purpose, or for the alleged purpose of using the same in carrying on military enterprises against such territories or dominions, by enlisting and organizing armed forces to be used against such powers, and by fitting out, equipping, and arming vessels to transport such organized armed forces to be employed in hostilities against such powers;

And, Whereas, it is alleged, and there is reason to apprehend, that such evil-disposed persons have also, at sundry times, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, violated the laws thereof by accepting and exercising commissions to serve by land or by sea against powers with whom the United States are at peace, by enlisting themselves or other persons to carry on war against such powers, by fitting out and arming vessels with intent that the same shall be employed to cruise or commit hostilities against such powers, or by delivering commissions within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States for such vessels to the intent that they might be employed as aforesaid;

And, Whereas, such acts are in violation of the laws of the United States in such case made and provided, and are done in disregard of the duties and obligations which all persons residing or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the

United States owe thereto, and are condemned by all right-minded and law-abiding citizens:—

Now, Therefore, I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that all persons hereafter found within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States committing any of the afore-re-cited violations of law, or any similar violations of the sovereignty of the United States for which punishment is provided by law, will be rigorously prosecuted therefor, and, upon conviction and sentence to punishment, will not be entitled to expect or receive the clemency of the executive to save them from the consequences of their guilt; and I enjoin upon every officer of this government, civil or military or naval, to use all efforts in his power to arrest, for trial and punishment, every such offender against the laws providing for the performance of our sacred obligations to friendly powers.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this twelfth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy, and of the independence of the United States of America the ninety-fifth.

(Seal)

U. S. GRANT.

By the President :

HAMILTON FISH, *Secretary of State.*

The United States of Colombia, in February, 1870, extended to the Cubans belligerent rights. What a noble example of disinterestedness did those little, poor, South and Central American Republics give to the other nations of the world!

The Government employed the most stringent coercive methods in the course of this ten years struggle, to prevent demonstrations of sympathy towards the patriots by the inhabitants of the cities. The most ridiculous measures were taken to that end, and in a good many instances the proceedings were savage and barbarous. A mob of volunteers threw the city of Havana into consternation by forcing a court-martial, and passing capital sentence on eight innocent youths, students of the University there, on the suspicion that they had scratched somebody's tomb in the graveyard.

Dozens of prisoners from a filibustering expedition, the *Virginius*, were shot unmercifully at Santiago, notwithstanding the protestations of the American Consul, and only by the firm intervention of one of Her Majesty's warships did the Spanish General Burriel stop the executions.

President Grant, through his miserable money expectations from the Alabama claims, and also through the sudden and unaccountable change effected in Mr. Hamilton Fish's attitude towards the patriots, lost the best opportunity of his civil career to give a noble example to the civilized world of what a great, free nation would generously do for a suffering people and for the love of liberty. Had the President granted to Cuba the rights of belligerency, all the savagery of the Spanish would have been stopped and Cuban Independence secured, unstained by the innocent blood of aged men, women and children.

In April, 1875, Guatemala recognized the Cuban Government.

The revolution weakened considerably, ravaged by disease and battle; the communications with the outer world were difficult and even extremely dangerous. With canoes made of the trunk of the *seiba*, a gigantic tree of Cuba, trips were constantly made to Jamaica with the most remarkable luck attending the improvised sailors, who would start out to sea without a compass or a sail. Still this was carried on during all the war, and it is not known that a mishap overtook any of them.

The most important battles of the ten years war were: Guasimas, Palo Seco, Punta Gorda, Melones, Copo del Chato, siege and capture of Tunas. The leaders who distinguished themselves the most were:—Maximo Gomez, Antonio Maceo, Calixto Garcia, Ignacio Agramonte, Modesto Diaz and Vicente Garcia, although this leader's attitude was the cause of losing the revolution its unity, respect and obedience to authority, absolutely necessary for the regulation of an army. The Civil Government of the revolution proved to be absolutely worthless.

Many expeditions with arms and ammunition were sent to the patriots by refugees in the United States, but they were

not sufficient to meet the necessities, and many were captured by the Spanish, on the sea or ashore.

In 1878, General Martinez Campos, who had conquered in Sagunto, was sent to subdue, at any cost, the revolution, and after offering to the patriots reforms and liberties of all kinds, the compact of Zanjón was made. General Maceo, at Mangos de Baragua, protested against it and left the Island without having anything to do with the treaty. General-Commander Gomez put himself aside on the pretext that he was not a Cuban—that the Cubans should decide. And so ended the ten years struggle.

After four years of imprisonment in dungeons and cells of different fortresses of Spain, when the Zanjón compact was made and General Calixto Garcia Yniguez was given his liberty, he proceeded directly to Paris, where, in company with Dr. Betances and other prominent Cubans, he commenced the organization of new plans for a conspiracy. The long captivity he had suffered, instead of exhausting his vigor and enthusiasm, had only served to increase them. It was astonishing to all, to see the man who had wasted perhaps the best years of his manhood boxed up between walls waiting patiently for his liberty, instead of being downhearted and disappointed, come out strong and enthusiastic, ready for another struggle, of which no one dreamed, in Cuba or elsewhere. He sought and obtained the co-operation of nearly all the commanders and officers of the war living at that time in the Island or abroad. Among others were Antonio Maceo, Gregorio Benitez, Pio Rosado, Roloff, Fonseca, etc., who answered, offering their services. General Maximo Gomez and General Vicente Garcia never definitely gave their approval, and consequently General Calixto Garcia Yniguez did not have their help. Suddenly the leaders of the conspiracy in the Santiago province were arrested. Brigadier Flor Crombet and Colonels Pedro Martinez Freire, José Maria Rodriguez (Mayia) and Beola were sent to Spain as prisoners of war; they had had General Calixto Garcia's unbounded confidence. The three prisoners arrived at Madrid, where they were put in communication with the other members of the conspiracy in Oriente, through General

Garcia's special revolutionary envoy, Dr. Ensebio Hernandez, who undertook to carry letters of the said leaders, which he delivered to General Moncada and to Colonels José Maceo, Silverio del Prado and Santos Perez, the last, commanding a band of Spanish guerrillas, and approving of the uprising. In these letters the prisoners warned them not to wait any longer, lest they too be discovered and arrested. It was agreed by the Committee of Santiago, in several meetings held, not to wait any longer but to revolt, which they did on the night of the 26th of August, 1879, easily taking possession of the city of Santiago. But General Moncada, senior officer commanding, incensed because of the intrigues of the autonomists, who characterized the movement as a war of races (the three principal chiefs, whites, as stated above, having been made prisoners and deported to Spain), hesitated at the last moment, when it was most important to exert promptness and pluck, and instead of surprising and seizing the barracks, he marched out of the city with the revolutionists and began to organize his force in the country. The garrison was so taken by surprise that they did not even fire a shot, and if they had been attacked, would have surrendered immediately. Dr. Hernandez carried to Havana orders to the leaders of Las Villas and the Western province. The delegate and sub-delegates of Gen. Garcia, in Havana, were José Antonio Aguilera and José Marti, in conjunction with whom Dr. Hernandez set to work and sent arms and ammunition to Francisco Carrillo, Emilio Nuñez, Arias and other leaders of Las Villas. They were soon discovered, and Aguilera and Marti were arrested. Dr. Hernandez escaped to the States in a boat. Carrillo and Nuñez revolted and were seconded by Arias and Cecilio Gonzalez, who landed with a small expedition sent from New York by Gen. Garcia, and the new revolution became formidable in a short time. But this did not last long. Gen. Garcia battled against the lack of sufficient funds to continue the war.

The people were fatigued from the ten years struggle and felt skeptical in regard to the results of the present one; their contributions for the cause were scanty; the policy of suavity employed by the Government since the Zanjon compact did

much to prevent the undecided from joining; the revolutionary propaganda had not been accepted by the plantation districts of the West that were making good harvests; the rich Vegas of Vuelta Abajo were producing delicious tobacco, sold at heavy prices; the laborers received fair wages and work was plenty everywhere; and then the absence from this movement of Gen. Gomez and Vicente Garcia, who dodged all proposals to engage themselves in it, were reasons of sufficient weight to prevent the revolutionists from succeeding.

When Gen. Calixto Garcia, in despair, failing to obtain the necessary funds to equip an expedition for the aid of those that were in the field fighting, flung aside his patience, and with 15 men risked his life thrice, in the attempt to land in Cuba, he did it, not because he had faith in the success of the struggle, but because he was bound to get there even though he perished in the attempt.

About the same time that he landed in Cuba with his staff, the two most prominent men of the uprising, Moncada and José Maceo (mysterious and complicated event!) surrendered with all their men to the Spanish authorities, and Gen. Garcia and his 15 followers were left to battle in the Oriente alone, the battle for the independence of 1,500,000 inhabitants, while they were all enjoying the blessings of a dishonorable truce, in shameful association with the Spaniards. All the available troops were detached in operations against the small party of revolutionists. Only Carrillo and Nuñez remained in arms, the rest having surrendered.

Gen. Benitez, who had arrived successfully at the Puerto Principe province, seeing the failure of the revolution, attempted to escape by boat to Jamaica and was murdered by some men bought with Spanish gold.

Abroad, only three leaders upheld their convictions in those cruel days of defeat: —Gen. Roloff, Col. José M. Aguirre and Dr. Hernandez, who prepared an expedition to aid the revolutionists. Gen. Garcia suffered horribly for several months. Bullets, famine and disease reduced his party to four men, who, at last, exhausted and without ammunition, were compelled to surrender to Gen. Valera, near Bayamo. This happened in the latter part of the year 1880.

Then came what may be justly called the anæsthetic period of Cuba. Autonomy was the powerful drug employed. Its effect was produced simply by smelling of the bottle where it was carefully kept. Generally a lecture on the therapeutics and materia medica of Autonomy was quite sufficient a dose to produce a profound slumber. Without administering the drug, anæsthesia would be produced, and it was prolonged with marvelous precision. The Autonomists claimed that they were versed on the subject, that the Cuban people were pathological cases and that only Autonomy could keep them on their feet. This period lasted but a few years, fortunately.

Meantime the leaders of the Cubans were scattered and discouraged all over the world:—Gen. Calixto Garcia, a prisoner of the enemy; Gen. Gomez, shunned by the Cubans since the Zanjon compact, more for what he wrote than for what he did; A. Maceo, unsuccessful, in Turk's Island, where he was driven, pursued by Spanish gun-boats; Roloff also unsuccessful. There remained only one senior leader with sufficient prestige to take command, but he became so indolent that he was not fit for the place—Vicente Garcia (no connection with Calixto).

Here Hernandez appeared again, persuading the men of Yara to reunite. He reconciled Maceo and Roloff, and later on Roloff and Gomez.

The four mentioned and Generals Crombet, Ruis Rivera, R. Rodriguez, J. Calvas and Tomas Estrada Palma, sought hospitality in Honduras, where they were well treated and held important positions of official capacity.

Gen. A. Maceo well understood that he could not be the leader of the next revolution, and in accord with others, supported by Dr. Hernandez, suggested Gomez as their future leader. This was difficult to arrange, because the Cubans had taken a great dislike to him for certain things he had said about them. So the work of reconciliation lasted from 1881 to 1884.

Crombet and Hernandez were detailed to collect funds. This they did, from President Bogran of Honduras and from numerous Cubans who had settled at the Panama Canal and were working there.

In August, 1884, Gomez, Maceo, Crombet, Marti, Zambrana, Salvador Cisneros and a majority of the officers were in agreement and accepted the leadership of Gomez, excepting Gen. Bonachea, Panchin Varona and Limbano Sanchez. The first of these fitted out an expedition. He was made prisoner with his men and shot at Santiago. Col. Limbano Sanchez fitted up another, landed, was captured and killed. Marti disagreed with Gomez's and Maceo's methods and separated from the commission.

Dr. Hernandez was sent to collect funds, and, aided by generous patriots, raised \$40,000. This sum was received on deposit by F. Lamadriz to deliver to Gen. Gomez. The movement was planned but the plot failed. The authorities of St. Domingo confiscated \$10,000 worth of war material and distributed it to their soldiers. Gomez became unpopular again. He had done his best, no doubt, but all his plans failed.

Maceo too lost the chance of combining in a plot to send war material from the United States to Colon, made by Drs. Hernandez and Tomas Padro. Carrillo, Hernandez and Crombet attempted to get to Cuba in an open boat, but failed. These manœuvres lasted from 1884 to 1886.

In 1887, Juan Fraga, a noble-hearted refugee, aided by Angel Garcia, a good patriot and man of action, founded the club, "Los Independientes." Among the founders were Calixto Garcia and Hernandez. This club continued work for the cause with the purpose of not compromising more lives or money uselessly, as had been done, and agreed not to set out on any uprising without half a million dollars.

Marti appeared again: he wanted to go to Cuba.

Then the Sartorius Brothers made an uprising at Purnio (Holguin), but it all vanished in a few days.

Then came the last of the Fernandina expeditions, which was Marti's first experience and cost Cuba dear.

Carlos Garcia Scler
 Coronel de C. M.
 General de Brigada jefe.
 E. L. G.



Calisto Tanic.

CHAPTER II.

CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.*

BY

CARLOS GARCIA VELEZ, Brigadier-General.

IT is a hazardous, as well as a very difficult task to undertake, as I do in this chapter, to narrate the principal events of the Santiago Campaign from a point of view unknown as yet to the world, after so much has been said about the subject by different writers with whom I differ essentially in the course of this narration.

The author of this chapter, a member of Calixto Garcia's staff, having taken an active part in that campaign, believes that he is qualified to give his opinion, together with important data, based on original and authentic documents, *fac-similes* of which are not displayed here because of the limited dimensions of this chapter. The facts are so plain and comprehensive that they will be sufficient proof of the author's assertion when he states that all the official reports are decidedly unjust to General Calixto Garcia's army of Cuban patriots, as to the active and undeniable part taken by them in that wonderful success, the surrender of Santiago. On the other hand, it was to be expected that some one would come forward to vindicate the Cubans, so praised at first, so slandered afterward by the war correspondents and some military commanders.

The author will demonstrate the many things accomplished by the Cubans if it only be with the object of answering the

*Gen. Calixto Garcia responded very enthusiastically to our invitation to write this chapter. He wrote us :

"I will gladly undertake the work you propose to me for the history of the war with Spain. This work will be very dear to my heart."

His untimely death cut short his preparations for writing. His son has prepared the chapter from his father's memoranda and papers.

gratuitous charges heaped on the brave allies of the Americans. The writers who have done this might be pardoned if they had contented themselves with magnifying their own feats, having, as I freely admit, accomplished so much in behalf of Cuban independence. But when they go beyond this and claim for the Americans exclusively, what pertains rightfully and equally to both armies, they do a great and perhaps irreparable injustice to a whole allied army. In so doing they attempt to belittle and, what is worse, ignore deeds of men, in no respect—be they nude and starving as they were—inferior as generals or soldiers. The harmless vanity of victorious commanders and unscrupulous correspondents becomes the criminal wrong of the false historian. Some have erred from lack of proper and impartial investigation of the campaign as it was conducted by both armies; others, because their sole object, for some unaccountable reason, was to misrepresent and belittle the coöperation of the Cubans.

Fortunately, history is not made by a dozen writers or from the reports of only one of the nations engaged in a war,—no matter if these reports are made by reputable military writers. The history of the American-Spanish War has not yet been written because the facts revealed in this chapter have not as yet been published. As a contribution to do justice and to honor the grave of the dead, the author of this work relates the truth, and in it the living and the dead find just defence and credit.

The misrepresentation of facts in this war, especially by the American writers, is only a repetition of what has happened under similar circumstances with all other auxiliary armies of invasion. The victory has been invariably claimed by the army whose country is larger and more powerful. History presents numberless instances and although I could furnish the reader many well-known examples, I shall cite only two that will suffice to show the accuracy of the statement.

Lafayette, with a well equipped and disciplined army, aided the Americans in their war for independence. The French army came from a rich and powerful country, its officers and soldiers retaining fresh in their remembrance the luxurious

European life which they had enjoyed at home. They had formed an ideal, purely imaginative, of the American patriot, having seen only those who had gone to Paris, commissioned by the Continental Congress. Their surprise was great when they beheld masses of poor and ragged men, worn and haggard from long privations, in a terrible struggle of which the newcomers had no conception. Then a sensation of disgust overpowered them, derived from a selfish and unfair comparison of their own polished and glittering appearance with that of the sombre American patriots, shabbily attired and care-worn. The victory achieved by both parties was claimed by the French in those days as due entirely to them, although the French never thought of taking back with them to France, as trophies, the guns, which they had helped the Americans to capture from the English, and which are to-day admired at West Point with patriotic and legitimate American pride.

The English sent their army in aid of the Spanish whose independence was at stake. The whole peninsula was burning with sacred and noble patriotism and in many a battle the Spaniards had proved to the world how dearly they cherished liberty. Although not equal either to their opponent or to their ally as a disciplined army, Spanish valor and tenacity were never questioned. Nevertheless, the English have always claimed that the Spaniards were only bands of unorganized guerrillas and that victory was solely due to Great Britain's soldiers.

It appears that humanity, in this respect, does not change as years roll by.

Primero yo, despues yo, y siempre yo.

A fearful war, with destruction of life and property, had been waging in the Island of Cuba for three years; three hundred thousand victims had already fallen to the ferocious war yell of the Spaniards: "*Exterminio de los Cubanos!*" Many able Cuban commanders had been killed in battle, of whom the foremost figures were Antonio Maceo, Flor Crombet, Ducasse, José Maceo, Zayas, Serafin Sanchez, Aranguren and the great José Martí; and of these dying of disease contracted

in the campaign, Guillermo Moncada, José M. Aguirre, and Juan Ruz.

In the Eastern Department (from the Jucaro-Moron trocha east), in point of organization of troops, and farming zones and cattle-herding, the military condition of the Cubans can be classified as excellent. The Spaniards were kept constantly at bay within the fortified cities and towns, never daring to venture out of them without forming columns of not less than four thousand men, and then only to accompany the convoys of rations to the different garrisons. The city of Tunis had been stormed with artillery and carried by the Cuban forces, taking several hundred prisoners who were delivered back to the Spaniards. The towns of Guaymaro and Guisa had likewise been captured. Other numerous smaller towns and villages had also been taken and the enemy was compelled to evacuate many others on account of the impossibility of rationing them with regularity. The Spaniards were kept constantly busy within those fortified precincts which allowed them to remain entirely on the defensive. It was no difficult thing to do, as may be inferred, to travel about the whole Department without fear of being surprised by the enemy, for, as has been already stated, they were shut up in block-houses, forts and, invariably, within walls.

The Jucaro-Moron trocha was of no military value when the American-Spanish War broke out because it was not sufficiently garrisoned to prevent the passage of the Cuban forces from one department to another. The line of block-houses along the Cauto River (navigable 75 miles) up to Cauto Embarcadero Village, which General Pando had two months previously completed, kept twelve thousand Spanish troops inactive and exposed to malaria and yellow fever, without any positive effectiveness against the plans of the Cuban General, Calixto Garcia, Commander of the Department.

The Western Department extended from the Jucaro-Moron trocha to the west, being cut by another trocha, the Mariel-Majana, and was in command of General J. M. Rodriguez. War in this part of the island was conducted on different principles by the Spaniards. There the towns and cities with excellent harbors were more numerous, richer, larger and far

better. Plantations and railroads traversed the whole Department, and for centuries the site of the supreme authority of the Island had been situated there. Havana the capital, and, as such, under the old system of centralization, the head and the stomach of Cuba, had absorbed all that was important for itself and had a larger proportion of Spanish inhabitants than any other city. Capital was accumulated consequently in the Western Department of Cuba and naturally the Spaniards gave more attention to fighting the rebellion there than in the east, considering too that the nature of the country was better adapted to develop their so-called strategic movements. Moreover that part had never before been in a serious revolt and it was believed by the Spanish that the Revolution could be more easily checked there than in the east. Besides, since the invasion of Maceo and Gomez, the world's attention had been fixed exclusively on the war events of the west, as this invasion was an extraordinary raid, the results of which the world was anxious to see. The movements of these commanders in that famous march were so rapid that they had time only to fly through towns and villages. Notwithstanding great destruction of property, as the invaders had no time to pause, what was conquered one day had to be abandoned the next, leaving it again in the possession of the Spaniards.

After the surprise came the reaction and the Spaniards immediately fortified the towns and plantations and divided Gen. A. Maceo's army from that of General Gomez, by building a trocha which was formidable, considering our lack of well-armed troops and of artillery. One hundred and fifty thousand men were thrown upon the Cubans and active operations were constantly carried on. The result of it was that General Maceo was daily compelled to fight desperately, while General Gomez failed to organize his forces properly to relieve Maceo from such enormous odds. Maceo, fighting the most brilliant battles in Pinar del Rio, was abandoned by Gomez to his fate. Seeking to organize the forces east of the trocha he went by sea to Havana province where he was killed in a skirmish. The Revolution was greatly weakened, but notwithstanding the activity and great number of the Spanish troops and General Gomez's incapacity to direct the

campaign, it continued, thanks to the extraordinary ability of Rius Rivera,* Betancourt, J. M. Gomez, Gonzalez, Arango, Cardenas, Lacret and other leaders who with notable skill kept the Spanish columns busy with their small fragments of veteran regiments, till the American-Spanish contest put an end to such an unequal struggle.

This, in a few words, was the state of the Cuban Revolution, when, on April 13, 1898, Gen. Calixto Garcia camped at Jaguey, near Baire, received news from several Cuban commanders that the enemy had hoisted flags of truce in the cities, towns and forts throughout the Eastern Department and that the fire of our troops was unanswered by the Spanish. Orders were issued by the General to investigate the cause of such a change and it was promptly learned that General Blanco had given orders for a suspension of hostilities. As General Garcia had not received any such order from his government, he suspected the measure to be a stratagem of the enemy to gain time for some unknown object and immediately directed that all his troops move towards the fortified towns to harass them with musketry day and night. It appeared clear to us that the Spaniards, fearing a declaration of war from the United States and finding themselves involved in a rather complicated affair for which they were totally unprepared, had decided to prevent intervention by seeking, through conference with the Cubans, a prompt solution of the war. After some days we received a copy of Captain-General Blanco's Manifesto and a proclamation ordered by the Queen Regent suspending hostilities in the Island of Cuba, which read as follows:—

“His Majesty's Government, yielding to the reiterated wish expressed by His Holiness the Pope, has been pleased to decree a suspension of hostilities with the object of preparing and facilitating the restoration of peace on this Island, in virtue whereof I believe it convenient to order:

“ARTICLE 1.—From the day following the receipt in each locality of said proclamation, hostilities are ordered to be suspended in all the territory of the Island of Cuba.

“ARTICLE 2.—The details of the execution of the above arti-

* Taken prisoner by the enemy after an engagement in Pinar del Rio subsequent to Maceo's death.

cle will be the object of special instructions that will be communicated to the several commanders-in-chief of the army corps for easy and prompt execution according to the situation and circumstances of the case.

Havana, April 11, 1898.

BLANCO.

“The General Government of the Island of Cuba to the inhabitants of the Island of Cuba:—

“Without any reason or legality, without the least offense on our part, and at a time when they received from us only proofs of friendship, the United States are forcing us into war just at the moment when quietude began to settle over the country, when production was flourishing, commerce taking courage and peace approaching, with the coöperation of all classes and all parties under the new institutions granted by the mother country.

“Such a proceeding is without precedent in history. It evidently manifests the bogus politics of the Republic, demonstrating the tricky plans and purposes that have always been nourished against Spain's sovereignty in Cuba, which the enemy has been conspiring for nearly a century to destroy. Our foes now carry their hypocrisy and falsehood to the extent of demanding immediate peace in a war provoked and sustained by themselves; her prudence and moderation have been of no avail to Spain, though she has carried her concessions to the extreme limit of toleration in order to avoid a rupture. She still deplors the state of affairs but she accepts it with all the energy of a glorious national history and the pride of her people, a pride which will never yield to the stranger's haughtiness, nor consent to see Spain's right and reason trampled upon by a nation of nobodies.

“If the United States wants the Island of Cuba, let them come and take it. Perhaps the hour is not far distant in which the Carthaginians of America will find their Zama in this Island of Cuba, which Spain discovered, peopled and civilized and which will never be anything but Spanish.

“It is our turn to have the honor of defending her and we shall know how to do it with decision and an effort many a time put forth. I count upon you for this with absolute certainty. I believe there is no sacrifice you are not prepared to make in defense of the national territory, whose integrity is sacred to all Spaniards of whatever origin. I am sure that every one in whose veins runs Spanish blood will respond readily to the call, which, in these solemn moments, I address to all, and that all will group themselves around me to contribute as much as they can to

repel a foreign invasion, without allowing dangers, sufferings or privations to weaken the heart of courage.

“To arms, then, fellow countrymen, to arms! There will be a place for all in the fight. Let all coöperate and contribute with the same firmness and enthusiasm to fight the eternal enemy of the Spanish name, emulating the exploits of our ancestors, who always elevated high their country's fame and honor. To arms! Cry a thousand times ‘Viva España,’ ‘Viva el Rey Alfonso XIII,’ ‘Viva la Regente,’ ‘Viva Cuba, always Spanish.’

Your Governor-General,
RAMON BLANCO.”

Of course the armistice, thus proclaimed by the Spanish, without consultation or agreement with our Government, was not even considered by any Cuban commander. On the contrary, all simultaneously attacked or feigned to attack the towns, especially those of the interior, and it was done to such an extent that the Spanish soldiery exclaimed, “*Would to God that the suspension of hostilities had not been decreed, because now we have to fight day and night and be on the alert every moment.*”

The Autonomists endeavored to send commissioners to the Revolutionists with propositions of peace, but as they were not based upon the absolute independence of the Island the commissioners did not even dare to approach our lines, fearing to meet the death penalty in accordance with the Spotorno law of the revolution. Blanco soon convinced himself that the Cubans would not enter with him into any understanding whatever, that was not based on the absolute independence of Cuba. Then the Spaniards, losing all hope of securing peace, made several unsuccessful attempts to concentrate forces in different cities. While crossing the country, protected by a flag of truce, several columns were severely attacked by our forces and compelled to stop and turn back. This happened to a column that marched out of Jiguani and was beaten so badly that it fell back to the town.

The ruse that the Spaniards employed was promptly frustrated by General Garcia's circular which, condensed, was :—

1st. That the suspension of hostilities was not to be con-

sidered unless our Government should order it, at the same time stating Spain's agreement to proclaim peace on the basis of absolute independence of Cuba.

2nd. To harass the enemy continually and lay siege to their fortified towns.

3rd. To prevent by all means the concentration of the enemy's troops, which they would surely try to effect should war be declared between Spain and the United States.

4th. To be in readiness to aid and support the Americans by land should they attack the Spaniards by sea.

In a letter of General Garcia to the Government dated at La Ratonera (Baire) April 18, 1898, he said :—

“In view of the last events, I first thought of going where the government was, so as to second its orders with more rapidity, but as I receive news daily from the exterior and as I desire to be in position to direct personally the operations of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, I have at last determined to stay in Oriente. I shall give you, notwithstanding, my views of the situation. The armistice proclaimed by the enemy, without stipulating previously its terms or bases with our Government, moreover, without counting with our Government, may be qualified as a sarcastic mockery, if, besides gaining time with the Americans, as we at first believed, it had not the principal object, as we clearly see now, of providing with rations all the towns of the interior and reconcentrating with impunity its forces in points of the coast of their convenience. I inclose copies of the orders issued to the commanders of the corps under my command and the great crisis in which they were issued will demonstrate that if it had not been for them a large column would not have been attacked, as it was on its march from Holguin to Bayamo.* I have the artillery ready to take advantage of the first chance, which I do not doubt will come as soon as war between Spain and the United States is declared.

“I propose to aid the Americans in every way I can, even if this American intervention takes place without a previous recognition of our Republic, and I tell you this, for, in case my purposes should not merit the approbation of our Government,

* Col. Carlos Garcia, with part of his flying brigade, six hundred infantry, composed of Baracoa, Guantanamo and Jiguani battalions, at El Tamarindo, near Babiney, fought a large Spanish column commanded by Gen. Tejada as it was *en route* from Holguin to Bayamo, attempting to cross the country unmolested under a flag of truce. This same column some days before had sought to cross the province of Holguin also and was heavily chastised by Gen. Menocal's division and the explosion of dynamite mines at Aguacatonos. Several days later, Col. Garcia fought another column from La Mula to Cautillo *en route* from Holguin to Bayamo commanded by the Spanish General, S. R. Marina, on whom he inflicted serious loss.

it may be able to give me contrary orders which I shall, of course, obey. I have just received telegrams from Santiago of which I inclose copies. They confirm more and more my belief that a war between Spain and the United States is on the verge of breaking out, and my plans are to aid the Americans unconditionally and to take advantage of the first opportunity the Spaniards may give me to attack them in the towns.

April 18, 1899.

CALIXTO GARCIA,

Maj.-Gen. Commanding Eastern Department."

In the letter transcribed, Gen. Garcia exposed clearly to the Government of Cuba the sentiment prevalent among the Cuban troops in favor of coöperating with the Americans against the eternal enemy of Cuba's independence. It was logical for them to feel in this way, and I may say without fear of being contradicted that it would not have been prudent and upright to have our army refused a frank and decided coöperation in fighting the common foe. I do not enter into the analysis of the legal point, as to whether our Government conducted the diplomatic negotiations through proper channels to draw from the American administration under President Cleveland, in those critical days, a compact or promise in which some sort of official recognition be accorded our Government. Anyway, it would have been folly, to say nothing of the grave complications which would have ensued, in addition to the world's bitter criticism, if we had refused outright to coöperate in a war which we had been waging alone for three years. The nature of this work does not allow me to dwell on this special subject which is of vital importance.

All efforts of the Spanish commanders to accumulate provisions in the inland fortified towns met with the energetic resistance of the Cuban troops, who were largely reënfined by thousands of new soldiers who joined the patriots, abandoning the towns where they had been during the war. This stubborn resistance of our troops caused Captain-General Blanco some days later to order the evacuation of all the inland fortified towns, some excellent ports of Oriente and towns of minor importance of the west.

The heliographic turrets of the Eastern Department were

likewise abandoned. One after the other—from April 20 to the first week of May—La Piedra, Jiguani, Santa Rita, Bayamo, Cauto Embarcadero, Bueycito, Veguita, Guamo, San Agustin, San Andres, Brenosa, Maniabon, San Manuel, Puerto Padre and other villages and fortifications were abandoned by the Spanish troops after plundering and destroying all the valuable private and official property, as it was impossible to carry it with them on account of the constant harassing by our troops. The Spaniards tried to induce the families to abandon the towns also and accompany them to the cities, telling them that if they stayed, the insurgents would abuse them and plunder their households, but the majority did not heed the advice and remained in their homes. In the Eastern Department, as the villages and towns were evacuated by the Spanish under Cuban musketry fire, our forces entered them in perfect order. General Garcia issued orders for each locality to elect by suffrage its civil officials, and these first elections can be cited as comparable with any in the most civilized countries. Utmost order prevailed in all the towns that the enemy had abandoned, and their inhabitants were satisfied to see their persons and property so well respected by that army of ragged men, who had been long misrepresented to them by the Spaniards. It must not be forgotten that those people who remained in the towns were families of our own soldiers, but many were loyal Spanish subjects. Still others, although native Cubans, had fought against us throughout the war in the guerrillas.

On the 28th of April, General Garcia moved his headquarters to Bayamo, where he received the visit, on May 1, of Lieut. (now Lieut.-Col.) A. S. Rowan, with credentials from Mr. T. Estrada Palma introducing him as a representative of the War Department. Lieutenant Rowan told the General that the American Government was ready to aid the Cubans and that his errand to Cuba was to ascertain what quantity of war material and other supplies were wanted by General Garcia in order to send it immediately to him. General Garcia dispatched Gen. E. Collazo and Lieut.-Col. Chas. Hernandez to accompany Lieutenant Rowan to the United States with instructions as to his opinion on the coming campaign:—

“TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR, U. S. A.

DEAR SIR:—I have had real pleasure in receiving to-day the visit of Mr. A. S. Rowan, who affirms himself to be the bearer of verbal instructions of your department.

After answering through him the questions you ask me, I send Gen. E. Collazo, perfectly authorized to represent me near you. Mr. A. S. Rowan has accomplished his mission entirely to my satisfaction and I should be very glad if you could put him under my command.

I profit by this opportunity to express to you the heartfelt thanks of the Army of the East under my command.

Yours truly,

Bayamo, May 1, 1898.

CALIXTO GARCIA.”

The party started that same day and embarked at the northern coast of Tunis, on May 3, for the United States, where they arrived, after a perilous voyage in an open row-boat, some days later. Gen. E. Collazo was favorably greeted in Washington and received marks of great consideration from Secretary Alger and Gen. Nelson A. Miles.

On May 10, the Cuban Government issued orders to Generals Gomez and Garcia to coöperate with the American army and for them to obey the orders and second the plans of the American Generals.

A close lookout was recommended to the coast-guards, and Col. Thomas Collazo, Chief of the Staff of General Garcia, was directed to embark on the Holguin coast and in a sailboat proceed outward and lie in wait for some vessel of the American Navy to send letters to the War Department. In the latter part of May a large expedition of arms, munitions and rations arrived at the port of Banes; it was the *Florida*, escorted by the American dispatch-boat *Osceola*. In this expedition Gen. Julio Sanguilly and José Lacret arrived with a small regiment of Cuban volunteers. The war material was safely deposited in charge of Gen. L. Feria, but the provisions were distributed by General Lacret among the many starving families that flocked to Banes praying for food. This circumstance caused great suffering, a fortnight later, to three thousand men who were obliged to march to the vicinity of Santiago, through a territory absolutely devoid of victuals,

without rations which otherwise would have served for that toilsome march in which so many Cuban soldiers died from fatigue and lack of food.

On the sixth of June, Lieut.-Col. Chas. Hernandez arrived aboard the U. S. S. *Gloucester* at the Bay of Banes. He brought important orders and news from the War Department relative to the role the Cuban army was to play in the coming campaign against the Spaniards. General Garcia promptly answered the communications on the same night, and the next day the *Gloucester* steamed out of the bay back to the United States to convey the final arrangements decided upon between Generals Miles and Garcia before the American troops should leave their country for the attack on Santiago. With what throbbing anxiety were those papers of General Garcia expected. The military commanders did not try to conceal their joy when the *Gloucester* arrived and the documents were read at headquarters.

Meantime, what had happened on the other side of the Jucaro-Moron trocha? The War Department had also sent to General Gomez an envoy, Mr. Somerford, a newspaper correspondent, asking Gomez for some information about that part of the island and also offering him necessary assistance. The American Vice-Consul at Cardenas, Sr. Juan Joba, proposed to furnish Gomez, in the name of the Administration, with all the war supplies for which he should ask. It appears that General Gomez was too low in his estimate of the needs of his army for he asked only for three small expeditions to be embarked respectively in the provinces of Cienfuegos, Remedios and Sancti Spiritus. Afterwards he changed his order and instructed that one of these expeditions should approach the coast of Camaguey, where it was to embark a brigade and transport it to Matanzas Province. The Administration, however, after conferring with Mr. T. Estrada Palma, sent several well-equipped expeditions of arms and provisions and several hundred Cuban volunteers that were put ashore at different points of the Western Department, to the great disgust of General Gomez, who feared that they would be seized by the enemy as he did not have at his disposal a sufficiently large force to protect the landing

of the war material. In one of these expeditions, the "Maine," a company of American cavalry commanded by Captain Johnson, arrived and was attached for several days to General Gomez's escort, passing them under the orders of Gen. José Miguel Gomez* the hero of Jibaro and Arroyo Blanco, towns which this General captured with the aid of artillery admirably directed by Col. J. Estrampes.

I beg the reader to return to the events that occurred in the Eastern Department after the arrival of the *Florida* expedition at Banes, where about five thousand men had been concentrated by General Garcia to arm themselves with Springfield rifles and two hundred rounds per soldier. On June 13, all these forces had arrived at Mejia (Holguin) already armed and prepared for the operation that was contemplated. Next day, camp was struck and one of the most wonderful efforts of the whole war was performed by the bare-footed, ragged, Cuban infantry; a long and toilsome march under heavy rains, through knee-deep muddy trails, fording or swimming swollen rivers, climbing and sliding mountains while loaded with heavy rifles and two hundred cartridges each; without provisions of any kind whatever till Juan Baron was reached, where for the first time since their departure from Banes the troops got something for their empty stomachs, quinine for their malaria, and rest for their bodies; this two days' stop enabled them to continue their march across the Sierra Maestra to Aserraderos, where they arrived in excellent spirits on the 22nd and the rear guard on the 23rd. General Garcia arrived at Aserraderos, early on the morning of the 19th, where Generals Rabi, Cebreco and Lora were camped with two divisions of the 1st and 2nd army corps. A few hours after his arrival General Garcia paid a visit to Rear-Admiral Sampson on board the *New York*, with whom some agreements were made as to the manner in which the campaign was to be developed.

On June 20, Major-General William R. Shafter went ashore to meet and confer with General Garcia. At this council the Cuban Generals Rabi, Lora, Castillo (D. and J.) and the chiefs of staff of both armies were present. General Garcia's plan of

* Gen. José Miguel Gomez is not related to Gen. Maximo Gomez.

disembarkation was accepted by General Shafter and it was resolved that a demonstration of Cuban forces and of the U. S. Navy be made on the western part of Santiago in order to facilitate the landing of the American troops on the eastern coast at Daiquiri; this landing to be protected by Gen. Demetrio Castillo's brigade, which was composed of troops perfectly familiar with the mining district east of Santiago. It was agreed also to transport 3,000 Cubans from Aserraderos to Siboney to aid the American troops in the attack on the city. The Cuban troops were rationed by order of General Shafter at Aserraderos with hardtack, bacon, canned beef, coffee and sugar. The rations were good and plenty.

Gen. Agustin Cebreco, in compliance with orders from General Garcia, marched with his division on the 21st to Manacal, whence he was to feign an attack on the enemy, west of Santiago; on the same day Col. Carlos Gonzalez embarked with a small brigade of the second division of the second army corps. He was to receive orders from Brig.-Gen. Demetrio Castillo, who was in charge of the forces that were to aid the landing of the American troops at Daiquiri. Brig.-Gen. Francisco Estrada was ordered to take charge of Col. Carlos Garcia's flying brigade that was distributed at Cauto Abajo and on the Holguin-Santiago highway in expectation of fighting the reinforcements that might endeavor to reach Santiago. Col. Carlos Garcia was ordered to General Garcia's staff to assist in the conferences between his father and the American commanders.

Orders had been given since the first days of June to Gen. Salvador Rios, Gen. Luis de Feria and Gen. Pedro Perez, commanders of the Manzanillo, Holguin and Guantanamo Divisions, respectively, to keep a sharp watch on the enemy in case they should try to make a sally towards Santiago in aid of the blockaded city. These orders were repeated several times. Sufficient forces were left to embarrass, harass and delay the enemy on the roads to Santiago, in proximity to Guantanamo, Manzanillo and Holguin.

Gen. Pedro Perez of Guantanamo had, since the arrival of Admiral Sampson's fleet in Cuban waters, rendered most valuable services. To his measures it was due that General

Correa's order (Spanish Minister of War) to reinforce Santiago was not obeyed by the commander of the Guantanamo troops, who was compelled to remain shut up in the city, blockaded by the Navy off Caimanera and on land by the Cubans. Commander McCalla can testify to the valor and discipline of Lieut.-Col. E. Thomas and his battalion and to the fortunate assistance which our soldiers rendered to the Marines in the Caimanera engagements.

The Spanish commander of Holguin was General Luque, who had 12,000 men. Next to General Linares, he was considered the most daring Spanish commander of the department, although his campaign in Oriente does not register one single victory. Nevertheless, everybody expected from him a bold sally with a strong column, and General Garcia, fearing it, gave General Feria a large force with instructions to prevent by all means the advance of Luque toward Santiago and if possible inflict upon him severe loss. He was to follow on the heels of the Spanish column, sending couriers ahead at full speed to headquarters, in case that column should break through the Cuban lines. General Feria, ably aided by his officers and brave soldiers at El Pason River, repulsed Brig.-Gen. Nario, who was in command of the reinforcements, and compelled him to fall back within that city's line of fortifications. If General Luque's pluck had been equal to the height of his fame (for he was called by the Spanish press the Hero of Paso Real), General Linares might have given a little trouble to General Shafter. As it was, he preferred to remain quietly in Holguin while the sovereignty of his country in the new world was being shattered to pieces. Moreover, if he had intended to retreat towards Puerto Principe, as was whispered in the city during those critical days, he would have met Gen. Lope Recio, commander of the Camaguey forces, with a cavalry brigade ready to oppose him. General Garcia had instructed Recio to advance towards Holguin with the cavalry, leaving the infantry camped near the Tunas boundary line in readiness to take into their hands the fleeing enemy.

Of the three commanders to whom General Garcia entrusted the checking of reinforcements, the only one that deserves any criticism is Gen. Salvador Rios, commander of the Man-

zanillo division. It is true that Rios was baffled by Colonel Escario's sudden sally and due credit is given to this Spanish commander for his ability to avoid engagements with the Manzanillo infantry. In excuse for General Rios it may be stated that although his infantry was not able to engage the enemy on account of the impossibility of covering all the roads properly, his cavalry, marching out of Manzanillo at dusk, rather unexpectedly fought the enemy incessantly, as will be explained later in this chapter.

On June 21, Col. Carlos Gonzalez with his brigade was taken to Daiquiri on one of the American transports. General Shafter ordered Gen. W. Ludlow, chief of the Engineer Corps, to build pontoons at the beach of Aserraderos, for the embarkation which was accomplished with considerable trouble.

The landing of Cuban troops at Daiquiri was a wise and able manœuvre that gave the key to the whole invasion of the territory and gave perfect security to the disembarkation of the American troops. The Spanish were menaced by the navy from Punta Cabrera to Punta Berracos, being fired upon along nearly the whole line. Colonel Cebreco was feigning an attack on the west of Santiago. The Spaniards were scattered, holding forts in all the iron-mining region, covering very feebly an extensive territory which they were unable to protect against an enemy already in it and perfectly familiar with every trail, and the powerful fleet that constantly swept the coast with its guns. The assistance of the Cubans in the operation, clearing the way and attacking by land, while the fleet bombarded the fortifications, gave success to the disembarkation of General Shafter's army. This has been passed over in silence by all writers and is one of the facts that I distinctly wish to impress upon the reader. To illustrate the dashing attack of the Cubans by land, it may be well to recollect that at Siboney they entered under the fire of Spanish musketry and of the bomb-shells of the American fleet, compelling the enemy to retreat to Firmeza, and from there to Savilla. In this attack General Castillo suffered a number of casualties, some of them inflicted by the fleet's artillery, proving that the navy did not expect that the Cubans could carry

the village so quickly and under such a hail of bullets from the ships.

At 7 A. M. of the 25th, the Cuban troops began to embark in boats towed by launches of the U. S. N. to the transports that lay a mile and a half off. General Sanchez commanded the forces that were taken on the *Leona*, General Capote those on the *Seneca*, and General Cebreco those on the *Orizaba*. Col. Candelario Cebreco was left in command of the forces on shore at Aserraderos and of those that were detached on duty west of Santiago.

General Garcia, his staff, and Generals J. Rabi, S. Lora and R. Portuondo were invited aboard the *Alamo* by Gen. William Ludlow, who showed himself a perfect gentleman in the highest acceptance those words have; we all knew he was an able engineer and a good West Point scholar before we had the pleasure of meeting him. After that trip, strong ties of warm friendship united us all to General Ludlow, which tightened each day during the campaign, for he was our neighbor in the trenches. During all that period, General Garcia's army happened to be on the right of General Lawton's division, of which Ludlow's brigade was the extreme right.

On the afternoon of the 25th, General Sanchez landed at Siboney and the other Generals with their forces on the morning of the succeeding day. General Garcia established his headquarters in the village and awaited General Shafter's orders. When we jumped out of the surf, an officer approached General Ludlow and informed him hurriedly of what had occurred during his absence. I saw the General look suddenly grave when he learned that Captain Capron had been killed the day before, and he quickly inquired how the fight had begun. The officer could not tell exactly; so many contradictory versions were given that he hardly understood how it came. Later on we heard from our own men and from some correspondents the details of the Guasimas fight, with words of praise on every lip as to the bravery of the Rough Riders and their commanders. But one could hear some criticisms, for the movement ordered by General Wheeler, the gallant old soldier hero of a hundred battles, was considered reckless because such a comparatively small force had

advanced upon a position held by the enemy, whose number no one could exactly tell. It was logical to think that at that point a large force must be camped, considering that all the garrisons of the fortifications of the mining zone had retreated to that point and to Aguadores. The criticisms grew sharper when it was ascertained that General Castillo's forces, after driving the enemy out of Siboney and vicinity, had attacked the retreating Spaniards on the 23rd and skirmished all that day at Las Guasimas, meeting with a strong defense. When this fight of the Rough Riders was referred to General Garcia, he said:—

“It is always of good moral effect to soldiers that have never fought a battle to win the first one and it produces, naturally, an opposite effect on the one that is defeated. The Americans have done well if they have rushed to the front and carried the enemy, even if it was executed in a reckless way. By this time the Spanish soldier is perfectly satisfied that the Yankees are men of pluck. And if, in a couple of more fights, the Americans advance in the same manner, rest assured that as soon as the Spaniards see the blue shirts moving towards them, they won't wait a minute and will take to their heels terror-stricken.”

Our General knew the Spaniards well. He had sized them up accurately in those few sentences, as was demonstrated at the end of the campaign, when the Spanish soldiers were heard to exclaim;—“Oh, those Americans are devils: when they advance one must get out of their way, and d—— quickly too!”

Gen. D. Castillo has been accused of not keeping his appointment on the morning of the 24th to advance on Las Guasimas, and he in defense says that he made no such appointment with any American commander. He also states that he had sent to headquarters ample information of the enemy's position and had put at the disposal of the Americans all the men that as guides and scouts were to aid in the operation, and that he had distinctly informed General Young that he could not go because there would be left in Siboney no senior Cuban commander to receive orders from General Shafter and General Garcia. The latter, with three thousand men, was to disembark that day from Aserraderos. As I have already stated, the forces were not able to embark on the

24th because the pontoon bridge had not been completed, but they were expected to arrive at Siboney on that date.

I firmly believe that General Wheeler did right in pushing forward to Las Guasimas the van of the invading army, but the movement ought to have been combined with another column that should have previously advanced, taking the other trail. If there was a mistake in this fight, it certainly was due only to the lack of a flanking force that would have facilitated the advance of the main column. Col. Leonard Wood did what a good level-headed soldier would have done in similar circumstances—push forward.

In Cuba, a flanking force must always have excellent guides, with a section of *chapeadores*, armed with machete only, to open the way through the thick undergrowth, *bejuco*, and tangled bushes; otherwise the *manigua*—as it is called by the Cubans—is absolutely impenetrable, and deploying in such a country without men that know how to handle the machete is absurd.

The Spanish official report of the engagements sustained on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of June against the Cubans under Col. C. Gonzalez and the Rough Riders commanded by Col. Leonard Wood, is as follows:—

“Santiago de Cuba, June 24th, 1898.

“General Rubin’s column under orders of the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army Corps was attacked yesterday at noon and again in the evening.

“This morning considerable forces with artillery guns made a resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men.

“On our side we had, in the two days, seven dead, José Lances, Captain of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, and Zenon Borregon, second Lieutenant of the same battalion, seriously wounded; Francisco las Tortas, first Lieutenant of the regiment of Royal Artillery, slightly wounded; two privates seriously wounded and two slightly wounded. Various contusions.

“General Rubin had on the heights of Sevilla three companies of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, three of San Fernando, all the detachments from the forts gathered the day before, and two Plasencia guns. Rubin had divided his force in three echelons—as Lieut. Jose Müller * affirms,—

* Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, translated and published by the Navy Department, 1899.

the foremost one under Commander Alcaniz, formed of three companies of Puerto Rico troops and one mobilized company.

"On the 23rd, this echelon alone checked the enemy's advance in the morning and again in the evening, the echelon having been reinforced by one company from San Fernando, half engineers, and two guns. When the battle was over the forces withdrew to their former positions, the echelon remaining on the same site.

"At daybreak on the 24th, the echelon was reinforced by two companies from Talavera, and not only resisted a strong attack of the enemy but also forced the latter to retreat.

"In spite of this advantage, they received orders to withdraw because the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail, and, as there were not forces enough to oppose him, it would have been surrounded. In compliance with the order received, the column withdrew to the city."

If Lieutenant Müller's statement be correct, the enemy had about five hundred men at Las Guasimas on the first echelon, and now it does not appear queer that the Cubans should not be able to carry the position, as they were a much smaller force than their opponents.

General Shafter continued on board the *Segurança* till the road to La Redonda had been opened by the engineers. It was quite difficult to carry him any dispatches when the sea was rough, because the boats could hardly approach the pontoon bridge, and then there was no launch ready to take you to where the *Segurança* was lying, by no means near shore. All the launches were busy landing the regiments and only as a courtesy of the midshipmen in charge could you get aboard the floating headquarters of the 5th Army Corps.

Our troops were ordered to camp on the outskirts of the village and General Cebreco's force on the road to La Redonda. Gen. D. Castillo had organized a good system of receiving daily information from the city and we were pretty well posted on what was going on in Santiago. It was through this channel that General Garcia received and afterward presented to Rear-Admiral Sampson a map of the harbor, with important data of the fortifications, showing where the torpedoes and ships were lying. All this valuable service was performed by Cubans willingly and without remunera-

tion, risking their lives in the city, where, if detected, a summary court-martial would have deprived us of their valuable and much needed assistance.

On the twenty-seventh a dispatch was received at the Cuban Headquarters stating that a large Spanish column had marched out of Manzanillo late in the afternoon of the twenty-second, and as General Pando some days before left Havana via Batabano,—it was supposed for Manzanillo,—gathering first some forces at Jucaro, we inferred that the reinforcements were under his command. How mistaken were we! General Pando, far from coming with these, was travelling through Central America and Mexico *incognito* in pursuit of a wild plan of Spanish colonization. To think that when Spain was about to lose her colonies, literally kicked out of them by an American nation, the chief of staff of Captain-General Blanco should be seeking land concessions for colonies, particularly in America, where Spain's sovereignty was forever doomed!

General Garcia, fully realizing the importance of such news and thinking with foundation that the reinforcements were much larger than they really were, ordered Gen. D. Castillo and Col. C. Garcia to General Shafter's headquarters to give him the details of the dispatch and General Garcia's views of what could be done against the advancing column. We accordingly started out for a voyage to the *Segurança*, that was fully three miles off. By a lucky coincidence we found at the beach a good soul willing to steam us alongside of the flagship. We were politely greeted by the General and after saluting him we informed him of our mission. We stated that General Garcia suggested to him the advisability of sending a strong Cuban force to Aguacate that same day, the twenty-seventh, under Gen. J. Rabi's command. Aguacate was the junction of all the roads from Manzanillo, and he was confident that the enemy would pass through those positions which were unique for checking the enemy and routing him. General Garcia was sure to get his forces there in time to engage the enemy, for the column would certainly be delayed at the passage of the Contramaestre River by General Estrada, to whom orders were to be sent immediately to

make a desperate fight and hold his own till General Rabi should arrive at Aguacate.

General Shafter consulted the maps before him and ascertained through General Garcia's representatives that from Aserraderos the Cuban infantry would be at El Aguacate on the twenty-ninth by making a forced march, if they could be transported that same afternoon to Aserraderos. Meanwhile, General Garcia had given orders to General Rabi to be ready and near; two thousand men were rationed for four days and formed in the streets of Siboney, only waiting for General Shafter's order to embark.

General Shafter suddenly changed his mind, without any apparent cause to justify such change, and said to Castillo and Garcia that he would rather not send any troops to meet the reinforcements, that he needed all the Cubans with his troops, as they were a valuable aid to him; that it was not wise to divide the army now; that if the reinforcements should enter Santiago, he would have thirty-one thousand men to bottle them all up in the city, and that he certainly would not move a single man from the bulk of the army. As he was saying this, Colonel McClernand came in from the salon of the steamer where the typewriters were working incessantly, carrying a printed list of transports with all the important data concerning accommodation and other particulars. When the General saw him, he said, "Never mind it, sir, I don't need that list now."

We dropped the conversation and begged the General's permission to withdraw, but he detained us asking our opinion as to a proposed advance to Aguadores and as to the strength of Santiago's fortifications. Then the General sent word to General Garcia not to worry about the reinforcements and that next day he (Shafter) would go ashore.

Had the Cuban forces been allowed to go and meet the enemy—either by sea to Aserraderos or by land, cutting through the Spanish line of fortifications—Colonel Escario would have been routed or captured and then at least a part of the glory that the Americans monopolized with the surrender of Santiago would have gone to the credit of the Cubans. As it was, we were slandered bitterly by the war-

correspondents (with very few exceptions) who, in their wrath against us for not furnishing them servants and horses as they expected we would, wrote down statements that only existed in their excited imaginations.

We had left our packs, saddle-horses and tents at Aserraderos, whence they were to go all around to Juan Baron, Cauto Abajo, Sabanilla and Ramon de las Yaguas, to Siboney. Nearly all of our generals and officers were afoot, from the time of their arrival at Daiquiri and Siboney till the eighth of July, when they arrived at our camp at Quintero Hill. Col. F. Dieguez arrived at Siboney on the twenty-seventh with one hundred cavalry, and as soon as the horses were seen the petitions from the excursionists increased to such an extent that there was one who asked me to dismount some of the cavalry, so as to lend them the horses till the campaign was over. It was difficult to make them understand that we could not do such things. Some of them would ask an officer to let him hire one of the soldiers of his company, stating that the man would receive good pay. There was no end to these and other requests.

Miss Clara Barton had arrived at Siboney with a large cargo of provisions which had been intended to be distributed in the western part of Cuba. She sent word to General Garcia that the Red Cross would gladly aid his army in every possible way and that she desired to know if there were any indigent families near Siboney, so as to distribute food amongst them. General Garcia ordered an aide-de-camp of his to express in his name to Miss Clara Barton that he appreciated dearly and accepted the aid of the Red Cross and that he would be glad to give Miss Barton any information regarding indigent Cubans, who were many but lived far away from Siboney. That same day some nurses landed and took charge of the Cuban Hospital which was under the direction of the Cuban surgeon Dr. F. Veranes. These nurses performed wonderfully good service during the days that we were in Siboney, and all said in their favor is little compared to what they deserve. Soon, all the inhabitants of the mountains flocked down to Siboney, as they had been told that the Red Cross was distributing food and clothes to everybody. Hundreds

of poor settled down permanently in the village or its vicinity, giving to the streets a strong oriental aspect and odor, which made the most indifferent man shrink from the scene, besides causing some Americans to think that such an unfortunate collection were a fair representation of the Cuban people and members of Garcia's Army.

What seems to have caused considerable comment and unjust criticism by the many jolly excursionists that accompanied the Shafter expedition to Cuba was the personal appearance of our soldiers. The sad and weary gaze of these unfortunate men of the tropics, tired and worn out from privations of all sorts during months and years of toil, so different from the bold, defiant look of the free citizen of the north, a happy possessor of physical and moral energies accumulated during a lifetime of welfare, their calm and unconcerned attitude—not indolent as has been erroneously supposed—toward men and things that surrounded them, compared to the business-like, inquisitive brand-new and glory-seeking soldiers of optimistic inclinations just out from the land of liberty, caused those incipient war-critics to draw an unfair parallel without stopping to consider that the skeptical and unconcerned appearance of the first was a logical result of a rough campaign of numberless hardships, as was the optimistic and brilliant disposition of the others, the product of a charming civilized life of liberty, love and relative prosperity.

On the twenty-ninth, General Shafter came ashore and ordered General Garcia to move his troops next morning towards Santiago. On the thirtieth, at 6 A. M., we broke camp and three hours later we pitched it at El Salado. General Shafter moved all his army excepting Sheffield's division, and camped at La Redondita. Col. Carlos Gonzalez continued in the van where he had been since the first days, and his force was the foremost and nearest to the enemy. Scouting parties from this column went out daily to reconnoiter the enemy and the nature of the ground. General Chaffee accompanied them, once obtaining valuable knowledge that served him later. A council presided over by General Shafter at his headquarters, was held on the thirtieth at three o'clock P. M. attended by nearly all the American commanders, in addition

to Gen. Demetrio Castillo and Colonels Collazo and Garcia, representatives of Gen. Calixto Garcia. The combined movements of the next day's attack were discussed. General Lawton was to take El Caney, and General Wheeler, San Juan Hill block house. General Garcia was to move to Marianage and wait until Lawton should capture the village and then cross to Ducourau and keeping on Lawton's right flank advance to Santiago. The most optimistic views were expressed by those that took part in the discussion of the proposed attacks, and when we left the council we were quite satisfied that the next day's fight would not amount to anything worth considering.

Early on the morning of the first of June, complying with the orders above mentioned, General Garcia occupied Marianage, while General Lawton's division moved towards El Caney and General Sumner's towards San Juan. General Garcia distributed his forces, with orders to be ready for any emergency, in the following manner:—Two companies of the "Santiago" regiment under Col. F. Dieguez were ordered to the Masonry Bridge on the Caney-Santiago road with pickets at Santa Cruz and Ducourau. The infantry was stationed at the bottom of the Marianage plateau on the trail leading to San Juan, and in these positions the Cuban forces remained during the attacks of San Juan and Caney. Marianage is the ruins of a plantation, magnificently situated on a hill that commands all the territory facing Caney, Ducourau and San Juan. From the plateau we could clearly see both battles as they were fought simultaneously, and the incidents of both were eagerly followed by Generals Garcia and Rabi and their staffs. Col. Evan Miles, who was also awaiting orders at Marianage with his colored regulars, soon received instructions to move down to Caney, which he promptly did. At our left, facing San Juan, was El Pozo, where Grimes's battery was situated, and a detachment of Cubans had been left with it; the battery was soon quieted by the accurate shots of the Spanish artillery, which did some damage to our men, amongst whom may be mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel Paneque, who was badly wounded by a bomb-shell.

The advance on San Juan was brilliant but of the most reck-

less character. We could see the men climb the hill slowly, steadily, but without losing an inch of ground so dearly gained, and we could see bunches of five stand their own without flinching, and advance half way up the hill without firing a shot, while the Spaniards behind the trenches were blazing away at them. Turning our eyes towards El Caney we could see two horse-shoe formed clouds of smoke, which denoted that the battle there was raging furiously, both the defenders and the assailants manifesting, for hours of incessant fighting, unsurpassed bravery. Charge after charge was made, only to be again and again repulsed. Our anxiety had no limits as we watched those fights go on. We expected to be utilized in some way, and every Cuban heart was beating for envy and disappointment, being compelled to wait there between the two fights, inactive, while the men who came to aid us in our struggle were being killed in heaps by *our* enemy, who opened immense lanes into the serried ranks of our allies. They fought admirably, regardless of the losses to which they were thus being subjected, and they well deserved the victory so dearly won.

Those fights reminded us how the Cubans under Antonio Maceo used to attack. He would throw his infantry against an intrenched enemy regardless of the consequences. He did not possess artillery to shake the foundations of a fort or to clear a line of trenches, preparing thus for the infantry's attack. He counted only upon the pluck and stubbornness of his men, for he could not count on anything else. His self-reliance was supreme, and we believed unique, till we beheld the battles of San Juan and El Caney.

Meantime our infantry was receiving a hail of bullets from the enemy of San Juan Hill, and at four o'clock P. M., when roster was called, before moving to Ducourau it was learned at headquarters that we had over a hundred casualties without firing in return a single shot at the enemy.

Colonel Gonzalez, who with his men entered the Caney engagement with General Lawton's division, was warmly congratulated by his commanders for his behavior during the day, and especial praise was accorded Major Victor Duany, who with a Cuban Company had flanked the Spanish position and ably

assisted in the victory of the American troops. Brig.-Gen. Vara del Rey made a heroic defense of the village, and, had he had double the number of men at his disposal, the victory of the day would unquestionably have been his.

The Americans had abandoned, all along the trail, haversacks, blanket-rolls and all sorts of objects. Cubans, as well as Americans, who needed any of these articles freely helped themselves. Col. Evan Miles took a little more care with the property of his soldiers, and as he went down from Marianage to Caney, when the firing burst out, he ordered his men to lay their impedimenta alongside the Caney main road, leaving a man from each company to watch over the heaps of haversacks and blanket-rolls. In either case the surprise of our soldiers was great to see how unconcernedly the American soldier would throw aside these things so important in war. A mambi never parts from his *jolongo* (haversack); he fights, eats and sleeps with it. There is nothing more wearisome and discouraging to a soldier, after a battle in which his nervous system has been greatly strained by the work and emotions undergone, than to find himself at the end, when he most needs to repair his energies, without those articles so indispensable. Whoever has had any sort of practical war training fully appreciates the value and necessity of clinging to his *jolongo* and blanket, through thick and thin.

At nightfall our forces marched to Ducourau, where headquarters were established. Gen. A. Cebreco was ordered to camp at Sabana Ingenio.

I beg the reader to remember that General Lawton was to advance to Santiago after taking El Caney. But in General Shafter's plans it was not calculated what was going to happen. Lawton had suffered considerably in the assault of the village and was in no condition to continue that same day toward the beleaguered city. Next day before daybreak we marched from Ducourau and advanced towards Santiago, our van skirmishing with some Spanish detachments of the fortified zone (all the mountains back of Santiago) who were already in retreat to Santiago. We took possession of La Caridad Hill where General Garcia pitched his tent, while General Lora captured the San Miguel blockhouse, the village of Cua-

bitas and the water works; Generals Capote, Cebreco and Sanchez destroyed the railroad of San Luis, lifting and bending the rails, and burning the bridge named Purgatorio.

As we appeared on the height of La Caridad and Quintero facing the city, the Spaniards opened a heavy musket fire on us. During all that day it continued and General Garcia ordered Cebreco to deploy a line of sharpshooters that should keep an intermittent and effective fire on the Spanish trenches, especially at two batteries that had opened fire on us and were causing considerable damage. Col. F. Dieguez was detached with his cavalry on a reconnoitering tour towards the river Gascon and the Cobre road. Immediately afterwards the Spaniards sent from the fleet some Marines and disembarked them near Matadero. A considerable force could be seen moving to and fro at the Cobre entrance and about the Plaza de Toros, expecting no doubt an attack at those points. General Garcia never left the saddle until we were in possession of all the points mentioned.

At noon, Monsieur E. Cheux came out from the city, stating to General Garcia that the French consul was about to leave the city with all the foreign subjects. The General informed M. Cheux that the consul would be cordially welcomed within our lines. At 3 o'clock P. M. the consul, followed by about four hundred persons of both sexes, left the city by the Cuabitas road and were conducted far beyond the range of the Spanish fire.

When night came strong pickets were detached on our flanks to avoid a surprise from our enemy, as we were absolutely isolated from the American Army, which was at least one mile to our left. Captain A. Escalante carried an order to General Cebreco that evening to harass the enemy during the night with guerillas, which was done at about half past nine with a very unfortunate and unexpected result; the Spaniards, believing that they were assaulted, broke out with a heavy fire, and the Americans, in their turn, mistaking it for an advance of the enemy to recover the positions they had lost the day before, opened fire also, and in a few minutes there was such a thundering that the Cubans themselves concluded to blaze away in the direction of the city. This general alarm caused

Shafter to issue an order to General Garcia not to repeat the night harassment thereafter, for while it had the desired effect on the enemy it disturbed his own troops in their slumber.

Next day was the memorable third of July. General Lawton with other generals visited General Garcia and they all rode around to the positions held by the Cubans. While they were at La Caridad Hill, whence an excellent view of the city and harbor could be had, the Spanish fleet stupidly steamed out of the harbor to their inevitable doom, leaving the city without the protection of those floating, impregnable fortresses whose mighty guns were sufficient to clear the hills of an enemy far inferior in strength.

At 11 A. M. General Garcia received information that the enemy were landing forces by rail at Dos Bocas and along the line. He ordered General Sanchez's column to march immediately and reinforce General Lora, who was occupying the railroad. General Garcia himself started out towards the enemy with his staff and infantry escort and took command of both forces, advancing with them to San Vicente. This village was carried by a detachment of said escort under Lieutenant Arcia, who occupied it until General Lora, after taking the heliograph turret of Boniato, advanced to the village. When General Garcia returned he changed the headquarters to Cuabitás leaving in the trenches of Caridad and Quintero Hills the forces of Generals Capote and Cebreco.

That afternoon General Garcia was visited by Generals Lawton, Ludlow, Chaffee and Col. E. Miles, and a very important conference took place, in which very pessimistic views as to the situation were advanced by the visitors again and again. General Garcia as often gave assurances to the American generals that his army and he were greatly indebted to the American nation, and that the latter could positively count on the unconditional support of the Cubans. The American generals withdrew, feeling that they had done their full duty in behalf of the army under their command and satisfied that the practical knowledge of Spanish warfare and procedure possessed by the Cuban general was a satisfactory guarantee to them.

That day Colonel Escario with his column from Manzanillo arrived at the city. General Garcia has been held responsible

for the entrance of these reinforcements to the beleaguered city on the ground that he did not check their advance to Santiago, as it *now* appears that General Shafter expected he would do. I respectfully refer the reader to the conference held on board the *Segurança* the twenty-seventh of June, when General Garcia showed to General Shafter the necessity of sending General Rabi and troops to El Aguacate to intercept the above-mentioned reinforcements, a proposition that General Shafter refused.

Late in the afternoon of the third of July, our troops (General Lora) occupied the village of Dos Bocas on the railroad to San Luis. As may be observed, Lora's forces were gradually moving towards this town and the railroad was absolutely ours. All communications from the city to the fortified zone were cut. On the fourth of July we received the official report of the destruction of Cervera's fleet, also the news of the entrance and occupation of El Cobre, Bartolon, Monte Real, Coletto, Mazamorra and San Miguel, and the news that General Shafter had prolonged for twenty-four hours the truce which had been granted to the city the day before, allowing the families to evacuate. Before 6 o'clock A. M. of the fifth they began to leave the city. As they walked out they formed a column more than three miles long. Men, women and children flocked to Cuabitas, terror-stricken, fearing that the cannonade would commence at any moment and they would not have time to escape therefrom. The majority of them went out of Santiago without any other garments besides those they wore, and very few had the foresight to provide themselves with enough food for a few days. Everybody thought that in a couple of hours the fortifications of Santiago were to be a mass of ruins, figuring that the Americans were to open fire with no less than sixty enormous calibre siege guns, that being the story prevalent among them. Of course we did not dare to inform them of the true state of affairs, as that would tend towards increasing their already great distraction. General Garcia did his best to alleviate their many wants and desires; notwithstanding, many perished from want of food, disease and exposure. Subsequently, General Shafter ordered rations to be sent to them, but there were

hardly enough pack-trains to attend to the transportation of the rations for the troops. When the much-needed rations could finally be delivered them, alas, it was too late, for starvation had played its part.

As pack-trains have been incidentally mentioned, I venture to say that they were not sufficient in number to provide for the entire attacking forces, and as may be supposed, the Cuban troops were the ones to suffer. Lieut.-Col. J. M. Galdos, Chief Commissary of the Cuban Army, pitched his tent alongside of Major Gallagher's, Chief Commissary of the 5th Army Corps, at La Redondita, close to General Shafter's headquarters. It was fully nine miles from the Cuban trenches to the Commissary's camp, and daily the Cuban troops had to tramp that distance for rations, or go without. This necessary grub-parade caused the ever thoughtful and economical American correspondents to open their eyes in astonishment and exclaim that the Cuban allies, instead of fighting, were plundering Shafter's depots, thereby inconsiderately exhausting the war fund.

On the sixth of July, General Cebreco received an official report that Lieutenant-Colonel Vaillant, commander of the Cuban forces at Aserraderos under Colonel Cebreco, had captured Rear-Admiral Cervera and nearly all the survivors of the destroyed Spanish fleet, others escaping probably to Santiago. The prisoners were delivered to officers of the American fleet and receipts given the Cuban officers in exchange for them. It has possibly not been known into whose hands Cervera and his men first fell upon reaching the shore, so the above will explain.

As General Lawton had manifested to General Garcia his desire to move the artillery batteries to La Caridad, where our forces had dug out rifle-pits during four days of constant work, we moved to Loma Quintero the forces that held La Caridad, and those of Quintero along the crests of the hills as far as San Pablo. On the seventh of July, General Estrada arrived with 800 infantry and all the impedimenta of our army that had been left when we embarked at Aserraderos to go around the hills. General Estrada, as may be remembered, was in command of the flying brigade which was to engage

the enemy, should it come from Manzanillo, as actually happened.

The report that Col. Rafael Montalvo gave [he was in command at the Aguacate engagement] says very little that the reader does not already know. But it is convenient and just to affirm that Colonel Montalvo fought tenaciously with his 800 recruits at El Aguacate, and that he did his best to check the enemy, who outnumbered him four to one.

Colonel Escario entered Palma Soriano with a large quantity of stretchers, leaving all his dead unburied on the field. In that town he gathered fresh troops from the garrison, and leaving all the wounded marched to Santiago after having given his men ample time to recuperate their energies. Lieut.-Col. Alfredo Lora with a cavalry troop, and Lieut.-Col. Carlos Poey with General Garcia's cavalry escort, skirmished with Escario's column between Baire and Palma Soriano, both sustaining heavy loss.

A painful errand took the author a few months ago to Washington, where he accidentally met some good old friends of the Santiago campaign. Naturally their conversation turned upon the events of the war in which the deceased Gen. Calixto Garcia had so actively and ably coöperated with his army. An old veteran with a big, noble heart, a very dear friend of the writer, introduced him to General ——, who at once was recognized as one of his friends of the campaign. Through the courtesy of this gentleman a copy was received of Lieut. José Müller's *Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba*, then just off the press, published by the *Office of Naval Intelligence*. From the introduction to this official edition the following words are quoted :

“ Among the newly translated chapters, the one giving the diary of General Escario's march, with 3,752 men, from Manzanillo to Santiago, a distance of 52 leagues through the enemy's country, is one of great interest. Considering the nature of the country, which forced them generally to march single file, the heavy rains and the continual harassment of the Cubans, the effectiveness of which is shown by the large number of killed and wounded on both sides, it may be classed as one of the most noticeable military feats of the war. It shows what the Cubans did towards the fall of Santiago, and a study

of the situation will be interesting, considering what would have been the temporary effect if Escario's march had been unopposed and he had arrived at Santiago with his force unimpaired a day or two before that critical period—July 2—just previous to the departure and destruction of Cervera's fleet.

December 31, 1898.

RICHARDSON CLOVER,
Chief Intelligence Officer.

We herewith furnish a complete copy of the Spanish Colonel's diary, which, as Mr. Richardson Clover says, will be of great interest to study. The broad views and good sense of the American reader will, naturally, make due allowance for the bombastic style of the document, appreciating that it comes from a soldier of Spanish schooling. Ample conclusions can be drawn as to the credit due the Cuban troops, and the loss inflicted upon Escario's column during the march towards Santiago.

(Diary of the operations of campaign of the forces of the Manzanillo division from June 22 to July 3, 1898.)

“FROM MANZANILLO TO BAYAMO.

“In compliance with orders from the lieutenant-general, commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, in his cablegram of the twentieth inst., ordering that the forces of the Manzanillo division should proceed to Santiago de Cuba, Colonel Frederico Escario, for the time being commander-general of said division, having made the necessary preparations for such a long journey, having properly equipped the troops and rationed them for six days, commenced the march on the 22d at the head of a column composed of the first and second battalions of the Isabel la Catolica regiment of infantry, No. 75; the first battalion of the Andalusia regiment, No. 52; the Alcantara Peninsular battalion, No. 3; the battalion of Puerto Rico chasseurs, No. 19; the second section of the first battery of the fifth mountain regiment; part of the eighth company of the first regiment of sappers; mounted guerillas from Calicito, Bayamo and Manzanillo; five medical officers and thirty men of the medical department destined for the Santiago hospitals, and the tenth company of the transportation column in charge of thirty rations of hard-tack (galleta), 15,000 extra rations loaded on 148 mules and 50 private beasts of burden properly loaded.

“This column, comprising a total of 3,752 men, left Manzanillo at five o'clock P. M. and at nightfall reached Palmas Altas,

where its commander gave orders to encamp for the night, which, however, did not afford the soldiers the rest that was intended, owing to a steady downpour so that only a few could lie down.

"The twenty-third dawned more brightly than the preceding day; the camp was struck, the column reorganized, and the difficult march recommenced at 5:30. High weeds had to be cut down to open a road on the left bank of the Yara River, which route the commander chose in order to obviate passing through towns which might be occupied by the enemy, thereby complying with the order to avoid encounters, contained in the cablegram of the twentieth above referred to.

"The column passed through the Don Pedro plain and arrived at dark at the ford of the Yara river, near the town of the same name. Orders were given to encamp there. The column had been harassed all day, especially while preparing to occupy the camp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which lasted ten minutes, killing one of our men and wounding three. The fire was answered by the vanguard of the column. The usual reconnoissance having been made by the mounted force, which reported that the enemy had withdrawn, the column encamped and the night was spent without further events and under more favorable conditions than the previous night. A clear sky and a dense grove allowed our soldiers comparative rest until daybreak of the twenty-fourth, when the column, rising at the sound of reveille, after drinking coffee, was again formed and organized by six o'clock, when it continued its march through Arroyo Pavon, Ana Lopez and Sabaña la Loma, sustaining slight skirmishes in which the column had one man killed and one man wounded. The column encamped on the banks of the Canabacoa River.

"On the twenty-fifth, at the usual hour, the camp of the preceding day was struck and the column reorganized while heavy showers were falling. The march was continued through Las Peladas, Palmarito and across the Buey and Yao Rivers. The camp was pitched at Babatuaba. The same as yesterday, the column was harassed all day, always repulsing and dispersing the enemy. One man was killed during the skirmishes.

"The night passed quietly, and at 6:30 A. M. of the twenty-sixth the march was resumed. The day was eventful and of excellent moral and material results for the Spanish cause, as will be seen from the fact that our forces entered the city of Bayamo after a long march and pursued and scattered hostile detachments through the heights of San Francisco, Peralejo, across the Maybay River, and at Almirante, where the camp was pitched, not without some resistance from the

enemy, who was severely punished by the accurate fire of the column, without causing us the least damage.

"The diary of those days would not be complete without an account of the entrance into Bayamo above referred to. This manœuvre was undertaken, contrary to the orders to avoid encounters contained in said cablegram of the twentieth from the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, for the reason that the commander of the column thought it would be discouraging to the soldiers to be so near said city without entering it and that their spirits would rise, on the other hand, if they were allowed to do so and to show the enemy and the ungrateful people of Bayamo that there were Spaniards left in Cuba. For this purpose there was strength and time enough left that day. The commander therefore decided to explain these reasons to the commander-in-chief and ordered that Col. Manuel Ruiz, second commander of the column, should occupy the city with the cavalry and 600 infantry, the latter to be divided into two columns and the cavalry to form the third. Interpreting faithfully the wishes and orders of Colonel Escario, Colonel Ruiz left the camp at Almirante at 3 o'clock P. M. after the troops had taken their first mess, and divided his forces into the three groups mentioned, himself taking command of one of the groups of infantry, placing the other in charge of Lieut.-Col. Baldomero Barbon, the first commander of the Alcantara battalion, and the mounted force in charge of Luis Torrecilla, commander of the first battalion of the Isabel la Católica regiment. These three columns of attack, advancing steadily on three different points, succeeded in approaching the city without disturbance or interruption. Evidently the enemy was desirous of saving his fire, for alarm signals were heard and groups were seen running from one place to another of the precinct, leaving no doubt that the enemy was near.

"The columns in the meantime continued to advance rapidly and in silence, deployed in perfect order of battle and thus arrived at the banks of the Bayamo River, where hostile forces tried to check them by a steady musketry fire from the city. But this attempt became futile when the signal of attack was given. At the sound of it, our soldiers, arms in hand and without firing a single shot, crossed the river at a run. With only one casualty and without further resistance, they triumphantly entered the stronghold of the enemies of Spain. In disorderly and precipitate flight that savage tribe retreated. Our forces went to occupy the forts and principal avenues, and in separate groups they reconnoitered the whole city, gathering up at the military commandancia of the insurgents several packages of their records and correspondence.

The station and part of the telegraph line which the rebels had established with Jiguani and Santa Rita were wrecked.

"No information concerning the enemy could be obtained from the people of Bayamo, who, as usual, kept silent; a few only opened their doors from sheer curiosity, plainly showing in their faces the disgust they felt at the presence of Spanish soldiers on that soil where it had been believed that they would never again set foot.

"Our forces then returned to the camp at Almirante. The result of that day's work was not known at first, but it was afterwards learned that the enemy had 19 casualties, 10 killed and 9 wounded. The night at Almirante passed without further incidents, and thus ended the first part of what may be called the glorious march from Manzanillo to Santiago.

"FROM BAYAMO TO BAIRE.

"At daybreak of the twenty-seventh, the camp at Almirante was struck and the column continued its march across the plain of Guanabano, through Chapala and across the Cautillo River, destroying on their way the enemy's telegraph line from Bayamo to Santa Rita, where the camp was pitched for the night, which was spent without any further incidents.

"At 6 A. M. of the twenty-eighth, the march was resumed, the column proceeding to Baire *via* Cruz Alta, Jiguani River, Upper Jiguani, Piedra de Oro, Granizo, Cruz del Yarey and Salada. The enemy, in greater number than on preceding days and in control of the heights which overlook the ford of the Jiguani River, tried to prevent our forces from crossing, but their intention was foiled by timely flank attacks ordered by the commander of the column, protected by accurate artillery fire. After the river had been forded, the march was continued without interruption to Cruz del Yarey, where the rebels appeared again, offering less resistance, and we defeated them once more. They seemed inclined, however, to continue to impede the march, which was apparent upon the arrival of our column at the ruins of what was formerly the town of Baire. They were waiting there, and as soon as they espied the column they opened a galling musket fire, which was silenced by the rapid advance of our vanguard, who compelled them to retreat in shameful and precipitate flight. In this encounter, Col. Manuel Ruiz, second commander of the column, was wounded and his horse killed under him; four soldiers were killed and five wounded. The column encamped and spent the night at Baire.

"The high weeds which during almost all those days completely covered the soldiers and hampered their progress,

causing at the same time a suffocating heat, which made it almost impossible to breathe, and cutting off the road, which had to be opened by dint of hard work, rendered the march extremely laborious and often made it necessary to proceed in single file. The sickness caused by the inclement weather and the hard work of these operations; the ever increasing convoy of stretchers; the consideration that one-half of the journey had been accomplished; and the further very important consideration that the column had arrived at a place where it would be easy to throw the enemy off the track, as they would not know what direction our forces might take (there being three roads leading from here to Santiago); all these were reasons which the commander of the column took into consideration when he decided to suspend the march and rest during the day of the twenty-ninth. It was so ordered owing to fatigue, but the enemy kept harassing us and we had three more wounded.

“ LA MANTONIA.

“At daybreak of the thirtieth, the camp at Baire was struck and the column proceeded to Palma Soriana, where the wounded and dead were left, and continued its march *via* Ratonera, Doncella Creek and the Contramaestre River to La Mantonia, where the camp was pitched and the night spent.

“Before the column was deployed on the road to Ratonera, the enemy from intrenched positions opened fire, which was answered and silenced by the first forces leaving the camp. The commander of the column foresaw that such an attack would be repeated, and in order to obviate the casualties, thus further complying with the order of the aforesaid cablegram from the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, he changed the route, and our forces, thus eluding the ambushes, arrived at the slopes of the Doncella Creek, the ford of which was reached by a narrow pass and difficult ravine. The rebels occupied positions here. Our vanguard brought them out without answering their fire. When the column had been reconcentrated after fording the Doncella, they prepared to ford the Contramaestre River, where the enemy was awaiting us, which fact they had announced themselves by written challenges and threats which they had left along the road. Lieut.-Col. Baldomero Barbon of the Alcantara battalion, who since Colonel Ruiz was wounded had been in command of one-half of the vanguard brigade, deployed his forces in perfect order of battle and advanced resolutely. Commanding positions overlooked the clear and unobstructed road which the column had to follow, after coming out of the mountains

through the narrow valley of the Contramaestre, and moreover they had to scale the steep and tortuous ascent of the opposite bank. Without other shelter than the high weeds, which, as usual, impeded the march, without other trenches than their own hearts, these brave soldiers with their commander at their head, advanced calmly and in perfect order, accepting the challenge which had been addressed to them. The enemy had told the truth. There they were in large numbers occupying those favorable positions which would have been impregnable if they had been held by any one who knew how to defend them. But not expecting that we would accept the challenge, they allowed themselves to be surprised by a lively musket fire and effective artillery discharges, which demoralized and dispersed them, and the rapid advance of our forces rushing upon them arms in hand did not give them a chance to rally. The enemy, being unable to do much firing, retreated with little resistance and having suffered a number of casualties left the field and their positions to those who, understanding the sacred duty imposed upon honor, had known how to pick up the glove that had been thrown to them. Regardless of danger and without measuring their strength they had marched on unflinchingly in search of the death with which they had been threatened. Having crossed the Contramaestre and passed through extensive pastures, the column arrived at a farm (finca) known as La Mantonia, where a number of huts of all sizes and many recent tracks indicated the proximity of a large hostile force. And indeed, soon after the first forces of the vanguard had entered that large encampment, the enemy tried to check our advance by a galling fire from the slope of a mountain where they were entrenched, controlling a line of 1,200 meters. Through this it was necessary for us to pass unprotected, as the high weeds made any deployment of the column and advance of cavalry impossible. By order of Lieutenant-Colonel Barbon, the two companies of the vanguard of the Alcantara battalion in command of Francisco Gonzalez, who himself rendered an exact account of the hostile position, advanced steadily and without answering the fire, following the only passable trail, and engaged the hostile position on the left flank, compelling the enemy to abandon the trenches, leaving us a great deal of ammunition, mostly of the Remington type.

“In the fierce battles of that day Captain Jenaro Ramiro, of the Alcantara battalion, and nine privates were wounded and five killed.

“AGUACATE.

“At daybreak of July 1 the column resumed the march and

reached the ford of the Guarinao river, after passing through Las Lajas, where the enemy held the advantageous positions from which our vanguard routed them without much resistance. After crossing the Guarinao, small detachments sent out surprised two ambuscades; the column sustained insignificant skirmishes with outposts and small reconnoitering parties, which indicated that large hostile forces were not far off. Subsequent events showed that this theory was correct. When the column arrived at a rugged place dominated by steep heights forming an amphitheatre, they discovered in its center a camp of recent construction, sufficiently large to accommodate 2,000 men. A rapid glance convinced us that the site was specially adapted for an ambushade. Colonel Escario, realizing this and taking precautions accordingly, gave orders for the column to proceed in its advance and for the artillery to take positions. The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at once from Aguacate Hill, the station of our heliograph, and adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive intrenched line. Our soldiers manœuvred as though on drill, and advancing steadily two-thirds of the column entered the battle, and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not sufficient to make them retreat or even to check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism, they advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artillery and skillfully guided by their chiefs and by the cry "Long live Spain!" and, charging with bayonets, they simultaneously took these heights which were so difficult and dangerous to scale, driving the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather up their dead and wounded. Seventeen dead were left on the field, also ammunition of various modern types. There were moments during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy and the order with which they fought gave the impression that they might belong to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached Colonel Escario's ears. Fearing that this might really be the case, he gave orders to suspend the fire and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But this precaution was useless, and the commander becoming convinced that he was fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile positions to be taken. To do the enemy justice it must be stated that they defended those well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and that they rose to unusual heights that day, making this the fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Manzanillo to Santiago and one of the most remarkable ones of the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of seven dead, and one lieutenant and forty-two privates wounded. Large pools of blood on the battle-field showed the severe chastise-

ment which the enemy had suffered at our hands. When the column had been reorganized, the march was continued to Arroyo Blanco, where the night was spent.

“FROM ARROYO BLANCO TO SANTIAGO.

“From Arroyo Blanco, where the column had encamped during the night, it proceeded to Palma Soriano, fighting the enemy all along the road, on both sides of which the latter occupied good positions and endeavored to detain the column at any price. Engaging the enemy in front and on the flank, a passage was forced and the column reached Palma Soriano at 3 o'clock P. M. The battle of that day caused us four dead and six wounded.

“From Palma Soriano, the commander of the column, by heliogram sent to San Luis, announced his arrival to the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps at Santiago, and in reply he was notified that large United States forces had landed and were surrounding a part of the city, and that it was, therefore, of urgent necessity to reinforce the place, the defenders of which were few, and to force the march as much as possible. Desirous of complying with this order, Colonel Escario, who realized that the soldiers must be prepared to accomplish the rest of the journey with the greatest speed possible, had the following order of the column, dated at Palma Soriano, July 2, 1898, read to the companies:—

‘Soldiers:—We left Manzanillo because the enemy was threatening Santiago de Cuba. We must hasten to the assistance of our comrades; our honor, which is the honor of our fathers, calls us there.

‘I, who am proud of having been able to be with you in these days when our country requires of us twofold energy and courage, address these few words to you in order to tell you that I am highly pleased with your behavior and to point out to you the necessity of making a supreme effort to save the honor of our beloved country, as we have done so far.

‘Then say with me, Long live Spain! and let us go in search of these who are desirous of finding out what each one of you is worth. The victory is ours.

‘Your Colonel,

‘ESCARIO.’

“After a plentiful and nourishing meal the troops were ordered to rest. At 2 o'clock in the night the reveille was sounded, and the column, organizing immediately, resumed its march, which the soldiers tried to hasten as much as possible, with no other stimulus than that imposed by duty, of

which they were constantly reminded by the cannonades that could be heard in the distance, in the direction of Santiago. With slight skirmishes, and without eating or resting, these brave soldiers reached the pass of Bayamo, where they had the first view of the city of Santiago. Here it was learned that on the same day our fleet, forcing the entrance of the channel which was blockaded by the American ships, had gone out in search of death, which is the fate reserved for heroes.

"It was now between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning of the third, and when Colonel Escario noted the intense cannonade in the direction of the city, he organized a flying column which was to march as fast as possible, leaving the rest of the column with the train, in command of Col. Ruiz Ranoy, to follow at once.

"The flying column was formed of the first battalion of the Isabel la Catolica Regiment in command of Commander Torrecilla, with thirty of the strongest men of each company, the whole cavalry and two artillery pieces. The command of this column was placed in charge of Lieut-Col. Baldomero Barbon of the Alcantara battalion.

"This column advanced towards Puerto Bayamo, from which point Colonel Escario proceeded to the city with a section of cavalry, arriving there at 3 o'clock P. M. The rest of the flying column reached Santiago between 4 and 4:30, and the nucleus of the column with the train between 9 and 10 o'clock P. M.

"Those worthy chiefs, officers and long-suffering soldiers, that handful of brave men, constantly defeating the enemy who persistently tried to check them, rising superior to the inclement weather, to sickness and fatigue, had arrived at the post of honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that when they came in sight of the city, they took off their hats and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unanimous shout of 'Long live Spain!' which rose spontaneously from those noble hearts.

"The casualties during the whole march were 1 colonel, 2 officers and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. 28,670 Mauser cartridges had been used and 38 rounds of artillery fired.

"At 10 o'clock the last rear guard entered the city of Santiago de Cuba, and the battalions at once repaired to the different trenches assigned to them by the chief of staff, and from that time on they formed part of the forces defending the city.

Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898."

On the tenth of July we were again asked to leave our positions to allow them to be occupied by part of General Lawton's division, and we accordingly pushed our forces to San Pedrito, San Pedro and Gascon.

At Dos Caminos and upon the Jesus Maria Hill, Spanish cavalry and infantry held intrenched positions. General Garcia ordered a flank movement down from the left of the Jesus Maria intrenchments. The movement caused considerable panic among the enemy, who immediately abandoned both positions and retreated to the city, fearing to be isolated. Two infantry battalions with two twelve-pound Hotchkiss guns under Col. Carlos Garcia occupied the Jesus Maria Hill and a cavalry detachment was sent to Dos Caminos. On June 12 our forces were again compelled to abandon their positions at San Pedrito and San Pedro to leave them ready and very well intrenched, too, for the American forces.

General Garcia transferred his headquarters to Casa Azul (Gascon). At every new position that the Cubans would occupy, new trenches had to be dug, only to give them up to the Americans a few days later; it so happened that all the trenches made from La Caridad along the crests of the hills to the right, as far as Caimanes, were made by our men; and very painfully at that, for the hard earth had to be dug with sharpened sticks, as they had no shovels. As I was directing the construction of a line of trenches, an officer of the transit survey commission came along and was so shocked at seeing my men working with such tools that he offered to send me promptly next day picks and shovels. I am yet waiting for them. On the thirteenth General Garcia received a note from Major-General Miles, who had arrived and wished to see and confer with him. A most cordial meeting was that of the commanders of the American and Cuban armies, and the most exquisite courtesy and consideration was shown by the former to the latter, who esteemed those attentions highly.

Purposely I have not said a word in this chapter about the numberless times the flags of truce appeared on the tops of trenches and forts.

A dispatch was received at headquarters in which General Garcia was informed of the proposed sally of a Spanish

column from Mayari to Holguin. Col. Luis Marti was ordered to march immediately with his regiment and some forces of Colonel Enamorado's Tunas brigade. Colonel Marti, making forced marches, arrived in time to rout and stampede the enemy, winning one of the last battles of the war and certainly the luckiest and most brilliant of all. He captured two field pieces, a rapid-fire gun and all the convoy of ammunition that the Spanish commander in his evacuation of Mayari was taking to Holguin. Great slaughter was inflicted on the enemy in this engagement. Had it not been for the opportune marching of Colonel Marti's column from the Gascon heights near Santiago to Mayari, the enemy would not perhaps have suffered as severely as it did. The fleeing enemy was again attacked and defeated by Colonels M. Rodriguez and F. Salazar before entering Holguin.

On the fourteenth, the news of the capitulation of Santiago spread about the camps and was greeted with shouts of joy. Two days later, General Garcia visited the American headquarters, where he learned of the terms accepted by General Toral. We were absolutely excluded from all participation in the surrender of the city. General Garcia's interview with General Shafter was short and of imposing character. General Garcia did not go back to his camp of Casa Azul after the embarrassing and painful conference he had held with the American general. His grief and disappointment were such that he remained that night at Cuabitas, fearing we all should detect in him his great chagrin.

The fact, coming suddenly, utterly stunned him for a time, and the most sinister and cruel apprehensions for the future overpowered him. How was he to reveal to his army the cruel and awful truth? How was he to tell his men that our allies of yesterday with whom we had so willingly and nobly coöperated to overthrow the enemy, not needing our services further, had pushed us aside with contempt and away from the laurels and glory of a victory that was common to both armies, the Cuban and the American?

It is impossible to describe the first effect of the intelligence upon our troops. The rumors were received with general incredulity. Official confirmation of Shafter's order followed,

and disbelief gave place to excitement. Speculation as to what General Garcia would do covered a wide range.

In any case, never has an event come at a more critical moment. It caused such agitation that only General Garcia's extraordinary diplomacy and the great influence he exerted over his troops dominated the dangerous situation. The lofty spirit that inspired his famous letter to General Shafter reveals his genius. The American people acknowledged General Shafter's mistake some months later, showing marks of esteem and admiration for the commander of the Cubans, who had been so unjustly wronged.

General Garcia left the vicinity of Santiago for the interior on the twentieth of July, with all the forces that had assisted in the surrender of the city, leaving near the city only General Cebreco with a small force, in order to facilitate public intercourse between the inhabitants of the city and those that resided in the country. General Garcia immediately gave orders to these forces to continue the attack on the towns and cities held by the Spaniards. A very interesting and important communication from General S. Rios was received on the twenty-sixth of July, in which this general asked the commander of the department what he was to answer the Spanish forces of Manzanillo, who asked General Garcia's permission to leave the city and cross the country to Holguin, unmolested. General Garcia denied the petition, point blank. As the attacks on Holguin were increasing every day, the Spanish General Luque resolved to abandon the port of Gibara and concentrated all the forces of his division at Holguin. General Garcia occupied the city immediately and the good behavior of the Cuban troops there can be testified to by all the Spanish inhabitants, who were in a great majority, and by Commander Washburn Maynard, U. S. N., of the gunboat *Nashville*, one of the most able and distinguished officers of the American fleet.

On the sixteenth of August, General Luque attempted to capture Gibara but was compelled to desist from such an insane scheme, after a serious engagement with Generals Capote and Feria, at Auras, that lasted five hours. In the event of an attack on the city, General Garcia placed two brigades as a reserve, holding the mountain passes of

Embarcadero and Cupercillo, under Colonels M. Rodriguez and C. Garcia and in coöperation with Captain Maynard. Thus the *Nashville* could shell the enemy in combination with our attack on the advancing Spaniards.

On the seventeenth the Spanish gun-boat *Infanta Ysabel*, flying a flag of truce, entered the port with orders from Captain-General Blanco announcing a suspension of hostilities. A commission composed of three officers—American, Cuban and Spanish—was sent to General Luque with the orders of General Blanco.

On the eighteenth of August, an American transport arrived with the official news that the Protocol of Peace had been signed by President McKinley on the twelfth of August. General Garcia gave orders to all our forces to suspend hostilities.

This chapter is an exact narration of the events that occurred from the time when the rumors of an American-Spanish war were received at General Garcia's headquarters, up to the date when, officially, it was learned that the war between Spain and the United States had ended.

HABANA, April 29th, 1899.

Castro Garcia
General de Brigada.
E. L. G.



George F. W. Holman
Lieut. U.S.A.

CHAPTER III.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE *MAINE*.

BY

LIEUT. GEO. F. W. HOLMAN, U. S. N.

THE destruction of the *Maine* in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on February 15, 1898, is an event occupying a middle place between the long series of incidents connected with the struggles of the Cubans for release from the galling rule of Spain and the beginning of the actual war in which, as a result of the Cuban struggles, the United States finally became involved. Spain strenuously disavowed having caused, either officially or ultra-officially, the annihilation of this powerful battleship, and indeed, claimed, through its Court of Inquiry investigating the circumstances, that the *Maine* was destroyed by causes entirely internal, namely, the accidental explosion of one or more of her magazines. The United States, on the other hand, after a most thorough investigation of twenty-three days of patient labor by a Court of Inquiry composed of some of the most scientific men of the Navy, presided over by Captain Sampson, who soon after became the Admiral of glorious victories in the East, reached the conclusion that the loss of the battleship was due, not to internal causes, but to the springing of a mine planted in close proximity to the moorings which had been assigned her, in the harbor, by the Spanish officials. This finding of the Court of Inquiry of the United States was most conclusively substantiated by the condition of the wreck above and below water, which gave evidence that, although one or more magazines had exploded, throwing upward and outward heavy masses of the decks and sides of the ship, the primary source of damage originated from a mine exploded beneath the vessel's bottom, as manifested by the principal fact that the keel

had been thrown upward in an inverted V shape and broken in two with the break remaining about thirty feet above its normal position ; by the further principal fact that the outside bottom plating was bent inward from outward in a reversed V shape ; by the still further principal fact that the outer shell of the ship, on the port forward side, had been thrown upward to a point about thirty-four feet above its normal position ; and by many other facts impossible to have been produced save by a submarine mine. A full report of the Court of Inquiry was transmitted to our Congress by the President of the United States in his Message of March 28, 1898.

While the people of the United States were intensely inflamed by the outrage, and desired war at once, believing, with the greater part of the world, that the disaster was attributable to an outside source and not to internal accident, they nevertheless followed the counsels of their leaders and patiently awaited the result of the cool investigation ordered by them ; and when, after over two months of waiting, war was finally declared, the nation was content to accept the judgment of the President, which based the war on broad humanitarian principles for the liberation of an oppressed people, and cited the *Maine* disaster as merely an incident, one among many, that finally led to the inevitable struggle between the United States and Spain.

To go back a little, the sympathies of the people of the United States, always in favor of the Cubans as against Spain, had become pronounced to such an extent in the debates in our Congress and in the articles of the press, that between the public of the United States and that of Spain a great animosity and a strong desire for immediate hostilities developed, which required tactful exertions on the part of the diplomatic corps of both countries to keep in repression. Among other acts of conciliation adopted by our government was the discontinuance, with regard to Cuba, of the practice in vogue among all civilized nations from times of long ago—that of sending men-of-war on amicable visits to the ports of foreign nations. Realizing the possibility that the appearance of one of our war vessels in a Cuban

port during the period of strained relations between the United States and Spain might be regarded by the ignorant class of the latter country as a menace, and might consequently occasion a pretext for an outbreak of the unruly mob, our government refrained from despatching our ships of war to Cuban waters for any purpose whatever; but a time arrived when it was believed to be advisable to act otherwise in this respect.

In January, 1898, the relations between the Spaniards under arms and the Spaniards not enrolled as combatants, many on both sides being classed, on the one hand, as adherents of the aggressive General Weyler, and, on the other, as those of the more pacific General Blanco, together with the further confusion caused by the acts of the Cubans themselves represented by diverse parties and interests, led to rioting in the City of Havana, which, never becoming serious, nevertheless threatened the safety and property of all people within its limits. (For the protection of American citizens and their interests it became obligatory on our government to display our flag in the troubled region.) Our State Department acted through correspondence with the State Department of Spain in this direction with a careful regard for the peculiarities of the situation. The result of the diplomatic correspondence between the two governments was that the best interests of both countries would be observed by sending a man-of-war of the United States to Havana on a visit of a thoroughly amicable nature. The Spanish, in turn, intimated their intention of returning the courtesy by sending one of their battleships on a similiar visit to New York. The ship chosen by the United States for this interchange of visits was the battleship *Maine*. The Spaniards, on their part, selected the armored cruiser *Vizcaya*.

The *Maine*, built at the New York Navy Yard, was a second-class battleship, which went into commission September 17, 1895; she was a powerful vessel, as shown by the following details of structure, armament, and personnel:—Extreme length, 324 feet; beam, 57 feet; draught, 22 feet 1 inch; displacement, 6,650 tons; horse power, 9,290; speed, 17.45 knots; she was subdivided into 214 water-tight compartments. Her armor

protection was a heavy armored belt of 180 feet on each side, joined by heavy steel transverse bulkheads forward and aft, and roofed by a strong protective deck. Forward and abaft the armored portion of the ship, cellulose protection was relied upon. Two turrets, in barbette, of heavy steel, one forward and one aft, arranged in the echelon system, carried, each, two 10-inch breech-loading rifled guns. Six 6-inch breech-loading rifles, seven 6-pounder and eight 1-pounder rapid firing rifles completed her gun battery. A powerful ram and four torpedo tubes were an additional instalment to her powers, aggressive and defensive. She was completely fitted with all the modern appliances for pumping, lighting, interior and exterior signaling, internal communication, ventilating, and all other requirements necessary to the efficiency of a battleship. Her crew numbered 354 all told, 26 of whom were officers. The officers of the *Maine* at the time of the disaster were: Captain Charles D. Sigsbee; Executive Officer, Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright; Navigator, Lieutenant George F. W. Holman; Lieutenants, John Hood, Carl W. Jungren, George P. Blow, John J. Blandin, and Friend W. Jenkins; Naval Cadets, Jonas H. Holden, Wat T. Cluverius, Jr., Amon Bronson, Jr., and David F. Boyd, Jr.; Surgeon, Lucien G. Heneberger; Paymaster, Charles M. Ray; Chief Engineer, Charles P. Howell; Passed Assistant Engineer, Frederic C. Bowers; Assistant Engineers, John R. Morris and Darwin R. Merritt; Naval Cadets (engineer division), Pope Washington and Arthur Crenshaw; Chaplain, John P. Chidwick; First Lieutenant of Marines, Albertus W. Catlin; Boatswain, Francis E. Larkin; Gunner, Joseph Hill; Carpenter, George Helms; Pay-Clerk, Brent McCarthy.

The *Maine*, from the date of her commissioning, proved herself an exceptionally efficient ship, in calm and in storm, and met with but few of the mishaps incident to such complicated structures as are battleships. She did active and almost continuous cruising along the eastern coast of the United States from between the extreme limits of Bar Harbor, Maine, in the north, to New Orleans, Louisiana, in the south; at first, under the command of Captain A. S. Crowninshield, later Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; afterwards

under the command of Captain Sigsbee. She participated in all the drills of the North Atlantic Squadron; acted successfully, under Captain Sigsbee, as the senior officer's ship of the squadron detailed by the Navy Department for the repression of filibustering operations in the Cuban War with Spain; and visited many of our cities on occasions of public moment.

On Monday night, January 24, 1898, the *Maine*, then with the North Atlantic Squadron in the roads of Dry Tortugas, Florida, received orders to proceed to Havana. She immediately got under way and arrived at her destination the following morning, where she was boarded by the Spanish government pilot and was by him conducted to the mooring buoy where she subsequently met her fate. Captain Sigsbee's orders from our government were simply to make a friendly visit, all the details of his action in carrying out these orders being left to his discretion. This officer acted with marked tact and judgment under trying circumstances. The customary gun salutes were exchanged, and the usual interchange of official visits was strictly carried out; but beyond this, the visit of the *Maine* as a friendly tentative proved a failure. Captain Sigsbee emphasized the fact that he appeared on a friendly mission and gave all opportunities consistent with dignity for the establishment of social relations. While the representatives of all factions were punctiliously polite, the Spaniards of the higher classes in general were cold and non-responsive. The autonomists were apparently suspicious. [The Spaniards of the lower classes frequently manifested a disposition to show their dislike openly, and none but the Cubans gave a hearty welcome. 2

No open hostility was shown by any one, but it was deemed prudent to take all measures possible for the guard and safety of the ship consistent with her presence in the port of a friendly nation. Extra sentries were kept posted and vigilant lookout was maintained night and day, but nothing of an unusual or threatening nature was observed at any time.

At 9:40 P. M., on the 15th of February, 1898, nearly all the officers and crew not on duty having retired for the night, a heavy explosion, unmistakably that of a submarine mine, took place under the forward part of the ship in the neigh-

borhood of the forward magazines. This explosion was followed by another one, almost simultaneous, evidently that of one or more of the magazines ignited by the submarine mine. The forward part of the ship was at once reduced to a mass of wreckage, the after part remaining comparatively unharmed. The ship sank at once to the bottom in six fathoms of water, the poop deck being nearly awash, until later, when the vessel sank deep in the mud.

The scene was one impossible to depict; eye witnesses only, of the terrible calamity, could realize the horror of the situation. The placid waters of the harbor were suddenly lashed into foam in the neighborhood of the doomed ship; a heavy column of flame and smoke, dotted with innumerable fragments of the once mighty vessel, shot upward into the calm obscurity of the night; the waters around were sprinkled with the forms of men—some, through almost a miraculous escape, uninjured; others wounded; others dead, but apparently intact in person; others torn into fragments. In the bosom of the ship, as afterwards ascertained by the divers, hundreds of men lay drowned in their hammocks in such a tangle that even attempt at escape had evidently been impossible; others, to whom a brief interval of time, limited by minutes, had been given for an effort to reach the upper decks, were caught by the rushing waters and floating débris sweeping aft, in compartments and in places remote from the hatches which they were striving to reach as the only exit from the death trap below. Among the latter were two officers, Lieutenant Friend W. Jenkins and Assistant Engineer Darwin R. Merritt.

The loss of men all told, counting those who were immediately killed and those who subsequently died of their wounds, was 266, and the saved were 88.

The survivors exerted their utmost efforts in the rescue of the wounded, and in the hopeless attempt to save the ship. Captain Sigsbee directed the operations with a cool bravery paralleled by few episodes in the world's history, ably seconded by his executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright—later the hero of the *Gloucester* at the naval battle off Santiago, and earnestly aided by all the others. Fire was raging in the upheaved part of the wreck forward; ammunition stored in

emergency magazines in different parts of the superstructure of the ship was exploding at frequent intervals. Only two boats were left available for the work of rescue. Under Captain Sigsbee's direction, some officers were sent to the neighborhood of the fire to suppress it if possible; other officers and men were detailed to the boats with orders to rescue the men in the water. All proceedings were initiated and executed with the coolness attending an ordinary daily drill, manifesting a state of discipline of which the Navy and the nation may be forever proud.

It was believed by many on board, if not by all, that the explosion was the beginning of an attack by the Spaniards. In pursuance of this belief, orders were given to procure arms, which, however, were not obtainable, the ship having sunk so quickly that all armories and racks for arms were at once submerged. The survivors found themselves a defenseless group gathered together on the poop, the only remaining dry and intact part of the ship at the time—some clad in the uniform of the day; others partly robed; still others only in their night clothing. To whomever the dastardly deed was attributable, it soon became evident that a continuance of the attack was not contemplated, but that all in the vicinity were lending their aid to the rescue of the few who were left.

The noise of the explosion had aroused not only the harbor, but the entire city, and even the outlying suburbs. In the immediate neighborhood of the *Maine* was the Spanish cruiser *Alfonso XII.* and the Ward Line steamer *City of Washington.* The greatest activity was displayed by these vessels in sending boats to the scene of the disaster, and notable credit is due to the officers and crew of the *City of Washington* for bravery evinced on their part. Certain small row-boats plying a passenger trade in the harbor also contributed to the work of rescue. In a short time all of the men afloat were picked up out of the water and taken—some to the *Alfonso XII.*, others to the *City of Washington*, and others to the hospitals on shore, receiving everywhere proper attention from the surgeons. Captain Sigsbee, remaining on board the wreck, dispatched officers in all possible directions to make a muster of the saved, and not until this had been done, and it had long

since become evident that no more could be accomplished for his ship and that no further advantage was to be gained by exposing his own life and the lives of those whom he retained on board as assistants, did he finally give the order to abandon the wreck. He himself was the last to leave, stepping from the now all but submerged poop deck into his gig with the deliberate calm dignity befitting a captain who, with his ship sunk under him, was nevertheless not vanquished in spirit.

Captain Sigsbee, with his officers, went on board the Ward Line steamer *City of Washington* for the night. The following day, all of the wounded who were able to travel, and all of the officers and men whom it was not necessary to retain in Havana in the interests of the *Maine*, were sent by steamer to Key West, Florida. Captain Sigsbee, with a small staff of officers retained to assist him, occupied quarters at hotels in the city. The badly wounded were transferred from the *Alfonso XII.* and the *City of Washington* to hospitals on shore.

Work was at once begun in various lines : that of recovering the bodies of the dead ; of making preliminary investigations as to the cause of the disaster ; and of recovering from the wreck such articles of the equipment of the ship as were still above the water line or accessible to divers. This property was put on board the U. S. Despatch Steamer *Fern* and the U. S. Light House Tender *Mangrove*, which arrived in port from Key West the day following the explosion in answer to a request by cable from Captain Sigsbee. The Spanish officials expressed profound sympathy for the occurrence, and disclaimed any governmental knowledge of its cause. On the afternoon of February 17, impressive funeral services at the municipal palace were held over nineteen bodies, the first recovered, which, after the services in the palace, were taken to the Colon Cemetery escorted by one of the most imposing processions, civic, naval, and military, that had been witnessed in Havana for a long period of years. Every effort was made by the Spaniards to express sympathy on a magnificent scale.

On the 21st of February, a Court of Inquiry, ordered by Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief of the United States force on the North Atlantic Sta-

tion, convened on board the U. S. Light House Tender *Mangrove* in the harbor of Havana. The Court was composed of Captain William T. Sampson, President; Captain French E. Chadwick and Lieutenant-Commander William P. Potter, Members; and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, Judge Advocate. The Court made a most patient, thorough and searching investigation into all matters pertaining to the destruction of the *Maine*, examining the wreck in detail, above and below the water line, with the assistance of expert Naval Constructors and divers, and examining all witnesses whose testimony promised to throw light, in the faintest degree, on the subject. Eighteen days of this investigation were held on board the U. S. Light House Tender *Mangrove* in the Harbor of Havana, and five days on board the U. S. Battleship *Iowa* off Key West, Florida.

The primary object of a naval court of inquiry, in the case of damage to naval property, is to determine whether or not blame for this damage should attach to any officer in whose charge this property may be. The finding of the Court in the case of the *Maine* is of historic interest. The official report reads as follows :

“ After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the Court finds as follows :

“ 1. That the United States Battleship *Maine* arrived in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 fathoms of water, by the regular Government pilot.

“ The United States consul-general at Havana had notified the authorities at that place, the previous evening, of the intended arrival of the *Maine*.

“ 2. The state of discipline on board the *Maine* was excellent, and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly carried out.

“ All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled.

“ Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there.

“The magazines and shell rooms were always locked after having been opened, and after the destruction of the *Maine* the keys were found in their proper place in the captain's cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening at 8 p. m.

“The temperatures of the magazines and shell rooms were taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after 10-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the *Maine* was destroyed.

“The torpedo war heads were all stowed in the after part of the ship, under the ward room, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the *Maine*.

“The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft, and remote from the scene of the explosion.

“Waste was carefully looked after on board the *Maine* to obviate danger. Special orders in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer.

“Varnishes, driers, alcohol and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the *Maine*.

“The medical stores were stowed aft, under the ward room, and remote from the scene of the explosion.

“No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other storerooms.

“The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the forward magazines and shell rooms, four were empty, namely: B3, B4, B5, B6. A15 had been in use that day, and A16 was full of New River coal. This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and on the fourth side at this time, on account of bunkers B4 and B6 being empty. This bunker, A16, had been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty.

“The fire alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the *Maine*.

“The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a compara-

tively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable watch.

“These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the divers, and are in a fair condition.

“On the night of the destruction of the *Maine*, everything had been reported secure for the night at 8 p. m. by reliable persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the *Maine* was destroyed the ship was quiet, and, therefore, least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board.

EXPLOSIONS.

“3. The destruction of the *Maine* occurred at 9:40 p. m. on the 15th day of February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the *Maine*.

CONDITION OF THE WRECK.

“4. The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the Court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of the forward part.

“The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however, established by the testimony:

“A portion of the port side of the protective deck, which extends from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and over to port. The main deck, from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and slightly over to

starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after part.

"This was, in the opinion of the Court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the *Maine*.

"5. At frame 17, the outer shell of the ship, from a point $11\frac{1}{2}$ feet from the middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore about 34 feet above where it should be had the ship sunk uninjured.

"The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V shape (Δ), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 32 feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating, extending forward.

"At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is about 6 feet above the surface of the water, and about 30 feet above its normal position.


"In the opinion of the Court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship.

"6. The Court finds that the loss of the *Maine* on the occasion named was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel.

"7. In the opinion of the Court the *Maine* was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines.

"8. The Court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine* upon any person or persons."

George F. W. Holman
Lieut. U.S.N.



A. G. Calkins

CHAPTER IV.

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.

BY

LIEUT. C. G. CALKINS, U. S. N.

NOT long ago the Philippine Archipelago was nothing but a geographical expression to most of us. Now it threatens to become an interminable problem in our political future and appeals to the interest of millions of eager Americans. It may be worth while to discuss the historic event which brought about this transformation. Even personal impressions and incidental corrections may, perhaps, be set forth without suspicion of vanity or pedantry. For instance, it is worth noting that the Philippine Islands were discovered by Commodore Dewey before May 1, 1898. The work done by the Navy in the campaigns of 1898 was based quite as much on mental preparation as on that splendid, though incomplete, material equipment which has been one of the most picturesque features of our national progress since 1885. Given the constant factors of loyalty and discipline, the problems of war are solved by taking thought before putting on the panoply of battle.

When the Philippine Islands had to be studied, it appeared that sources of information were neither numerous nor interesting. Beside a few rare old books of rambling gossip about monastic affairs, there are two or three modern works blending scientific fragments with travelers' tales. Vague consular documents relating chiefly to commerce have also been printed. But the true basis of the campaign was contained in the portfolio of charts of the China Sea and Eastern Archipelago. The modern arts of navigation and pilotage reduce themselves to the interpretation of charts, and the tactics of naval warfare as well as strategy in general are only special

applications of the same method. These graphic representations are supplemented by volumes of Sailing Directions, which attempt verbal expression for hydrographic and topographic detail. Special interest attached to the *Estado General de la Armada*, or Navy List of Spain, which enumerates the armament of ships and the accomplishments and decorations of officers with elaborate candor. We knew the force of the Spanish squadron in every detail, and were informed in regard to the names and ages of all officers on duty in the Philippines. But no minute comparisons were attempted. Our confidence was founded on national and personal qualities and convictions.

After buying every chart of the Philippines in Hong Kong and examining the approaches to Manila, it became plain that no strong defensive combination was ready to oppose our advance on that capital. The situation might have justified the removal of the Spanish squadron to some place of greater tactical advantage, but there were political and other considerations to oppose such action. It did not appear that forts commanding the entrance to Manila Bay had been constructed during the three centuries of Spanish domination, and it was felt that no improvised batteries or torpedo-lines could serve as barriers for both channels. Once inside the bay, our fleet would find convenient anchorage anywhere within a circle twenty miles in diameter. Security would be attained as soon as the Spanish fleet was disabled and the batteries silenced or isolated from support.

While it was known that Spain had a more numerous squadron in the Archipelago than we had on the Asiatic station, there was more reason to dread their dispersion than their concentration at Manila. Light draught and local experience should have given them many advantages in a dodging campaign. If concentrated, their ships would have more men afloat and nearly as many modern rifled guns as we carried, but they had no ship equal to the *Olympia* in all round effectiveness, to the *Baltimore* in weight of metal, or to the *Raleigh* in rapid fire. Moreover, they had "lame ducks" well known at the Hong Kong dock-yards. Therefore we counted on finding them at anchor and disposed for fighting under the

protection of shore-batteries, under conditions implying discouragement and anticipation of defeat.

Our own preparations began with the choice of an objective. Ten days after the destruction of the *Maine*, while most of us were still holding that tragedy an accident, the Commander-in-Chief was informed that his squadron must be ready to attack the Philippines if war were declared. Concentration was immediately directed. The *Olympia* and *Petrel* were already at Hong Kong; the *Boston* and *Concord* hurried thither from Korea; the *Raleigh*, and later the revenue cutter *Hugh McCulloch*, came north from the Indian Ocean via Singapore. Last of all, and not a day too soon, came the *Baltimore* from Honolulu. There was a scanty margin of time for cleaning her bottom and filling her coal bunkers after the British authorities had issued their proclamation of neutrality. Two small steamers, the *Nan-Shan* and the *Zafro*, were purchased and prepared for service as colliers or tenders. There was time for the discussion of this gathering and an exchange of reassuring editorials between colonial and metropolitan journals. Manila was cheered from Madrid by statements denying that our concentration had any serious meaning, and depreciating our equipment for attack. But this report, reaching the Philippines during the last week of April, came too late to restore public confidence.

After coaling, the ships were all painted a dull greenish gray,—“wet moon color,” as the Spanish Admiral named it when prescribing a tardy imitation. The tint selected was found to blend naturally with the waters of Manila Bay. Another important detail was the distribution of ammunition. All the stock on hand, including a supply brought out by the *Baltimore*, was divided according to the batteries of the different ships. Some attempt was also made to get rid of superfluous wood-work to reduce the danger from sparks and splinters in action. So much had to be left in place that the precaution appeared suggestive rather than final. Fortunately the enemy's shells did not complete the demonstration of this well-founded opinion.

Changes in *personnel* had also to be considered. The Commanding Officer of the *Boston* had served his time on the sta-

tion and his relief was at hand. But Captain Wildes wanted to stick to his ship to test the discipline which he had spent thirty months in establishing. Therefore Captain Lamberton joined the *Olympia* as Chief-of-Staff. Lieutenant Elliot and other officers had also voluntarily prolonged their term of service. There were cases where there seemed no room for choice. Both the Captain and Executive Officer of the *Olympia* had been stricken by climatic disease before war was declared. Captain Gridley had not been ill until after the ship reached Hong Kong in February, and he insisted on retaining his command. He performed all his responsible duties with unflinching skill and with characteristic coolness and courtesy until the battle was over. A month later he died on his way home, a willing sacrifice to his country and his profession. Lieutenant-Commander Paine had suffered longer in his effort to complete a three-years' cruise without surrendering to the climate. The doctors were kind and inflexible, and he was sent home in April. He had been an eager and active officer for thirty-three years, two-thirds of which had been passed in the grade of lieutenant, and there was much regret that he should be forced to miss this opportunity of employing his recognized talents in working a battery in action.

Lieutenant Rees came from the old *Monocacy*, which was laid up at Shanghai, and was assigned to duty as Executive of the *Olympia*. He was followed by several officers and most of the crew of that antique side-wheeler, and every ship had her full complement. Altogether our force was about 1,750 men. A few Chinamen were missing at the last moment; a painter with twenty years of naval service, some stewards, and several mess-attendants deserted in Hong Kong. The Chinese who remained showed no fear in action and could bear comparison with any other race for cool industry and cheerful curiosity.

The *Baltimore* having made good use of the days of grace following the proclamation of neutrality, the flagship led the last group of ships out of the hospitable harbor of Hong Kong on April 25. As we passed the vessels of the British fleet, their bulwarks were thronged with eager soldiers and sailors. The men-of-war might not cheer, but the convales-



U. S. FLEET IN THE HARBOR OF HONG KONG.

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH FURNISHED BY LIBERTY CALKINS, SHOWING ADMIRAL DEWEY'S
FLEET AT ANCHOR, JUST PREVIOUS TO SAILING FOR MANILA TO
DESTROY THE SPANISH FLEET.

cent soldiers of the hospital-hulk were able to express British feeling by a hearty round of applause. We were going to war, and they felt both sympathy and envy. Our own men were cheerful and confident; ready to trust their guns, their ships, their Commander-in-Chief and themselves.

There could be little doubt as to our objective. "Proceed to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture or destroy vessels. Use utmost endeavor." This was the President's message, a model of wholesome elasticity and inspiring brevity. Had it been written a month later all exhortation might have been omitted. It soon came to be an axiom that Admiral Dewey would be strenuous and thorough in all his undertakings. Some New York papers had ventured to interpret the gathering of ships at Hong Kong to mean that they were to come to the Atlantic. The odd notion of a local war between two nations with world-wide interests still survived. Our commerce in the Pacific demanded protection. Spain's colonies invited attack. Beside the military weakness which exposed their capital and their naval stations, there were elements of moral weakness and strategic confusion in the condition of the Philippines. Much had to be conceded to the claims of prestige and sentiment. We had reason to hope for the concentration of the Spanish Squadron at Manila, to hold that capital and to suppress a renewal of the Tagalo insurrection of 1896. Dispersion would have baffled our purpose, and dodging might have prolonged the life of Montojo's fleet. Its prompt destruction involved, as we now see, not only the moral conquest of the Archipelago, but also the confusion of Spain's counsels and the diversion of her most powerful squadron from operations in the Atlantic.

Two restless days and nights were spent in Mirs Bay, completing material preparations and awaiting the last remnants of official instruction and casual information. Our visit to this region drew from the Manila press a sarcastic appeal to know how long we would "hide our flag on the inhospitable coasts of China." Did we intend to continue "wasting coal and hoarding ammunition" until the war was over? This was printed April 27, the very day we sailed from Mirs

Bay and shaped our course southeast for the shores of Luzon.

The situation might have seemed to justify some address to our ship's companies, some appeal to their loyalty as Americans, to their energy as fighting seamen. Fortunately the enemy saved us the trouble. Every public authority in Manila, Governor-General, Alcaldo and Archbishop, had burst into eloquence upon the declaration of war. The staple of these addresses was ever the same. Americans were abused for oppressing "Indians," hating religion and lacking courage. General Augustin's bitter words were published in every ship: "A squadron manned by foreigners possessing neither instruction nor discipline is preparing to come to this Archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honor and liberty." Whatever the effect may have been in Manila this address roused an excellent fighting spirit among our men. On the *Olympia* at least, nothing more was needed except a quiet lesson from Captain Gridley to the thirty men who were to point the guns. At dusk on Saturday evening he reminded them that we were at war with Spain and that it was the duty of every man to do his best, to waste no ammunition, but to take deadly aim and keep it up until the enemy was beaten. Nothing more was needed to prepare them for their Sunday morning's work.

The squadron formed in double column for a passage of 630 miles, maintaining a speed of about eight knots an hour. This low speed was adopted to give training to watch officers and engineers and also to show consideration for the smaller and slower vessels of our fleet. The force was made up of cruisers only; there were no ironclads and no torpedo boats. But it could hardly be called a homogeneous squadron. The *Olympia* had tried to combine many forms of power, and European criticism has said that she is "over-engined and overgunned"; while every gun was welcome, she had no chance to use her speed in this campaign. Her armor is confined to her turrets, where it was obstructive as well as protective in action. The heavy battery of the *Baltimore* gave moral as well as material effect to her bulky outlines, but she was not well-found in rapid-fire guns. The *Boston* is an early example of a good type, but she has her steering-

engine entirely exposed. The *Raleigh* has been said by a high authority to have "nothing good about her but her guns," but nothing else but her guns had anything to do with the coming battle. No battery could be better served or better fitted for the destruction of Spanish cruisers than the five-inch rapid-fire guns of the *Raleigh*. The *Concord* and *Petrel* have ever been reckoned as handy vessels for cruising and for inshore work generally. They showed themselves fit to form in line of battle, and developed every unit of power in their batteries. No battleship was needed to make this squadron effective and, for the work in sight, invincible. But these qualities could only be demonstrated by fighting.

The sea was smooth, and the passage from China to Luzon was uneventful. On the third night out, in the dark hours of the morning, we made the land near Cape Bolinao. A dark mass and a rank tropical odor revealed the great island. Daylight showed leagues of mangrove swamp backed by ridges of rock, covered with scrubby timber, with lofty peaks farther inland. Rather barren for the tropics it seemed, but the coast is bold with landmarks for safe navigation. The *Boston* and *Concord* were sent ahead to reconnoiter Subic Bay, and later the *Baltimore* was detached to support them. The wake of this advance squadron was strewn with cabinet-work and lumber. Clearing ship for action is a destructive yet inconclusive process which appeals to some boyish or primitive instinct of sailor-men, and the task was prosecuted with erratic vigor.

In the afternoon the southwestern cape of Luzon was rounded, and the advance section of our fleet was discovered lying peacefully off the entrance of Subic Bay. The narrow channel was unfortified and the navy-yard was open to attack. But our game was not there, and the scouting cruisers gathered like a pack of hounds at fault. There was time before dark for a final council, and the captains were called on board the *Olympia*. About sunset Captain Gridley was directed to lead the squadron through the Boca Grande, the wide southern channel of entrance to Manila Bay. The other ships were to follow the *Olympia*, guided by a narrow ray from her stern lantern, each ship turning in the visible wake

which trailed after the file-leader. All lights except these stern lanterns had been masked or extinguished during the night. A track was laid off on the chart and approved by the Commander-in-Chief, and this track was closely followed from dusk to dawn, from Subic entrance to the mouth of the Pasig River in front of Manila. Four changes of course were required, and the points where turns must be made were picked up by cross-bearings of islands and headlands checked by the courses steered and the readings of the patent log. No local knowledge was needed to arrange these details, and no degree of darkness could have disturbed our navigation. The moon made efforts to break through the clouds, but on the whole the night was dark, in spite of the dancing pillars of cloud pulsing with tropical lightning among which we cruised. There were light showers which dampened hundreds of suits of white duck, but nobody noticed such trifles.

As night fell, we began to realize that we were preparing to force an entrance into a guarded bay with hostile batteries and ships lying in wait for us. No welcome flashed from the dark summits of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo. Spain had extinguished every light intended to aid mariners in approaching her Archipelago. Having reason to suspect that the batteries on Corregidor were placed to command both channels, we had chosen the wider one and had shaped courses to pass that stronghold at a distance of three miles and a half,—not out of range, but too far off to be checked in a resolute advance. Before ten o'clock all hands went to quarters, and the guns were ready for service at any moment during the next twelve hours. Small islands showed clearly on the horizon, though black shadows lay under the land. La Monja, or the Haystack, was left to port, and El Fraile showed a jagged lump nearly ahead. While we could see these marks we needed no pilot. Yet the Spaniards abused the whole British race because of a suspicion that we were helped by the master of a British steamer trading to Manila. The legend of a foreign pilot belongs with the story of British gunners recruited in Hong Kong. We had Americans at the wheel and Americans behind the guns. Yet questions were asked in the British Parliament and fictions were invented in

Spain. "With every aggravating circumstance, darkness, treachery and desperation, the crime of Cavité was consummated"; thus the story was told in the journals of Madrid.

Yet there was nothing to show that the situation was strained or desperate. There were no dramatic moments on the bridge of the *Olympia*. The Commodore and Captain Gridley took counsel and kept watch quietly. Formal reports were hardly necessary and sonorous orders were never given. As we entered the channel, a clear light winked and flashed a long message from the north shore. Later, a rocket soared from the summit of Corregidor. There were dull flashes from other points, but no roar of guns followed them. Our course led past El Fraile at a distance of 1,500 yards. There was deep water close to the rock, and it was a good landmark. Just beyond opened the broad expanse of Manila Bay, where we might cruise or anchor, blockade or fight, at will.

Changing course from East to N. E. by N. swung the stern ray from the *Olympia's* guiding light toward the rock, and a moment later there was a red flash, a whistling shriek overhead, and a loud report. Then came other dull flashes from the South. Before one had time to remember that Secretary of the Navy who used to be fond of saying, "No naval officer now living will ever hear the sound of a hostile gun," the *Raleigh*, *Boston* and *Concord* made sharp answer, and shells were seen bursting in fiery spray against the southern cliffs. The *McCulloch* also let her six-pounders speak out in testimony of vigilance. The *Olympia* was too far ahead to assist, and there was no thought of confusing the line by any turning movement. The plan was to get through the pass and to leave the batteries to rave over their lost opportunity. Our unchecked advance carried us out into open water and signal lanterns were soon flashing assurance that the fleet was untouched by shell or torpedo.

All the defenses of both channels were made worthless by our safe passage. Returning at leisure to dismantle the batteries and dismiss their garrisons, it was found that four batteries guarded the northern channel and three were placed to command the Boca Grande through which we entered.

There were nineteen guns in all and they were all rifled, though most of them were muzzle-loaders. The best battery, containing three breech-loading rifles of modern type, was placed on El Fraile, where it had an excellent chance to disable one or more ships. Had the existence of this battery been known we might have circled around it to shatter the rock and dismount the guns by concentrated fire. Restinga Point also fired, but it was too far off to count. Pulo Caballo did not open, "because of the speed at which the enemy fled," says a simple apologist in the *Diario de Manila*, who adds that one of the Fraile guns was crippled by recoil at the first fire.

There had been much speculation about mine-fields, which had no effect upon the tactical methods pursued. Mines were simply ignored; there was no dragging or dodging to eliminate this danger. The channel is too wide and too deep for effective defense by torpedoes. Yet we knew that materials were accumulated, that telegrams were sent appealing for gun-cotton, for pebble-powder, for blasting-powder, for insulating tapes and guns. Finally the Colonel of Marine Artillery commanding, telegraphed from Corregidor on April 27 declaring the "batteries ready and lines of torpedoes in place." He added a request for gunboats to patrol the channels, closing with a characteristic proverb: "*Pedido queda pedido.*" "Things urgent remain urgent." This sums up the whole military system of Spain. Yet we were assured by the highest authority, by the Governor-General as well as by the Commandant of the Naval Arsenal, that the Boca Grande was "full of torpedoes." This statement came too late to be of any service, as it was delivered on May 2. It was not thought necessary to have the channel explored, and the warning remains unverified to this day.

The moon set shortly after the firing ceased, and we crept onward through the darkness at slow speed. Since the enemy's squadron had not fought in the entrance channel with the support of the shore batteries, there was no reason to expect them to attack in open water. They must have scattered to hide in remote harbors, or sought shelter under the guns of Manila or Cavité. The transports were called up to form an outer column abreast the column of attack. The course was

shaped for Manila, and speed was reduced so that the anchorage would be approached at early daylight. The white glow in the northeast broke into bright points of electric light, marking the avenues of Manila. Many snatched an hour or so of sleep during this silent mid-watch. The Commander-in-Chief watched the slow progress of the ship and tried to induce Captain Gridley to rest and recruit his shattered strength. Coffee was ordered to be ready at four o'clock and every one welcomed that refreshment. The coffee from the cabin was accompanied by sticky gingerbread; that from the ward-room brought a burden of thick bread and butter. Hardtack would have been more to the purpose, and sandwiches not unacceptable. We heard afterward that some ships' companies had to fight on empty stomachs. Breakfast at the usual hour was no wanton luxury after all.

Daylight came out behind Manila and revealed long ranges of white houses and gray fortifications with domes and towers breaking the dim outlines. Eager eyes were turned to the anchorage off the breakwater. The binoculars showed a cluster of black hulls and lofty spars; sixteen sailing-ships were counted. There were no men-of-war, no steamers of any sort, and another scrap of misinformation was cast away. Our transports and despatch-boat were warned off and the battle flags were broken at every masthead. The *Olympia's* mainmast bore a broad pennant of blue with the single star of a commodore. It was almost five o'clock and the dawn was spreading. All this we saw from the forward bridge of the *Olympia* and all that is told hereafter is the report of one pair of eyes from that post of observation. That it was a good look-out station has been proved by two excellent narratives, the official report of Admiral Dewey and the account written by Mr. J. L. Stickney for the *New York Herald*. Each ship had one or two posts of equal advantage, but there were none such outside the six fighting cruisers. This is proved by numerous extraneous publications, American and Spanish. There was not a single foreign vessel in port,—not even a German cruiser.

The *Olympia* carries her standard compass on a grating supported by brass rods some twelve feet above the con-

ning-tower overhanging the forward turret. This crow's-nest seemed to the Commodore a convenient station for handling his squadron in action, and there he spent several hours on that eventful Sunday morning. There was barely room for the compass and the navigator on this perch, but it escaped the jar and the smoke which annoyed those standing on the bridge. Captain Gridley was directed to stay in the conning-tower, where he had a clear outlook and a set of voice tubes for passing orders. Ensign Butler stood outside the tower acting as aid to the Captain. The ship was steered from a wooden pilot-house, on the roof of which Captain Lambertson took his stand. The Executive Officer, Lieutenant Rees, stood on the bridge to direct the working of the guns. There were half-a-dozen petty officers and marine orderlies on the bridge, and a quartermaster who took a twelve-hour's trick at the wheel. The signals were worked from the after bridge by Lieutenant Brumby and Ensign Scott of the staff. Every officer had his "understudy" indicated by order of rank or special detail. Ensign Kavanagh assisted the navigator with that change in view. The marine-guard was stationed on the upper deck to pass orders or to use their rifles when required.

It was after five when we sighted the enemy. Then we saw a line of gray and white vessels stretching to the eastward from the bay sheltered by Sangley Point. To the right lay a sweep of green grass and yellow sand; the white buildings of the Arsenal were behind. Topmasts were housed and flame-colored flags were afloat. As the *Olympia* turned to face them, a white cloud with a heart of fire rose from Sangley Point and a shell soared toward our line. The plunge of the projectile was followed by the roar of the gun. There has been a two-gun battery on that point since the year 1600, but this was the crack of a modern rifle. One shell was seen dropped beyond us describing a trajectory of more than six miles. They were ready for us then, and meant to fight. But a moment later two harmless fountains sprang up miles ahead of our column and it was plain that the defense was flurried. Another proof of wildness came from the batteries along the water-front of Manila. The two small breech-loaders on the south mole and the four big ones along the promenade rashly opened fire as our



U. S. CRUISER OLYMPIA
FLAGSHIP OF ADMIRAL DEWEY



line extended. A few broadsides in return would have laid waste the helpless mass of buildings in the background. But the heaviest battery was the only one noticed. The *Boston* and *Concord* sent some warning shells close to the guns, but their wanton fire was kept up for many hours.

The column swept past the city "in perfect and majestic order," wrote an unwilling admirer in the city; "rather confused," said the Spanish Admiral, who saw the line slantwise and made out eight ships instead of six. We did not count his force until later, but his flagship, the *Reina Cristina*, was readily made out, as well as the white *Castilla*, which was moored and protected by lighters filled with sand. While the head of our column was still three miles away, the two largest ships went off like bunches of fire-crackers and the waters ahead of the *Olympia* were troubled by plunging showers of shells. The other cruisers joined the fray, and for half an hour their fire was brisk though ineffective. We were patient for twenty odd minutes, but when the distance was estimated as 5,400 yards, the historic order, "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley," was uttered, and the roar and jar of an eight-inch gun pointed on the starboard bow announced that we had begun to fight. The firing was deliberate at first, but when we turned to the southwest and had our port broadside opposed to the enemy all the guns opened, and a mighty shower of projectiles was poured upon the Spanish line.

Yet the enemy's fire was not smothered, even when all our line lay parallel to his and every ship was engaged. Shells soared and whistled overhead. Others fell short and plunged and sank, or else leaped wildly up to dive again. *Ricochet* effects were worthless and incalculable. Perhaps each vessel could have counted a hundred shells that struck within her own length, yet did no harm. When a shell burst at the surface, the splash and smoke of the explosion would be followed by spiteful whistlings and sullen plunges as the lazy fragments made their scattering flight. Decks were scored, wire rigging stranded and signal-halyards cut by sharp-edged bits of steel. But no shell burst among our guns' crews, or scattered splinters among the firemen and others who toiled below. The

Olympia had a dozen boats on cradles or davits, but not one of them was injured by the Spanish fire. Other ships had their boats blown to pieces by the blast of their guns, but none were touched by the enemy. The *Baltimore* was penetrated by an armor-piercing shell from Sangle Point, but the projectile did not explode and it failed to strike anybody in its wandering course. A six-pounder shell burst in the ward-room of the *Boston*, doing uncompensated injury to an officer's wardrobe.

The course was set to pass the Spanish line at a mean distance of 3,000 yards, and a steady fire was maintained from our port broadside. But a new disturbing factor now appeared. A launch about forty feet long steamed out from behind the batteries and stood across our track. She then turned her head inshore, and seemed to lie in wait for the *Olympia*. She bore the Spanish ensign and her movements indicated a desperate resolve to use torpedoes. Of course, rapid fire was opened to sink her. Even the main battery threatened her, while six-pounders dropped shells close to her side. The marines also used their rifles to put her out of action. The boat was soon crippled and ran ashore, followed by a rain of projectiles. No man ever lived through a fiercer storm of fire, yet we are assured that this crew escaped with their lives. Must all the truth be told? The English owner of the boat declares that she was manned by his Filipino servants, bound for Manila on domestic errands. The incident leaves one puzzled, but inspires respect for the possible endurance of torpedo boats.

Within a mile of Sangle Point the *Olympia* made a quick turn and swept back to the eastward, followed by her flock, with the starboard batteries playing. We could see that the *Castilla's* hull was scarred and blackened by our shells. The Spanish fire seemed slacker than at first, and some ships were shifting uneasily in the rear rank. With some exasperation we noted a large percentage of misses from our well-aimed guns. It was hard to be sure of the fall of any particular shot, but many splashed ineffectually. Yet our batteries kept hammering away, straining and jarring the ship in the shock of their recoil. Sometimes the shock seemed to come from

the outside, but no casualty was reported. Nor did any of our consorts drop out of line or slacken fire. Yet the Spanish ensigns still flew and their broadsides still thundered when we had completed our third run past their line and had been engaged for an hour and a half.

There was some natural impatience for visible results. As we headed to the eastward for the fourth run, preparations were made to close, in order to try the effect of stationary practice. The *Olympia* was headed southeast to cross the five-fathom curve. At this instant the *Reina Cristina* was seen to move to a gap in the line and to turn her bows to seaward. The two flagships drew together as if for a duel, but the *Olympia* was covering more ground than her opponent, who was exposed to the concentrated fire of several broadsides. The slow advance continued until the *Cristina* was within 1,200 yards and we could see our shells strike home. Dark clouds of smoke poured up from the bow and stern and a plume of white steam made another signal of distress. A shell had pierced the superheater, the ship was on fire in two places, the steering-engine was shot away and most of the guns were disabled. So the ship turned inshore and sought refuge in shoal water close to the Arsenal. The object of her charge need not be considered. As usual, the Spaniards were reduced to counsels of desperation. Perhaps some dream of attack by ramming or using torpedoes inspired the effort. The *Don Juan de Austria* had made a similar movement earlier in the fight, but her rush was still more brief and ineffective. This battle had to be fought out with guns, though the enemy found that a hard saying.

Again we steamed to the westward, while Admiral Montojo was shifting his flag to the *Isla de Cuba*. In passing the *Castilla*, it was noted that she, too, was on fire. Turning within 1,500 yards of the batteries on the point, the fleet stood out toward the middle of the bay. The fine rifled guns on shore were as ineffective at 1,200 yards as they were at 12,000. They followed us with steady fire as we steamed to the northward, and the heavy guns outside the walls of Manila resumed their task of bombardment. Their shells of 9.5 inches calibre might have been powerfully destructive

had their descending flight landed them on our decks, but they all missed, even when our two groups made a motionless cluster of nine vessels within range of their cross-fire. The Spanish Captain-General telegraphed to Madrid that we "withdrew behind the merchant shipping to transfer wounded." The rest of the world insists in prose and verse that we stopped fighting to get breakfast. There may have been other considerations, but we had done a morning's work,—a bigger one than we knew—and breakfast was welcome. There were sardines, corned beef and hard-tack on a corner of the wardroom table, still encumbered by the surgeons' ghastly gear, which was all unstained, however. Indeed, the answer to the signal, "Report casualties," had been comfortable. Half-a-dozen men slightly wounded by the shock of that erratic shell which traversed the *Baltimore's* upper deck covered everything. A capable observer watching the fight from one of our colliers was able to give the net result of our work as soon as we stopped firing, but he estimated the American loss as not less than 400. Let us be thankful that it was not so, though we may not know why our men's lives were spared.

The crews had glorious opportunities for cheering each other. The big *Baltimore* and the little *Petrel* drew special attention as the two extremes of our fleet, but not one ship was slighted, nor was there a word of captious comparison mixed with the generous burst of applause. All had fought gallantly and loyally, and all had escaped unharmed. Natural selection had done its work on the niceties of naval uniform while we were cleared for action. Golf caps and pith helmets were seen in high places; officers and men came on the bridge in obsolescent pajamas or inadequate undershirts; the turret crews were frankly primeval in their attire. But good spirits and prompt obedience were the natural order of the day. There had been no need to promote them by signalling commonplace maxims. There was neither shirking nor flinching among the 1,700 men under the Commodore's pennant on the first of May.

The smoking hour and the consultation of captains after breakfast were enlivened and inspired by frequent explosions

of ammunition in the burning ships off Cavité. The inevitable decision was that the work should be finished. The records show that this movement began at 10:45 A. M., but it might have been six hours or a week later if one had to trust individual impressions. The *Baltimore* was designated to lead the line, and the intervals were closed, as Sangley Point was approached from the westward. One gun from the point was still in action when the *Baltimore* stopped her engines and turned her heavy broadside on the earthworks. Her six-inch and eight-inch shells were soon bursting and throwing up showers of sand close to the guns. The other ships ranged past in succession, and the *Olympia* poured in a galling fire from her six-pounders at a distance of 1,800 yards. In passing the *Baltimore* each ship had to stop firing and take to cheering, which seemed to have a decisive effect, as the batteries were silenced and deserted by their demoralized garrisons. One ship attempted to keep up the battle. The *Don Antonio de Ulloa* fired two or three shots, but she was soon silenced and sunk by shells from the *Boston* and *Raleigh*, which were turning the point to approach the Arsenal. She was the only ship sent to the bottom by our projectiles. Others were burned, blown up, or driven ashore by our fire. The Spanish flag still waved from the lofty shears at the Cavité Arsenal, but a few well-aimed shells from the *Raleigh* shattered buildings and scattered troops about the navy-yard. The red and yellow flag came down; a white sheet was shown from the Commandant's quarters, and Cavité was surrendered.


The *Petrel* had stood in ahead of the other ships assisting in the bombardment, and she was now sent in to finish the task of destroying the Spanish vessels, which had taken refuge behind the Arsenal and scattered themselves in shoal water close to the wharves, which were thronged by troops under arms and by the beaten crews who had escaped from the squadron. Lieutenant Hughes lowered the *Petrel's* soundest whaleboat and dashed in past these forces, supported by Lieutenant Fiske in another whaleboat. For the first time that day Americans and Spaniards came face to face. But the Spanish officers seemed to realize the responsibilities of surrender, and the work of destruction was not opposed. Cruisers sunk

within pistol range of the quays were boarded and set on fire by our boats' crews, and a flotilla of tugs and launches was gathered and brought out by the *Petrel*. The armed transport *Manila* was found to be uninjured and was also made a prize for the fleet. Meanwhile the *Concord*, supported by the *Olympia*, had stood in toward Las Pinas on a similar errand. The steamer *Isla de Mindanao*, which had held a place in the Spanish line during the action, had drifted ashore there, and her crew were driven off and the ship set on fire by the *Concord's* shells. This vessel was armed, and there is evidence that she fired during the action. She had brought war material on her last voyage from Spain, and she had been towing disabled cruisers just before the action. Her owners had intended to dispatch her to Spain on the next Saturday, May 7. They showed a lamentable lack of faith in American activity, and insurance companies refuse to pay for losses due to imprudent delay and belligerent behavior.

This second action lasted about two hours, or nearly as long as the first. It was performed before a larger audience, as the British steamer *Esmeralda* had just entered the harbor with a journalist or two on board. In spite of various destructive and dramatic incidents, the vital inspiration of battle was lacking. The enemy failed to stand to his guns. Only half-a-dozen shells were fired by the Spaniards, while a thousand or so were discharged from their ships in the early morning. But we had to make sure that all resistance was over. Our victory at Cavité also silenced the batteries at Manila forever. The Captain-General was warned that further firing would compel the fleet to bombard the walled city. In acceding to this warning he admitted total defeat.

The wanton and ineffectual employment of batteries adjacent to a defenseless city furnishes an instance of the desperate futility of Spanish traditions. The legend runs that the Governor-General had forbidden the batteries to fire, but that the Colonel of Artillery felt himself bound by technical rules affecting his military honor. So he persisted until defeat was demonstrated. He was told that the next day would see him under close arrest. He did not linger until the day of grace was done, but shot himself in the Plaza before the palace of

Battle of Manila Bay May 1st 1898.



Manila Bay

COURSE OF U.S. VESSELS IN 1st ENGAGEMENT

SCALE 3/8 INCH TO A MILE

the Archbishop the same evening. That sinister fact is certain, and it is also true that his wife died and his son became insane. So his daughter is left alone in the world to reflect on the cruelty of war as aggravated by arbitrary and fatalistic notions of honor.

Early in the afternoon our line was anchored in front of Manila, and our battle flags waved until sunset. The garrison might have heard the cheers of our seamen and the notes of the "Star Spangled Banner" when our band saluted the colors. Our Sunday's work included the destruction of eleven vessels, eight of them classed as cruisers in the Spanish register. Seven of them were anchored in line of battle and cleared for action when we approached Cavité. There was no question of a surprise. Our departure from Hong Kong and Mirs Bay and our presence off Bolinao, Subic and Corregidor had been duly reported by telegraph. The guns had been manned at daylight and the regular rounds of cheers, for the King, for the Queen, and for Spain, had roused the 2,000 men of the Spanish fleet.

The victorious squadron had fought in the following order: *Olympia*, *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Concord*, *Petrel* and *Boston*. The *McCulloch*, *Nan-Shan* and *Zafiro* made up our convoy or reserve. The names of the Spanish ships may also be noted: *Reina Cristina*, *Castilla*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Isla de Mindanao*, *Velasco*, *Argos*, *Marques Del Duero*, *General Lezo*, *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Don Juan de Austria*. The three cruisers last named are to be raised and refitted for service, under a contract signed in October.

The total number of effective guns in the batteries, placed to command the channels of entrance and the approaches to Cavité and Manila, attains the formidable figure of sixty-one. Smooth-bores and field-pieces are not counted. Of these guns twenty-five were breech-loading rifles, nine rifled mortars and the rest muzzle-loading rifles. The average calibre was over seven inches. When the fleet was destroyed and the Sangley Point battery silenced, all the rest were put out of action. The Manila batteries were silenced by intimidation and the Corregidor defenses condemned to isolation.

The American fleet was free to work its will upon the capi-

tal of the Philippines, but certain instincts or principles seemed to forbid bombardment. Spanish sentiment failed to understand our restraint. The papers still raved of defending the city, and our position was declared to be critical for lack of a naval base, of coal, and of other supplies. It was said that our shells did little harm in Cavité, and, therefore, that Manila could stand a bombardment. But neither the town nor the Arsenal had been our target during the action off Cavité. On the other hand, a Madrid journal declared that all the buildings had been laid in ruins before the place was surrendered.

After the Governor-General's rant about "ruffianly intentions," backed by the Archbishop's invective against the "base passions engendered by heresy," which inspired our campaign, it may have been difficult to allow for the moral restraints and humane tendencies which modified the situation. Certainly Spanish history reveals no such forbearance. The bombardment of Valparaiso, a commercial city undefended by a single gun, is counted as one of the glories of the Spanish Navy. In 1866 the squadron of Méndez Núñez fired 2,600 shells into that city, making the bonded warehouses their principal target, but incidentally hitting several churches and hospitals. Property to the value of \$15,000,000.00 was destroyed. Half of this belonged to foreigners, yet the Spanish Commodore refused to receive the protest of the Consuls against the proposed bombardment. He went on to Callao and attempted a similar attack, the history of which is given in the medal awarded to the Peruvians who took part in the defense: "With fifty guns you beat off three hundred." This motto might have braced the defenders of Manila, but they preferred to quote some empty phrase of Méndez-Núñez about "honor without ships rather than ships without honor." That sentiment failed to inspire a single torpedo attack during the summer of 1898, though there were scores of idle naval officers, many of them qualified as *torpedistas*, in Manila, with handy steam launches and torpedoes at their disposition. Their best excuse is the desire not to expose the city to retaliation. The "new school" of naval strategy, which takes commerce-destroying and the bombardment of

commercial towns to be principal objects of maritime attack, has its prophets in Spain as well as in France. Let us hope that war may teach them humanity.

It was necessary, however, to deprive Manila of some of the resources of civilization. A strict commercial blockade was announced and enforced. The cable was also cut as soon as it was found that we were not to be allowed to use it. The English managers had no choice under the terms of their contract and the constraints of Spanish authority. The interruption of this line of communication was far more hurtful to Spain than to us, since our dispatches could be forwarded *via* Hong Kong with only two or three days delay. Steamers were allowed to give passage to all neutrals who desired to withdraw from Manila, and even Spaniards, a Bishop, for instance, were granted the same favor when their stay in Manila would involve special hardship. Mails were also allowed to go in and out without interference. Foreign cruisers and trading steamers rendered this service at frequent intervals.

This sketch of visible results may be supplemented by some notes on the methods employed. Personal opinions and impressions only will be offered, and it is recognized that chronicle and argument are alike defective. The tactical scheme was simple; a column of vessels was to be led past the enemy until his defeat was accomplished by broadside fire. It took five turns to do the work. The length of our line with 400-yard intervals was about 2,500 yards, and this was also the mean distance from the Spanish center. The enemy had formed his ships with the western flank inside Sangley Point and the eastern flank near shoal water north of Bakor. Advancing in column, we moved freely in open water, slipping past our own smoke, and disconcerting the enemy's aim by varying distances. The Commander-in-Chief led the line and was enabled to guide his supporters by example as well as by signal. The extended order of our ships allowed effective concentration from all broadsides on the huddled Spanish formation. Finally, no turning movements were necessary within the space covered by the guns of the enemy's ships.

Our track was determined at first by the depth of water as shown on the chart. It was thought best to keep outside the

“ five-fathom curve.” The *Olympia* drew twenty-four feet, or four fathoms, and the rest could follow in her wake without taking soundings or angles for position. Certain sinister notes on the navigation of Cavité Bay imposed caution ; “ from Spanish surveys,” “ point extending to eastward,” “ filling up since Horsburgh’s time,” were warnings that turned out to be unnecessary. The chart was correct, except that the water had deepened to the eastward. The Captain-General cabled to Madrid that our fleet had suffered greatly and had been “ forced to make various changes and evolutions ” by the fire of batteries ashore and afloat. The evolutions had all been planned, and we cruised and fought between the points B’ and C’ of the diagram prepared in Hong Kong.

The enemy chose to open fire at extreme ranges, but we fired only one shot from a distance greater than 5,000 yards. Many of us had been taught that 2,000 yards was the maximum range for naval guns in action, and that that could be attained well enough by cast-iron smooth-bores. Fortunately, we had emerged from that era of darkness, and we saw a squadron destroyed at 2,500 yards. Had all the guns of the water batteries of Manila been mounted on Sangley Point, and had the Spanish line drawn back into shallow water, we might have had to diminish our distances to the danger point and to make turns under concentrated fire. Being left at liberty, however, a distance was chosen which enabled us to punish the enemy for his hopeless marksmanship without loss or injury to our ships.

The enemy failed to inflict damage, not on account of any deficiency in the range or penetration of the shells fired from his thirty modern breech-loading rifles of 12 centimeters and upward, or from his numerous rapid-fire six-pounders. Nor is there evidence that his ammunition was defective. Not even the ravages of our fire can be alleged as a complete excuse. The guns were pointed wildly, that is all.

Rapid fire from our guns doubtless had much to do with the unsteadiness of gunners. The *Olympia* and *Raleigh* had fine batteries of five-inch rapid-fire guns. Each shell from these guns was fit for any work that was done that day. Superheaters can be pierced, steering-engines crippled, and

guns' crews swept away by five-inch shells as well as by those of heavier calibre. No armor had to be pierced, and no ship was structurally disabled by any single shell. Nor were guns dismounted in shore batteries, nor parapets thrown down by any projectiles. The work was done by the shattering and incendiary effects of shells exploded inboard. The preference for "heavy guns in protected positions" was not justified here. The four eight-inch guns in the *Olympia's* turrets were able to fire only thirty-five shots in all, which was the average for each gun in the five-inch battery, which had also a greater percentage of hits among its 350 fires. Yet each turret was handled by a vigilant and experienced officer, and was fired on both broadsides without impediment.

Rapid-fire projectiles of smaller calibres, down to three-pounders, are also deadly in effect. They rarely fail to explode, and they are capable of igniting wood. Of course, the Spanish protest against the use of "incendiary projectiles forbidden by all laws divine and human" was mere ignorant raving. Had high explosives been used with delayed-action fuses,—the ammunition of the future,—the protest might have been still more shrill. Let us hope that before another contest comes we may be provided with genuine smokeless powder. Of old-fashioned ammunition we had a plenty. Our eight-inch guns might have been fought for a week, but the five-inch supply was low enough to cause some concern, about forty per cent. having been used in two hours. The Naval Bureau of Ordnance promptly replaced all deficiencies, and other Bureaus did likewise. It is worth noting that neither gun-mounts nor ammunition delayed the *Olympia's* fire, though annoying accidents have frequently interfered with target practice. The improvement was doubtless due to the training of the crews and to the adjustments made by division officers during a three years' cruise.

Range-finding offered the usual difficulties. The *Baltimore* had an electric range-finder which hardly survived the first broadside. The method of picking up ranges by a rapid-fire gun was not convenient in the *Olympia*, where most of the battery is mounted on covered decks. The approximate position of the Spanish line was marked on the chart and the dis-

tance measured from successive positions determined by cross-bearings. Some annoyance resulted from the attempt to communicate with the guns by "passing the word." The eye is the organ to be trusted during the crash and roar of naval action, and a series of dials should give direct and visible messages from the bridge or conning-tower to each division of the battery. Telephones fail and voice-tubes are uncertain.

It remains to consider the concrete effect of our fire. Admiral Montojo reckoned seventy hits in the hull and superstructure of the *Cristina*, with fifty odd killed and one hundred wounded. Her Captain, Don Luis Cadarso, was among the slain. On the last Sunday before the fight he had addressed his crew after mass, and his fiery harangue made them break forth (*prorrumpieron*) into cheers for every Spanish emblem of authority. The two funnels were also riddled by rapid-fire projectiles; the steam-steerer was disabled; steam was escaping from the superheater; the ship was on fire forward and aft; the ammunition had begun to explode when she retired from action. No other ship drew so much of our fire, and it is probable that less than ten per cent. of the shots aimed at her were effective. The estimate for the glorious running fight off Santiago was as low as three per cent. The *Castilla* also suffered heavily. The total number of killed and wounded is given as 381 in Spanish reports. The battery at Sangley Point lost six men killed and four wounded before the crews were driven from the guns, which were not dismantled by our fire, though one had been crippled by its own discharge. The effect of heavy shells against earth-works seems to be less, and the value of rapid-fire greater, than had been allowed. It has been a maxim among engineers that one gun ashore was worth five or ten afloat under like protection. This experiment does not establish any such co-efficient. Flagships draw fire, and it is probable that half as many shells were fired at the *Olympia* as at the *Cristina*, yet the score of hits is at least one hundred to nothing.

Apologists find reasons enough for this difference. Our ships were called iron-clads, invulnerable to Spanish shot. Cold steel was invoked "to disturb the deadly calm in which instruments of precision were regulating engines of destruc-

tion." Now none of our ships was handled from armored conning-towers. Wooden bridges and pilot-houses served our turn. Our broadside batteries were unshielded by armor. None of the existing protection was tested during the action. Scarcity of gunners and incapacity of engineers are also alleged. If it were to be discussed from our point of view, the scheme of defense would seem lacking in energy, foresight, and persistence. Individual courage was there, but organized resolution was not in evidence. The Spanish Admiral explained his decision not to fight in deep water by his unwillingness to lose men as well as ships. This amazing reason seems to have been allowed to circulate to the discouragement of the fleet.

The deep water which had to be abandoned was in the harbor of Subic. Had the artillery scattered about Manila been mounted at the entrance to Subic, our work would have been done in a slow and costly fashion. But in spite of a dozen annual reports from the commission which has been investigating Subic since 1885, nothing seems to have been known of its defensive conditions. It was abandoned two days before our coming, and the fleet was brought back to defend Cavité. The delay in mounting guns and mooring torpedoes caused the Admiral "much disgust."

The only advocate of Subic was Captain del Rio, who was left behind to burn his coal-depot. He had sketched an imaginary naval attack in 1891, and his pamphlet must have been familiar to every naval officer of high rank at Manila. Assuming an attack on Manila by a squadron somewhat superior to the defensive force, he points out that the hostile Admiral will reconnoitre Subic. Finding it empty, he will gladly stand in to seek the Spanish squadron. Encountering it motionless off Cavité, he will destroy it and the Arsenal. Then he will bombard Manila. This prediction erred only in assuming a ruthless Spanish temper in the victorious Admiral. The notion of strategic naval defense by a squadron not confined to the harbor of a commercial capital is not universally accepted. Yet, if the United States ever undertakes the defense of Manila, it will be necessary to make Subic a naval *port de sortie* and to equip and fortify it accordingly.

When the last gun was silenced on this memorable May day, a high authority announced the meaning of the day's work as follows: "Spain has lost her fleet and she has lost these islands also; without ships she cannot hold them, and this fleet cannot be replaced." Desperate efforts have been made by military and diplomatic methods to reverse this verdict. But history does not allow the hands of the clock to be put back, and the fact remains that the Philippine Archipelago was virtually and strategically relieved from the domination of Spain by the squadron commanded by Admiral Dewey on the first of May.

C. G. Calkins



Francis Kelly
U. S. S. Merrimac

CHAPTER V.
STATEMENT OF THE SINKING OF THE
MERRIMAC.*

BY
FRANCIS KELLY, U. S. S. New York, Flagship.

I T had always been my inclination to enlist in the American Navy as fireman. I saw my opportunity on the 21st of April, 1898, when the war broke out between the United States and Spain. On that date, I went on board the U. S. R. S. *Franklin* at the Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va., and through a special request, enlisted for one year. I passed all the required examinations, having had ten years of experience in the merchant service, in engine and fire rooms, as well as on deck. The next day after enlisting, I was detailed to go on board the *Merrimac*, which was then loaded with coal for the use of Rear-Admiral Sampson's fleet, then blockading the island of Cuba. Arriving at Key West on the 7th of May, we anchored outside all the fleet which was there at that time. I passed the remark to my shipmates that it looked as if they were going to leave us there for a target, we lying so far out to sea, and on the 17th, when we received orders to paint her all black, over her war color, I believed it still more. But all such thoughts soon vanished, for on the night of the 19th, we got orders to get ready for sea and to proceed to Cienfuegos to meet Schley's fleet, which was there at that time watching the harbor, in which Cervera and his ships were thought to be.

On the 24th, we got a signal from the *Brooklyn* to go along-

* Mr. Kelly was the only man below the deck of the *Merrimac* after she came well within range of the Spanish guns. He gives a most interesting statement of one of the bravest deeds of history.

side the U. S. S. *Massachusetts* and give her all the coal she wanted. As we had over 5,000 tons aboard, several small ships of the fleet came alongside and took on coal.

On May 28, we were compelled to leave early, proceed to Santiago, and begin coaling the remainder of the ships as soon as possible, because the Commander-in-Chief wanted to have the *Merrimac* dismantled so that she could be sunk in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, to bottle up the Spanish fleet, which, by that time, was known to be there and not at Cienfuegos.

It was the first day of June when we were ordered to dismantle her. At that time she had on board about 2,500 tons of coal. Then the crew got orders from Lieutenant Gilmore to take all their clothes and transfer them to the *Massachusetts*. After this, the crew of the *Massachusetts* began to dismount the *Merrimac's* guns and her other gear. At the same time, a working party from the flag-ship *New York* was detailed for the cable to be run right aft, so that when we should enter the harbor of Santiago, we might be held by an anchor aft as well as fore.

On that same day, the first of June, at four o'clock in the afternoon, Admiral Sampson on the bridge of the *New York* signaled to the fleet, asking for volunteers to go in and designedly sink the *Merrimac* in the entrance to Santiago harbor.

At the same hour, Mr. Crank, chief engineer of the *Merrimac*, came down into the engine room along with Lieutenant Hobson, for the purpose of showing him all the connections of the keelson valves on board, which might be of use in assisting to sink her. He also showed him the bunker doors which we had opened. When those seven mines, which were hanging over the port side under water, should be connected and exploded, that side of the ship would be blown in, the water would rush through those bunker doors, and fill up fire-room, engine-room, and holds numbers one, two and three. Hold number three had been filled with coal for our own use. It was all gone. We had cut two holes in the wooden bulk-head twenty feet in diameter, which would allow the water to travel from hold number three to holds numbers two and one. So, you see, we were prepared to make a good job of it.

Now I, Francis Kelly, was present with Mr. Crank and Lieutenant Hobson when all these things were being discussed. After the plan of action had been decided upon, Lieutenant Hobson went up on deck.

As Mr. Crank still stopped in the engine-room, I asked him if he was going into the harbor with her. He answered that he was going, as far as he knew. By this time it was six o'clock at night. Then I asked Mr. Crank if I could get to go in along with him, as I had heard that our machinist, George Phillips, was going in with him.

He asked me if I was willing to go. I answered that I certainly was, and that was the reason I had asked him. Then he wanted to know if I realized the job I was about to undertake. I told him I did. Then he took me up from the engine-room to the bridge, where were Commander Miller of the *Merrimac* and Lieutenant Hobson. Mr. Crank said to Commander Miller,—“Here is Kelly, the water tender, who wants to go in along with us to help sink the *Merrimac*.” Lieutenant Hobson asked from what ship I came. Mr. Crank told him that I was one of the *Merrimac's* own crew. Then Lieutenant Hobson said he didn't want any of her own crew; that the men he wanted were volunteers. Mr. Crank said, “I am going in with her myself, so I would like to have Kelly and Phillips along with me, as they thoroughly understand the work they have got to do. I do not think I could get better men for the same job, as they understand the run of the ship.” Then Lieutenant Hobson called me by name. “Kelly, go and get Phillips, as I want to see you together.”

You see, the flag-ship *New York* was supposed to chase the *Merrimac* into the harbor, firing blank shots. This was to blindfold the Spaniards, and make them believe that it was a Spanish ship that the *New York* was chasing. Such a ship was expected about this time by the Spaniards with provisions for their fleet. In reality, the *New York* had captured this merchantman several days before.

When we both came back to Lieutenant Hobson, he gave us the following instructions. The signal, two bells, was to mean that I was to knock the bonnets of the keelson valves and cut the pipes. When this had been done below, I was to

come on deck, go to the bridge and report to Lieutenant Hobson that I had performed my duty. I was then to lie down on the bridge. Then Lieutenant Hobson was to signal one bell to Phillips, the machinist, to stop the engines. As soon as this was done, I was to leave the bridge, dive overboard and get into a small boat that had been towed alongside the *Merrimac*. In this boat we were supposed to make good our escape if possible. After I got into the boat, I was to cut away the lines fore and aft which held her to the *Merrimac*. By that time Phillips would be up on deck from the engine-room to report to Lieutenant Hobson. I was supposed to have pulled the boat about twenty yards from the side of the *Merrimac* and to be ready to pick up the remainder of the crew. At this time Lieutenant Hobson would give the word of command to let go the two cables as he was putting her across the entrance of the harbor, and, by that same command, the rest of the crew were to dive overboard and swim for the small boat which I was keeping ready for them. The crew would not mind the swimming part of it as we were all supposed to be good swimmers. Lieutenant Hobson was to be the last man to leave the *Merrimac*. He was to stand on the bridge and touch the button which connected the mines hanging on her port side and so explode them. We were also told that if the small boat in which the crew was to escape was blown up by the Spanish, we would have to swim over three miles. Now those three miles of water were alive with sharks, and before we could strike the beach it would be necessary for us to pass among all those man-eaters. The clothing we had for that trip was very light, consisting of a pair of pants cut off above the knees, a life belt, a revolver and belt and thirty-six rounds of ammunition well covered with tallow to prevent the water getting to them, and three pairs of stockings. We had to have as many as that on our feet, to keep them from being cut should we have the good luck to get to the beach. These were Lieutenant Hobson's instructions, knowing that the flag-ship *New York* would have a steam launch cruising around the entrance of the harbor looking for us.

On the first of June, at eight o'clock in the evening, Admi-

ral Sampson came on board the *Merrimac* to see how Lieutenant Hobson was getting along with the clearing of the ship. He saw that the work was going on pretty well. He also inspected the decks from forward to aft, the mines which the electrician had about finished, and the cable chains, to be sure that they were placed in the right position on deck, that there might be no fouling in their running out. Seeing that everything was all right, he left the *Merrimac* at 9:30 P. M. I expect that he said that he would be back before we should start to go in, but something happened to his steam launch about one o'clock on the morning of the 2d, when he was returning to the *Merrimac* for the last time. When he did come on board, he went to the bridge and asked Lieutenant Hobson if everything was ready. The answer was, "Yes." Then the Admiral said, "You are rather late this morning."

Lieutenant Hobson replied, "We can make it, sir." "What time is it?" Lieutenant Hobson took his watch out and went to the starboard side of the bridge, where there was a lamp covered over to keep it from showing light about decks. Then he replied to Admiral Sampson that it was twenty minutes past three. Commander Miller of the *Merrimac* had been standing on the bridge with them all this time.

Turning to the Commander, the Admiral said, "I think we will be going."

Commander Miller said, "Am I not going with the ship?"

But Admiral Sampson replied, "No, no, we are too old for this cruise. It is one of the most daring that ever was made, and it requires young heroes like Lieutenant Hobson and his crew. We will bid them 'good-night' and 'God speed.'" Uttering these words to Commander Miller, he shook hands with Lieutenant Hobson and his crew and then went over the gangway.

Phillips and I were ordered below, and the telegraph was rung half speed ahead by Lieutenant Hobson on the bridge. Ten minutes after we started, daylight came on. Then Admiral Sampson sent up signals for us to return. He also sent the torpedo-boat *Porter* after us and made us come back. Down below we did not know that we were to turn back.

I was working hard in the fire-room. Mr. Crank, the engineer, was also helping me by raking the fires so as to get up as much steam as possible. Mr. Crank made the remark that we were like three rats in a trap, as everything had been closed down on us so that no noise could be heard from the engines. Five minutes later Lieutenant Hobson sent down the chief gunner's mate to tell Mr. Crank that we were to turn back by the orders of Admiral Sampson. The time was four A. M. and the day was just breaking. We steamed to the starboard side of the flag-ship, which lay one mile from us. Mr. Crank gave me orders to draw the fires, which had been made extraordinarily heavy for the purpose of getting high pressure to drive her hard across the channel. We got the fires down to prevent her making any noise that would arouse the suspicions of the Spaniards. This was the second of June.

That day we lay on the decks wishing that the flag-ship would send us something to eat, as we commenced to feel hungry. We had been up the day before and all that night, and you may believe that there was not much cooked aboard for those two days, because the excitement in regard to the sinking of the ship was working the boys up to a high pitch.

About ten o'clock in the morning, the *Marblehead* steamed alongside of us, and Mr. Crank requested them to send over a machinist and fireman to relieve Phillips and Kelly, so that they might be in working order for the morning of the third. By this time, the *New York* had a whale boat alongside and took us aboard to get something to eat. That afternoon at four, we lay down and rested till half-past eleven that night.

At about half-past two, the pilot discovered a light and made the remark, "You are not going to take me any further in, as the Spanish will see the light of the compass through the window of the pilot house." Turning to Lieutenant Hobson he asked him to get something to cover the window, as that would protect the man at the wheel. Lieutenant Hobson, seeing that the pilot was getting scared, said it would be much better to let the steam launch come alongside and get the pilot off the *Merrimac*, as the Spaniards knew him well, for he was a Cuban.

During this time Lieutenant Hobson had run another signal down to the engine-room. It was a rope. One end was to be made fast to machinist Phillips' arm, so that in case the telegraph was blown away by the enemy, one pull of the rope by Lieutenant Hobson would stop the engines and tell me to cut the pipes and let go the keelson bonnets, for the purpose of sinking her.

We started away, for the second time, into the harbor, about three o'clock on the morning of the third. Just as we were entering, a torpedo boat fired a six-pounder and destroyed all our steering gear. Lieutenant Hobson gave the signal to stop the engines. At the same moment he also told the man at the wheel to put his helm hard aport. He replied, "Hard aport, sir, but helm will not answer."

During this time I was cutting away the pipes. Before this, I had heard the shooting, and one shot had come through the plates into the fire-room. I had gone into the engine-room and asked Phillips if he heard the shooting. He said, yes, and that it was the *New York*, for, you remember, the *New York* was to pretend to chase us. Then I said that it was a very funny blank shot to come through the plates, for the ball went right past me.

Then Phillips went on deck to set off his mine, leaving me below to cut the pipes yet remaining. This was a very hard thing to do, because all this time there was heavy firing and the shots were coming into the engine-room and the force of the water knocked me down below the platform. I had a hard time to get out again, there being no light in the engine-room. When I did get out, I had a curious feeling on me. Hearing so much firing, I did not know what minute one of those shots might penetrate the boilers, and there was twenty-five pounds more of steam on than she was tested for. During all this time I had not seen any water in the starboard boilers. As the steam was still rising, I thought of starting the auxiliary pump, but then it seemed as if I might as well take my chances and put water into the boilers. I expected to be killed as soon as I went on deck anyhow, hearing such terrible shooting, and might as well get blown up by the boilers down below. So I opened the feed check on the star-

board boiler and started the fire pump and, leaving it working, proceeded on deck.

I had not seen Phillips since he went up to set off his mine and thought I might find him lying down somewhere near the place where we were all to meet. This place was on the starboard side of the spar deck. But you could not see or hear anything for the rapid firing. So I crawled along the deck on my hands and knees, thinking that every moment would be my last, until I got alongside the mine which I was to set off. This was mine number seven. Near it was a life belt and a revolver which I was to put on. Then I got hold of the wire which I was to connect and found the insulation on. As I had lost my knife, I had to tear it off with my teeth, so that it could be set off. No sooner had I set the mine off than a shell from the western battery struck the main mast and exploded. A piece of it struck me over the left eye and on the mouth. Both my legs also were struck, and I was knocked flat on the deck. My wounds were slight. As there was no decrease in the firing, I thought that it was all up with me now. Finally I got on my feet and made toward the engine-room, looking for Phillips, but I could not see him. I did see that the pressure of the steam was gaining, and opened up the connection doors of the boilers to reduce the steam. I did not know at what moment they would explode, for the water was rushing all about. Then I went up on deck again to go to the place where we were to assemble. The boat in which we were to make our escape had been blown away by the enemy. This made the men get together in another part of the ship. I did not know this, as I saw the block in its place as if the boat had been unhooked. As it was twenty minutes since Phillips and I had seen each other, Lieutenant Hobson thought that I must have been killed down below.

The Spaniards were all the time firing away, as I wandered about the decks alone. Then the thought struck me to make for the bridge. As I was on the starboard side close to the machinist's mess room, I heard a voice, but where, I could not tell. Then I overheard some one say, "That is Kelly." I went through a mass of smoke calling out, "Hallo, where are you?" The answer came, "Come alongside of the bunker hatch." Just at that moment a shell from Morro battery ex-

ploded all around me, but none of it touched me. I got alongside the rest of the men and they told me to lie down with them. Some one asked me if I had been wounded, as they had seen the shell burst all around me. I said, yes, that over by the mine I got pelted in the eye and mouth and legs. One of the men said to me, "You were lucky, as Lieutenant Hobson and I were on the point of shooting you. We thought you must be a Spaniard who had gotten on board, for we were sure you had been killed down below when you didn't turn up sooner." Lieutenant Hobson asked me if I had gone down into the engine-room to see if Phillips had been there, as I could not find him or any one on deck. He also asked me how things were down below. I answered him that the water was blowing freely. At this time they were firing away strong at us from the western battery, and one shot had struck the smokestack and whistle, tearing them away. As the steam was escaping, I was satisfied that the boilers would not explode, knowing that there was an independent valve from each boiler connected with this pipe. That was the only thing which was in my mind while lying on deck.

Then the enemy began to explode the submarine mines, and one of them struck on her starboard side, giving her a list to port. Lieut. Hobson said, "They are helping us to sink her, lads." This was about a hundred yards from the entrance to the harbor. The next mine that struck her was the final blow which lifted her bodily eight feet out of the water. Then the water rushed with terrific force and washed us along the deck forward and then aft again, washing some of the men overboard. It washed me into a bunker. I thought it was all up with me, but kicked until the ship settled to the bottom and then shot up like a rocket. I was very nearly used up from the amount of water I drank, but the life belt assisted me in my struggle. When I looked about to see where I was, I noticed a lot of wreckage floating around. Striking out, I got hold of a scuttle bucket. I heard the Spaniards cheering. They still kept firing at everything they saw. During the time that I was hanging on to the bucket, I was wondering if all my comrades were drowned. I could see none of them. But soon I heard some one calling to me, "Come over this way." The

voice came from outside the catamaran, so I dived off the scuttle bucket and came up alongside Lieut. Hobson. He asked me if I was all right. I said, "Yes, but I feel a little shaky."

By this time they had stopped firing at the *Merrimac*. I should think that the time from their starting firing till they finished was about thirty-five minutes. We still remained hanging on to the float for an hour and a half. We saw the Spanish soldiers running about the beach with signal lamps. As daylight came on, the Spaniards saw us from the lighting tops of the *Reina Mercedes*. Then Lieut. Hobson discovered the steam launch of the *Cristobal Colon* coming toward us. He said, "Lads, they see us." They came within fifteen yards of us and challenged all of us in Spanish. Lieut. Hobson answered them in Spanish. Then the officers of the launch gave orders to the Spanish marines to get ready. One of our men, Dan Montague, called out, "They are going to fire on us." At that moment Lieut. Hobson said, "I give myself up as a prisoner of war, also the men with me, under the flag of truce." That was for them to notify the flag-ship that we were safe. So then the Spanish officers told us to give up our arms, and Lieut. Hobson told us to swim for the launch. At that moment we cast loose our belts and revolvers and let them overboard, sooner than allow the Spaniards to get them. Then we went on board the steam launch one by one. They stripped us of our life belts, dumping them overboard and leaving us with only the trunk of our overalls. I can assure you that we were pretty well exhausted by being so long in the water. The steam launch took us to the *Reina Mercedes*. As soon as we went aboard, all the Spanish crew ran from forward to aft to see the American prisoners. Surely we were pretty wild-looking men, with nothing on but plenty of grease and a half pair of pants. This was about half-past six o'clock the morning of the third. Lieut. Hobson was taken to the cabin and we got supplied with the articles asked for.

During this time our launch had been cruising around looking for us. When the Spaniards spied her from the fort, they began firing at her. Then the *New York* sent three shells at the *Reina Mercedes* and these landed very close to where we were standing washing ourselves. At once the Spaniards

sounded "Quarters" and flew to their guns, thinking that there was going to be a battle. Some of us commenced to laugh at them, which made them mad, but we did not care, for we thought that there was something worse in store for us.

About nine o'clock that same morning, Admiral Cervera gave orders that we should be removed from the ship to the cells in Morro Castle. The launch put us ashore, and we had about a mile and a half to walk on a bad road and in our bare feet. When we reached the Castle the Commander ordered Lieut. Hobson to be taken to a cell by himself, then turned and shook hands with us all, at the same time pointing out our cells to us. These were not inviting. The smell was like that of a pig-sty, but we were pretty tired, so we lay down and commenced to think how we all had escaped with our lives. I passed the remark that our time had not yet come. Shortly after this, they opened the cell door and brought some rice and olive oil and horse beans and black bread and wine. The fare was not very good but there was no use in kicking.

At three o'clock that same day, they opened the cell door and told us all to come out. Some of us thought we were going to be shot, but they took to Lieut. Hobson's cell, uniform cloth which had been sent from the flag-ship. There had also been sent tobacco, and money in case of hunger. Lieut. Hobson told the English consul to buy us each a hammock and a blanket. With these, we returned to our cell. Then we started to smoke, hearty and glad to know that they knew that we were safe.

On the second day, the bombarding began. Some stray shots came close to the cell where we were. The sentry, who was guarding us, ran away. The sergeant of the guard got hold of him and kicked him back to his post. He went down on his knees and began to pray while the mortar and bricks were flying thickly around him and in through the window and door of the cell.

On the morning of the sixth of June, they came to the cell and wakened us, telling us to get dressed, as we were to be removed from Morro Castle to the prison in the town, about six miles away. When we were all ready, they formed a

guard of thirty soldiers. There was also a sergeant and one officer. We were made to go in single file with fifteen of the guard in front and fifteen behind. They marched us over hills and railroad tracks for the purpose of fooling us in regard to the roads. When we had marched about three miles they handed us over to another guard, a body of sixteen men, a sergeant and an officer, who took us the rest of the way. Along the road the women were crying, thinking that we were going to be shot. When we got to the city, Lieut. Hobson was put by himself and the seven of us into one cell, with cots in it. We were taken out in the day time. Every morning they used to let two of us out at a time to wash, with a guard of sixteen men forming a square around us while we washed.

During all this time they did not believe that we belonged to the navy, but thought that we had been engaged outside the navy for the purpose of sinking the *Merrimac*. They thought that navy men would not do such a deed. Every day for about eight days, some of the Spaniards would come to our cell, making motions with their hands as if firing a gun, and saying that in about two hours we should be shot. This continued until the English consul put a stop to it. We also made a report to the English consul in regard to the complement of bread with which we were served. Some days we would get two ounces, other days three, with rice and beans and olive oil all mixed up together. Besides this, there was a sardine and a half for each man and two bottles of wine. That was our living during our stay. But the English consul brought us eighty-five biscuits, which cost twenty cents apiece, some sugar and some coffee. He told us he could not do any more, as there was nothing else in the place.

Then I took the fever and so did Dan Montague. We had it badly. A Spanish doctor visited us every morning. He always complained of the very bad smell in the cell. There was but one opening about eighteen inches square. That was all the ventilation we had. Exercise we had none. At last the English consul requested the general to remove us to a place where we could get more fresh air, saying that we should all be down with the fever. So they removed us to another block, which looked like a prison and a hospital and barracks. There we had plenty of fresh air and a new doctor to attend

us who could speak good English. We began to recover our strength under the treatment he gave us. But they never let us out of this place to wash. They sent water in to us. They would not allow us to walk about the cell and told us to sit on our cots.

On the morning of the 25th of July, about seven o'clock, the doctor came in and told us that he had been ordered to notify us that we were to be exchanged that day. He said that we might as well be ready about two o'clock. But no one came until three o'clock the next day. Then it was the doctor who made his appearance and wondered why we were not gone. At eight o'clock that night the aide-de-camp of the general came and asked if we had any complaints to make against any of the officers for anything that had happened while we had been in prison. We said no, but alas, we had plenty of them to make! At seven the next morning, the doctor and the aide-de-camp both came and notified us from the general that we were to be exchanged at ten o'clock that day. Then the doctor shook hands with us all, saying that war was a bad thing and that they were going to have a battle at five o'clock that evening, and added, "Perhaps you will be fighting against us." Again he told us to be ready at ten o'clock. We said that we would not accept the exchange unless Hobson was to be released with us. Then an officer came with handkerchiefs and blindfolded us, leading us to the place of exchange. We sat there about half an hour, until our officer brought the ten Spanish prisoners to exchange for the eight Americans. But the Spaniards would accept only man for man. We were then taken to the American lines and were received with loud cheering. We had another hearty cheering and reception when we got on board the *New York* at Siboney.

This is the true statement of the sinking of the *Merrimac* and of our imprisonment in Morro Castle and in Santiago.

Francis Kelly
U. S. S. Merrimac



Cyrus A. Radford
1st Lieut. U.S. Marine

CHAPTER VI.

THE STORY OF THE TEXAS.

HER PART IN THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.

BY

CYRUS S. RADFORD, Lieut. U. S. Marines.
R. K. CRANK, Ass't Engineer, U. S. N.


BEFORE proceeding to describe the naval battle of Santiago, the precautions taken by Admiral Sampson to make the blockade of Santiago effective and to prevent the escape, by day or by night, of any of the enemy's vessels, should be noted.

On June 2nd, the day after his arrival off Santiago, Admiral Sampson issued an "Order of Battle." By this order, the American naval force was divided into the First and Second Squadrons. The First Squadron, under Admiral Sampson, comprised the *New York*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *New Orleans*, *Mayflower* and *Porter*. The Second Squadron, under Commodore Schley, comprised the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Marblehead* and *Vixen*. These ships were stationed on a semi-circle around the Morro, a fort at the entrance of the harbor on the east, each ship lying six miles from the entrance, the ships on the extreme east and west keeping two miles from shore. At night the vessels were to close in nearer. The accompanying sketch shows the arrangement of the ships under this first order. The First Squadron was on the east, the Second Squadron on the west, of the entrance. The Admiral also said: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close in and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel."

On June 7th, when the dark nights came on, the Admiral adopted the following plan for night blockade; three armed picket-launches were stationed at dark at a distance of one

mile from the Morro, one launch to the east, one to the west and one south of the entrance. Outside of the launches, at a distance of two miles from the Morro and disposed in a similar manner, were stationed, naming from west to east, the *Vixen*, the *Suwanee* and the *Dolphin*, the eastern and western vessels being about three-fourths of a mile from shore. The larger remaining vessels, in their regular blockading order, lay four miles from the entrance.

On June 8th, the *Iowa*, *Oregon* and *Massachusetts* took turns of two hours each, in keeping a search-light on the entrance




- l.—Picket launches.
 b.—Guard ship.
 s.—Search-light ship.

Disposition of vessels for night blockade according to Admiral's last order.

of the harbor. This proving to be a success, these ships were ordered to go in, each in turn for two hours, to a distance of two miles from the entrance and keep the beam of a search-light directly up the narrow harbor entrance, taking care not to expose the picket launches. On June 12th, the blockading distance was reduced to three miles in the daytime and to two miles at night. After the landing of the Army, when the position of the

enemy became critical, one battle-ship always lay in the shadow near the ship that was using the search-light, with the men at the guns, ready for immediate action.

The morning of Sunday, July 3rd, 1898, was slightly cloudy and sultry. The ships of the American blockading squadron lay in their usual positions around the harbor-mouth of Santiago, anticipating nothing beyond the usual, quiet, uneventful day of routine duties. The ships lay, as they had done for weeks in compliance with the order of Admiral Sampson, in a large semi-circle, with the Morro for its center. The little *Vixen* lay farthest to the west and closest in shore ;



Blockading positions of ships according to Admiral's order of June 2nd. These were relatively the positions in which the ships lay on July 3rd, except that the distance from the Morro was three miles instead of six.

then came the *Brooklyn*,—she was out of position, outside the semi-circle and about 7,000 yards distance from the Morro; almost due east of the *Brooklyn*, and 5,100 yards S. S. W. from the Morro, lay the *Texas*; she was heading nearly east, with her port broadside to the shore. To the east of the *Texas* and in the order named came the *Iowa*, *Oregon* and *Indiana*. These ships lay in their positions on the semi-

circle; they were about two thousand yards apart and each ship headed towards the Morro, as had been ordered by the Admiral. Close inshore to the eastward lay the converted yacht *Gloucester*; she was about 4,300 yards from the Morro. The flag-ship *New York* had left her blockading station about nine o'clock to go to Siboney, where the Admiral was to have a consultation with General Shafter; the *Massachusetts* had gone earlier in the morning to Guantanamo to coal. Pursuant to orders, the remaining ships had closed in to fill up the gaps in the blockading line. The torpedo-boat *Ericsson* and the converted yacht *Hornet* lay about six miles to the eastward of the Morro.

The usual Sunday-morning muster and inspection had been omitted to give the men a chance to rest; and as the chaplain was ill, there had been no prayers on the quarter deck, as was customary. Most of the men were lying around the decks. Shortly before 9:30 A. M., moving columns of smoke were seen back of the hills to the west of the harbor-mouth. There was but little breeze and the smoke went straight up. It had become an instinctive habit and almost second nature to watch the Morro and the harbor; and nothing that was visible in the direction of the entrance escaped notice. It was thought from the columns of smoke, that some of the ships inside were changing their position; it was hoped, no doubt, by many, that the Spanish ships were coming out. Very soon after the smoke was first observed, the black bow of a big ship was seen poking out of the channel to the east of Smith Cay.

Almost simultaneously, signal guns were fired from the *Iowa* and *Oregon*; and the signal, 250, "The enemy's vessels are escaping," was hoisted on all our ships. On the *Texas*, some one shouted down through the ward-room hatch, "They're coming out!" and a moment later the general alarm sounded. It is hard to describe one's emotions at this time. There was a feeling of intense but suppressed excitement and of momentary doubt that the Spaniards were really coming out; and there was a desire on the part of nearly every one to verify, by the testimony of his own eyes, the stupendous fact that the long-awaited enemy was at last coming out to meet



R. K. Crank
Asst. Eng'r., U.S. N.

us; but with all, I think, there was a feeling of elation over the fact that the enemy was coming. One felt as if the time of his life—or at least, of his naval life,—had come.

In a moment, all was activity aboard. The ships were already cleared for action and ammunition was kept in readiness near the guns. We were practically ready for battle at any time. The men instinctively went to their stations. They had almost lived at the guns for five weeks. As the engines were moved frequently to keep the ship in position, the fires were kept in good condition, heavy and covered over, a third of them being cleaned every watch, as is usual at sea. The steam pressure was always kept up to the highest working-pressure. The officer-of-the-deck shouted down the speaking tube: "For God's sake give us all the steam you can! They're coming out!" Then came the slamming down of battle-hatches, shutting out the last ray of natural light from the compartments below the protective deck; the shutting of water-tight doors; the calls of the men in the handling-rooms and at the ammunition hoists; the hurrying of feet as the men went to their stations; the clanging of the general alarm;—all apparent confusion, yet all perfect system and order. The ships were sighted and the general alarm was sounded at 9:35; just three minutes afterwards, we began firing with our port guns. The Spaniards said that they had expected to surprise us at prayers; what a cruel disappointment!

The leading ship of the enemy came out rapidly, firing with her big gun as she cleared Socapa Point, probably at the *Brooklyn* or the *Texas*; the shell fell short. The forts opened fire simultaneously.

The leading vessel of the enemy was soon followed by three others; they came out rapidly, running apparently at about nine knots. We now know that the order in which the enemy came out was as follows: 1st, the *Maria Teresa*, flying the flag of Admiral Cervera; 2nd, the *Vizcaya*; 3rd, the *Cristobal Colon*; 4th, the *Almirante Oquendo*. As soon as the *Maria Teresa* cleared the mouth of the harbor, she turned sharply to the west and ran full speed close inshore, the other vessels following in her wake at intervals of about 500 or 600 yards.

The ships of our squadron that were lying to the eastward of the *Texas*, as well as the *Brooklyn*, were headed towards the Morro, so that they had only to go ahead at full speed, as they did, to close in on the enemy. The *Texas* was headed towards the east, and as soon as the enemy was sighted, she went ahead full speed with both engines and with the helm hard-a-starboard so as to swing around to the west; as she swung, the port guns were fired as rapidly as possible, the turret gun being fired.

The other vessels of our force, with the exception of the *Vixen*, headed full speed for the enemy, firing with their main and secondary batteries as they closed in. The *Vixen* was lying close inshore, about 5,300 yards west of the Morro, and right in the path of the enemy's ships. Had she remained there she would have been caught between the shore and the enemy's ships, or between the enemy's line of battle and our ships, and exposed to the fire of both; so she very properly and promptly hustled seawards, going beyond the *Brooklyn's* first position, and ran parallel to our ships and outside of them during the engagement. The *Gloucester*, lying a little to the eastward of the Morro and about a mile and a half off shore, headed at full-speed for the enemy, firing as she approached; she began firing at about 3,500 yards and soon reduced her distance to less than 3,000 yards, when she slowed down to wait for the two Spanish torpedo destroyers in case they should come out.

As soon as they cleared the entrance, the enemy's ships opened a very rapid, fierce fire on our ships. At first their range seemed to be fairly good; but later, as the action became closer, all their shells seemed to go too high. The fire from our ships was also very rapid. As we knew very closely the distance at which our ships had been lying from the Morro at the beginning of the fight, and hence knew very closely the range at which to fire, our fire at first must have been very accurate,—as indeed, was subsequently proved to be the case. A very light breeze was blowing from the shore, and the smoke hung in heavy clouds over our ships and was blown back into the faces of the men at the guns, seriously interfering with our fire. This same smoke however, forming

as it did, a grayish-white background for the lead-color of our ships, must have made it very difficult for the enemy to see us well. The black hulls of their ships stood out plainly through the smoke of their guns.

When the four large vessels of the enemy were well clear of the harbor-mouth and the rear one had gotten about 1,500 yards to the westward of the Morro, the destroyers *Pluton* and *Furor* made their appearance and turned to the west to follow in the wake of the other vessels. This was shortly before ten o'clock. The *Gloucester*, in anticipation of the coming out of the destroyers, had slowed down to wait for them, keeping up a deliberate fire on the enemy's cruisers in the meanwhile. As soon as the destroyers appeared the *Gloucester* opened a rapid fire on them and closed in on them at full speed.


At ten o'clock, then, all of the enemy's vessels were well out of and away from the harbor-mouth and steaming at full speed to the west. The leading vessel was half a mile southeast of the entrance to Cabañas Bay,—a small bay about two miles to the westward of the Morro. The interval between the enemy's ships was about 500 or 600 yards. The *Pluton* and *Furor* were close inshore and about half a mile west of the entrance of Santiago. Our ships that were at first lying to the east of the Morro had closed in rapidly. The *Gloucester* had arrived at a point just about south of the Morro. The *Indiana*, steaming almost due west, had come up to a point about 2,500 yards southeast of the Morro. The *Oregon*, heading at first northwest, had swung around to the westward and had come up rapidly until she was nearly abreast of the *Texas*. The *Iowa*, at first headed almost due north, had also swung around to the westward, and was on the starboard beam of the *Oregon*. The *Texas* had swung around in a big circle to port, with starboard helm, until she was now heading west, with the *Iowa* and *Oregon* on her starboard quarter. The *Brooklyn*, heading northeast and running directly for the enemy, would have crossed the bows of the *Texas*, had she (the *Brooklyn*) continued on her course; but, putting her helm hard-a-port, the *Brooklyn* swung around to the eastward almost directly in the course that the *Texas* was taking. Continuing to swing with a port helm, the *Brooklyn*

made almost a complete circle, finally standing off to the west on a course parallel to that of the enemy's vessels. As the *Brooklyn* swung, she ran directly across the bows of the *Texas*; the *Texas* was forced to slow and stop until the *Brooklyn* had passed out of the way. About this time, while the *Texas* was slowed or stopped, the *Oregon* passed her on the starboard side, running between the *Iowa* and the *Texas* and blanketing the fire of the *Texas*. This was a little after ten o'clock. This manœuvre on the part of the *Oregon* was extremely dangerous in the smoke and confusion of the battle. It is said that one of her 6-inch-gun captains had the lock string of his gun in his hand, waiting for a favorable opportunity to fire into the *Texas* at point-blank range. With the *Oregon* on the starboard bow and the *Iowa* on the starboard quarter, the *Texas* was at the focus of the enemy's fire,—in a very fair position to receive the shells of the enemy directed at these other two vessels. It was at this time that the shells from the enemy were flying most thickly and rapidly over the decks of the *Texas*. It is probable that the 6-inch shell that struck and burst just outside the smoke-pipe, in the air-trunk to the forced-draft blowers, came aboard at this time.

The *New York* had gotten under way from Siboney at the beginning of the fight. At first she could make only eight knots, having only a fraction of her boiler power in use, but she gradually increased her speed and was coming up slowly astern. The torpedo-boat *Ericsson* had also gotten under way at the beginning of the fight and ran up in time to overhaul easily all the ships; she stopped to assist the *Iowa* in picking up the men of the *Vizcaya* after that ship had been beached. The action began at a range, for the *Texas*, of about 4,500 yards. At 9:45, the range given out on the *Texas* was 3,200 yards. Shortly afterwards, a range of 2,600 yards was given out. This was the last range given.

The perpendicular distance between the enemy's column and our own column was about 2,200 yards; this was because we were firing at the enemy forward of the beam.

The *Oregon* passed the *Texas*, and running ahead, engaged the two leading vessels of the enemy with the *Brooklyn*. The *Texas* and *Iowa* devoted themselves to the last two vessels of



Copyrighted 1890 by A. Loether.

U. S. BATTLESHIP TEXAS

CAPT. J. W. PHILIP



the enemy. The destroyers received the concentrated fire of the secondary batteries of the *Texas*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Indiana* and *Gloucester*. The fire directed on these two, the *Pluton* and *Furor*, was something terrible; the water around them fairly foamed from the rain of rapid-fire shells that struck near them. A big shell—whether from one of the 12-inch guns of the *Iowa* that was fired at one of the boats or from the after 6-inch gun of the *Texas*, that was also fired at one of the boats, no one knows—struck one of the destroyers, cutting her nearly in two. The other boat was cut to pieces by shell. The *Gloucester* followed the destroyers closely, though she was exposed to the fire of the larger vessels of the enemy that were in the rear.

About 10:15, the two leading vessels of the enemy were about one and a half miles west of the mouth of Cabañas Bay. Until ten o'clock the order of the enemy's vessels was as follows: 1st, *Maria Teresa*; 2nd, *Vizcaya*; 3rd, *Colon*; 4th, *Oquendo*. Between 10 and 10:15, this order was changed. The *Vizcaya*, keeping her course, had taken the lead. The *Colon*, passing inshore of the *Teresa*, followed on the starboard quarter of the *Vizcaya*, and at some time, the *Oquendo* passed the *Teresa*. Our ships were enveloped in smoke and were very hotly engaged with the enemy about this stage of the fight; so it is very difficult, if not impossible, to say with certainty just what happened. At 10:15, the position of our ships was this: The *Brooklyn* was the farthest offshore, abreast of the leading vessel of the enemy; the *Oregon* followed closer inshore and about on the starboard quarter of the *Brooklyn*; the *Oregon* was 500 yards or more closer to the enemy than the *Brooklyn*, *i. e.*, about 3,000 yards from them; the *Texas* was just astern of the *Oregon* and about 1,000 yards behind the *Oregon* and about abreast of the third of the enemy's vessels; the *Iowa* was on the starboard quarter of the *Texas* and about 400 yards astern of her; the *Indiana* perhaps a mile and a quarter astern of the *Iowa*; the *Gloucester* about half a mile southeast of Cabañas Bay, engaging the destroyers, which were just off the mouth of the bay. These hours given are approximately accurate.

The destroyers were the first of the enemy's vessels to be

knocked out. The explosion on the *Furor* occasioned by a big shell, most probably from the *Iowa*, which was the first visible sign of disaster in the enemy's squadron, took place about 10:17; and the *Furor* sank in deep water a little to the west of Cabañas (about one mile). A great cloud of steam and smoke ascended from the *Furor* as she exploded. She stopped and sheered in toward the beach, firing her guns to the last. When the smoke cleared away, only the *Pluton* was to be seen. The *Pluton* slowed after the *Furor* exploded. Soon after, there was an explosion on the *Pluton* and she steered wildly, being apparently unmanageable; she did, however, get close inshore and was beached in the surf on the rocks. The destroyers went down about 10:22.

The action was probably hottest from ten o'clock until the *Teresa* and *Oquendo* were beached. The enemy's vessels kept up a continuous and very rapid fire. Numbers of their shells, both large and small, passed over the *Texas*. Their fire was not so rapid as ours, however. Roughly, the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* were engaged with the *Vizcaya* and the *Colon* after 10:15; and the *Texas* and *Iowa* with the *Oquendo* and *Maria Teresa*. At ten minutes past ten, the *Maria Teresa* the third of the enemy's vessels in column, was seen to be sheering in towards the beach; she seemed to be on fire forward before she headed in. But this smoke was probably due to an explosion, as it seemed to clear away soon, after which she at once headed for the beach. To those on the American ships astern, it looked as if she were coming back to aid the *Oquendo*, which was now the last ship in the column, and, because of this position, had been receiving the concentrated fire of the *Texas* and *Iowa* and probably also of the *Indiana*. The *Oquendo* went on a short distance past the *Teresa* and then herself headed in towards the beach. These two ships beached in a small cove called Nima-Nima, about six miles west of Morro: they went ashore about 500 to 800 yards apart and almost simultaneously. This was at 10:35. The *Teresa* hoisted a white flag. The *Oquendo* simply struck her colors.

The *Cristobal* had gained steadily on the *Vizcaya*, and about the time that the first two ships were beached, she passed in-

shore and ahead of the *Vizcaya*. They were a mile and a half beyond Nima-Nima at 10:35. The *Brooklyn* was well on the port quarter of the leading ship of the enemy and well offshore (about sixty-five hundred yards). The *Oregon* followed on the starboard quarter of the *Brooklyn*, about half a mile closer inshore. The *Texas* followed in the wake of the *Oregon* and about a mile astern of her; the *Iowa* was close on the starboard quarter of the *Texas*; the *Indiana* was about a mile astern of the *Texas*. The running fight continued. The two fleeing Spaniards replied rather weakly to the fire of our ships, which was concentrated on the *Vizcaya*. The *Texas* was firing at a range of 6,400 yards. This rather dispirited fight continued for about seven miles. The *Vizcaya* must have suffered severely from the fire of these four ships, the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas* and *Iowa*. At 10:55, the *Vizcaya* sheered in towards the beach, on fire forward and aft, and in a very short time she hauled down her colors (11:05). She was enveloped in clouds of thick smoke that came from her decks and sides; through the smoke patches of flame could be seen. Her men were to be seen lowering boats, and many jumped overboard. The *Texas* was abeam of the *Vizcaya* about 11:30. About this time, there was a terrific explosion on the *Vizcaya* and our men burst into cheers. The *Vizcaya* went ashore at Acerradero, about fifteen miles west of the Morro. The *Iowa* dropped out of the chase here, and remained to pick up the officers and men of the *Vizcaya*; she was out of the fight from this time, as was also the *Indiana*. The *New York* was gaining slowly and coming up astern, increasing her speed all the time.

The *Colon* had increased her lead and was now doing her best to escape. She was closely followed by the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*. The *Texas* followed about four miles astern of the *Oregon*. The speed was about sixteen knots and at times it must have run nearly two knots higher. The *Brooklyn* shaped her course so as gradually to force the *Colon* to run ashore. The *Brooklyn* was about a mile farther offshore than the *Oregon*, which held a parallel course. The *Texas* was headed for the *Colon*. The *Brooklyn* was firing from her 8-inch guns. The greater number of the shells fell short, a few going over

the *Colon*. The chase continued from 11:30 until 1:20, the *Brooklyn* gradually edging the *Colon* in towards the beach and the *Oregon* hauling up astern. As there was a point of land (Cape Cruz) in plain sight, and as the *Brooklyn* was heading directly for it, it soon became evident that the *Colon* must turn out seaward or run ashore on this point, if the *Brooklyn* did not intercept her before the point was reached. After the *Vizcaya* was beached and we had ceased firing on her, there was no further firing until about 12:45. We had been gaining on her all the time, even the *Texas* being in the push. About 12:45, the *Oregon* fired two heavy shells at the *Colon*, which fell short. The *Oregon's* next shot fell very close. The *Brooklyn* tried a few shots, which fell far short on account of the great distance from the *Colon*. It is probable that the commanding officer of the *Colon* had decided that the game was up and was simply looking for a good place to beach his ship. His case was hopeless. The shells from the *Oregon* were splashing close around his ship, the *New York* was coming up rapidly astern and the *Brooklyn* could have headed him off had he turned to seaward. So the *Colon* was seen to slacken her speed about one o'clock, and at 1:20 she ran on the beach and surrendered. The *Texas* hoisted the signal: "The enemy's vessel has surrendered," and Captain Philip called all hands aft for silent prayer. The *Colon* surrendered to Commodore Schley, who signalled to the *New York*: "We have gained a great victory; details will be communicated later."

Gyus S. Radford
1st Lieut U.S. Marine

R. K. Crank
Asst. Eng'r., U.S. N.





R. N. Evans

CHAPTER VII.

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.

BY

CAPT. ROBLEY D. EVANS, U. S. N.

ON May 19, 1898, the Spanish Admiral, Pascual Cervera y Topete, had entered the harbor of Santiago, on the south side of the Island of Cuba, with the fast armored cruisers *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, *Almirante Oquendo* and *Cristobal Colon*, together with the sea-going torpedo boats *Furor* and *Pluton*.

On Sunday morning, July 3, 1898, the American fleet, commanded by Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, was blockading the harbor of Santiago. The entrance to the harbor was defended by numerous batteries, none of sufficient strength to endanger the blockading fleet, but together strong enough to protect the lines of electric and observation mines with which the narrow channel was known to be planted.

The disposition of the blockading fleet was as follows: beginning at the eastern end of the line was the auxiliary gunboat *Gloucester*, off Aguadores, close into the land and about three miles from the Morro fort; next to the *Gloucester* the flag-ship *New York*; then the battleship *Indiana*; then the battleship *Oregon*; next to her the battleship *Iowa*; next to her the second-class battleship *Texas*; next to her the armored cruiser *Brooklyn*, flying the broad pennant of Commodore Schley; and on the western end of the line, the auxiliary gunboat *Vixen*, close into the land.

The fleet was arranged in an irregular half circle with the western part of the curve flattened out, owing to the lay of the land in that direction, and all distant about three miles from the Morro—the fort at the eastern entrance to the harbor. This was the usual position of the American fleet from daylight until dark.

The orders from the flag officer commanding, Admiral Sampson, were as follows: "The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles from the Morro in the daytime and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well inshore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close in and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel."

The distance from the Morro was afterwards decreased to three miles in the daytime and less at night.

Sunday, July 3, was one of those beautiful clear days sometimes seen in the tropics, without a cloud in the sky and when objects can be distinguished at a long distance. The flag-ship *New York* had started to Siboney, at about 9 A. M., flying the signal: "Disregard the movements of the Commander-in-Chief"—Admiral Sampson had been invited to a conference and was on his way to meet General Shafter.

At about 9:35 the Spanish fleet was discovered coming out. The *Iowa*, from her position, could see farther into the harbor than any other ship and was therefore the first to discover them. Before the leading vessel, the *Maria Teresa*, bearing the flag of Admiral Cervera, had made the turn into the channel in front of the Punta Gorda battery, the *Iowa* flew the signal: "Enemy's ships coming out;" at the same time she fired a shotted gun to call attention to the signal. This was the first gun of the engagement.

The above signal was immediately repeated, and almost at the same moment, by the *Oregon*, a few seconds later by the *Texas* and then by the *Brooklyn*.

Lieut. Schuetze, navigator of the *Iowa*, and Lieut. F. K. Hill were on the bridge when the latter discovered the *Maria Teresa* as her bow showed around the end of Cayo Smith. Lieut. Hill immediately jumped to a six-pounder on the bridge, gave the gun extreme elevation and as the signal was run up, fired in the direction of the enemy's ships. The signal had been bent on the night before and was, therefore, all ready.

At this moment the ships of the American fleet were in the

following positions :—The *New York* about four miles to the eastward of her usual position, turning with helm hard aport—the Admiral's flag in plain sight from the *Iowa* ; the *Gloucester* close inshore off Aguadores ; the *Indiana* in or near the position usually occupied by the *New York*, heading for the Morro and going at full speed ; the *Oregon* heading for the entrance at full speed ; the *Iowa* heading a little to the westward of the entrance, going at full speed ; the *Texas* heading about East across the course of the *Iowa* ; the *Brooklyn* heading about North by West and the *Vixen* heading South and coming out fast from under the land.

Almost immediately upon the discovery of the *Maria Teresa*, the *Oregon* and *Iowa* opened fire on her at a range of 6,000 yards. The *Texas* and *Brooklyn* also opened with their port batteries. As the *Maria Teresa*, followed by the *Vizcaya*, *Colon* and *Oquendo*, in the order named, cleared the point and stood to the westward, the *Indiana*, which was approaching the Morro from the eastward, was exposed to their fire and became hotly engaged.

When the last Spanish vessel, the *Oquendo*, cleared the point, the action was general on both sides and the fire very heavy. The shore batteries had all opened on the American fleet as soon as the first shots were fired at the *Maria Teresa* and, as they received no answer from the Americans, they continued to fire at will, but it could not be observed that any damage resulted from their efforts.

The Spanish squadron was now standing to the westward in column, the distance between the ships being about 600 yards and the speed gradually increasing to about thirteen knots.

Three American battleships were closing in on them at full speed, keeping them on their starboard bows and using all guns that would bear in that direction. The Spanish were using their broadsides and firing with great rapidity but with little accuracy.

The armored cruiser *Brooklyn*, at this stage of the battle, put her helm to port and turned to the south, away from the enemy's fleet, and thereby materially increased her distance from them. In performing the manœuvre she caused the

Texas to slow down and stop to avoid collision. Before the latter could recover her speed she had fallen somewhat astern of the battleships. As the *Brooklyn* completed her turn and headed off to the westward she became hotly engaged with the *Vizcaya*, as was also the *Texas*, the latter having regained her position by an increase of speed.

The pace proved too hot for the *Maria Teresa* and the *Oquendo*, and at about ten o'clock both ships were seen to be in distress. Soon smoke began to show from their after hatches and through the shot holes in their sides and they turned and stood for the beach, first the *Maria Teresa* and then the *Oquendo*. At 10:25 the former, and a few minutes later, the latter took the beach. Both were in flames fore and aft.

The *Colon* had in the meantime tried to carry out her part of Admiral Cervera's well-considered plan of escape. When all the ships were fully engaged and the smoke was the thickest, she ran inside the Spanish ships ahead of her and, at a speed of seventeen knots, made her dash for liberty. The *Oregon* immediately passed under the stern of the *Iowa*, across the bows of the *Texas* and stood after the *Colon*, in so doing closely engaging the *Vizcaya*. At this time the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana* swung to the westward and the American fleet was in column at irregular distances. The cruiser *Brooklyn*, well off to the left, led the column and was broad off the port quarter of the *Colon*, about six miles away from her; the *Oregon* came next, well inside the *Brooklyn* but astern of her and a little on the port quarter of the *Colon*; next came the *Texas* on the port quarter of the *Oregon* and astern of her; next after the *Texas* came the *Iowa*, inside ship of all, heading for the *Vizcaya*, and last the *Indiana*, almost directly in the wake of the *Iowa*.

At 9:50, two thousand yards astern of the Spanish ships came the torpedo boats *Pluton* and *Furor*. The *Indiana* flew the signal: "Enemy's torpedo boats escaping," and opened on them with her secondary and rapid-fire batteries as they passed the Morro and hauled to the westward. The *Iowa* and *Texas* also opened a furious fire on them and a few moments later the *Gloucester* attacked them with great spirit.

At 10:30, the *Furor* blew up and sank in deep water, and the *Pluton* headed for the beach, where she ran on the rocks and was submerged except a small portion of her bows. The American fleet, having destroyed or disabled the two torpedo boats and two of the Spanish cruisers, stood on in column, as before described, in chase of the two remaining ships.

At 11 o'clock the *Vizcaya* turned for the beach, in flames, and was run ashore at Accerraderos, fifteen miles to the westward of the Morro, where she continued to burn until practically destroyed. At this time the battle of Santiago may be said to have ended.

The *Indiana* was sent back to guard the Santiago entrance and prevent the escape of the Spanish vessels known to be still in the harbor. The *Iowa*, assisted by the *Hist* and *Ericsson*, rescued the crew of the *Vizcaya*; the *Harvard* performed the same service for the *Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo*, assisted by the boats of the *Indiana* and *Gloucester*.

Shortly after the surrender of the *Vizcaya*, the flag-ship *New York* passed to the westward in chase after the *Colon*. The *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas* and *Vixen* continued also in chase and at about 1 P. M. the *Oregon* opened fire with her forward thirteen-inch guns. The *Brooklyn* fired with her eight-inch guns at about the same time. The *Oregon's* first shot, at nine thousand yards, fell short, but the second at nine thousand eight hundred went over the *Colon*, and her captain, deeming further resistance to be useless, struck his colors at 1:15 P. M. and ran his ship on the beach at Rio Tarquino, about fifty miles to the westward of the Morro. After she had been surrendered her sea valves were treacherously opened and the vessel sank and rolled over on her side. No shot struck the *Colon* after she made her run past the other Spanish ships and her commander stated that she surrendered only because he found the *Oregon* could reach him and he feared the effect of her thirteen-inch shells.

When the flag-ship *New York* passed near the wreck of the *Vizcaya*, it was evident at a glance that the *Iowa* could be of no service in chasing the *Colon*. At the same time it was clear to all that the fast battleship *Oregon*, and the faster armored cruisers, *New York* and *Brooklyn*, were surely and

steadily overhauling her and that it would be only a short time before they would come up with her and compel her surrender. This was accomplished, as before stated, at 1:15 P. M.

The effect on the American ships of the fire of their Spanish opponents was very much less than might have been expected. The *Iowa* was more damaged than any other vessel, having been struck in the starboard bow by two six-and-a-half-inch shells, one of which exploded on the berth-deck, doing great damage. She was also cut up somewhat about the upper works by small projectiles and her sides and turrets marked by a great number of Mauser bullets fired from the *Oquendo*. One shell struck at or near the water line on the starboard bow and penetrated the cellulose belt. The cellulose was washed out of the coffer-dam before it had time to swell and stop the shot hole and the water astern for several miles was covered with it.

The *Brooklyn* lost the only man killed in the action. She was much cut up or marked by small projectiles, but was not struck by anything larger than a six-inch shell. The fact that she was struck much oftener than any other ship was no doubt owing to the much larger target she presented to the enemy due to her high foreboard and great length.

The *Texas* came next in point of damage received. She was twice struck, once by a six-inch shell which exploded after passing through the hammock berthing, doing much harm; the other shell, size not known, exploded near the bridge and did considerable damage to the pilot-house.

The *Oregon* was struck by one six-inch shell and two fragments of shell but was not seriously injured.

The *Indiana* was marked by two small fragments of shell but no damage was done her.

The other American ships were not struck. In no case was the machinery injured and not a single gun was put out of action by the fire of the Spaniards.

The accuracy of fire on the American side was vastly superior to that of the Spaniards and its effects were terrific. The *Maria Teresa's* water mains were cut before she reached the Morro and when she was headed to the westward she had



Copyrighted 1890 by A. L. Merritt.

U. S. BATTLESHIP IOWA

CAPT. R. D. EVANS

forty dead men on her decks. In fact, all the Spanish ships were simply smothered by the fire of the Americans. The full effect of this fire could not be observed except in the case of the *Colon*, as all the others were burned and partially submerged, but the parts above water show how effective and terrific it must have been. The forward turret of the *Oquendo* is a fair sample of it. An eight-inch shell struck the edge of the hood of this turret, flanged it back and exploded, killing every man and officer in the turret and disabling every piece of machinery in it.

Every ship except the *Colon* showed in all parts, above the protective decks, the awful havoc caused by the explosion of modern projectiles. Their exposed sides were simply riddled and in many cases the shells passed completely through from side to side. To the accuracy of the American fire may be fairly attributed the inaccuracy of the Spanish return fire.

The loss of life in the action was most disproportionate, the Americans having lost but one man, while the Spanish loss in killed was given by Admiral Cervera, in his telegram to General Blanco, as over six hundred. This has since been reduced to about four hundred. The number of wounded will never be known, as a great many of them were burned with their ships.

The American hospital ship, *Solace*, however, cared for and took north 117 wounded Spanish officers and men. Of the several plans of escape open to Admiral Cervera, he undoubtedly adopted the one most likely to succeed. He might have headed to the eastward after passing the Morro instead of to the westward, but if he had done so he would have had to pass the battleships *Oregon* and *Indiana* at close range, immediately after encounter the *New York*, one of the most efficient armored cruisers in the world. If he had succeeded in escaping from Admiral Sampson's fleet, he would still have had to deal with the vessels under Commodore Watson at Guantanamo, among them the battleship *Massachusetts*.

He might have opened out his ships after clearing the entrance and made for the open sea, each vessel steering a

different course. Had he done so, each of his ships would have had to pass between two American ships, and the result to him would have been the almost instant destruction of his fleet.

If Admiral Cervera had intended to fight with the object of doing all the damage possible to the American fleet, he should have come out with his ships in column, closed to half distance, with the torpedo boats close under the stern of the last, or next to the last vessel, and in this formation charged the American line. In the thick of the smoke there would have been a chance for ram and torpedo, and it is more than probable that the Americans would have lost seriously in ships and lives. The result would, however, have been the same in the end—the Spanish fleet would have been destroyed and sunk in deep water, and the loss of life appalling.

But Admiral Cervera had no such intentions. He came out to escape and not to fight more than was necessary in order to accomplish his object. He was compelled by imperative orders to leave the harbor and under all the circumstances he adopted the course most promising of success. His plans were admirably made, and the attempt to carry them out, one of the most gallant recorded in history.

It was a fatal mistake to send the fleet out in the face of such a force, and the result must have been foreseen by Admiral Cervera and the able officers associated with him, but once outside, by standing to the westward, he confined the fire of the American fleet to one side of his ships and thus reduced the chance of hits to the minimum.

The handling of the torpedo boats was a mistake. They should have been kept close to the leading ships and on their starboard or inshore sides, ready at the proper moment to use their torpedoes or make a dash for liberty.

The only other course open to the Spanish Admiral was to attempt to escape by night, and this was rendered absolutely impossible by the persistent use of search lights by the American fleet, and by the further fact that three battleships were always close in to the entrance of the harbor. Any attempt to come out during this time—from dark until daylight—would have resulted in the sinking of the leading ship and the grounding and destruction of all the others,

It may be fairly assumed that if Admiral Cervera—one of the ablest men of his profession—had been left to his own devices, the Spanish fleet under his command would not have attempted to escape from Santiago harbor on the 3d of July. Following is a list of the vessels engaged in the battle of Santiago with their batteries.

AMERICAN SHIPS.

NAME.	BROADSIDE.
<i>New York</i>	{ 5—8 inch rifles.
	{ 6—4 “ “
	{ 4—6 pounders.
	{ 2—1 “
<i>Brooklyn</i>	{ 6—5 inch rifles.
	{ 6—8 “ “
	{ 5—6 pounders.
	{ 2—1 “
	2—Colt Automatic.
<i>Texas</i>	{ 1—12 inch rifle.
	{ 4—6 “ “
	{ 6—6 pounders.
	{ 2—Hotchkiss revolving guns.
<i>Iowa</i>	{ 4—12 inch rifles.
	{ 4—8 “ “
	{ 3—4 “ “
	{ 10—6 pounders.
	{ 1—1 “
	2—Colt Automatics.
<i>Indiana</i>	{ 4—13 inch rifles.
	{ 4—8 “ “
	{ 2—6 “ “
	{ 10—6 pounders.
	{ 2—1 “
	1—Colt Automatic.
<i>Oregon</i>	{ 4—13 inch rifles.
	{ 4—8 “ “
	{ 2—6 “ “
	{ 10—6 pounders.
	{ 2—1 “
	1—Colt Automatic.
<i>Gloucester</i>	{ 2—6 pounders.
	{ 3—3 “
	{ 1—Colt Automatic.

Vixen { 2—6 pounds.
 } 3—1 “

SPANISH SHIPS.

NAME.	BROADSIDE.
<i>Infanta Maria Teresa</i>	2—11 inch rifles.
	5—5.5 “ “
	4—6 pounds.
	5—1 “
	4—Nordenfeldt machine guns.
	2—Maxim “ “
<i>Vizcaya</i>	2—11 inch rifles.
	5—5.5 “ “
	4—6 pounds.
	5—1 “
	4—Nordenfeldt machine guns.
	2—Maxim “ “
<i>Almirante Oquendo</i>	2—11 inch rifles.
	5—5.5 “ “
	4—6 pounds.
	5—1 “
	4—Nordenfeldt machine guns.
	2—Maxim “ “
<i>Cristobal Colon</i>	*2—9.8 inch rifles.
	5—6 “ “
	3—4.7 “ “
	5—6 pounds.
	5—1 “
	2—Maxim machine guns.
<i>Pluton</i>	2—12 pd'r rapid-fire Maxim Nordenfeldt guns.
	1—6 “ “ “ “
	1—Maxim Automatic.
<i>Furor</i>	2—12 pd'r. rapid-fire Maxim Nordenfeldt guns.
	1—6 “ “ “ “
	1—Maxim Automatic.

*These guns were not on board—they were replaced by guns supposed to be six-inch rifles.

R. N. Evans



*W. H. Allen,
Lieut., U. S. Army.*

CHAPTER VIII.

THE VOYAGE OF THE *OREGON*.

BY

LIEUT. W. H. ALLEN, U. S. N.

THE U. S. S. *Oregon*, when designed and built, was classed as a coast-line battleship. It was not intended that she should make long trips at sea, but her duty was to defend the coast against any vessels that might be sent to devastate it. The ship is nominally of 10,288 tons displacement, but, when equipped for a long cruise, displaces nearly 12,000 tons. She was designed for 15 knots, but on her official trial developed a speed of 16.7 knots, under forced draft, using both her main and auxiliary boilers. Her crew consists ordinarily of thirty officers and 438 men, and her armament is the heaviest carried by any vessel of the same displacement. Foreign experts doubted the ability of this class of ships to keep at sea in rough weather.

The only extended trip of the *Oregon* previous to March, 1898, had been from San Francisco to Acapulco, Mexico, a distance of about eighteen hundred miles. This voyage was made at various speeds to determine the coal consumption. At that time this was considered a long distance for a battleship to make without a stop. Subsequently, on a trip from San Francisco to Puget Sound, during a violent wind, she demonstrated her ability to weather any gale if properly handled.

In order to make the ship more steady at sea, bilge keels were built on her bottom. This was done in the dry dock at Bremerton, Washington.

As the *Oregon* was being hauled out of the dry dock at Bremerton on the morning of February 16, 1898, news of the blowing up of the *Maine* in the harbor of Havana was re-

ceived. On that day commenced the preparations for her memorable voyage to the eastern coast. Previous to going into dock, all ammunition and coal had been removed in order to lighten her, the ammunition having been left at the Mare Island Navy Yard near San Francisco.

Orders were received to proceed as soon as possible to San Francisco and prepare for a long cruise. Owing to the Klondike excitement in the northwest section of the country, vexatious delays occurred in procuring the necessary coal for the trip to San Francisco, nearly all available vessels being diverted to the Klondike trade. It was not until the 6th of March that the *Oregon* sailed for San Francisco, where she arrived on the 9th.

Ammunition, coal and stores were hurried on board, the bunkers and store rooms of the ship being crowded to their utmost capacity. The work was carried on night and day, the crew working with an enthusiasm seldom seen on a man-of-war. At this time the final destination of the *Oregon* was not known to any one on board, but it was surmised that she would proceed as far as Callao, Peru, and there await further instructions. Just as the ship was ready for sea, Captain A. H. McCormick, who was in command, was obliged to leave on account of ill health, and was relieved by Captain Charles E. Clark, who assumed command the morning before the ship sailed, and who remained on the ship until after the battle of Santiago. During the period of preparation the excitement on board was intense, and no one doubted what would be the findings of the Court of Inquiry on the *Maine* disaster, though the final result was in doubt. It is certain, however, that the crew of the *Oregon* hoped for war, whatever may have been the wishes of the officers.

Final orders were received from the Navy Department on March 18, and early on the morning of the 19th, the *Oregon* sailed from San Francisco, and after passing through the Golden Gate and across the bar, was headed by the most direct route for Callao, Peru.

During the trip from San Francisco to Callao fine weather was experienced. Ten knots an hour was decided upon as the most economical speed for this distance, and the engines

were run at a constant rate of seventy-five revolutions per minute. As she was just out of dock and her bottom clean, this gave her a speed of nearly eleven knots per hour during the entire trip. Owing to the construction of the ship, when she had been a few days at sea, all parts below the upper deck became so heated that it was impossible for the men to sleep in their quarters, and this continued all the way around, even in the cool climate of the Straits of Magellan. It may be mentioned that the temperature in the armored portion of the ship over the boilers and engines ranged from 110° to 115°, while the temperature in the ammunition passages was at times as high as 140°, and these parts of the ship were not cooled by the blowers, which supplied hot air. The temperature of the fire and engine rooms was even greater than this, and it is worthy of note that during the entire trip around, only one man of the engineer's force of the ship succumbed to the heat, while on previous occasions on short trips such occurrences were common. This was probably due to the enthusiasm of the crew. Every man seemed determined to do everything in his power to push the ship along.

From the time of leaving San Francisco, clearing ship for action and battery drill were the order of the day, and preparations were made for all possible contingencies. These drills were carried on daily with few exceptions until the arrival of the *Oregon* at Key West. The crew and officers thus became thoroughly familiar with their duties in battle. Little time could be spared for actual target practice, and ammunition was precious, but frequent sub-calibre practice was had, to perfect the gun pointers.

The equator was crossed on March 31, and that day was given up to the reception of King Neptune, who came on board with his suite and initiated all those who had not before come into his royal domain. All land lubbers were treated to a shave and a bath, and were given certificates showing that they were now free to pass Neptune's kingdom, and bespeak for them good treatment.

The *Oregon's* band, composed of sailors, was an unfailing source of amusement during the voyage, and there was dancing on the superstructure deck nearly every evening. A

whist party of officers met nightly in the cabin, pajamas being the customary uniform.

During this portion of the trip the anxiety for news was great, and on our arrival at Callao, April 4, there was a feeling of disappointment that the report of the Court of Inquiry had not been made public. The meagre news that could be gathered from the papers published at Callao and Lima was contradictory and unsatisfactory. Two days after our arrival, however, the findings of the Court were published. It was here that Captain Clark was notified by the Department of the presence on the east coast, of the Spanish torpedo boat *Temerario*. The picture and description of this vessel, in connection with her slow speed, failed to create any alarm among the officers and crew, who even hoped that they might meet and sink her. The captain decided, however, that if she was met in the Straits of Magellan she would be there for no other reason than to attack the *Oregon*, and that he would sink her, war or no war.

The gunboat *Marietta* had been at Callao, and sailed for Valparaiso the day before the arrival of the *Oregon*. Her captain, by order of the Department, had purchased coal for the *Oregon*, and it was ready for the ship on her arrival. Coaling was commenced immediately, and carried on night and day until all bunkers were full and about two hundred tons of coal in sacks were piled on deck. This large amount was taken because of the uncertainty of finding any at Punta Arenas.

The sentiment of the Peruvians seemed to be strongly in favor of the United States, but it was reported that a plot existed among the Spanish residents of Callao and Lima to sink or blow up the *Oregon*. In consequence of this rumor the number of sentries was doubled, and they were furnished with ball cartridges. The steam launch patrolled around the ship from dusk until daylight, and no boats were allowed to approach the ship without proper authority. This patrol was continued in all South American ports visited by the *Oregon*.

Coaling being finished, the *Oregon* left Callao just before dark April 7, and headed for the western entrance to the Straits of Magellan. Fair weather was encountered until the

afternoon of April 16, when the ship was off Cape Pilar, at the western entrance to the straits. Fortunately it was clear enough for her to run in before the gale, which proved to be a very severe one, even for this region, noted for its furious gales. At dusk we anchored outside Port Tamar in forty fathoms of water, having two anchors down. The gale blew furiously during the night, which was an anxious one, but the good ship rode it out without difficulty, and early next morning was under way for the run through the straits to Punta Arenas. This proved to be one of the remarkable runs of the voyage. The distance to Punta Arenas is 165 miles, and the captain decided to reach that point in the evening, if possible. The ship was, therefore, run under assisted draft, that is, the fire-room blowers were used to increase the natural draft of the smoke pipes. The distance to Punta Arenas was covered in eleven hours, or at a rate of fifteen knots an hour. The strain on the engineers and firemen was great, but all bore it without a murmur. During this run crews were stationed at the secondary battery, in case the *Temerario* should be found in the straits, where there are many coves in which a vessel might lie in wait. On approaching Punta Arenas the lights of several vessels were visible through the dusk, and as a precaution the crew was called to quarters and the guns loaded. The anchorage was reached at 6:30 P. M., April 17. No Spanish vessels were found in the port, and there was no later news than that we had heard at Callao. Arrangements were immediately made for taking in coal from the coal hulk, and the work commenced early the next morning.

The *Marietta* arrived about midnight, having been storm-bound in Tuesday Bay, a harbor near the western entrance to the straits. Seeing the *Oregon* pass, her captain immediately got up anchor and followed to Punta Arenas.

While the coaling was going on the usual courtesies were exchanged with the Chilean naval and military authorities. The sentiment here, as at Callao, seemed to favor the United States, but, nevertheless the launches patrolled around the ship at night, as in that port. On the evening of the 20th an English mail steamer arrived from Valparaiso, but she brought no later news than the 17th. Coaling was distressingly slow,

owing to the poor facilities, and working night and day, only about 500 tons had been taken on board by the evening of the 20th. For this coal the government was obliged to pay the sum of twenty-two dollars per ton.

At 7 A. M., April 21, the day war was declared, the *Oregon*, accompanied by the *Marietta*, took her departure from Punta Arenas and steamed towards the eastern entrance to the straits. The *Marietta* preceded, on account of her lesser speed, and also to act as a scout. During the day two American steamers bound to the westward to engage in the Klondike trade, were met, and one of them, much against her captain's will, was compelled to stop while a boat was sent to obtain the latest news. The other was interrogated by signals, but neither had as late news as we already possessed.

The two ships passed out of the straits after dark and both were for the first time in the Atlantic, and headed once more to the northward. During the remainder of the voyage, no lights were shown except two lights on the *Marietta*, to serve as a guide for the *Oregon*, and these were carefully screened so as to show only astern. The *Marietta* was pushed to her utmost capacity, while the *Oregon* was obliged to go slower than her usual speed. The *Marietta* rolled and pitched in a fearful manner in the Atlantic swell, and life must have been very uncomfortable for her ship's company. From the *Oregon* she appeared at times fairly to stand on end, but she pluckily kept on. On the *Oregon* all lookouts were doubled, and the crews slept at their guns or on the tops of the turrets. No precaution against surprise was neglected, though it was not thought that any formidable Spanish vessel would be found in this locality. Drills were carried on with renewed energy, for the captain realized that when the tropics were reached it would be necessary partially to suspend drills in order to keep the crew in good physical condition.

On the morning of April 30 the *Oregon* left the *Marietta* and pushed ahead at fourteen-knot speed, and at 3 P. M. dropped her anchor in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the *Marietta* arriving about 9 P. M. The first boat alongside the ship was eagerly questioned for news, and it was then learned that war had been declared on the 21st. This news

was received with wild cheering by the ship's company, and all on board were anxious to be away to the scene of action.

The *Oregon* had anchored at the usual man-of-war anchorage, but soon after her arrival, various rumors were heard as to the movements of the *Temerario*, one being that she was at Isla Grande, a port a few miles to the southward of Rio de Janeiro. In consequence of this, the *Oregon* moved farther up the harbor and Captain Clark gave notice to the Brazilian authorities that if the *Temerario* entered the harbor and anchored within half a mile of the *Oregon* or *Marietta*, she would be fired upon and sunk. The *Marietta* was anchored nearer the entrance with orders to signal the approach of the Spaniard. The Brazilian Admiral stationed a torpedo destroyer near the entrance to intercept the *Temerario* should she attempt to enter the harbor. At this time, however, the redoubtable *Temerario* was in the vicinity of Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, in a state of dilapidation, and finally went up the La Plata River as far from the scene of action as possible, there to remain until the war was over.

Although a state of war existed, no objection was raised to the stay of our ships in port, repairs being necessary to the engines, and no difficulty was experienced in obtaining all the coal needed; in fact, it was understood that our government, through its agents, held an option on all the coal in the harbor, and the Brazilian government had not declared coal contraband of war.

While here, information was received of the departure of Cervera's fleet from the Cape de Verdes in the somewhat poetical cablegram, "Four armored cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo boats, sea-going class, left St. Vincent on the 29th; avoid them if possible." The news of Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila and of the bombardment of Matanzas was received, and created the wildest enthusiasm among the crew, and was celebrated in proper style, the band playing patriotic airs and several of the crew making speeches.

The departure of the two ships was somewhat delayed by the non-readiness of the *Nictheroy*, which had been purchased from the Brazilian government. This vessel had been bought by Brazil during the recent revolution and fitted as a dynamite

cruiser, but had never seen active service in that capacity. The guns had been removed, and she was to all intents and purposes a merchant vessel. Her machinery and boilers being in bad condition, extensive repairs were necessary before she could sail, and the Brazilian government stipulated that she should not leave until twenty-four hours after the departure of the *Oregon* and *Marietta*. The *Nictheroy* is known in our service as the *Buffalo*.

None of the officers or crew were allowed to go ashore except on duty, on account of the prevalence of yellow fever in the city.

The orders received by Captain Clark left everything to his discretion after leaving Rio de Janeiro, being in general terms to avoid the Spanish fleet and to proceed to some West Indian or United States port and report to the Department.

On the morning of May 5, the *Oregon* and *Marietta* steamed out of the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, and after passing outside the marine league, the *Marietta* was ordered to cruise off Cape Frio, while the *Oregon* steamed slowly up and down off the harbor entrance, awaiting the *Nictheroy*, which did not come out until the evening of the 6th. The three vessels then started to the northward, but it soon became evident that the *Nictheroy* could not make more than six or seven knots. The captain then decided to push ahead, leaving the *Marietta* to convoy the *Nictheroy*, with orders to proceed to Bahia and report to the Department. The *Oregon* soon lost sight of the two vessels, and headed for Bahia, where the captain wished to notify the Department of his action. During this trip the upper works of the ships were painted war color, in place of the former spotless white. The hull was painted during the stay at Bahia. This port was reached at 8 P. M., May 8, and, after reporting to the Department, the captain received orders to proceed north, and at the same time the Department expressed its confidence in the ability of the *Oregon* to defeat the whole Spanish fleet. The ship left Bahia at 10 P. M., May 9, and resumed her voyage north.

After leaving Bahia, the plan of action in case the Spanish fleet was encountered, was developed. In general terms, as the Spanish fleet was supposed to have a speed of nineteen

knots, the *Oregon* was to run away at full speed. If the Spaniards pursued, they were likely to become separated at high speed, and the *Oregon* could engage them singly, or two at a time, if necessary, with a good chance of success. Even if the *Oregon* was defeated, the Spaniards would pay dearly for their victory. Subsequent events showed that the *Oregon* could probably have gotten the better of the whole squadron. The orders to the officer of the deck were substantially as follows: In case a suspicious vessel was sighted, immediately to sound the general alarm, go to quarters and run away from the stranger at full speed.

The first test of this plan occurred on the morning of May 11. The officer of the deck at early daylight sighted the masts of a vessel and immediately sounded the electric gongs. The crew rushed to quarters, the men and officers below in decided undress, all divisions were ready in eight minutes, and the ship was soon running at full speed, under forced draft, away from the stranger. Full daylight showed the suspected vessel to be an inoffensive merchantman, but the incident proved how quickly the crew of the *Oregon* could prepare for action in an emergency. Another period of excitement occurred on the night of May 12, shortly before midnight, when the masthead lights of two steamers were seen on one side of the ship and, shortly after, the light of another steamer on the other side. We were then near Cape St. Roque, and as this was the locality where it was thought the Spanish fleet might be encountered, many believed that the *Oregon* actually passed through it unobserved, for it will be remembered that all lights were carefully screened, and she carried no running lights. At this time, however, the Spanish fleet was near Martinique. After the battle of Santiago, a wounded Spanish sailor who was taken to the *Oregon* from the *Cristobal Colon*, stated that on May 12, the *Colon* had picked up off Cape St. Roque, a flour barrel marked "U. S. S. *Oregon*." This, of course, was only a sailor's "yarn." No more exciting incidents occurred during this portion of the trip, and the *Oregon* pushed on rapidly to her next stopping place, Bridgetown, on the island of Barbadoes, where she arrived at 3:30 A. M., May 18.

It had not been the intention of Captain Clark to enter the harbor during the night, but as a number of suspicious lights were seen in the vicinity of the island, he decided to go in and anchor. After daylight the health officer visited the ship, and she was placed in strict quarantine, having come from an infected port.

Barbadoes being an English colony the British declaration of neutrality was strictly enforced. The captain was not allowed to report the arrival of the ship or receive any telegraphic communication. The arrival, however, was reported by our consul. The ship was allowed to take coal and stores enough to reach the nearest home port, but the Colonial government was liberal in the allowance of coal. Only two hundred tons were needed, however, and this was taken in before night. Here it was learned that the Spanish fleet was, or had been at Martinique, though it was actually at this time at Curacoa. Two Spanish torpedo boats and a transport had been seen to pass the harbor a day or two before, so the *Oregon* was evidently in the vicinity of some Spanish vessels. Little news of the progress of the war could be gleaned from the local papers. The sympathy of the Barbadians was clearly with us, and we were constantly advised to go in and whip the Spaniards. The ship attracted great attention and during our stay was surrounded by boatloads of spectators. At 9:30 P. M. the *Oregon* was again under way, and stood out of the harbor to the westward, with her steaming lights burning. After proceeding to the westward a few miles, all lights were extinguished and the ship headed to the eastward to make a detour around the Windward Islands. The strictest kind of lookout was kept, and it was not until Martinique had been passed that a feeling of relief was felt, for then it was reasonably certain that the *Oregon* was out of reach of the Spanish fleet. From this time until arrival at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, nothing of special importance occurred, though the ceaseless vigilance which had marked the whole trip was never for a moment relaxed.

The *Oregon* arrived at Jupiter Inlet at 8 P. M., May 24. Captain Clark reported his arrival, and received the congratulations of the Department. He was ordered, if the *Oregon*

needed repairs, to proceed to Hampton Roads, otherwise to Key West. As the ship, owing to the constant care and earnest work of all on board, was practically in as good condition as when she left San Francisco, Key West was her next stopping place, where she arrived on the morning of May 26.

The total distance traveled by the *Oregon* during this record-breaking trip was 13,792 miles, at an average speed of 11.2 knots per hour. During the entire journey, the engines were never once slowed or stopped for repairs. The voyage occupied sixty-eight days, of which fifty-eight days or parts of days were spent at sea. Such repairs as were necessary were made by the ship's force. No body of men could have worked more earnestly under adverse circumstances than did the *Oregon's* crew. Comfort was out of the question during the trip, but not a murmur was heard. Such patriotism speaks for itself. Later on, the crew showed its capacity for fighting as well as for work.

Arriving at Key West, the work of coaling the ship at once began, and was carried on night and day until 1 A. M. on the 28th of May, when the *Oregon* was once more under way, to join Commodore Watson's blockading squadron on the north coast of Cuba. She reached it on a beautiful Sunday morning. The ship and crew were dirty, forming a strong contrast to the other ships, with their crews in Sunday dress of spotless white. But her reception was none the less hearty, and amounted to an ovation. Each ship in turn cheered the *Oregon's* crew, and their bands played welcoming airs, the most popular apparently being, "There's a new coon in town," and, "There'll be a hot time in the old town to-night."


The *Oregon's* stay with Commodore Watson's fleet was brief, for the next morning Admiral Sampson arrived from Key West on the *New York*, and, in company with her and the *Mayflower*, the ship proceeded around the east end of Cuba, and on June 1 joined the blockading squadron off Santiago de Cuba.

Naval officers at Key West had been skeptical as to the ability of the *Oregon* to make the speed claimed for her, after her long trip and no repairs. But during the cruise with the

New York she had maintained a speed of thirteen knots without difficulty, and on the day of her arrival off Santiago occurred an amusing incident, which at the same time settled the question of the *Oregon's* speed.

Soon after joining the squadron, the Admiral steamed away on the *New York*, without leaving orders for the *Oregon*. Captain Clark asked Commodore Schley by signal what station would be assigned to the *Oregon*. The Commodore replied, "Proceed six miles to the southward and report names of strange vessels," meaning that this was to be our station. It happened that just at this time smoke was seen to the south, and in a moment the *Oregon* was off in pursuit, and the boilers put under forced draft. All was excitement on board, for here was the first prize. Gradually the *Oregon* increased her speed to sixteen knots, and was closing up on the stranger, which, in the distance, appeared to be a large steamer. The lookout even saw the cargo being thrown overboard, and the steamer was evidently doing its best to escape. A nearer view showed the chase to be a large tug, and when finally a blank charge brought it around, the United States flag was shown, and it proved to be a newspaper boat, with a number of correspondents on board, bound for Port Antonio, Jamaica, with despatches. The chase occupied about four hours, as the tug was making fourteen knots an hour. Those correspondents would have fared sadly that day had they fallen into the hands of the firemen of the *Oregon*. Seeing the mistake of the *Oregon*, the Commodore ordered the *Marblehead* to overtake and order her back, but the *Marblehead* could only meet her on the return from the fruitless trip, although making fifteen knots. The *Oregon* received a hearty cheer from the *Marblehead*, for here was a battleship with cruiser speed. She participated in all the bombardments of the forts at Santiago, occupied a regular station on the blockading line, and nightly, in turn with the *Iowa* and *Massachusetts*, moved in close to the entrance of the harbor and turned her searchlights into it to prevent the escape of the Spanish fleet.

The event for which her crew had impatiently waited took place on Sunday, July 3. The writer was officer of the deck at



Copyrighted 1909 by A. Loewitz.

U. S. BATTLESHIP OREGON

CAPT. C. F. CLARK

the time. The ship had been tidied up for the usual Sunday inspection by the captain, and officers and crew were in Sunday dress. The first call for quarters had sounded at 9:25, and all hands were awaiting the 9:30 call. At 9:28 the chief quartermaster rushed up to the bridge with the cry, "They're coming out." At that instant nothing was visible in the harbor entrance, but a moment later a Spanish ship, the *Maria Teresa*, flying a large new Spanish ensign, showed her black hull and masts, rounding a point inside the entrance. Although he had many times rehearsed what he would do in case the Spaniards came out, the officer of the deck was momentarily dazed, but recovering quickly, he caused the alarm gongs to be sounded from the pilot house. For a moment or two every one thought the gongs had sounded accidentally, as was often the case, but the order, "To your quarters," convinced the crew that this was no false alarm. A rousing cheer went up from the men as they rushed to their stations, stripping off their clothes as they ran. The *Oregon* was heading towards the entrance at the time. She immediately went ahead full speed towards the enemy, and in a few minutes was under forced draft. The *Oregon* had at all times kept fires spread in all her main boilers, and was thus ready for the emergency, attaining her maximum speed before the other ships of the squadron, and quickly passed all except the *Brooklyn*.

It is claimed on the *Oregon* that the first gun of the action was fired from one of her six-pounders, and that she first made the signal, "The enemy is escaping," but these statements have been disputed, as have the stories of many other incidents of the battle. In such exciting moments, one's attention is naturally concentrated on his own ship.

The story of the battle has been often and graphically told, but in the first newspaper accounts the *Oregon* was omitted and the *Massachusetts* put in her place. It is now a matter of record how the *Oregon*, with her marvelous speed, soon passed the other ships of the squadron and closed up on the *Brooklyn*, her guns all the time firing on the enemy; how she overtook three of the Spanish ships one by one, passing them as they turned to the beach in flames, and still rushing ahead, with the

Brooklyn outside her, was finally able, with her thirteen-inch guns, to force the *Cristobal Colon* to run on the beach and surrender. The chase lasted nearly four hours. During the engagement the *Oregon* fired nearly 1,800 shots from her guns, and by singular good fortune was struck only once, and then by a small fragment of a shell which merely marred the paint on one of her turrets.

She well earned her Spanish and American nicknames, "The Yankee Devil," and "The Bull Dog of the Navy."

The *Oregon* at present, after a few minor repairs, made necessary by the wear incident to war service, is on her way to her native waters, the Pacific, but without the rush and excitement which marked her voyage to the eastern coast.

M. N. Allen
Lieut., U. S. Navy.





Wm. M. Hooper

CHAPTER IX.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

BY
MAJ.-GEN. WM. R. SHAFTER, U. S. V., Commanding General.

I N April, 1898, it was decided by the War Department to assemble troops on the Atlantic seaboard, with a view to their mobilization for use in Cuba. At that time I was in command of the Department of California and was stationed at San Francisco. Orders came to proceed to New Orleans; upon arrival there I was directed to come to Washington, at once, for consultation with the President and was informed that the command of the first expedition that would be sent to Cuba was to be given to me. It was understood that this expedition would be what is termed a "reconnoissance in force," for the purpose of communicating with General Gomez, supplying him with arms and ammunition and ascertaining the number of his men and their position. It was to be organized at Tampa, Florida. I proceeded to Tampa and practically commenced the work of organizing troops for the expedition, and incidentally the 5th and 7th Army Corps. On May 30 a telegram was received from the Headquarters of the Army in which it was stated: "Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have been seen in the Harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet."

Transports had already been assembled in Tampa Bay. Orders were immediately given for loading aboard these transports the necessary subsistence and quartermaster's supplies, and for the embarkation of the authorized number of troops and their material. The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa, for embarking the troops and the large amount of supplies required, were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it was

not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as I hoped and desired.

On the evening of June 7, orders were received to sail without delay, but with not less than 10,000 men. After some of the transports had started out and had reached the lower bay, telegraphic instructions were received from the Secretary of War directing that the sailing of the expedition be delayed until further orders. This delay was occasioned because the Navy reported that a Spanish war vessel had been sighted in the Nicholas Channel. The ships in the lower bay were immediately recalled. On the next day, in compliance with instructions from the Adjutant-General of the Army, the necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the full capacity of the transports and the expedition sailed on June 14, with 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men.

The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. The health of the command remained remarkably good, notwithstanding the fact that the conveniences on many of the transports, in the nature of sleeping and closet accommodations, space for exercise, etc., were not all that could have been desired.

While passing along the north coast of Cuba, one of the two barges we had in tow broke away during the night and was not recovered. The loss proved to be very serious, for it delayed and embarrassed the disembarkation of the army. On the morning of June 20 we arrived off Guantanamo Bay and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came on board the headquarters transport. It was arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban General Garcia, at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west of the Morro. During the interview, General Garcia offered the services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men in the vicinity of Aserraderos, and about 500 under General Castillo at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Daiquiri. I accepted his offer, telling him however that although no military control could be exercised over him except such as he would concede, yet as long as he served under me I would furnish his command rations and ammunition.

From the time the orders were received every effort possi-

ble was made to become familiar with the surroundings of Santiago, both as to the terrain and the climatic conditions with which we should have to contend. The description given in the "Journal of the Siege of Havana" of the experience of the English Army during their siege of Havana in 1762 was re-read. Valuable information was also obtained from two natives of Cuba, who were on the *Segurança* with me, one of them a civil engineer who had assisted in making surveys in the vicinity of Santiago. From General Garcia also additional information was received which was of great value in planning the attack on Santiago. At this interview with General Garcia, all the possible points of attack were for the last time carefully considered and, for the information and guidance of Admiral Sampson and General Garcia, the following plan of campaign was then and there outlined.

With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, the disembarkation was to commence on the morning of the twenty-second at Daiquiri. On the twenty-first, 500 insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This force under General Castillo was to attack the Spanish force at Daiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. (This movement was successfully made.) To mislead the enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, I requested General Garcia to send a small force, about 500 men, under General Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabañas, situated on the coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and where it was reported that the enemy had several hundred men intrenched and from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago. Admiral Sampson was requested to send several of his war ships, with a number of the transports, opposite this town, Aserraderos, for the purpose of making a show of disembarking there. In addition the Admiral was asked to cause a bombardment to be made at Cabañas, upon the forts around the Morro, and also at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney and Daiquiri. The troops under General Garcia, remaining at Aserraderos, were to be transferred to Daiquiri or Siboney on the twenty-fourth. This was successfully accomplished at Siboney.

The approach to Santiago and the attack upon it was to be made from the east over a narrow road, in some places not better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla towards Santiago. This seemed the only feasible plan. Subsequent information and results confirmed that judgment.

On the morning of the twenty-second the army commenced to disembark at Daiquiri. The following general order indicates the manner in which the troops left the transports and the amount of supplies carried immediately with them :—

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD S. S. SEGURANCA, AT SEA, June 20, 1898.
General Orders, No. 18.

EXTRACT.

1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders, troops will disembark in the following order :

First. —The 2nd division, 5th corps (Lawton's). The Gatling gun detachment will accompany this division.

Second.—General Bates's brigade. This brigade will form as a reserve to the 2nd division, 5th corps.

Third. —The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler's).

Fourth.—The 1st division, 5th corps (Kent's).

Fifth. —The squadron of the 2nd Cavalry (Rafferty's).

Sixth. —If the enemy, in force, vigorously resist the landing, the Light Artillery, or part of it, will be disembarked by the Battalion Commander and brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If no serious opposition be offered, this artillery will be unloaded after the mounted squadron.

2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with coffee ground), canteens filled and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage and company cooking utensils will be left under the charge of the Regimental Quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company.

3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and constituting a part of, the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs will remain aboard ship, until the landing be accomplished and until notified that they can land.

4. The Chief Quartermaster of the expedition will control all small boats and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark the troops in the order indicated in paragraph 1.

5. The Ordnance Officer, Second Lieutenant Brook, 4th Infantry, will put on shore, at once, 100 rounds of ammunition per man and will have it ready for distribution on the firing line.

6. The Commanding General wishes to impress officers and men with the crushing effect a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline and will caution their men to fire only when they can see the enemy.

* * * * *

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER.

E. J. MCCLERNAND, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

The small boats belonging to the Navy and to the transports, together with a number of steam-launches furnished by the Navy, were brought alongside and loaded with troops as prescribed in the order just quoted. When General Lawton's division was fairly aboard the small boats, the latter were towed in long lines by the steam-launches to the shore. The sea was somewhat rough but, by the exercise of caution and good judgment the beach was reached and the troops disembarked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible attack upon the part of any Spaniards who might have been hidden in the adjacent blockhouses and woods, the Navy opened a furious cannonade upon these places, while the troops were moving towards the shore. It was learned afterwards that the Spanish garrison had retired, in the direction of Siboney, soon after daylight. By night about 6,000 troops were on shore. General Lawton was ordered to push forward a strong force in order to seize and hold Siboney.

On the twenty-third the disembarkation was continued and about 6,000 more men landed. Early on this date General Lawton's advance reached Siboney, the Spanish garrison of about 600 men retiring as he came up and offering no opposition except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of the Cuban troops pursued the retreating Spaniards and skir-

mished with them. During the afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent's division was commenced at Siboney, which enabled us to establish a base eight miles nearer Santiago. The unloading of troops and supplies was continued at both Daiquiri and Siboney. The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the twenty-third, and by the evening of the twenty-fourth it was practically completed.

The orders for June 24 contemplated General Lawton's division taking a strong defensive position a short distance from Siboney, on the road to Santiago; Kent's division was to be held near Siboney, where he disembarked; Bates's brigade was to take position in support of Lawton, while Wheeler's division was to be somewhat to the rear on the road from Siboney to Daiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situation until the troops and transportation were disembarked, and a reasonable quantity of necessary supplies landed. General Young's brigade, however, passed beyond Lawton on the night of the twenty-third, thus taking the advance, and on the morning of the latter date became engaged with a Spanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guasima, a point on the Santiago road, about three miles from Siboney. General Young's force consisted of one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, one of the 10th Cavalry and two of the 1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry; in all 964 officers and men. The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field with considerable loss. Our own loss was one officer and fifteen men killed; six officers and forty-six men wounded. The engagement had an inspiring effect upon our men and, doubtless, correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under their heavy fire delivered from intrenchments. General Wheeler, Division Commander, was present during the engagement and reports that our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front, on which to encamp.

The unloading of transportation and subsistence stores, so that we might have several days' rations on shore, was continued during the remainder of the month. This work was

ably superintended by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles F. Humphrey, Deputy Quartermaster General U. S. A., and Colonel John F. Weston, Assistant Commissary General of Subsistence, Chief Commissary. Notwithstanding their utmost efforts, it was with great difficulty that supplies were landed in excess of those required daily to feed the men and animals, and the loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken away during the voyage, as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent by the Quartermaster Department was greatly felt. The lack of wharves, scows, steam-lighters and steam-launches can be appreciated only by those who were on the ground directing the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for the daily consumption.

On June 30, I personally reconnoitered the country about Santiago and completed the plan of attack. From a high hill, from which the city was in plain view, the San Juan Hill could be seen and the country about El Caney. The roads were very poor, indeed little better than bridle paths, until the San Juan River and El Caney were reached. The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to assail the right flank and rear of any force operating against San Juan Hill. In view of this, I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney with one division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing by El Pozo House, and, as a diversion, to direct a small force against Aguadores from Siboney, along the railroad by the sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards in the latter direction, and of preventing them from attacking our left flank or going to the support of Santiago garrison.

During the afternoon of June 30, the division commanders were assembled, and the general plan of battle was explained to them. Lawton's division, assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon towards El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning. After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney

road towards Santiago and take position on the right of the line. Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry, and Kent's division of infantry, were directed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Pozo. Toward these heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the next morning and, at the proper time, to prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard at El Caney and his infantry fire showed that he had become well engaged.

The history of the disasters of previous expeditions in that climate determined me to bring on the battle at the earliest possible moment. The preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but if we were to succeed the blow must be struck promptly. We were in a sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road which the rains might at any time render impassable; fears were entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our supplies; and lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8,000 reinforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manzanillo and might be expected in a few days.

Early on the morning of July 1, Lawton was in position around El Caney, Chaffee's brigade on the right across the Guantanamo road, Miles's brigade in the center and Ludlow's on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's retreat, along the Santiago road, was assigned to the latter brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6:15 A. M. The battle here soon became general and was hotly contested. The enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more so by blockhouses, a stone fort, intrenchments cut in solid rock and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been anticipated and prevented Lawton from joining the right of the main line, during the day, as had been intended. After the battle had continued for some time, Bates's brigade of two regiments reached my headquarters from Siboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance if

necessary. He did so and was put in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued with varying intensity during most of the day and until the place was carried by assault about 4:30 P. M. As the Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road, Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective work and practically to cut off all retreat in that direction.

After the battle of El Caney was well opened, and the sound of the small-arms fire caused me to believe that Lawton was driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes's battery to open fire from the heights of El Pozo on the San Juan blockhouse, which was visible in the enemy's intrenchments that extended along the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire was effective and the enemy could be seen running away from the vicinity of the blockhouse. The artillery fire from El Pozo was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill and their first shells killed and wounded several of our men. As the Spaniards used smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the positions of their pieces while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.

At this time the cavalry division under General Sumner, which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El Pozo House, was ordered forward with direction to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago side, while Kent's division was to follow closely in its rear and deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render it impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at all points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the long-range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded a number of our men while marching along this road and before there was any opportunity to return the fire.

At this time Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all possible haste and place their troops in position to engage the enemy. General Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry

column as far as the narrow trail permitted and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan, the road forks,—a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, with the result that Sumner moved on the right hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left.

General Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cavalry division, who had been ill, came forward during the morning and later returned to duty, rendering most gallant and efficient service during the remainder of the day.

After crossing this stream, the cavalry moved to the right with a view of connecting with Lawton's left when he should come up, and with their left resting near the Santiago road. In the meanwhile Kent's division, with the exception of two regiments of Hawkins's brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from the forks in the road previously mentioned, utilizing both trails, but more especially the one to the left, and having crossed the creek formed for attack in front of San Juan Hill. During the formation, the Third Brigade suffered severely. While personally superintending this movement, its gallant commander, Colonel Wikoff, was killed. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, who was soon severely wounded, and next upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, 24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the terrible fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, 9th Infantry.

While the formation just described was taking place, General Kent took measures to hurry forward his rear brigade. The 10th and 2nd Infantry were ordered to follow Wikoff's brigade, while the 21st was sent on the right hand road to support the 1st Brigade under General Hawkins, who had crossed the stream and formed on the right of the division. The 2nd and 10th Infantry, Colonel E. P. Pearson commanding, moved forward in good order on the left of the division, passed over a green knoll and drove the enemy back towards his trenches.

After completing their formation, and advancing a short distance, both divisions found in their front a wide bottom, intersected by several lines of barbed wire fence, beyond which there was a high hill, along whose crest the enemy was strongly intrenched. Nothing daunted, these gallant men pushed on and drove the enemy from his chosen position, both divisions losing heavily. In the action on this part of the field, most efficient service was rendered by Lieutenant John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, and the Gatling gun detachment under his command.

Words fail to do justice to the gallant conduct of regimental commanders and their heroic men in this fierce encounter, for, while the generals indicated the formations and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid bravery of the subordinate officers and men that planted our colors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy from his trenches and blockhouses, thus gaining a position which sealed the fate of Santiago.

The fighting continued, at intervals, until nightfall, but our men held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so much blood and toil. During the night Lieutenant-Colonel Derby collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and later in the night trenches of very considerable strength were constructed. During the afternoon Major Dillenbeck, by my order, brought forward the two remaining batteries of his battalion and put them in position at El Pozo, to the left of Grimes. Later in the afternoon all three batteries were moved forward to positions near the firing line, but the nature of the country and the intensity of the enemy's small-arms fire was such that no substantial results were gained by our artillery in the new positions. The batteries were intrenched during the night. The diversion at Aguadores was successful, in that the Spaniards who were there were held so that they could not withdraw to reinforce those in Santiago.

After the brilliant and important victory gained at El Caney, Lawton started his tired troops, who had been fighting all day and marching much of the night before, to connect with the right of the cavalry division. Night came on

before this movement could be accomplished. In the darkness, the enemy's pickets were encountered, and the Division Commander, being uncertain of the ground and as to what might be in his front, halted his command and reported the situation to me. This information was received about 12:30 A. M. General Lawton was directed to march by the road passing my headquarters and the El Pozo House, as the only certain way of gaining his new position.

My headquarters were practically on a line from El Caney to Aguadores, at the junction of the Santiago and El Caney roads and from a mile to a mile and a half to the rear of the center of the line. Lawton's division returned along the Caney road to the Santiago road, thence along the Santiago road to the San Juan river and took position on the right of the cavalry division early the next morning, the morning of the second. Chaffee's brigade arrived first about half past seven, and the other brigades before noon.

On the night of July 1, the 34th Michigan and 9th Massachusetts, which had just arrived at Siboney from the United States, were brought forward. The 34th Michigan was placed in the rear of Kent, and the 9th Massachusetts was assigned to Bates, who placed it on his left.

Soon after daylight on July 2 the Spaniards opened fire, but with the intrenchments made during the night by our troops, the approach of Lawton's division and the presence of Bates's brigade, which had taken position during the night on Kent's left, little apprehension was felt as to our ability to repel the Spaniards and to hold our position.

It is proper to state here that General Bates and his brigade performed most arduous and efficient service, having marched much of the night of June 30 and a good part of the next day, during which they also participated in the battle of El Caney. After this they proceeded, by way of El Pozo, to the left of the line at San Juan, reaching the new position about midnight.

All day on the second the battle raged with more or less fury, but such of our troops as were in position at daylight held their ground, and Lawton also gained a strong and commanding position on the right. About 10 P. M. the enemy

made an assault on one of our pickets and for a short time firing was general throughout the line, but no advantage was gained on either side.

On the morning of the third of July the battle was renewed, but the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the assault of the previous night, and the firing along the lines was desultory until stopped by the sending of the following letter within the Spanish lines :

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, July 3, 1898, 8:30 A. M.

TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE
SPANISH FORCES, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

SIR: I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children, that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM R. SHAFER,
Major-General,
U. S. V.

To this letter the following reply was received :
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898.

HIS EXCELLENCY,
THE GENERAL COMMANDING FORCES
OF THE U. S., NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER.

SIR: I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-day, written at 8:30 A. M. and received at 1 P. M., demanding the surrender of this city, or in the contrary case announcing to me that you will bombard this city and that I advise the foreigners, women and children, that they must leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message.

Very respectfully,
JOSÉ TORAL,
Commander in Chief, 4th Corps.

The first message went under a flag of truce at 12:30 P. M. I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would surrender if given a reasonable time and thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand how they would be treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon this presumption, it seemed best to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors, and there is every reason to believe that the return of the Spanish prisoners and what they told of the treatment they had received from us produced a favorable impression on their comrades. The cessation of firing about noon on the third practically terminated the battle of Santiago.

After deducting the detachments retained at Siboney and Daiquiri to render those depots secure from attack; organizations held to protect our flanks; others acting as escorts and guards to light batteries; the members of the Hospital Corps; guards left in charge of blanket rolls, which the intense heat caused the men to cast aside before entering battle; orderlies, etc., it is doubtful if we had more than 12,000 men on the firing line on July 1, when the battle was fiercest and when the important and strong positions and San Juan Hill were captured. A few Cubans assisted in the attack on El Caney and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to change materially the strength as indicated above.

The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our own, they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the company officers and men and the benefits derived from the careful training and instructions given our troops during recent years, in rifle practice and other battle exercises.

Our losses in all these battles embracing the actions at San Juan Hill, El Caney and Aguadores July 1 and 3 and the

actions around Santiago July 10 and 12 were: killed, 22 officers and 222 enlisted men; wounded, 93 officers and 1,288 enlisted men.

On the night of July 2 the Spanish garrison of Santiago was reinforced by about 3,000 troops under General Escario. General Garcia, with between four and five thousand Cubans, had been intrusted with the duty of watching for these reinforcements and intercepting them, but for some reason he failed to do so, and General Escario passed into the city along my extreme right near the bay. Up to this time I had been unable to complete the investment of the town with my own men, but to prevent any more reinforcements coming in, or the enemy escaping, I extended the lines as rapidly as possible to the extreme right and completed the investment of the place, leaving General Garcia's forces in the rear of our right flank, to scout the country for any approaching Spanish reinforcements, a duty which his forces were very competent to perform.

In the battle of Santiago, the Spanish Navy endeavored to shell our troops on the extreme right, but the latter were concealed by the inequalities of the ground, and the shells did little if any harm. Their naval forces also assisted in the trenches, having 1,000 on shore, and I am informed that they sustained considerable loss,—among others Admiral Cervera's chief of staff was killed. Being convinced that the city would fall, Admiral Cervera determined to put to sea, informing the French Consul that it was better to die fighting than to sink his ships. The news of the great naval victory which followed was enthusiastically received by the army.

Information of our naval victory was transmitted under a flag of truce to the Spanish Commander at Santiago on July 4, and the suggestion was again made that he surrender to save needless effusion of blood. On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that, if he would force his way into the harbor, the city would surrender without any further loss of time. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Schley was temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the Navy should not enter the harbor.

In the meanwhile, letters passing between General Toral

and myself caused the cessation of hostilities to continue. Each army, however, continued to strengthen its intrenchments. Being still of the opinion that the Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, on July 6, I called General Toral's attention to the changed conditions and at his request gave him time to consult his home government. This he did, asking that the British Consul with the employés of the Cable Company be permitted to return from El Caney to the city. His request was granted.

The strength of the enemy's position was such that I did not wish to make an assault if it could be avoided. An examination of the enemy's works, made after the surrender, fully justified the wisdom of the course adopted. The intrenchments could have been carried only with very great loss of life, probably with not less than three thousand killed and wounded.

On July 8, General Toral offered to march out of the city with arms and baggage, provided that he would not be molested before reaching Holguin, and to surrender to the American forces the territory then occupied by him. I replied that, while his proposition should be submitted to my home government, I did not think that it would be accepted.

Meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson that when the Army again engaged the enemy, the Navy would assist by shelling the city from ships stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes.

On July 10, the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia regiments arrived and were placed on the line to the right of the cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton's line farther to the right and practically to command the Cobra road.

On the afternoon of the date last mentioned, the truce was broken at 4 P. M. I determined to open with four batteries of artillery and went forward in person to the trenches, to give the necessary orders, but the enemy anticipated us by opening fire with his artillery, a few minutes after the hour stated. His batteries were apparently silenced before night, while ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark. During this firing, the Navy fired from Aguadores, most of

the shells falling in the city. There was also some small-arms firing.

On the morning of July 11, the bombardment by the Navy and our field guns was renewed and continued until nearly noon, and on the same day a report was sent to the Adjutant-General of the Army that the right of Ludlow's brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our hold upon the enemy was complete. At 2 P. M. on this date, the eleventh, the surrender of the city was again demanded. The firing ceased and was not again renewed.

By this date, the sickness in my army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of exposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun, the heavy rains and the dews which, in Cuba, are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was becoming so apparent that I was anxious to bring the siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of the army I did not think an assault would be justifiable, especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in his preliminary propositions to surrender.

On July 11, I wrote General Toral as follows:

"With the largely increased forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of your Excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your Excellency's army. I am authorized to state that should your Excellency so desire, the Government of the United States will transport the entire command of your Excellency to Spain."

General Toral replied that he had communicated my proposition to his General-in-Chief, General Blanco.

July 12, I informed the Spanish Commander that Major-General Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, had just arrived in camp and requested him to grant us a personal interview on the following day. He replied that he would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on the thirteenth, and I informed General Toral that only his surrender could be considered and that as he was without hope of escape he had no right to continue the fight.

On the fourteenth another interview took place, during

which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon the basis of his Army, the 4th Army Corps, being returned to Spain, the capitulation embracing all of eastern Cuba, east of a line passing from Asseraderos on the south to Sagua de Tanamo on the north, via Palma Soriano. It was agreed that commissioners should meet during the afternoon to arrange definitely the terms of surrender, and I appointed Major-Generals Wheeler and Lawton and Lieutenant Miley to represent the United States.

The Spanish Commissioners raised many points and were especially desirous of retaining their arms. The discussion lasted until late at night and was renewed at 9:30 next morning. The terms of surrender finally agreed upon included about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in the surrendered district. There were included also a small gun-boat and about 200 seamen, together with five merchant-ships in the harbor. One of these vessels, the *Mexico*, had been used as a war vessel and had four guns mounted on it.

It was arranged that the formal surrender should take place between the lines on the morning of July 17, each army being represented by 100 armed men. At the time appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon accompanied by my staff, my general officers and their staff, and 100 troopers of the 2nd Cavalry under Captain Lloyd M. Brett. General Toral also arrived with a number of his officers and 100 Infantry. We met midway between the representatives of our two armies, and the Spanish Commander formally consummated the surrender of the city of Santiago and the 24,000 troops in the city and the surrendered district.

After this ceremony, I entered the city with staff and escort, and at twelve o'clock, noon, with appropriate ceremonies, the American flag was hoisted over the governor's palace by Captain McKittrick and Lieutenant Miley of my staff and Lieutenant Wheeler of General Wheeler's staff.

On August 4, I received orders to begin embarkation for transfer to Montauk Point, Long Island, New York. The movement continued without interruption until August 25, when I sailed for Montauk with the last troops of my com-

mand, turning over the district of Santiago to Major-General Lawton.

Something may be said of the natural obstacles which had to be encountered and which no foresight could have overcome or obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast afforded no sheltered landing places, the roads were mere bridle paths, the effect of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated troops was deadly, and a dread of strange and unknown diseases had its moral effect upon the army.

At Daiquiri, the landing of the troops and stores was made at a small wooden wharf, which the Spaniards tried unsuccessfully to burn, and the animals were pushed into the water and guided to a sandy beach about 200 yards in extent. At Siboney, the landing was made on the beach and at a small wharf erected by the engineers. I had neither the time nor the men to spare to construct permanent wharves. At times the roads were impassable for wagons. The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so much as to prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the command had to be depended upon for the victualing of the troops, as well as the 20,000 refugees, who could not, in the interest of humanity, be left to starve while we had rations. Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack trains. After the great physical strain and exposure of July 1 and 2, the malarial and other fevers began rapidly to advance throughout the command, and on July 4 the yellow fever appeared at Siboney.

The supply of Quartermaster and Commissary stores during the campaign was ample and, notwithstanding the difficulties in landing and transporting the ration, the troops on the firing line were at all times supplied with its coarser components, namely, bread, meat, sugar and coffee.

The sick and wounded received every attention that it was possible to give them. The medical officers, without exception, worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. Of the wounded, only fourteen died as the result of their wounds. Each soldier and officer carried into action what was termed a "First aid package,"—a small supply of bandages and anti-

septic dressing. In many cases, the wounds were so well dressed on the battle-field by use of these packages that it was not found necessary to remove the dressing until after the wounded men returned to the United States.

In closing, it is proper to say a word in regard to the discipline of the command. It is a remarkable fact that not an officer or enlisted man was brought to trial by court-martial during this campaign. The discipline of the entire command was superb.

Wm. M. Hooper





Henry H. Whitney
Capt. & A.S.G.

CHAPTER X.

MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO.

BY

CAPT. HENRY H. WHITNEY, U. S. A., Assistant Adjutant-General.

“During a campaign, whatever is not profoundly considered in all its detail is without result. Every enterprise should be conducted according to a system; chance alone can never bring success.”—NAPOLEON.

PUERTO RICO was a strong base of supplies for the Spaniards in Cuba, and as it was known that the rainy season did not begin until late in August, it seems to have been the plan of the Major-General Commanding to strike the first real blow there, making it a secondary base of operations against Cuba later in the fall. But the presence of Cervera's fleet changed the plan, when the Navy asked for the Army's assistance at Santiago. When this bugaboo of the seas had been so brilliantly disposed of, and General Miles had taken reinforcements to Shafter's army and with them the prestige of a “Master of Victory,” he hurried to Guantanamo to assemble his Puerto Rican expedition.

Every contingency that might arise had been foreseen, and on the 15th of July, requisition by cable was made for a train of 800 pack mules complete, 400 freight travois with saddles, an abundant supply of medical stores, hospital supplies, ambulances and tentage, dock construction corps with laborers, steam tugs and lighters, and \$100,000 for hire of native transportation and purchase of horses. All infantry was to be supplied with smokeless powder arms, and there was to be sent a full allowance of transportation for all commands.

Several days were spent waiting for the necessary naval convoy; finally, on the 21st of July, the fleet set sail, composed of the following vessels: transports *Lampasas*, *Nueces*,

City of Macon, Comanche, Unionist, Specialist, Rita and Stillwater, together with the cruiser *Columbia* and converted cruiser *Yale*, with a grand total of 3,554 fighting men. The conveying squadron was composed of the U. S. Battleship *Massachusetts*, the U. S. converted yacht *Gloucester*, and the U. S. converted yacht *Dixie*. The cruiser *Columbia*, and auxiliary cruiser *Yale*, having troops aboard, are not properly considered part of the convoy.

When the invasion of Puerto Rico was definitely decided upon, a temporary landing on Vieques, or Crab Island, about 13 miles east of the main island, was considered. This could be effected without opposition, hospitals established, the troops from Cuba recuperated and a landing made, when the proper time came, at any desired point on the main island. But after the fever had broken out, it was not deemed safe to take any of the Cuban troops. Besides, Santiago had fallen and it was important to seize Puerto Rico and make secure some of the substantial fruits of victory, before the enemy, seeing the hopelessness of the struggle, sued for peace. So, on the representation of naval officers who had cruised along the eastern coast, Point Fajado, on the northeast coast, was selected, and on the 16th of July General Miles cabled that reinforcements on transports coming from the United States be directed to proceed to that point.

When, on leaving the Windward Passage, the bows of the ships turned eastward on their hazardous mission, the General Commanding had with him very little more means for disembarking on a strange and hostile shore than did Columbus when he sailed westward on adjoining seas some four centuries before. The fleet moved slowly, expecting to be overtaken by or fall in with transports bringing reinforcements and appliances for landing quickly. Finally the northern end of Mona Passage was reached, but no looked-for ships appeared. The problem now became a serious one for the General Commanding, who had but 3,554 unskilled troops with which to land in the face of between eight and nine thousand Spanish regulars and more than that many armed volunteers, the majority of whom could concentrate at any point on the coast in from four to five days. The waters about Point

Fajado, the selected landing place, might be used as a rendezvous for the naval vessels in fair weather, but is nothing of a harbor at which to land troops and munitions of war without the means at hand for disembarking, and with no prospect of securing any on arrival. As the landing place had been well advertised in our own press, the Spanish commander evidently knew of our intention and would bring artillery from the Capital, some 35 to 40 miles away, over passable roads, and entrench on the hills commanding the beach. This, it was learned afterwards, had in a measure, been done, when a naval vessel touching at this point brought away some Puerto Rican refugees. So common prudence as well as one of the first principles of strategy demanded that the landing be made elsewhere in an unexpected quarter.

An officer on the staff of the Major-General Commanding had made, in May, a hasty reconnaissance of the southern portion of the island and had gathered important information about the harbors on that coast and noted the number and location of the native lighters, means for defence, etc. It was known that on the south coast Guanica was the best harbor of which there was a chart, and it was reported to be unmined and undefended. It opened into the most disaffected district of the island. Four miles from its head, at Yauco, is the terminus of a railroad, fifteen miles long, leading to Ponce. The town of Ponce could be taken easily, being practically undefended because the troops had been withdrawn to oppose our projected advance from the east. Ponce once occupied, we would have the largest town on the island, the end of a cable, and the terminus of the fine military road leading to the Capital.

The General's mind was soon made up, and he signalled to the Admiral of the fleet, (Captain Higginson) his desire to change the objective. As fast as the signal flag could spell out the words, came back the message of the naval commander, with hearty co-operation, "All right, Guanica it is," and the ships were promptly headed south by southwest into the Mona Passage, a vessel being dispatched to Cape San Juan to redirect any transports that should arrive there.

With all lights out and absolute quiet aboard, the fleet

crept through the passage, close to the shore, and arrived off Guanica harbor on the morning of July 25. The *Gloucester* (Commander Wainwright) was sent forward to reconnoiter. She made her way slowly at first, zigzagging her course back and forth across the mouth of the harbor, feeling for possible mines or torpedoes, more mindful, apparently, of the safety of the transports to follow than of her own. When sure that the way was unobstructed, she struck straight in, followed closely by the transports. Spanish troops, to the number of about 250 were occupying the village but retreated when a few shells from the *Gloucester* were thrown about them. The marines, two companies of the provisional engineer battalion and several companies of infantry were put ashore in ship's boats, a skirmish line was formed and shortly afterwards outposts established. Brigadier-General Gilmore, who was the first general officer to land, superintended the disembarkation. Upon opening fire the inhabitants, terror stricken, fled from the town to the hills. During the day word was sent to them to return to their homes, which, before night, they did and were very demonstrative in their expressions of joy at the arrival of the Americans. It was the policy of the General Commanding to make the best impression upon the natives on the initial landing, knowing how rapidly the news of arrival would travel over the island and the effect his every act would have upon future operations in the interior. The Spaniards had caused reports to be circulated freely among the ignorant, mainly through the priesthood, that the American soldiers were giant ravishers who, though impotent against Spanish arms, would despoil their homes and destroy their property. At the date of invasion, therefore, a large proportion of the illiterate native element were in doubt whether to support the ills they already had or to fly to others that might be worse. The best protection to life and property was what they wanted and what they would fight for. General Miles showed by his treatment of the inhabitants that the complete success of the expedition depended as much on the conciliation of them as upon the force of his arms.

Our arrival was a complete surprise, as was afterwards learned, the enemy having no intimation of our proximity.

On the morning of July 26 General Garretson, with parts of the 6th Mass. and the 6th Ill. regiments of his brigade, undertook a reconnoissance, in force, to about three miles beyond Guanica along the road towards Yauco. He found the Spanish troops in position on a hill along a solid angle formed by the intersection of the north and east slopes. The enemy opened fire on the advance guard of his force from a position on a hill to the west. The suddenness and volume of the fire caused a momentary confusion among our troops, but they were quickly steadied, and in a spirited engagement drove the Spaniards from their position into the valley beyond. The force of the enemy engaged consisted of battalion 25 ("Patria") of the Spanish regulars and some volunteers—in all about 600 to 700 men. The casualties on the American side were two officers and two enlisted men slightly wounded. The casualties of the enemy were reported to be one lieutenant and one cornet killed, eighteen seriously and thirty-two slightly wounded. On the following day, July 27, a further reconnoissance established the fact that the enemy had retreated beyond Yauco, which a part of General Henry's command promptly occupied.

Several staunch lighters were found in the harbor and these, towed by two navy steam launches, were of great assistance in disembarking the light batteries, ammunition and supplies. The Chief Engineer, Lt.-Col. Black, built a pontoon bridge 260 feet long, employing the battalion of provisional engineers under Maj. Sackett. On this bridge most of the animals and stores were unloaded and it has been continued in use almost daily up to the present time.

As Ponce was our real objective, Guanica being what might be called an accidental one, on account of its harbor, the *Dixie*, followed by Capt. Higginson with the rest of the naval convoy, moved into the port of Ponce on the evening of July 27, and its commander, through one of his officers, Ensign Curtin, took possession of the Playa without opposition. Seventy lighters and several schooners that were in the harbor were seized by the navy and declared prizes of war. On suspension of hostilities the lighters were turned over to the army for proper disposition, when it was found that they were the property of private citizens.

On the morning of July 28, General Miles, accompanied by his staff, landed, formally took possession and raised the National colors and the headquarters flag over the custom house. Maj.-Gen. Jas. H. Wilson, who had arrived at Guanica with his command on the twenty-seventh, was sent forward to occupy the city of Ponce two miles inland from the port. The Spanish troops, numbering about 500, retreated on our approach, leaving arms and ammunition in store-houses and barracks. Before retiring they endeavored to destroy the railroad property at the station, planting mines along the route to Yauco, setting fire to the rolling stock, breaking down the telegraph lines and destroying the cable instruments. The railroad, under the energetic supervision of Brig. Gen. Roy Stone, was soon put in running order and the telegraph lines were promptly repaired by the Signal Corps under the immediate supervision of Lt.-Col. Sam Reber. New cable instruments were procured by Colonel James Allen at St. Thomas, Danish West Indies. On the day of landing the Major-General Commanding published, in Spanish and English, a proclamation to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, for which they were anxiously looking. This manifesto had a very salutary effect upon the people. The dignity of its language and the wisdom of its assurances as to the future policy of the government will give it the highest rank among state papers.

General Wilson proceeded energetically to get his command into shape for a forward movement and to organize the civil administration of the city and district. Owing to the lack of launches, which had been foreseen before leaving the U. S. but which had not been remedied, the work of landing troops and supplies was seriously hampered and the difficulties would have been almost insurmountable had it not been for the assistance rendered by the navy in towing lighters back and forth from the shore to the transports. As it was, the preparations for an advance into the interior were delayed at least a week longer than would have been otherwise necessary. This movement was further delayed by the grounding of two loaded transports, the *Massachusetts* and *Manitoba*.

General Schwan having joined at Ponce with his command,

July 31, and General Brooke with his on August 1, gave a total strength of about fourteen thousand men. The General Commanding was now ready to make his contemplated forward movements. The friendly attitude of most of the inhabitants, the abundant supply of provisions in some sections of the country, the apparent healthfulness of the climate and the ability to hire native transportation convinced him that columns starting from Ponce as a base of operations, moving first on diverging lines and then converging finally toward a principal objective, would meet with success. The columns were to capture or drive the enemy out of the small towns, receive and disarm such volunteers as desired to surrender, and so conduct their march that the inhabitants might be made to understand that our chief object was to overthrow the armed authority of Spain; that it was not a war of devastation, but one bringing protection and security to all within the control of our military and naval forces. The campaign was to be conducted along four lines of operations separated into two groups, Brooke's and Wilson's commands forming one, and Henry's and Schwan's the other—the former converging towards Aibonito and the latter towards Arecibo.

On the second and third of August the forces under Major-General Brooke landed at Arroyo, about forty miles east of Ponce. They consisted of General Peter Hains's brigade, made up of the following elements:

3rd Ill. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Bennett);
4th Ohio Vol. Infantry (Colonel Coit);
4th Penn. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Cass);
27th Indiana Light Battery;
5th Missouri Light Battery "A";
Penn. Light Battery "B," (with three dynamite guns);
Philadelphia City Troop;
Troop "H," 6th U. S. Cavalry;
Co. "H," 8th U. S. Infantry;
Detachment Hospital Corps;
Detachment Signal Corps.

Total——4,790.

The task selected for this force was the movement on Aibonito with the view of co-operating with General Wilson in the defeat and capture of the Spanish, particularly those in the vicinity of Cayey, it being especially important that the column should reach this point in time to intercept the enemy should he abandon his position at Aibonito and retreat along the military road to San Juan.

On the morning of August 5, at eight A. M., General Hains, with the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry in advance and the 3rd Ill. Vol. Infantry in reserve, moved on the town of Guayama, occupied by about 300 of the enemy, who offered but slight resistance and were driven out of the town and pursued beyond it with a loss on our side of four enlisted men wounded. One of the enemy was killed and two wounded, so far as known. A few shots fired from the Sims-Dudley dynamite guns are reported to have had a very demoralizing effect upon the enemy. By the night of the fifth, the 3rd Ill. and the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry occupied a strong position on the outskirts of the town. No active movement again occurred until the eighth of August, when a reconnoissance along the Cayey main road, "for the purpose of developing the enemy's position and to clear the way for the engineers to map the country correctly," was attempted by two companies of the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry. They were met with a sharp fire from the enemy on the hills. Some members of Co. "C," 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry, fell back to the town, bringing reports of a repulse. In consequence of this, the remaining companies of the regiment were sent forward to the support of the reconnoitering party, when the enemy retired to stronger positions and the regiment returned to the camp with five men wounded and two overcome by heat. No further aggressive movement was made until August 13, General Brooke being seriously delayed by the grounding of two transports on which were his artillery, cavalry and most of his rations. For this day a general attack upon the Spanish position was planned. The enemy, variously estimated at from six hundred to fifteen hundred infantry, had been busily engaged, during the eight days he was left unmolested, in entrenching himself along the crests and in the

passes of the hills north of Guayama, where Nature had provided a stronghold that lent itself most admirably to the genius of the Spanish engineer. The trenches were cleverly hidden among banana trees and palms, and disposed along not less than five miles of the divides of the Sierra de Jajome, the Corro de las Palmas and the Atlas de Guamani, in the form of an arc convex towards the front, with advanced works on the sharp spurs jutting out from the main divide. The Spanish center occupied the Guamani Pass, 2,100 feet above the sea level, through which the military road to Cayey leads. Their right rested on a spur of the Sierra de Jajome range, 2,400 feet high. The left, on the Atlas de Guamani, was 400 feet higher. The trenches and barricades covered about four miles of the main road south of the pass and every important trail along which the position might be flanked. Brooke's general plan of action was an artillery assault upon the Spanish center, which was to begin when General Hains, with the 4th Ohio, had executed a flank movement against the enemy's right on the crest of the Sierra de Jajome. At the moment when the order suspending hostilities was received the artillery was unmasked before the Spanish trenches, at a bend in the road about three miles above Guayama, and was about to open fire. The flanking column had proceeded about eight and a half miles on the old Cayey trail, which passes through the village of Carmen, four miles south of the Jajome range. The greater part of this march, although over a rough mountain trail, was accomplished in a remarkably short time, considering the heat, yet without a single straggler. In the light of what is now known of the strength of the Spanish position it would seem that our troops had a very warm day's work before them. General Brooke was "satisfied, however, that but for the receipt of telegram from Headquarters of the Army the entire Spanish force would have been captured."

As rapidly as General Wilson's command was disembarked at Ponce it was pushed forward along the military road leading to San Juan, the troops finally comprising the force being as follows:

General Oswald Ernst, commanding Brigade,
 2nd Wis. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Born),
 3rd Wis. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Moore),
 16th Penn. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Hulings),
 Battalion of Light Artillery (Major Lancaster),
 consisting of—
 Light Battery "F," 3rd Artillery (Potts),
 Light Battery "B," 3rd Artillery (Anderson),
 4th Artillery, Detachment with two dynamite guns
 and one Gatling gun (Buckey), also
 Troop "C," N. Y. Vol. Cavalry (Clayton),
 5th Co. U. S. Vol. Signal Corps,
 Hospital Detachment.

Total———3,417.

On the evening of the seventh of August Wilson's outposts occupied a line across a narrow valley about seven and a half miles beyond the village of Juana Diaz, controlling the valley of the Descalabrado River. Energetic reconnaissance and reports of spies and deserters disclosed the fact that the enemy had gathered a force of about 2,000 regulars and volunteers at Aibonito, thirty-five miles from Ponce, a village situated in a pocket near the summit of the main divide, in a position of great natural strength overlooking and commanding at every turn the winding military road leading to it. Coamo, an advanced position held by not less than 250 of the enemy, was in the way of a movement against Aibonito and, as it could not be taken by direct attack without great loss, Wilson decided to turn it by the enemy's right. On the evening of the eighth, he sent the 16th Penn. Vol. Infantry by exceedingly difficult mountain cross trails over the divide into the valley of the Coamo River, so as to reach the main road from a half-mile to a mile in the rear of the town. Meanwhile, at 6 A. M. on the morning of the ninth, General Ernst, with the main body of his brigade, moved forward and began the direct attack against the town, four guns of Captain Anderson's battery having shelled and destroyed the block-house commanding the forks of the road about a mile and a half southwest of Coamo. The entire

movement was executed substantially as planned. The 16th Penn., under the guidance of a staff officer who had discovered the mountain route, reached the road beyond the town and engaged the enemy, who began retreating at the opening of the direct attack. The affair lasted about an hour and was terminated by the surrender of the Spanish forces. The brunt of the action fell upon the 16th Penn., which lost seven men wounded. The Spanish lost two officers and fourteen men killed and wounded, while seven officers and 163 men surrendered. The enemy was taken completely aback by the brilliant turning movement of the Pennsylvania men, most of whom, brought up among the mountains of their own state, took as naturally to hill climbing as did Lord Robert's regiment of Goorkhas in India during his advance upon Cabul. Those of the enemy who were not cut off were pursued by the cavalry about five and a half miles beyond Coamo, where the advance was stopped by fire from the enemy's batteries on the summit of Asomante Hill and El Peñon, situated two and a half miles northwest of the town of Aibonito. On the slopes below the batteries were the infantry intrenchments, which completely swept, with a plunging fire, the main road for several miles. The position was practically impregnable against a direct assault and Wilson decided after a careful reconnaissance of all approaches, to turn it by a movement around the right as at Coamo, moving the main body of the brigade to Barranquitas, and thence to Aibonito, via Honduras, or to Cayey, via Comerio and Cidra, leaving a battalion as a containing force in front of the position. To divert the enemy's attention from the movement, which was ordered for the thirteenth, and to develop his fire, an artillery reconnaissance was made by Light Battery "F," 3rd Artillery (Potts), which on the twelfth advanced from camp at Coamo and opened fire, at one P. M., with five guns, from a position on the reverse side of a low ridge to the left of the main road, at a range of 2,250 yards from the batteries on Asomante and 1,200 feet below them. More than a passing word is due this action of the artillery. Before the guns were in place the action was begun by the Spanish batteries on El Peñon. The preliminary shell firing developed the range almost imme-

diately as corresponding to the calculated range of 2,250 yards, and in less than twenty minutes the enemy's battery was silenced and the fire was directed on the rifle pits, whose occupants scampered out at the first direct shot.

Too much credit cannot be given for the skill displayed by this battery. It was manned mostly by men who had never before been under fire, yet it came into position exposed to the projectiles of small arms and field pieces, and in an incredibly short time had ranged the objectives to a nicety. The position was most difficult, with an enemy elevated 1,200 feet in a range of 2,250 yards, and could never even have been reached had not the sloping hillside afforded the necessary additional elevation; yet the greater difficulty under which the Spaniards labored, compelling the use of plunging fire,—where the slightest deviation in depression made their shots go wild of the mark,—is all that rendered our position tenable, for the ranges had been carefully determined beforehand by the enemy. The ammunition in the meantime had been exhausted, and, as the primary object of the reconnaissance had been attained, the guns were withdrawn. It is believed, however, that if advantage could have been taken of the first supremacy of fire by throwing forward a regiment of infantry on the hog-back, which approaches the position from the south, its capture would have been a certainty, for the accurate fire of the battery would have held the enemy in check till our forces got within rifle range, when their left flank would have been at our mercy. The casualties on our side were two enlisted men killed, and two officers and three men wounded. The order to suspend hostilities, received on the thirteenth, stopped the projected movement by the flank. The distinguishing feature of General Wilson's operations was his thorough reconnaissance of the ground before making any advance, so that there was no hesitancy or miscalculation when once a movement was begun.

With Wilson advancing in force on Aibonito, and Brooke at Guayama moving evidently against the same objective by way of Cayey, it must have looked to the enemy as if General Miles was determined to push his entire command along the main military highway through the Spanish center to San

Juan. Indeed, this seemed about the only land operation against the Capital, with Ponce as a base, that was practicable. But to do what the enemy least suspects you of doing is a cardinal principle of warfare, whether it be between prize fighters in the ring or between armies in the field. So General Miles decided that the opportunity was ripe for the planned diversion around the western end of the island, in order that the ground might be swept clean as his army moved towards the ultimate objective, San Juan. General Schwan was therefore directed, on August 6, to proceed from Ponce with six companies of the 11th U. S. Infantry to Yauco, moving by rail if desirable. Troop A, 5th U. S. Cavalry, and two batteries of light artillery were to move by wagon road. At Yauco the remainder of the 11th Infantry and two companies of the 19th U. S. Infantry were to be added and when the expedition was organized it was to proceed to Sabana Grande, San German, Mayagüez, and from thence to Lares and Arecibo, driving out or capturing all the Spanish troops in the western portion of the island. It was to be a sort of "flying column" of picked troops moving with the greatest freedom and dispatch. The column as finally organized consisted of the following:

11th U. S. Infantry (Colonel DeRussey),
 Troop "A," 5th U. S. Cavalry (MacComb),
 Battery "C," 3rd U. S. Artillery (Califf),
 Battery "D," 5th U. S. Artillery (Thorp), *our third?*
 Detachment Signal Corps,
 Detachment Hospital Corps.

Total,———1,464.

A party of well-mounted natives, numbering at various times from eleven to twenty men, under their chief, Lugo Viña, a man of fine character, accompanied the expedition as scouts and rendered valuable service. But one day was occupied in organization, the command moving out on the morning of the ninth, General Schwan supplementing its regular or government transportation, which was quite inadequate, with hired or impressed native transportation.

This expedition was unique in several respects. The force comprising it was taken entirely from the regular establishment and was made up of the three fighting arms—cavalry, infantry and artillery. The cavalry fought mounted, the only instance during the war where this arm had an opportunity to act in its natural sphere. The strict tactical order of march, as laid down in the text books, was followed successfully and satisfactorily,—an answer to the objection that practice marches, so faithfully made by the regulars in peace-time, were not simulating war conditions. The disposition on the march was as follows: the troop of cavalry acted as a screen and marched about two miles in front of the “point” of the advance guard. Two companies of infantry, one platoon of artillery and two Gatling guns constituted the advance guard. A pioneer detachment, consisting of one non-commissioned officer and eight men, with the requisite tools carried in a cart, and under the direction of the engineer officer of the brigade, were attached to the advance guard. The main body consisted of nine companies of infantry, one battery and two platoons of artillery and two Gatlings. The train followed the main body in the following order: hospital train, ammunition train and supply and baggage wagons. The rear guard was composed of one company of infantry, a detachment from it being required to guard the exposed flank of the train. This order was preserved until the afternoon of the tenth, when the cavalry ran into the enemy’s scouts near Hormigueros. Here the entire garrison of Mayaguëz, numbering some 1,300, of which about 900 were regulars, had selected a position of great strength on the hills commanding our line of march, in order to oppose the advance on the town. In the engagement that ensued the enemy was completely routed; the advance guard, admirably led by Captain Hoyt, pushing forward followed by the main body, on the principal road; the cavalry, under the skilful guidance of Captain MacComb, diverging to the right to attack the Spanish flank. One enlisted man killed and one officer and fifteen men wounded comprised the loss on our side, while that of the enemy amounted to fifteen in killed, alone. The command bivouacked on the spot and at an early hour the next morning resumed

the march. General Schwan entered Mayaguëz at the head of his troops at 9:30 A. M., with band playing and colors flying, the populace giving him a most enthusiastic reception. Six companies of the first Ky. Vol. Infantry on the transports *Morgan* and *Hudson* convoyed by the U. S. S. *Montgomery*, had been sent from Ponce as reinforcements to Schwan in time, it was expected, to reach Mayaguëz so as to be of assistance in taking this important seaport. The *Montgomery*, entering the harbor on August 11 all cleared for action, was surprised to find that Schwan had already arrived and was in possession, with his flag flying from the hill overlooking the bay. His column of regulars did not tarry long at Mayaguëz. Leaving the Kentucky infantry to hold the town and to patrol the surrounding country, which was swarming with bushwhackers, he promptly resumed the pursuit of the fleeing Spanish force. On August 13 his advance, under Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, overtook this force while crossing the Rio Prieto, near Las Marias, in their retreat toward Lares, inflicting upon them a heavy loss in killed, wounded and drowned. The part of the Spanish force which reached Lares on the evening of the thirteenth evacuated it the next day in anticipation of pursuit. The task set for this column had been nearly completed, when early on August 14, notice to suspend hostilities was received. The engagement on the Prieto has the distinction of being the last affair of the war on land, as it occurred later than the battle of Manila by several hours. Eleven towns, including the important seaport town of Mayaguëz, and the country adjacent to them, had been cleared of the enemy. One hundred and sixty-three regulars, including a Colonel, a Lieutenant-Colonel and three other officers, had been made prisoners of war and a large number of captured or surrendered volunteers had been paroled. Under conditions of intense tropical heat and bad roads, the command had made a remarkable march. They had covered a distance, including outposts, etc., of ninety-two miles from August 7 to August 13. Fully one-fourth of the command were sick, they had no extra clothing and their shoes were worn out, yet when the telegram to General Schwan from headquarters, "Commanding General sends congratulations and thanks.

He relies implicitly upon your skill, good judgment and generalship," was published to the men, new life was infused into them and fresh hardships were eagerly sought.

General Henry, with a part of his original command, led the fourth and last column, made up of the following troops:

General Garretson, commanding Brigade composed
of the
6th Mass. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Rice),
6th Ill. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Foster),
Troop "B," 2nd U. S. Cavalry (Hoppin),
Part of Troop "A," N. Y. Vol. Cavalry (Coudert),
Four Cos. 19th U. S. Infantry,
Detachment Signal Corps,
Detachment Hospital Corps.

Total force about———3,060.

He was directed to proceed north through Adjuntas and Utuado to Arecibo, connect with Schwan and cut off the retreat of any of the enemy who might attempt to reach San Juan in that direction. Previous to General Henry's movement General Stone had been sent forward with material to repair and build the road between Adjuntas and Utuado. He employed native labor for the purpose, assisted by a company of the Provisional Engineer Battalion. The rough mountain trail could be widened only sufficiently to permit the passage of troops and supplies with great difficulty, yet Henry had succeeded, without opposition from the enemy, in getting a force through to within a few miles of Arecibo, when the order to suspend military operations was received. When the Commandante of Arecibo learned that troops and wheeled vehicles had come over the Utuado trail he evinced the greatest surprise. The route was deemed impossible except for solitary animals, and was left totally unguarded. A few determined men posted at the single pass could have held it against a division.

A glance in review shows that the announcement that a peace protocol was signed found aggressive activity along the line of operations, which extended almost straight from

Aguadilla on the northwest coast, southeast to Arroyo on the south coast. Schwan was close on the heels of the Spanish regulars he had routed at Hormigueros and again on the Rio Prieto, and what few might have escaped would surely have run into the arms of Henry's command approaching Arecibo. Brooke's guns were primed ready to fire on the heights above Guayama, and Wilson was about to execute a most difficult and hazardous turning movement around Asomante. The military student was on the point of gaining valuable material for his education. There would have been some blood spilled, the interest of the country in the Puerto Rican campaign would have been aroused in consequence, military reputations would have been made, and some, perhaps, lost. Of the favorable result to the American arms there can be no question. Even if Wilson and Brooke had found it expedient to "mark time," as it were, in front of their allotted tasks, Henry and Schwan would surely have joined at Arecibo, the Spaniards stationed here having retreated to San Juan. With the former seaport on the north coast as a new base, they were to move along the shore by the railroad and two parallel wagon roads, which have frequent connecting cross roads, and, with the left flank always in close supporting distance of the sea, would, in two days at least, have been in the rear of San Juan, and at the northern terminus of the main military highway, along which a force would have been despatched to take the positions at Aibonito and Cayey in the rear, if they had not already fallen.

Such, briefly outlined, was the campaign suspended August 13 by the peace protocol and auspiciously closed on October 18, when the U. S. flag was raised in San Juan, farther east by a thousand miles than ever before. Sovereignty changed hands on that day and there is no question of divided interest in the title.

The campaign in Puerto Rico was clean cut and strategically brilliant, and none the less great because on account of it a thousand homes are not in mourning and twice that number of pensioners are not compelled to stand at the doors of the Treasury and demand alms of the Government. It demonstrated too that the Commanding General of the Army

is as great a strategist, at the council board with a map and a pair of dividers, as he is a great personal leader of men in battle.

But it is not the business of the historian to draw conclusions or to point morals, particularly when he happens to be an army officer. Sufficient facts are presented in the preceding pages, it is hoped, to enable the reader to make intelligent deductions. Suffice it to say, that the prompt success of the army in Puerto Rico was an important factor in precipitating Spanish overtures for peace, so anxiously desired by both the nations in arms, while the strategic and purely material advantages accruing from the campaign make it the most profitable and satisfactory one of the war.

"At the last accounting, the war has only cost us directly about \$165,000,000, and as a compensation for the outlay we have appropriated Puerto Rico, which can hardly be valued at much less than double that sum."*

NOTE :—TROOPS AND STORES ON TRANSPORTS FOR PUERTO
RICAN EXPEDITION, LEAVING GUANTANAMO
JULY 21, 1898.

Steamer Yale (Captain Wise).

General Miles and Staff, General Garretson and Staff, 12 Cos. 6th Mass. Vol. Infantry, 1 Co. 6th Ill. Vol. Infantry, with camp and garrison equipage,—a total of 1,410 men; 52,000 field rations (lacking 18,000 pounds bacon, 200 pounds sugar), 25,000 rations tomatoes, and 4,000 travel rations.

Steamer Columbia (Captain Sands).

3 Cos. 6th Ill. Vol. Infantry,—a total of 300 men, with camp and garrison equipage, and 1,300 travel rations.

Lampasas (Captain Barstow).

Provisional Engineer Battalion, 10 officers, 139 enlisted men, with 45 days rations, engineer's supplies, pontoon train, 22 wagons, 136 horses and mules, forage, ammunition, packs and harness for pack-train and Headquarters mess supplies; and Red Cross surgeons and nurses.

*Hon. Hannis Taylor in the December number of the North American Review.

Nueces (Captain Risk).

12 officers, and 199 enlisted men of Siege Battery "B," 5th U. S. Artillery, and 24 teamsters, 7 hospital corps men, 163 horses and mules, 22 wagons, 6-7 in. mortars and 10-6 in. mortars, 10 field cars, with ammunition and appliances; also 50 kegs of powder, for General Shafter.

City of Macon (Captain Savage).

275 unassigned regular recruits and 100,000 rations.

Comanche (Captain Pennington).

General Henry and staff, Light Batteries "C" and "F," 3d Artillery, "B," 4th Artillery and "D," 5th Artillery, —a total of 492 men, with 6-3.2 in. guns to each battery; also 483,000 rounds 30 calibre ammunition, 50 steel shields and 100,000 rations.

Unionist (Capt Scanes).

Horses for light batteries, 2-5 in. siege guns, 216 smokeless, and 216 black powder charges for same, 863,000 rounds 30 calibre, 85,000 rounds revolver ammunition, 7 escort wagons, and 7 sets of harness, 1,000 rations of forage, much of it in a damaged condition, and 22,000 gallons of water, with capacity to condense 1,000 gallons daily.

Stillwater (Captain Stevenson).

6 officers and 60 enlisted men of Signal Corps, 53 horses and mules; 8 wagons; 2 lance trucks; 1 balloon; telegraph and signal stores, etc.

Rita (Captain Porter).

6 companies 6th Ill. Vol. Infantry,—a total of 672 men, with camp and garrison equipage and 2,700 travel rations.

Specialist (Captain Evans).


Horses for light batteries, and forage for 200 horses for five days; 4 caissons and limbers for 3.2 in. guns and ammunition for same; Battery "G," 5th U. S. Artillery; 2-3.2 in. guns and limbers; 2 caissons and limbers for same; 5 limbers and 2 caissons belonging to Batteries "C" and "F," 3d Artillery, guns of Battery "B," 4th Artillery, and "D," 5th Artillery; 6-5.2 in. guns and limbers; 2-3.2 in. gun carriages and limbers; 8 caissons

and limbers for 3.2 in. guns, with harness belonging to Light Batteries "E" and "K," 1st Artillery, and "A" and "F," 2nd Artillery, and Battery "F," 5th Artillery, in Santiago, Cuba; 23 boxes of clothing, consigned to General Shafter's troops, which Quartermaster at Daiquiri, Cuba, could not receive; 3,500 rounds of ammunition, for 3.2 in. field guns, of which about 700 rounds were intended for Light Batteries in Santiago, Cuba, and 2,800 rounds for Batteries going to Puerto Rico, and 16 wagons to haul extra field-gun ammunition.

NAVAL CONVOY.

- U. S. Battleship *Massachusetts*,
- U. S. converted yacht *Gloucester*,
- U. S. converted yacht *Dixie*.

Henry H. Whitney
Capt. U. S. A.



H. C. Taylor.
Captain U. S. Navy.
Comd'g Battleship "Indiana"

CHAPTER XI.
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.

BY
CAPT. H. C. TAYLOR, U. S. N.

THERE are different kinds of blockades, varying with the objects to be attained. In a general way they may be said to be naval and commercial. The former has a military object in view, the holding within a port of an enemy's fleet, preventing its exit and thereby destroying for the time its power for harm, its warlike offensive quality, compelling it to that inactivity which in itself is a form of strategic paralysis. Such was the blockade of Cervera's fleet in Santiago by our squadron. This form of blockade is of a directly warlike character,—force is matched against force,—a battle is always probable, usually imminent. If the enemy within attempts to escape, he knows he must fight, must lose heavily in ships and men; if the force outside means to make sure of its object and keep the enemy in, it must for its part keep close to shore and chance heavy losses from the enemy's sorties, from land batteries and submarine mines. The situation assumes an actual fighting character, one actively hostile.

A commercial blockade, on the other hand, although an act of war and frequently of great weight in determining the final issue, is not directly warlike in its nature. It does not necessarily nor usually involve the sinking of ships or the killing of men. Attempts to evade it when discovered, are met by threats, such as firing a shot across the bows or the milder menace of a blank charge. Should the blockade runner think his chances of escape good, he disregards the gun which orders him thus to heave to and he may escape; but should there appear the slightest sign of fighting or loss of life,

the delinquent surrenders at once and without bloodshed. When in the possession of the capturing force, the prize passes to judicial trial to decide whether it is justly captured. Whatever that decision may be, the people of the prize are not regarded as prisoners of war and are released as soon as convenient, without any pledge or guarantee required from them that they will not repeat the offence. In fact there are several instances in our own War of the Rebellion of persons returning more than once, only to be recaptured in new attempts to run the blockade. Commercial blockade has the general features of a game to be played, of great hazards and high stakes, but not the quality of war and killing, nor the sanguinary tinge which marks the incidents of an active campaign carried on by a military or naval force properly opposed.

The blockade of Cuba as generally understood was the effort to close its ports, prevent trade and prohibit the entry of all articles which could assist the enemy in prosecuting the war. The subject had received attention before the war came. It had been decided that a blockade of the western half of Cuba would practically isolate the Spanish force in the island. The axial railway running east and west has branches to the north and south coast, but the continuity of this road is broken after it passes to the eastward of a line joining Cienfuegos on the south coast and Sagua la Grande on the north. A blockade therefore extending from Cienfuegos around the west end to Sagua la Grande would include all points from which goods, if landed, could be shipped conveniently or in any way successfully to Havana and to the army in its vicinity. There was no doubt in naval minds generally that this blockade could be made effective, as blockades go, as thorough in fact as any we know of in history; but there had been at times differences of opinion as to how effective the most perfect blockade could be. Some there were who held that the Spanish army, depending as it did from day to day upon the arrival of provision ships, would actually begin to starve within a few days, in a week would be at the last gasp and in a fortnight would surrender unconditionally and even gladly. Thus would be avoided the loss, misery and bloodshed of a protracted campaign by sea and land. The statement that a

passive blockade, however thorough, could produce such results was contrary to the nature of things. It was the effort so often made before to find a short cut to success, a royal road to learning.

It should be said that the great majority of practical men among naval officers recognized the impossibility of such results flowing from a simple blockade. Students of the art of war learn early in their studies that there are no easy roads by which to travel toward the goal of victory,—it is in war as in other trades and pursuits, the object to be obtained will require vigorous work and persistent effort in proportion to its value. The blockade of Cuba was but one of several factors which combined could compel the surrender of the Spanish. Vigorous offensive movements must accompany a blockade. The closing of our southern ports in the War of the Rebellion was very satisfactory after experience had taught us the proper methods. Perhaps none in history has been more successful, and it is well-known that the suffering of the Southern Confederacy was much increased by its inability to procure the munitions of war as well as the necessities of life in sufficient quantities; yet the starving out of the South by this means took four years to achieve. It was forced by necessity to produce many of the articles needed, but this was not altogether the reason for the tenacity of its resistance. That was in great part due to the fact that a large majority of the blockade runners did succeed in passing through the lines, both in and out. Not more than a third of the attempts were unsuccessful. Not more than that proportion were captured or otherwise prevented from landing their cargoes in the Confederacy and departing outward bound with cotton which was largely used to pay the cost of goods imported. There was no reason to expect a higher percentage of captures by our blockading line at Cuba than in our Civil War, certainly not in the opening months of such a war before experience in the methods of blockading was gained. The conditions of our blockade of Cuba were distinctly favorable to those attempting to evade it. South of Cuba lies Jamaica with good ports and with but a short distance intervening between it and Manzanillo, where a network of reefs,

permeated by deep but dangerous channels badly surveyed or in some cases quite unknown, offer every opportunity to such a traffic. Farther to the west but still within easy distance of Jamaica is another similar labyrinth of islands and reefs in the neighborhood of the Isle of Pines, whose channels, known only to the local pilots, afforded access for light-draught vessels to Batabano and other landing places inside the Isle of Pines. All blockade runners of whatever country could take their goods on board at Jamaica and start thence to any one of the south Cuba ports. Jamaica is an English possession and that government was neutral, even friendly in its disposition towards us, but there is no international law or general custom which would regard the use of this island for that purpose as an act of enmity, a blockade being, as has been said before, of a commercial rather than a warlike nature. Similar conditions prevailed to the north of Cuba. The Bahamas, an English group of islands whose reefs and islets extend southward over the Great Bahama banks to within sight of Cuban shores, offered every chance of concealment to those attempting to violate the blockade. Nassau in the center of this group was used for years as the starting point of blockade runners during the War of the Rebellion, and the Bahama bank, to the south of that port, makes the passage to Cuba even more feasible than to the United States for those vessels whose errands require secrecy. The closer the examination of existing conditions was carried the more certain it became that, whatever an ideal and theoretical blockade might accomplish, a practical blockade, such as a fleet could maintain ought not to be counted upon for more than a small part in deciding the campaign against Spain in the West Indies.

It was felt of course that the blockade must be as stringent as it was possible to make it and, to insure this, it was decided to concentrate the force at the government's disposal upon the western half of the island and to close all ports from Sagua la Grande on the north around the western end of Cuba to Cienfuegos on the south and thus to stop or at least check the influx of goods destined for the Spanish forces.

On the twenty-second day of April, 1898, the President of the

United States issued the proclamation of the blockade of Cuba in the following terms :

PROCLAMATION.

Blockade of Cuban ports by the President of the United States. A proclamation. Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved April 20, 1898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it was demanded that that said government at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and the President of the United States was directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states, to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into effect, and,

Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the laws of nations applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessels approaching any of said ports or attempting to leave the same without notice or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade will be duly warned by the Commander of the blockading forces, who will endorse on her register the facts and the date of such warning, where such endorsement was made, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo, as prizes, as may be deemed advisable. Neutral vessels lying at any of said ports at the time of the establishment of said blockade will be allowed 30 days to issue therefrom.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

(SEAL)

Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-second day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the Independence of the United States, the One Hundred and Twenty-second.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.


By the President,

JOHN SHERMAN, *Secretary of State*,

It will be observed in this proclamation that, on the north coast of Cuba, Bahia Honda is the most western point named and that a gap of several hundred miles intervenes between it and Cienfuegos, on the south coast of the island. At Bahia Honda begins a line of reefs skirting the shore and rendering it unapproachable as far as Cape San Antonio. After passing San Antonio, for some distance on the southern shore the coast has no harbors of commercial importance. Add to this the fact that communication with the capital from these western points of the island was difficult, that the insurgents were strong in that section while the military grasp of Spain was relatively feeble, and it will be understood that ships employed in blockading that portion of Cuba would be in a measure wasted. The Isle of Pines was however, a prominent feature of the south coast between Cape San Antonio and Cienfuegos, and abreast of it was Batabano on the mainland of Cuba, a place of some importance, being but thirty miles from Havana and connected with it by a direct railroad. Only vessels of very light draft could reach it, however, and it was to be supposed that the government thought the limited number of ships then available could be better employed elsewhere.

It will be noticed further that the proclamation omits the port of Sagua la Grande, lying on the north shore to the eastward of Cardenas. This point was of considerable value to the Spaniards and its omission was thought at the time to be due to reasons of state, unknown to the writer.

War having been declared on the twenty-first of April, the first movement toward Cuba was made by Admiral Sampson's fleet leaving Key West the morning of the twenty-second and arriving off Havana at sundown of the same day. Patrolling, during the night, before that port in fleet formation, the vessels took station the next day at points specified by the Admiral and began the regular work assigned to them. Shortly after leaving Key West the Spanish steamer *Buena Ventura* was captured, and in the first few days of the blockade several vessels were intercepted and either captured and sent in as prizes or warned of the blockade and ordered to keep off. The latter were valuable vessels which, being within the limit of time set by the President in his proclama-



Copyrighted 1899 by A. Loebner

U. S. BATTLESHIP INDIANA

CAPT. H. C. TAYLOR

tion and belonging to neutral nations, could not be regarded as guilty, unless after one warning a second attempt should be made. The margin of time thus given does not, however, exempt vessels belonging to the enemy, and of these one of the most notable captures was the *Panama* which appeared from the northward steering for Havana and was pluckily brought to by the little *Mangrove*, which was assisted later in securing the prize by the *Indiana*.

From Havana as a center Admiral Sampson extended the blockade to neighboring harbors east and west, as rapidly as his force was increased by the Navy Department. Matanzas was almost immediately guarded by monitors and small vessels and these extended the line, as their numbers made it practicable, to cover the entrance to the reefs and islands, inside of which lies Cardenas. Beyond this to the eastward there was no marked extension for some time, and later, when the force at hand would have permitted the next port to the eastward, Sagua la Grande, to be closed, the order so to blockade it was withheld by the government for reasons which as before mentioned were not known to the writer or to the fleet generally.

Extending in the same way to the westward the line of vessels soon included Mariel, twenty miles west of Havana. The intention was to make a close blockade of the three ports: Havana in the center, Matanzas to the east and Mariel to the west, for the reason that the two latter ports were near enough to Havana to be constantly in touch with it and directly in the sphere of military influence which concentrated at the capital. West of Mariel the next harbor of importance, fifteen miles distant from it, was Cabañas while ten miles farther west was the sheltered bay of Bahia Honda. Cabañas and Bahia Honda were deemed of secondary importance because of their distance from Havana and the lack of railroad connection. They were, however, observed by our vessels though not closely blockaded in the earlier days of the war.

These two bays of Cabañas and Bahia Honda would have offered some advantages as a shelter and refuge for our torpedo boats and other light craft as well as an anchorage for

colliers if we could have taken possession of them. It has always been found in blockade service, or in any duty which demands that a fleet of war vessels maintain itself in a given locality for long periods of time, that a temporary advanced base near the scene of operations is very necessary to the efficiency of the fleet.

Such a base is not likely to be found in most blockades except upon the enemy's coast or upon islands lying conveniently near it. The reefs and islets of the Bahama bank are near enough to portions of the northern coast of Cuba, but being English possessions they were neutral territory during this war and could not, therefore, be occupied for such purposes. Opposite Havana and about ninety miles distant is Key West and Tortugas. Both of these harbors could be utilized as bases and Key West became a center of bustle and activity throughout the war. Hither vessels resorted to take coal, provisions and ammunition, and to receive such minor repairs as the resources of its naval station could make. It was felt, however, that a distance of ninety miles across a rough channel was too great for the convenience of the numerous small vessels which were in use and there was serious thought of seizing one of the less frequented harbors of the north coast of Cuba and holding it as an advanced base. In the early stages of the war the blockading fleet did not have at its disposal a land force capable of holding a position on shore. Later on, a body of marines was sent to Admiral Sampson but, soon after they became available, the interest of the campaign shifted to Santiago de Cuba, six hundred miles to the eastward, and the marines were urgently needed to hold a base at Guantanamo. The blockade about Havana, therefore, was obliged to rely upon Key West and no position upon the enemy's shore was held by us in that vicinity. The points that were under consideration for advanced bases in the early days of the war were, as before said, Cabañas and Bahia Honda to the westward of Havana and one of the islands off Cardenas to the eastward. More convenient than these, being closer to Havana, would have been Mariel to the west and Matanzas to the east but as before mentioned these points were in one case strongly fortified and held by the

Spanish, and in the other so closely under observation of the enemy's troops that their occupation would have been difficult if not impossible.

A lesson may be drawn from the above in reference to having at hand, when war threatens, a considerable force of marines fully equipped for land operations and ready to be placed aboard transports, these latter being also kept fully equipped for this duty. The preparation of this body of marines and the vessels that are to carry them should keep pace with that of the principal fleet or squadron, when operations against or near to an enemy's coast are anticipated, and they should sail in company with the fleet for the scene of operations, unless some important naval battle with a hostile squadron is impending.

The blockade of the southern coast of Cuba began later, as was to be expected, and was more irregular in its operations. The President's proclamation mentioned at first only Cienfuegos on the south coast, and operations at that point were interrupted for a time by the expectation that Cervera might bring his squadron there. Thus our strength off that port varied at different times from a heavy squadron of iron clads to a small gun-boat or auxiliary vessel. West of Cienfuegos and occupying a large part of the coast front between that port and Cape San Antonio, lies the Isle of Pines, with a great expanse of reefs, shoals and channels between it and the Cuban shore. Inside of this island the coast of Cuba makes a great bend inward, forming a large recess in the land. In the middle of this bend in the Cuban shore lies Batabano, separated from Havana by the width of the island which being here at its narrowest is less than thirty miles. A railroad crosses the island between Batabano and Havana. The position is an ideal one for running the blockade and it was early seen that our possession of the Isle of Pines was essential to a successful blockade of Batabano and of that part of the coast extending for fifty miles on each side of it.

It is probable, had a large force of marines been ready early in the war, that the Isle of Pines would have been at once occupied, but even without that advantage some blockade runners were captured by our ships in that vicinity. It was,

however, only in the latter days of the war and after Cervera's squadron had been destroyed that our numbers sufficed to detach a portion of our force to occupy the Isle of Pines, and before this occupation was effected the campaign was brought to an end by the Peace Protocol. We repeat that we cannot too strongly emphasize the necessity for marines to be at the disposal of an Admiral from the day a naval war begins. Any regularly organized body of troops would be similarly useful, but the preparation of an army for war does not usually include the instant mobilization of a small force to be landed at once upon an enemy's territory. The minds of army chiefs are naturally and properly directed to the preparation for the line of battle of a due proportion of infantry, artillery and cavalry, and to the provision of the stores and munitions of war for a large army. This great task is not compatible with sudden mobilization of a smaller body for a special purpose. For this sort of work the marines were doubtless invented in the early days of history.

There came a time very early in the days of the blockade of Cuba when the battleships and other heavy vessels were suddenly called away from blockade duty. The news that Cervera had sailed from the Cape de Verde Islands for the West Indies and the uncertainty as to his exact destination made it necessary for the ships of the line of battle to seek him out and if possible destroy his squadron. It was among the probabilities that he would proceed to Puerto Rico where the Spanish government had, at the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico, a comfortable harbor and dockyard facilities, defended by some strength of guns and fortifications on shore. On May 4, therefore, Admiral Sampson with his flag-ship the *New York*, the *Iowa*, the *Indiana*, *Terror* and *Amphitrite*, together with the *Detroit*, *Montgomery* and smaller vessels, left the blockade and proceeded a thousand miles to the eastward to search for Cervera's squadron at Puerto Rico. The absence of these vessels from the blockading line did not seriously affect its efficiency, as they were for the most part constructed more with a view to fleet engagements than for chasing blockade runners, and there were no Spanish armed ships then in Cuban ports to make the presence of our battle-

ships and monitors necessary to sustain our line of blockading ships in case of an attack from the enemy. We may except from this statement the *Detroit* and *Montgomery*, which cruisers accompanied the fleet to Puerto Rico but were regarded also as very valuable blockaders.

Not finding Cervera's squadron at San Juan and believing therefore that he contemplated some other destination, Admiral Sampson moved promptly back to the westward, learning on the way that the Spanish fleet had touched at Curaçoa, an island in the southern part of the Caribbean Sea near the main land of South America. Our squadron regained the vicinity of Havana and Key West on the nineteenth of May, having been absent fifteen days from the blockade. The Flying Squadron, which had been ordered to the front from Hampton Roads, arrived off Key West about the same time and, as Cienfuegos was thought to be a probable destination for Cervera's force, the Flying Squadron sailed at once from Key West for that port. This squadron was composed of the *Brooklyn*, Admiral Schley's flag-ship, the *Massachusetts*, *Texas* and smaller vessels, reinforced in a few days by the *Iowa*.

The blockade of Havana was now for the moment strengthened by the vessels that had returned from Puerto Rico, with the exception of the *Iowa*, but a few days later the news reached the fleet there of the arrival of Cervera's force at Santiago. The knowledge that the Flying Squadron was off Cienfuegos and that therefore the Spanish ships might, after hastily coaling at Santiago, leave that port and come westward along the northern coast of Cuba caused the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sampson, again to withdraw from the Havana blockade a number of vessels and move to the eastward to guard the mouth of the old Bahama channel and intercept Cervera at that point, thus forcing him to battle before he could decide between passing to the northward, to raid our coasts, and continuing along the Cuban shore in an attempt to raise the blockade of Havana and enter that port. At this stage of the war the blockading force was much strengthened by vessels of the cruiser and gunboat type which our government had hurried to the front to assist in the blockade. Moreover, the position chosen by the Admiral for

patrolling the Bahama Channel with the heavy ships was one which enabled them to guard at the same time and quite effectively a considerable stretch of coast east of Havana and Matanzas; so that, although the blockading line on the north coast was at times thinly held, it was at no time so sparsely occupied as to cause a question concerning its effectiveness.

On the southern coast Cienfuegos, after it was known that Cervera was at Santiago, was blockaded and a gradual extension of the line was made a little to the east, while to the west our efforts reached as far as the Isle of Pines. It was in this vicinity that the attempts of the valuable prize *Santo Domingo* to run in her valuable cargo were finally frustrated and the vessel destroyed.

The squadron patrolling the western mouth of the old Bahama Channel continued that work until the Commander-in-Chief had assured himself that the Spanish ships were still at Santiago and that the Flying Squadron had arrived from Cienfuegos in that vicinity. He then, with his flag-ship and the *Oregon*, which had lately arrived at Key West and joined the patrol, proceeded eastward to take command at Santiago, leaving the patrol to be continued under the command of Commodore Watson. The latter's force was still further diminished by the *Indiana* being sent to Key West, where she organized the force of vessels which was to convoy General Shafter's army to Santiago.

At this period, that is about the first of June, the blockade had been extended and strengthened and the general condition was as follows: Havana and Matanzas thoroughly guarded; Cardenas and Mariel sufficiently so; Cabañas and Bahia Honda also blockaded, but it was not expected that any large or valuable cargoes would enter those harbors owing to the difficulty of landing their goods and of transporting them to the Spanish centers of military force; Cienfuegos blockaded and the great bay of the Isle of Pines beginning to come under the influence of our watchfulness; Sagua la Grande on the north side still open. So much for the western half of the island. To the eastward on the north coast the harbors of Nuevitas, connected by rail with Puerto Principe, but not with Havana; Nipe bay, a deep and commodious har-

bor but not having easy connections with the centers in the interior; and some other harbors of less importance not permanently guarded. Passing thence around Cape Maysi, the extreme eastern point of Cuba, we come, on the southern side, to the harbor of Guantanamo, a place of some importance commercially and, in a military and naval view, very necessary as a base to a fleet operating at Santiago and its vicinity. Its value being recognized, it was occupied by a division of the squadron under Commander McCalla. On June 10 a strong post on shore was occupied by our marines and after some brisk fighting permanently secured. Remarks have already been made about bases for naval operations on a hostile coast and their usefulness was fully demonstrated in the case of Guantanamo. Doubtless even without this base the blockade of Cervera's fleet at Santiago would have been maintained for as long a time as the circumstances demanded, but the work was made much simpler and easier by the possession of this valuable harbor. Our battleships could and did, to some extent, coal directly off the port of Santiago in the open sea from the steam colliers that were sent to the squadron, but it was most difficult and resulted in more or less damage to the vessels that thus lay close together in the swells which even in the quietest weather are felt in the open sea. The repairs of modern ships demand some quiet harbor near by in order to preserve their efficiency and as soon as Guantanamo was securely in our hands the government hurried to that point the repair-ship *Vulcan*, a complete outfit of tools and machines, and a body of skilled mechanics and officers who rendered valuable assistance to the battleships which came for that purpose to Guantanamo. The value of this port to our blockade of Cuba can hardly be overestimated and this experience should not be forgotten by us in future operations. It was recognized fully in the War of the Rebellion, though not until experience had taught us that the blockade of the North Carolina coast could not be successfully maintained if based upon New York or even upon Hampton Roads, and it was not until Beaufort, North Carolina, was in our hands at a distance of only a few hours steaming from the Wilmington blockade that the needs of the blockade were completely filled

and its efficiency thoroughly established. Off Charleston, the blockading line had Port Royal conveniently at hand after its capture by Admiral Dupont and this harbor served also as a base for the blockade of Savannah river. In the Gulf of Mexico, Pensacola and Ship's Island served as bases for the blockade of Mobile and the Mississippi River. The general principle that a base is necessary to efficient blockading is not new but is of special application in our present stage of naval evolution, which requires coal as a fuel, in large quantities, and convenient methods for taking it on board. During the sail period, that is the few centuries intervening between the warfare of rowing galleys and triremes and our present condition of steam propulsion, vessels being driven by wind alone were independent so far as their powers of propulsion were concerned, although in the matter of provisions and repairs they still felt a base to be a great convenience. English fleets blockading off Cadiz had Gibraltar close to them. Those blockading Brest had their own ports across the English channel, while those fleets which watched Toulon, not always successfully, had Sardinia and Corsica conveniently at hand.

Passing to the westward from Santiago toward Cienfuegos, we come to no ports or harbors until we reach Manzanillo which is in the upper part of a deep gulf in the southern side of the island. At the period of which we speak, this port and the other towns in the same gulf were for the first time beginning to be watched by occasional vessels and this soon developed into a regular blockade, culminating in the attack upon Manzanillo of a division of small ships under Commander Todd and the complete destruction of all the enemy's armed vessels in the port. From Manzanillo westward along the southern shore there extended to Trinidad, which is to the eastward of Cienfuegos, a line of reefs and keys separated by a considerable interval from the coast, the area thus included being occupied by keys and devious channels making navigation for a stranger impossible. Had the war continued long, this stretch of coast would probably have been the resort of blockade runners from Jamaica but it would not in any case have had great effect upon the final result of the war, for the

goods once landed could not have been transported in any large quantities or in any reasonable time to points of Spanish influence in the island.

No blockade, as has been said, is perfect and there were one or two occasions in which vessels were successful in breaking through our lines off the Cuban ports. But these exceptions were rare. Vessels above the size of fishing craft, as a rule, failed completely to get in or out of blockaded ports. There was very little effort made by vessels in Cuban harbors to come out, while on the contrary considerable effort was made by Spanish and other vessels to carry valuable cargoes to the island. In this respect the reports of our smaller armed vessels on the blockade form a mass of evidence of great interest. The running ashore of the fine steamer *Santo Domingo*, with her rich cargo by the *Eagle* near the Isle of Pines on the southern coast of Cuba, and her subsequent burning by Lieutenant Southerland, commanding the *Eagle*, is an example of these incidents and there are many similar cases. The rigid character of the blockade can be best understood by a succession of reports made by certain vessels blockading different ports of Cuba. These taken together show that the same blockade runner tried successively several ports and at each one was chased off until at the last one she was run ashore and destroyed. The incident is sufficiently typical to justify brief extracts from the reports of the vessels concerned. We will premise by stating that Cienfuegos, where the blockade runner first made her attempt, is near the central part of the southern coast of Cuba. Her second attempt was at or near the Isle of Pines at a distance of about one hundred and fifty miles. The third scene of her efforts was at Mariel on the north coast and it was here that she was caught and destroyed.

U. S. S. YANKTON,

OFF CIENFUEGOS, July 3, 1898.

SIR:—I have the honor to report that on July 2, about 3:30 P. M., I sighted a smoke bearing south-southwest and gave chase. At 4 P. M. the steamer, which up to this time had been heading for Cienfuegos, turned at first to the

eastward and then to the southward and westward, and steamed away from us. I was able plainly to see that she had four masts and two smokestacks between the second and third masts. The two forward masts seemed to have heavy cross-trees. I chased her for two hours, but she evidently was making about 15 knots, while we were making only 12. As there was no possibility of our overhauling her I turned back and reported the occurrence to the commanding officer of the *Detroit*.

The vessel answers to the description, furnished me by Commander Dayton, of the Spanish auxiliary cruiser *Alfonso XII*, but, I am at a loss to understand why, if this were the case, she did not show fight, unless she mistook us for a heavily armed gunboat.

Very respectfully,

J. D. ADAMS,

Lieut.-Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.

*The Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.*

U. S. S. EAGLE,

OFF ISLE OF PINES, CUBA, July 3, 1898.

SIR:—At 5:05 this morning, when about 10 miles west of Cape Pepe, Isle of Pines, bound to Rosario Channel, a large four-masted steamer with two smokepipes was sighted to the southward, standing to the northward and westward.

The *Eagle* gave chase immediately, and a few minutes later the steamer altered her course to the southward almost at right angles and commenced to run away. She continued on this southerly course for over ten miles, when, it becoming apparent that she was slowly dropping the *Eagle*, she commenced to edge away to the westward, and at the end of the chase was heading about west by north, a good course for San Antonio.

The *Eagle* chased her for a distance of 59 miles. There was nothing shown to indicate her nationality.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND,

Lieut., U. S. N., Commanding.

*The Commander-in-Chief of United States Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.*

U. S. S. PRAIRIE,

OFF HAVANA, CUBA, July 5, 1898.

SIR:—I have the honor to report that at half-past 10 on the morning of July 5, 1898, I being the senior officer present of the Havana blockading force, the Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. *Hawk* came on board and reported to me that on the preceding night a large four-masted steamer was observed by him attempting to run the blockade and enter Havana; that as soon as she caught sight of the *Hawk* she turned and steamed down the coast to the westward pursued by the *Hawk*. Upon reaching the entrance to the harbor of Mariel she attempted to enter the harbor and in so doing ran high and dry on the beach on the west side of the entrance. The commanding officer of the *Hawk* reported the circumstances to the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Castine*, the nearest blockading vessel, and was ordered to report to me by him. The commanding officer of the *Castine* immediately proceeded to the spot and shelled the vessel, setting her on fire. Upon receiving the report from the commanding officer of the *Hawk* I proceeded with this vessel to the place and found the steamer burning fiercely and opened fire upon her with my port battery to complete her destruction.

Very respectfully,

C. J. TRAIN,

*Commander, U. S. N., Commanding,
and Senior Officer Present.*

The Secretary of the Navy.

The efficiency of the blockade is plainly shown by the above reports. It is quite within bounds to say that nothing of consequence reached the enemy through ports that were being guarded. It should be observed, however, that the war ended so quickly that no systematic running of the blockade had begun. There had been no time to organize a system. There is no reason to doubt that the conditions existing in Cuba were not different, or at least not more favorable to blockaders, than were the conditions of our own coast in the War of the Rebellion. It is needless to dwell upon what might have happened in case the blockade had been existing a year or even six months, and the urgent needs of the inhabitants of the island had begun to be measured in money value suffi-

cient to tempt adventurous men and capitalists to fit out ships and take the risks of their ventures. Practically we may say that the enemy got nothing through the blockaded ports and comparatively little from Sagua la Grande which was still open. Yet how disappointing were the results of this three months exclusion from outside assistance to those who thought ten days' stoppage of provisions for the Spanish army would cause its surrender! In truth that large force, which was said to live from day to day upon provisions brought in from abroad and which it was thought could not last a fortnight without such supplies, did continue to live and thrive without them except such small amounts as came in through Sagua la Grande.

It was a never-ceasing wonder that no attacks of the nature of sorties were made by the Spanish vessels upon our blockading lines. The description of such a sortie is given in a German account as having occurred on May 14 at Havana. It is stated that two Spanish gunboats came out and attacked the blockade line and that an action ensued, but our own records do not confirm this. These vessels may have come out and in the darkness some shots may have been fired at them, but anything in the nature of a determined attack on the part of vessels of the Spanish navy is entirely without foundation. It was customary for some small armed vessel of the Spanish force to come to the mouth of the harbor whenever our ships appeared and the writer has seen at Sagua la Grande quite a display of energy in that way when his ship lay for a few hours off that port to reconnoiter, but it amounted to nothing more than this in almost all instances.

When we consider the numerous small armed craft in the possession of the Spaniards in Cuba, the intricate and dangerous reefs and shoals which made entrance into many of their ports hazardous or impossible to strangers; when we reflect on the experience the Spanish officers and their pilots had had through several generations, and their intimate acquaintance with these tortuous channels; and when finally we recognize the approved bravery of Spanish gentlemen, we stand bewildered before the entire failure of these men to harass us seriously and cause us heavy loss in our attempts to blockade

their coasts. Knowing them as gallant men we discern in their conduct a strange and fatal apathy. To inquire whence this came,—what causes may be found for it in the history of Spain,—are questions we need not here pursue. It is a difficult problem and he who attempts to solve it by instancing the corruption of government, the form of religious worship, or any other special and definite circumstance, must be careful that he does not confuse cause and effect ; for he may discover at the end of his reasonings that all the defects he enumerates have themselves a common cause in some inherent national malady, whose nature and origin are unknown to him.

H. C. Taylor.
Captain U. S. Army.
County Battleship Indiana





Mutellom

CHAPTER XII.

THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.

BY

HON. SHELBY M. CULLOM, Chairman of Senate Committee on Hawaiian Annexation.

TRADITION indicates that during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there was more or less intercourse between the various groups of the islands of Polynesia. Voyages were made between the Hawaiian Islands and the Samoan and Society groups. About that time the Harvey Islands and New Zealand were colonized. The fact that the Hawaiians, New Zealanders, the inhabitants of the Easter Islands and others in the south and east, have a distinct physical resemblance, as well as similar moral peculiarities, would tend to bear out the tradition that the Polynesian races sprang from the East Indian countries, and probably trace a relationship back to the Hindoostanees of the third and fourth centuries. It is claimed that many of the modern Polynesians speak dialects of the same language, have similar traditions and general rites. In many instances they have the same color as the residents of Java. They have also the straight black hair of many of the Malaysian people.

There being no written history which extends far into the early centuries of the Christian era regarding these various peoples, of course very many of these assumptions are based only upon collateral facts and, to a certain extent, upon known conditions. Alexander, who is perhaps the leading modern historian of the Hawaiian people, says: "The question of the origin of the Hawaiian race cannot yet be said to have been fully solved." The general fact remains, however, that the affinities of the people are with the islands to the south and southwest.

Again, it has been proven that the Polynesian language is

but one member of a wide-spread family of languages, spoken over the islands from Micronesia, the Philippines and the Malayan Archipelago, even to Madagascar.

Marquesan traditions state that the progenitors of the race, or of the chiefs, were Wakea and Papa, his wife, but they give so early a date that nothing whatever authentic can be ascertained in regard to it. There are no traditions of any voyages to and from other countries for at least thirty generations (about one thousand years) after Wakea's reputed time, but there are still to be seen many of the early great works, such as the lava-stone temples called "Heiaus," and the great fish-ponds along the coasts of several of the Hawaiian Islands. These works, which are plainly visible at this date, show that the labor of possibly thousands of men had been so employed by the island chiefs, in the building of these royal premises; and they, possibly better than anything else, mark approximately the time of certain classes of rulers. It is quite likely, however, that the two progenitors above mentioned, Wakea and Papa, were simply words expressive of certain ideas, as the first is the God of Light, in the Marquesan Islands, while Papa is intended as a personification of the Great Mother. This idea is also expressed in the Hawaiian phrase, "The Mother of Islands."

Everything relating to the Hawaiian Government during the latter half of the last century and for many years in this century must refer in some important particulars to the dynasty of Kamehameha, or his successors whose reigns covered the period of some of the great changes and reforms which have taken place. A very brief sketch of the rise of the Kamehameha administration may be of interest.

In November, 1736, Kekaulike, who was the chief of the Island of Maui, died and was succeeded by his son, Kamehameha Nui, *Nui* being translated "Great." He died in 1765 and was succeeded by his brother Kahekili. During his reign, on the eighteenth of January, 1778, Captain Cook, the great English navigator, while sailing due north from the Society Islands, discovered the Islands of Oahu and Kauai. The next day he landed at Waimea, Kauai, where he held friendly intercourse with the natives, and afterwards laid in

supplies at Niihau. He finally sailed for Alaska on the second of February. The Hawaiians looked upon him as an incarnation of the god Lono and upon his crew as supernatural beings. Returning from the Arctic the following winter, he anchored in Kealakekua Bay, on the Island of Hawaii, January 17, 1779. Here he received almost divine honors and was loaded with munificent presents of the best that the islands could produce. By the rash and arbitrary conduct either of himself or his men, however, he involved himself in an affray with the natives, in which he was killed on February 14, 1779. The spot where he fell is now marked by an appropriate monument, erected in 1825 by Lord Byron, an English Captain.

The struggles between Kahekili and other island chiefs were kept up from 1765 to 1794. Sometimes the warriors of one island defeated the others, and the supremacy over Hawaii, Oahu, Kauai and Maui passed backwards and forwards repeatedly. Armies went from island to island in fleets of double canoes, and sanguinary conflicts were carried on. There are instances, well authenticated by tradition and by the reports of visiting travelers, where the armies of one side were driven bodily over perpendicular precipices and hundreds were killed. During the chiefship of Kahekili, war continued between Maui and Hawaii, with occasional expeditions to Oahu. Kamehameha I., now became his rival for the control of Maui. He was defeated once or twice by Kahekili, who captured Oahu; but, after a time, he succeeded in overcoming all the various island chiefs, effected a consolidated government over all the islands, except Kauai and Niihau, and became the king. He finally obtained the cession of Kauai, from the chief of that island, in 1809, and thereafter was the ruler and king of the entire group, until his death in 1819.

Kamehameha I., was the original Hawaiian governmental reformer. The government at the time of his accession was a sort of semi-barbarous establishment, with chieftains over the principal islands. He re-organized the general system and broke up that which existed at the time, appointing governors in place of the chieftains. These governors, subject to his personal supervision, appointed tax collectors, heads of dis-

tricts, and other subordinate officers. They also dispensed justice, after a manner. The four great chiefs who had aided him in all his wars were the twin-brothers, Kameeiamoku and Kamanawa, and a half-brother. These, with Keeaumoku and Keaweheulu, were his recognized advisors and, together with Kalauimoki, they may be regarded as his cabinet.

Prior to his death in 1819, Kamehameha I., had appointed his favorite queen, Kaahumanuu, as the premier or regent, called a "Kuhinanui," to exercise equal authority with his son Kamehameha II., who was known as "Liholiho." She possessed the power of veto over the young king's acts. Liholiho visited England in 1823 and died there in 1825, whereupon Kauikeaouli, his brother, known as Kamehameha III., began to reign in 1833, at nineteen years of age. The premiership of Kaahumanuu was continued on account of the youth of the young monarch, and the former council of chiefs or governors was converted into The House of Nobles.

Up to that time the common people were not considered to have any political rights whatever, but during the reign of Kamehameha III. both he and his chiefs became convinced of the necessity of remodeling their system. They sent to the United States for a legal advisor and a person to instruct them in the science of government. In 1838, they chose Mr. Richards as advisor and interpreter; and he, having been released from his connection with the American Mission, entered upon his duties in 1839, by delivering a series of lectures on the science of government to the king and his chiefs, at Lahaina. A code of laws was drawn up and a declaration of rights was prepared by a graduate of the Seminary at that place, directed by the king. The king and the chiefs spent several days in discussing it. At a second meeting, which included all the important chiefs of the islands, it was read a third time and unanimously approved. It was then signed by the king and published June 7, 1839, in a pamphlet of twenty-four pages. The next year, 1840, a constitution was drawn up in a similar manner and approved in the general council of the chiefs.

The islands were visited occasionally by Russian and American ships and some French and English vessels. Probably

the most important visitors, who, at any time before or since, have visited Hawaii, were those who arrived on March 20, 1820, in the American brig, *Thaddeus*, from Boston. These were the first missionaries to the islands, the first party consisting of the Rev. Asa Thurston and the Rev. Hiram Bingham, ordained missionaries, with their wives and five other Americans and four Hawaiians who had received some education at a school in the States. These missionaries at once commenced their labors, and on August 25, 1821, the first Christian meeting house was erected in Honolulu. Following this, many native congregations were organized and a number of churches built. The missionaries were persistent and industrious.

Up to this time, the Hawaiians had had no written language or printed books. The missionaries prepared an alphabet, created and introduced a written language and, in 1822, six months after the first church building was erected, the first printed sheet in the Hawaiian tongue was struck off at the American Mission in Honolulu. The missionaries and many of the leading citizens devoted much time to the introduction of this new language. Teachers were immediately sent out among the natives, who were eager for knowledge and advanced rapidly in the study of the new tongue. It was adopted by the Seminary which had been established at Lahaina. Schools for its introduction were opened in many places throughout the islands. It may not be amiss to say that the general features of the new tongue are these:—there are but twelve letters in the alphabet; five of the letters are vowels which have, generally, the European pronunciation; all words end with a vowel. During the twelve or fifteen years following its introduction it became quite well understood not only by the younger, but even by the older classes of the people, and it still remains the native language.

From immemorial time, a system of *tabus*, or forbidden things, had grown up in Hawaiian life; the penalties for violation of these, in many cases, were extremely severe. A few years after the introduction of Christianity by the missionaries, many of the chiefs and important officials of the islands became earnest Christians and at quite an early date the sys-

tem of *tabus* was destroyed. Many of the old superstitions which had come down from a distant past were shown to be foolish and members of the royal family took part in the efforts to break up some of the more ridiculous notions. At a later day the worship of idols was abandoned. In the city of Honolulu and in Hilo, to-day, some of the largest churches are native churches of different denominations.

During the closing years of the reign of Kamehameha I., the principal business, or method of obtaining money or property, was the sale of sandal-wood ; ships loaded with sandal-wood were frequently dispatched to China, and cargoes were bartered for various articles of trade. In 1829, an adventurer, on the pretense that he had discovered an island of sandal-wood in the South Pacific, obtained one or two vessels from credulous Hawaiians and started away for the south. One of the vessels had about 300 men and the other 179 men. The inhabitants went wild over this expedition. One of the vessels was never heard of again ; the other one, on its return, nearly a year later, had only twenty remaining of its original crew.

In 1831, under the care of the Rev. Lorrin Andrews, the Lahaina Luna Seminary was founded. A printing press and book-bindery were attached to the school and many books were printed. In the year 1832, Kaahumanuu, the premier or "Kuhinanui," who had become noted for her advanced ideas of government, religion and humanity, died. After her death, Kamehameha III. became king.

In 1833, the Rev. John Diell arrived in Honolulu, bringing with him from New London, Connecticut, the frame-work of a chapel, which was erected in Honolulu under the name of the Bethel Church. About this time schools began to be opened for the native children, and school-houses were erected for English-speaking children. In 1837, a girls' boarding-school was opened in Wailuku.

The sandal-wood trade, which at one time amounted to \$400,000 a year, fell off in 1835 to \$30,000. Efforts were made to start silk plantations and cotton began to be manufactured in 1835 and 1837. In 1836, the first English newspaper, the *Sandwich Island Gazette*, was published in Honolulu.

There were, however, still existing among the inhabitants of the islands, very crude notions of government. They could not understand a government distinct from the person of the king. They had always been led to believe that the king or monarch was the controller and practically the owner of all the property, particularly the real estate of the islands, and that the king could dispossess any person at will. At a later date the idea of independent ownership of land began to be understood better.

In 1838 and 1839, there was a great religious revival, which extended to nearly all the islands and affected nearly all the people. In the two years, over fifteen thousand people were admitted to the Protestant churches and during the same time over seven thousand were admitted to one of the churches in Hilo.

In the latter year, 1839, a Captain La Place of a French 60-gun brig, arrived at Honolulu. As the French Ministry had adopted a vigorous colonial policy, the Hawaiian Islands, as well as the Marquesas and Tahiti, felt its effects. Captain La Place issued a manifesto, practically compelling the islands to submit to any indignity which he might see fit to attempt. He announced that on the twelfth of July he intended to commence hostilities. On the fourteenth, with one hundred men with fixed bayonets and a band of music, he proceeded to a building belonging to the king and presented certain demands, which the king was required to sign by breakfast next morning. He refused to grant time for consideration or consultation and the convention was signed. But Captain La Place soon sailed away; and after his departure the demands which he had imposed upon them obtained little attention.

In the period of 1839 to 1842, as there had been much confusion growing out of religious persecution, a declaration of rights, which has been termed the Magna Charta of Hawaiian freedom, was signed by the king and promulgated. The following year a constitution was drawn up and proclaimed, creating a legislative body of representatives. Old laws were revised and new ones added. School laws were enacted in 1841 and, in 1842, all government property was set apart and

a Treasury Board created. A regular system of keeping accounts, paying government officers and collecting taxes, was adopted.

On May 30, 1840, a great eruption of the volcano of Kilauea began and continued for three weeks. A few small hamlets were overwhelmed by the lava stream on its way to the coast, but no lives were lost.

A school for the education of young chiefs was founded in May, 1840, and fifteen men of high rank were educated through the medium of the English language for about ten years. The school now known as the Oahu College, one of the finest institutions to be found anywhere, was founded at Punahou in 1842. The buildings and grounds of this college are now, fifty-eight years after its founding, among the finest and best in the islands.

In 1842, the government of the islands having had frequent difficulties with the French government, certain attempts were made by other countries to take advantage of the simplicity of some of the Hawaiian officers and diplomats but through intervention and recognition by the United States, these difficulties were readily settled.

In 1843, under the coaching of certain private interests, the government was induced to yield certain points to Lord Paulet, representative of the British government, but the king and premier protested bitterly against the proceedings of the British Ambassador and appealed to the sense of justice and magnanimity of the Queen of England for redress. The king was intimidated into signing a guarantee deed for the benefit of speculators but finally, declined to yield to any further intimidation. The speculators had brought in lists of damages against the government in a short time aggregating about \$80,000. An attempt was made to collect these claims by additional force and intimidation. Certain lands were claimed by a Mr. Charlton. Lord Paulet seized the land which had been claimed by Charlton, cleared it of its occupants and demolished a number of the houses. The British government at London, as soon as the true state of affairs was presented to the Premier, disavowed the acts of Lord Paulet and of those who had been attempting the intimidation of the

Hawaiians, and declined to accept the provisional cession of the Hawaiian Islands, which had been forced from King Kamehameha III. under duress.

On the thirty-first day of July, 1843, a ceremony memorable in Hawaiian history was celebrated by a salute of twenty-one guns in honor of the restoration of the flag from unauthorized British encroachments. The king addressed the people, a great crowd of whom had assembled at the native church in Honolulu, and said to them, "The life of the land has been restored through righteousness;" using the words which have since been adopted as a national motto:—"Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono." The British Admiral, Thomas, who was present, gave his assistance in establishing order and morality. His act of justice was fully approved by the British government. The ground whereon this ceremony took place is named "Thomas Square," in honor of the Admiral.

In 1845, the Legislature created a Board of Commissioners to settle land titles. Before these commissioners, all persons were required to file their claims to land within two years, or to be forever barred. This board continued in office until March 31, 1855, having performed a great work, the results of which are comprised in many large books deposited in the records of the Land Office. After investigation, it was finally determined that three classes of persons had vested rights in land, namely,—first, the king; second, the chiefs; third, the common people. It was decided that the king should allow to the chiefs one-third, to the common people one-third and keep one-third for himself. In 1848 a division was effected. The king voluntarily divided the lands which had been surrendered to him, reserving only one-half of his share for himself as his own private estate and setting apart the other half for the use of the government. This was deemed an illustrious example of public spirit, and within the next two years nearly all the chiefs gave up one-third of their lands to the government in order to obtain an absolute title to the remainder. The common people were given fee-simple titles for their house-lots and the lands which they actually cultivated. These were finally confirmed, amounting, in all, to 11,309

claims. Aliens were not allowed to hold lands in fee-simple, until July, 1850. Thus a foundation was laid for individual property in land. The poor people became for the first time owners of their homes, the ancient feudal system having now been swept away.

Alexander says that the preliminary declaration of rights, published in 1839, was the first step towards establishing the right of individual property in land. It also guaranteed religious liberty and was followed by the edict of toleration, issued by the king in 1839.

Under this constitution, land could be conveyed without the consent of the king. Land forfeited for the non-payment of taxes reverted to him. He had the direction of the government property and was given the prerogative to make treaties and receive ambassadors. He was commander-in-chief of the army, with power to make war in any time of emergency, when the chiefs or nobles could not be assembled. He was also the chief judge of the Supreme Court.

The office of the premier was continued, being the same in nature as that created by Kamehameha I. for Kaahumanuu, but all business done by the premier was under the authority of the king.

The four governorships instituted by Kamehameha I. were perpetuated with nearly the same powers.

A Legislature was created, composed of a House of Nobles consisting of fifteen hereditary nobles, together with the king and premier, and certain representatives to be chosen by the people. The Legislature was to meet annually. The number of representatives was fixed by law at seven. The two houses could sit separately or together, at their discretion.

A Supreme Court was established, consisting of the king, premier and four judges to be appointed by the Legislature.

Under the provisions of this constitution, the Legislature was formally opened in May, 1845, with appropriate ceremonies which have been retained since. An attorney general appointed at that time, Mr. Ricord, made an able report in regard to the Constitution and the powers and duties of the king. By order of the Legislature, he prepared two volumes of statute laws, organizing five executive departments, and,

until now, there has been little change in this executive machinery set in operation over fifty years ago.

In 1850, the number of representatives in the legislative council was increased from seven to twenty-four, and the cabinet ministers were given seats and votes in the House of Nobles. An act was passed regulating elections. The office of the premier, or, in Hawaiian language, the *kuhina nui*, was retained as a kind of vice-king, in deference to the wishes of the chiefs. This officer was to be the king's special counselor and the king and premier each had a negative upon the other's acts.

A privy council was created.

The members of the House of Nobles were appointed by the king for life, but their number could not exceed thirty. The House of Nobles was empowered to sit as a court to try impeachments brought by the House of Representatives against public officers.

Representatives were to be elected only by universal suffrage. There was no property qualification for voters or representatives.

All revenue bills were to originate in the lower house.

For a number of years, the constitution worked reasonably well. Occasionally amendments were offered and, in 1856, the sessions of the Legislature were made biennial instead of annual.

Kamehameha III. died December 15, 1854, and was succeeded by Alexander Liholiho, who became King Kamehameha IV. His brother, who afterwards became Kamehameha V., was known as Prince Lot. He was very strongly opposed to the American tendency of the constitution of 1852 and, accordingly, on the thirtieth of November, 1863, after the death of his brother, he was proclaimed king, under the title of Kamehameha V., without taking the oath to support the constitution. He did not convene the regular Legislature in 1864, but called a constitutional convention, to be held on the thirteenth of June.

He, together with several of his special friends, made a tour through several of the islands to induce the people to support the changes which he desired to make in the constitution.

The convention met on the seventh of July, 1864, and after considerable debate and controversy, the action of the convention not being satisfactory to him, on the thirteenth of August, 1864, he prorogued the convention and declared the existing constitution to be abrogated.

On the twentieth of August, 1864, he promulgated a new constitution, on his own authority, which was submitted to without resistance and which continued in force for twenty-three years. This constitution made fewer changes than was expected. The clause guaranteeing elections by ballot was stricken out, the office of *kuhina nui* was abolished, and other provisions made for a regency in case of minority of the royal heirs or in the absence of the king.

Some other changes were made in the number of representatives and nobles. Voters were required to own a certain amount of real property and, if born since 1840, to know how to read and write.

During the existence of the constitution of 1864, government offices were freely bestowed upon members of the Legislature. Consequently, the legislative bodies were soon under the direct influence of the crown.

There was a great deal of discontent in the public mind with the arbitrary reign of Kamehameha V. Upon his death in 1872, W. C. Lunalilo was elected king by the Legislature. He took the oath to support the constitution. He lived only about a year, his death occurring in February, 1874; whereupon, David Kalakaua was chosen king by the Legislature and took the oath to support the constitution.

The disposition manifested during the two past reigns, that of Kamehameha V. and Lunalilo, to override the people and to take away constitutional prerogatives was intensified during the reign of Kalakaua. The evil tendency of the wrongful assumptions of kingly power produced its legitimate effect and caused a revolution in 1887. By this Kalakaua was compelled to sign and proclaim a new constitution on the seventh of July. This new constitution contained a great many changes, nearly all of them tending strongly in favor of the rights of the people at large. It was, in a limited sense, comparable to the Magna Charta granted by King John, at Runnymede, many hundred years ago.

After the death of Kalakaua, the sovereign, Queen Liliuokalani, insisted upon or claimed the right to demand the resignations of the former cabinet and to appoint a new one. It was said that she was about to present a new constitution and insist upon its acceptance by the people. The people, generally, were wide-awake and were not willing to submit to any constitution about to be proposed by the queen, without having something to say about its terms. Another revolution therefore took place, which resulted in the organization of a provisional government, the dethronement of the queen and the final adoption of a republican form of government.

The Legislature of 1892 closed its sessions January 14, 1893, "and passed into history, flagrant with intrigue against the public interest." The act of the queen and the announcement of her intended revocation of the constitution, to follow the removal of her constitutional advisers and the appointment of a new cabinet, produced the utmost consternation in Honolulu. A revolution immediately followed and a Provisional Government was at once established. Special commissioners were at once sent to Washington, leaving for San Francisco by steamer on January 19, to arrange terms of union with the United States. A draft of a treaty was proposed by President Harrison and sent to the Senate for action.

On the twenty-fourth of January, 1893, after an investigation had been made, which looked to the punishment for treason of a number of people who had been tried and found guilty, the following document was forwarded to the new republican government:—

"I, Liliuokalani Dominis, do solemnly swear in the presence of Almighty God that I will support the constitution, laws and government of the Republic of Hawaii, and will not, either directly or indirectly, encourage or assist in the restoration or establishment of a monarchical form of government in the Hawaiian Islands.

(Signed) LILIUOKALANI.

Subscribed and sworn to this twenty-fourth day of January, 1893, before me,

W. L. STANLEY, *Notary Public.*

On the same day, a lengthy paper, signed by the late queen, announced her irrevocable abdication, renunciation and release of all claims or pretensions whatsoever to the late throne of Hawaii.

Meantime, while awaiting further developments, the situation at Honolulu becoming serious, United States Minister Stevens, acting at the request of the Provisional Government, proclaimed a Protectorate over the country February 1, 1893. He hoisted the American flag over the government building, while a battalion of U. S. troops from the U. S. Cruiser *Boston*, then in the harbor, took possession of the premises and remained on guard.

President Cleveland assumed the administration of the government of the United States on the fourth of March and immediately withdrew the treaty from the Senate. He followed this by sending Colonel J. H. Blount, as a Special Commissioner, to visit the islands, examine and report. Colonel Blount reached Honolulu on March 27, took official control, terminated the Protectorate on April 1, lowered the American flag, and the troops from the *Boston* returned to their ship.

This unexpected action on the part of the American Government caused the greatest consternation all over the United States and appeared almost like a death-blow to the Provisional Government. But the men who, like the signers of the American Declaration of Independence, had put their hands to the work did not turn back. They maintained the organization and kept control of affairs.

They were successful in the collisions which occurred between their forces and those of the expiring monarchy. They conducted their new government with firmness, decency and constant watchfulness. The situation culminated early in the following year by the calling of a Constitutional Convention. The adoption of the constitution ordained by that body resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Hawaii.

The government of the Republic, which has been in full operation since the fourth of July, 1894, and which will continue in operation until final action by the Congress of the

United States, has been a strong, vigorous, effective government. It has maintained good order and demonstrated its stability. Under its administration, the welfare of the common people has been closely looked after and the conditions of society generally are remarkably good.

Among the incidents or occurrences of more or less importance, which have taken place during the last half century upon the islands, that of the development and growth of leprosy is one of very great significance. This unwelcome disease was first observed in 1853, and its spread was quite rapid, persistent and apparently uncontrollable, for ten or twelve years. The alarm created by its presence was widespread and serious. Public interest was awakened, not only among the people of the islands but in the United States and other countries, and special efforts for taking control of the persons effected were directed by law. It seemed to attack persons of Hawaiian or part Hawaiian parentage in a far greater proportion than those of other races and nationalities. After a careful investigation by the best medical authorities of the world, acting by their advice, the Legislature in 1865 passed a law to isolate all lepers from association with other persons. In that same year Dr. Hutchinson, acting for the Government, selected a peninsula on the north side of the island of Molokai, covering about five thousand or six thousand acres and shut off from the main portion of the island on the south by a range of inaccessible mountains over two thousand feet in perpendicular height. Upon the east, north and west sides of the peninsula dash the high waves of a raging ocean, whose rushing waters break upon coral rocks. Upon this peninsula the first colony of lepers, 140 in number, was established in 1866. The government has provided liberally and kindly for the unfortunates; it furnishes them with clothing, food and medical attendance, paying all expenses and making their support a part of the fixed charge upon the general public. The law operates effectively throughout the groups and, whenever any person is credibly charged with having become leprous, he or she is held in a detention hospital until the certainty of the infection has been determined. Then he is conveyed to the settlement to remain there permanently.

About 1,150 persons so gathered are now at this place. The disease does not appear to be increasing or diminishing at present but remains somewhat stationary. The usual period of life of those confined here is from three to ten years after admission. They do not seem especially unhappy, considering their almost certain future. Very few whites or Chinese or Japanese contract the disease, probably not one per cent in all. There was grim philosophy in the remark of one of the physicians in charge, who told us that the chief amusement of the people was attendance upon funerals. Two brass bands exist among the lepers and there is a rivalry between them as to which shall give the most acceptable music at the burials, which occur every day or two. There are two or three churches, Catholic and Protestant. The hospital duties are performed at Kalaupapa, the women's settlement, by five devoted Sisters of Charity from Syracuse, N. Y., who have given their lives to the work. At Kalawao, on the eastern end of the peninsula, the hospitals and cottages of the male lepers are located and several Catholic brothers look carefully after them, under the direction of Brother Joseph Dutton, who came from Wisconsin and dedicated himself to this work for life. Sad as the situation appears to be, the dread conditions are greatly mitigated by the kindly care given by the government in their support and comfortable maintenance.

There is one feature of the Hawaiian policy which deserves more attention in this country, and that is the educational system. Schools are carefully maintained and a sufficient classification is kept. School attendance is compulsory by general law. Good educators have been imported from the States, but the chief value of the school establishment is found in its English tendency. The native Hawaiian language has been abandoned in schools and the English tongue is made the arbitrary medium of all their studies. This has a far-reaching effect which can readily be understood by those interested in the progress of American institutions in the new territorial accessions.

The Hawaiian Islands are delightful oases in the broad Pacific. They lie a little over two thousand miles to the

southwest of California, which is, in fact, the nearest of the enlightened countries bordering upon the Pacific. As facilities for steam transportation across the Pacific exist at present, it is about a six-days voyage from San Francisco to Honolulu.

There are eight of the larger islands which compose the group, of which seven are inhabited. The area of the group is about 6,740 square miles. The largest of these islands, Hawaii, has 4,210 square miles. The next in size, Maui, has 760 square miles. But the most important of the group is Oahu, which has a population of 40,000 and an area of 600 square miles. The most fertile of the islands, Kauai, has a little less than 600 square miles of surface and is called the "Garden Island," because it is abundantly watered and adapted to the growth of several important agricultural products.

For many years, Honolulu, the chief city, situated upon the island of Oahu, has been an important port of call for the great number of ships, including whalers, freighting ships, fishing vessels, war vessels and others, which have traversed the Pacific. It bids fair now, since it is to come under the beneficent control of the United States, to become the principal commercial point in that broad ocean 6,000 miles across.

The group takes its name from the largest of the islands, Hawaii. The soil upon them all is volcanic in character, except for a very small extent along the coast where it is of a coral-line formation. During the past ages, there have doubtless been innumerable flows of lava from the different volcanoes, most of which are now extinct. There are remaining at present on the Island of Hawaii two living volcanoes, both of which are occasionally active. They are both upon one mountain, Mauna Loa. The greater one in size, Mokuaweoweo, is situated at the top of this great mountain at a height of nearly 14,000 feet above the level of the sea. The other one, Kilauea, upon the north side of the same mountain is about twenty miles from Mokuaweoweo at a point 4,000 feet above the level of the sea. Kilauea, which has within the last score of years been frequently in eruption, has often been described by travelers and others and, because of the existence of the so-called "Lake of Fire" in its crater, has become somewhat celebrated. On the adjacent island of Maui is the

crater of Haleakala, the largest extinct crater in the world, being nearly twenty miles in extent and half a mile in depth.

The soil of all the islands is composed of lava. Much of this has become disintegrated or decomposed by lapse of time and now upon the application of water becomes wonderfully fertile and productive. Lying only a few degrees from the equator, in nearly the same latitude as Cuba, the products of the soil are all tropical in character, except at high altitudes upon the slopes of the higher mountains where the temperature ranges, according to elevation, from summer heat to freezing. The rainfall varies greatly according to location, elevation and prevalent winds. For the larger part of the year, the northeast trade winds are nearly constant and the precipitation of moisture from the clouds upon the windward or northeast side of the islands is many times greater than upon the leeward side. For instance, upon the windward side of Hawaii, at Hilo and Oloa, two places fifteen miles apart, the annual rainfall varies from 150 to 200 inches, while at Kailua, on the leeward or southwestern side of Hawaii, it is about sixty inches and at Waimea, on the north and west, only forty inches. At Paia, on the island of Maui, where there is a profitable sugar plantation irrigated by artesian water, there is an annual rainfall of only thirty inches.

At Honolulu the temperature is delightful and constitutes a chief attraction to the American visitor. It averages for the year about seventy-two or seventy-three degrees Fahrenheit, while the highest is about eighty-eight and the lowest about fifty-eight. The cooling influence of the northeast trade winds has the effect of modifying the temperature of the entire group, so that there is no really *hot* weather and no cold weather except on the tops of the high mountains. The temperature at sea level is such as to be well adapted for the growth of sugar cane, rice and tropical products generally.

Churches are numerous and church privileges are in most places easily available.

The government for many years, even under the king has been an excellent one and the abuses, which crept into the administration of the Hawaiian monarchs, resulted in most cases from the improper influences of white courtiers.

The revolution which resulted in the establishment of a Republic was the natural outcome of the attempt to break down the high civilization which existed, by pressing degrading measures and acts upon weak rulers. The people would not submit and the result is before us. The Republic, which succeeded the Monarchy in 1893, has since commended itself to Hawaiians and to the world. It became a strong and excellent government, advanced in its ideas and efficient in execution of wise laws. It was respected and deserved respect. But any small insular establishment in a remote part of the Pacific, growing rapidly rich and prosperous, would have been simply a standing invitation to predatory powers to capture and possess.

The people of Hawaii with their institutions are decidedly valuable acquisitions to the United States as a government. Their annexation is not so directly valuable to the individual American as to the country. Of course that means much to individual Americans ultimately, by their participation in the property of the United States. But the failure of the United States to avail itself of the opportunity which offered itself in July last, would have been clearly censurable if not criminal. As it now is, the sugar fields and rice fields, the coffee plantations and the cattle ranches of Hawaii will all prove of advantage to our interests. These products, which now have an annual export value of about sixteen millions and promise much more, will go far to render us independent of other nations in certain trade matters.

But in addition to all else which may be said about the value of this most excellent country, one of its chief jewels is Pearl Harbor. Its name is well chosen, for it will certainly become in a few years not merely Pearl Harbor, but the Pearl of the Pacific. It is a wonderful natural addition to our facilities for the building, repairing, protection and development of the shipping and commercial interests of the United States in the Pacific. It is the only harbor of magnitude available in a vast water field seven or eight thousand miles in extent. Considering the delightful climate, it is bound to become a veritable sailor's home,—a home for commerce,—and although it be two thousand miles from our

nearest seaport, it is still hundreds of miles nearer to our coast than to any other.

ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES.

For many years there has been a strong sentimental relationship in social, religious and commercial interests between the government and people of the Hawaiian Islands and those of the United States. The dynasty of the Kamehameha family in Hawaii began not far from the time that the United States became an independent republic. The visits of the English mariner, Captain Cook, to Hawaii and his discoveries and death took place there during our own Revolutionary period. From that time down to the last decade, the vicissitudes of political and governmental affairs have very frequently involved Hawaii in difficulties with other nations. On several occasions the kindly offices of the ships of the United States have been tendered by our government in aid of the Hawaiians, whose rights were invaded by the navies of other nations. Great Britain and France, each with armed force, invaded the islands in 1839 and 1843.

Annexation to the United States was solicited by Hawaii in 1853 and a treaty to that end was signed by the negotiators, but the sudden death of the king prevented its adoption. Daniel Webster when Secretary of State in March, 1853, writing to Commissioner Brown, instructed him as follows:—

“It is obvious, from circumstances connected with their position, that the United States require that no other power should colonize or possess the Sandwich Islands, or exercise over their government an influence which would lead to partial or exclusive favors in matters of navigation or trade.”

The people of the United States and of Hawaii have looked to annexation as manifest destiny, and the failure of the treaty sent to the Senate by President Harrison on its peremptory withdrawal by his successor was a staggering blow to the hopes of both Americans and Hawaiians. The real sense of our people was voiced by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in their report of March 16, 1898, as follows:—

“The full ownership of the Hawaiian Islands is indispensable to the commerce of the United States, in respect of its development and safety, and equally indispensable as to the defense of our Pacific coasts.”

The preceding remarks indicate the conservative sentiment of the Congress of the United States in relation to the necessity of annexation. This sentiment was greatly emphasized by the events of the recent war with Spain and heightened by the naval victories at Manila and elsewhere, so that Congress on the seventh of July, 1898, adopted a joint resolution to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. This resolution declares that the cession of those islands by the government of the Republic of Hawaii is accepted, ratified and confirmed and that they are thereby declared to be annexed as a part of the territory of the United States.

In pursuance of the further provisions of this resolution, a Commission, consisting of the following five persons, was appointed by the President to recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they should deem necessary and proper:—

Senator Shelby M. Cullom, of Illinois, *Chairman*.
Senator John T. Morgan, of Alabama.
Representative Robert R. Hitt, of Illinois.
President Sanford B. Dole, of Hawaii.
Judge Walter F. Frear, of Hawaii.

These Commissioners met at Honolulu on the eighteenth day of August, 1898, and held their sessions in the government building, formerly the palace of King Kalakaua, and of the late Queen, Liliuokalani. Daily sessions were held for several weeks and all matters pertaining to the future government of the islands were fully and freely considered. The principal question which confronted the Commission was the form of the government to be recommended for adoption. The Commission discussed the question whether there should be established a colonial government for the islands, a government by a commission, as in the District of Columbia, or a

territorial form of government much after the fashion of the territorial governments heretofore established for the Dakotas, Idaho and other territories which have since become states. The Commission considered with care all the questions involved and unanimously determined that the colonial system should not be recommended; neither did they favor the suggestion of government by a commission, but believed that every consideration of duty demanded a territorial form of government in harmony with past precedents, taking into account the history of the islands, the relation they have sustained to the United States, their fitness for self-government and the perfection of their government already established, patterned largely after our own.


Besides all these reasons in favor of a territorial form of government, the Commission regarded the joint resolution of Congress annexing the islands as in a sense equivalent to a declaration that the islands should not be regarded as a colony, the language of the act or joint resolution being:—"that the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be, and they are hereby, annexed as a part of the territory of the United States," etc., etc.

These islands are as completely a part of the United States as it has been possible for the United States Government to make them by legislative action and while the United States may have the arbitrary power to govern the people of the islands in some other manner, yet the Commission deemed it to be its duty to make the recommendation for a territorial form of government. The proposed government is intended to be as nearly like that of the present Republic of Hawaii as the conditions of the new sovereignty will admit. The bill provides for appointment by the President of the United States of a Governor and Secretary of the territory, leaves the local courts to remain as already established, provides for the appointment by the President of the United States of a United States District Judge for life for the District of Hawaii and attaches the district to the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the United States. This, in the judgment of the Commission, was important, because of the multitude of weighty questions constantly arising out of our commercial

relations with the Pacific States and the large amount of foreign shipping already calling at Hawaiian ports. For these and for many other reasons, it was deemed necessary to separate the jurisdictions, thus leaving all cases arising under local laws to the territorial courts, and all cases arising under United States laws to be disposed of by a United States District Court. Of course the creation of a United States District Court carries with it the necessity of a United States District Attorney and Marshal to prosecute and execute the orders of the Court. The ordinary territorial judiciary will be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate, and their compensation provided by the territory. The territorial machinery provided in the bill reported by the Commission is intended to cause as little change or shock as possible to the accustomed methods already in vogue and well understood by the people. Otherwise, the system proposed is nearly identical with that already in operation in other territorial governments of the United States.

The limitations upon the right of suffrage are rather conservative. Both a property and an educational qualification are required for the position of senator and also for voters for senators, and an educational qualification is required for the position of representative and also for voters for representatives. It is thought, however, as both qualifications were in force under the monarchy and retained under the republic, that there will be but little objection to those limitations.

The giving of vitality to the recommendations of the Commission remains for Congress to direct and, as the Fifty-fifth Congress has adjourned without final action, it is believed that the early sessions of the Fifty-sixth Congress will speedily dispose of the Hawaiian question by actual annexation and the establishment of the proposed territorial government. This desired result will happily bring under the beneficent control of this government a people who are worthy of the kindest care and consideration from the United States.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "M. W. Kellogg". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned at the bottom right of the page.



Wesley Merritt
Major General
U. S. Army.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE MANILA CAMPAIGN.

BY

MAJ-GEN. WESLEY MERRITT, U. S. A

COMMODORE DEWEY'S matchless Naval victory over the Spanish fleet in the Bay of Manila, May 1, 1898, raised a difficult and unlooked-for problem in the prosecution of the war with Spain. In order to follow up the advantage gained, and to secure full control of the capital of the islands, it was necessary to send heavy reinforcements of troops at the very earliest possible date. It was estimated that a force of at least 20,000 men would be required for the capture of the city itself and its subsequent occupation. The task of organizing, arming and equipping so large a body of troops under pressure of such urgent necessity was simply enormous. San Francisco was selected as the rendezvous for the troops; and the first regiment of volunteers, the Second Oregon, arrived at this point May 13, 1898.

On May 16, Major-General Wesley Merritt, United States Army, was placed in command of the Department of the Pacific, which department included all the military forces which participated in the Philippine operations.

The first expedition to the Philippines, under command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, United States Volunteers, consisting of the First California Infantry, the Second Oregon Infantry, part of the Fourteenth United States Infantry, and a detachment of California Artillery—115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men—sailed May 25, arriving off Manila June 30.

The second expedition, under the command of Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, United States Volunteers, sailed June 15, and consisted of the First Colorado, First Nebraska,

Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, four companies each of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third United States Infantry, two batteries Utah Artillery and a detachment of United States Engineers—a total of 158 officers and 3,428 enlisted men—reaching their destination July 17.

The third fleet of transports, in command of Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, United States Volunteers, put to sea June 27, carrying four companies of the Eighteenth and four companies of the Twenty-third United States Infantry, one company of United States Engineers, the First Idaho, First Wyoming, Thirteenth Minnesota, First North Dakota and detachments of the Hospital and Signal Corps. This fleet did not drop anchor in Manila Bay until July 31, six days after the arrival of the transport *Newport*, which sailed from San Francisco June 29, with General Merritt and his staff, four batteries of the Third United States Artillery and the Astor Battery (New York Volunteers). There was an aggregate in the three expeditions of 470 officers and 10,464 enlisted men, including those on the *Newport*, who participated in the operations before Manila. The fourth and subsequent expeditions did not arrive until after the fall of the city. The military situation in Manila Bay when General Merritt assumed command of the troops was as follows:

Rear-Admiral Dewey's fleet of warships was anchored off Cavité, outside the line of military transports and supply vessels. He was in full control of the bay, and his vessels passed and repassed within range of the water batteries at Manila, without drawing the fire of the enemy. General Anderson commanded the military forces prior to General Merritt's arrival, with headquarters in Cavité, that town being occupied by the Second Oregon, detachments of California heavy artillery and two regiments of regular infantry. General Greene's brigade, comprising the troops of the second expedition, with the addition of the Third United States Artillery was encamped not far from Manila, along the line of the bay shore, and near the village of Paranaque, about five miles by water and twenty-five miles by the road from Cavité.

The left or north flank of Greene's brigade camp extended to a point on the Calle Real, the only road out of Manila

toward Cavité, one and a quarter miles from the outer line of the Spanish trenches of Manila. The Spanish line stretched eastward from old Fort San Antonio (the powder magazine), just south of the Malaté suburb, in more or less detached works, through swamps and rice fields, completely encircling the city and covering all avenues of approach.

Between the American and Spanish lines on the Calle Real, along the front of General Greene's brigade, the Filipino insurgents under General Aguinaldo had established an earthwork within 800 yards of the magazine fort. In addition, the insurgents occupied a position to the right of Greene's line, on the road leading from the village of Pasay, and they also commanded the approach by the beach. In fact, they held positions of investment at various points opposite the Spanish line throughout their entire extent. They had been waging a desultory warfare against the Spaniards for several months, their forces now numbering about 12,000 men. They were well supplied with small arms and ammunition, besides several antiquated field pieces. The presence of a quasi-hostile force of native troops between the American and the Spanish positions was, of course, very objectionable. The situation was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar relations which existed between the American and the insurgent leaders as a result of the active operations undertaken by the latter, more or less encouraged by the naval authorities, prior to the arrival of the army reinforcements. General Emilio Aguinaldo, the principal leader of the insurgents, shortly after the battle of Manila Bay, had come to Cavité from Hong Kong and begun active work in raising troops, and had succeeded to some extent in pressing the Spaniards back toward Manila. At least 4,000 officers and men had been made prisoners by Aguinaldo's forces; and they held full possession of the territory adjacent to Manila, including the Province of Cavité, which Admiral Dewey had allowed them to occupy. Aguinaldo then proclaimed himself president of the Philippine Republic, and, at the time of the arrival of the third expedition, he had established executive and legislative departments, and was ostensibly in complete control of an independent government. On July 4, in a letter addressed to

General Aguinaldo, General Anderson, in behalf of the United States, expressed entire sympathy for the native people of the Philippine Islands and the most friendly sentiments toward them. A desire was also expressed both to have the most amicable relations with the insurgent commander, and to have his people co-operate with the Americans in military operations against the Spaniards. Considerable correspondence, mainly with regard to the difficulty of collecting supplies for the American forces, passed between Generals Anderson and Aguinaldo. It was found necessary to solicit the latter's aid in obtaining horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for purposes of transportation, for which the native population was disposed to charge exorbitant prices. Further communications passed between them on the subject of securing maps and other data concerning the topography of the country about Manila. Aguinaldo, although profuse in promises of assistance in every possible direction, actually rendered very little aid. This correspondence was abruptly terminated by a letter from the Filipino General dated July 24, in which he asserted that he had come from Hong Kong in order to prevent his own countrymen from making common cause with the Spaniards against the Americans and protested against the landing of American troops in places conquered and occupied by the insurgents, without previous notice, in writing, to his "Government."

General Merritt sought no communication with the insurgent leader, not wishing to recognize his authority until Manila should be under American control, when he would be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce his authority in the event of Aguinaldo's pretensions conflicting with his designs. Aguinaldo did not offer his services as a subordinate leader and the preparations for attack were conducted independently, no attempt being made to secure the co-operation of the insurgents. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the American troops carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, they were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the

insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs.

The position of the insurgent troops between General Greene's brigade and the Spanish line made a forward movement difficult. It was arranged, however, between the brigade commander and the insurgent chief that the latter's forces should move farther inland, thus giving the Americans unobstructed control of the roads in their immediate front. General Greene then threw forward a heavy outpost line on the Calle Real, occupied the insurgent trenches and, about 100 yards in advance of them, constructed another line of trenches about 270 yards in length in which a portion of the guns of the Utah battery was placed. The Spanish line of intrenchments stretched from the beach at Fort San Antonio, across the American front, eastward in a curved line, for a distance of about 1,200 yards, enveloping their right flank and terminating in a fortified blockhouse on the Pasay road known as Blockhouse 14. The entire length of the line was held by a strong force of infantry, while several light pieces of artillery were mounted at the stone fort on the beach and near the blockhouse on the Pasay road. It was supported in its rear by strong reserves at Malaté and in the walled city.

The activity of the Americans in pushing forward and constructing trenches aroused the Spaniards, who made a sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The trenches were then occupied by two battalions of the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, a foot battery of the Third Artillery and four guns of batteries A and B, Utah Artillery, which sustained the attack until reinforcements came up from the rear. When the firing commenced, battery K of the Third Artillery proceeded at once to the trenches, followed by a battalion of the First California Infantry. The second and third battalions of the latter regiment and the First California Infantry moved forward and awaited orders just out of range of the Spanish fire. For about an hour and a half both sides kept up a heavy artillery and infantry fire. In the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment, which was posted to the right of the intrenchments, six men were killed and twenty-nine wounded. Of the other regiments engaged, four men were killed, includ-

ing Captain Richter of the First California, and four wounded. It is estimated that the American forces fired nearly 60,000 rounds of infantry ammunition and 160 rounds of artillery, while the Spaniards used nearly double that amount. The intense darkness of the night and the blinding rain may account for the small number of casualties, as compared with the amount of ammunition expended.

After this attack the construction of trenches was vigorously pushed, although constantly interrupted by the enemy's fire. Owing to the almost incessant rains, which kept the trenches half filled with water, this work was attended by great suffering among the men, who were obliged to remain at their work twenty-four hours before being relieved.

During the week following, the Spaniards repeated these night attacks, inflicting losses aggregating five killed and ten wounded. The brigade commander expressed the opinion that these nightly attacks could be stopped if the fleet would co-operate and reduce the Spanish fort. Both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt, however, believed that a bombardment by the fleet would precipitate a general action, which they were anxious to avoid at that time on account of unpreparedness; but it was agreed that the *Raleigh* and three other vessels should be held in readiness to render assistance if necessary. A blue light was to be burned on shore as the signal for the ships to open fire, but this signal was not to be given except in the face of imminent danger of being driven from the trenches. This contingency did not arise and the signal consequently was not used, although the enemy continued to harass the troops until the notice was given of possible bombardment after forty-eight hours or sooner, if the Spanish firing continued. From this time, August 7, until the final assault, not a shot was fired on either side. Great difficulty was experienced during this period in preventing the insurgents from provoking further outbursts from the Spaniards, and it was necessary to use stringent measures, even force, to keep them from breaking the tacit armistice.

The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty rendered it imperative to reinforce Greene's troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived

on the 31st of July. The landing from the transports was accomplished under great difficulties. The vessels being at anchor off Cavité, five miles from the point where it was desired to land the men, it was necessary to employ native lighters, called "cascos," or small steamboats, to move the men to the landing place and then disembark them either through the surf in small boats or by running the lighters head-on to the beach. Severe squalls and heavy rains continuing day after day, the landing was accomplished only as a result of hard work and great hardship.

The same difficulties were met in landing supplies and equipment, so that the greater portion of the troops were provided with shelter tents only and suffered many discomforts on account of inadequate protection from the fierce heat of the sun and the terrific rain-storms characteristic of the tropics at this season.

On August 1, the forces of Generals MacArthur and Greene were organized into a division of two brigades, the first and second, respectively, and designated as the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, with General Thomas M. Anderson in command. There were now about 8,500 men in position for the attack. Admiral Dewey's fleet had been strengthened by the arrival of the monitor *Monterey* and the time had come for final action. Under date of August 7, the naval and military commanders sent a joint letter to the Governor-General of the Philippines, notifying him that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defenses of Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the time of its receipt and suggesting the removal of all non-combatants from the city. The following is a translation of the reply received from the Governor-General:

MANILA, August 7, 1898.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL OF THE ARMY AND THE REAR ADMIRAL OF THE NAVY, COMMANDING, RESPECTIVELY, THE MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

GENTLEMEN:—I have the honor to inform your excellen-

cies that at half-past twelve to-day I received the notice with which you favor me, that after forty-eight hours have elapsed you may begin operations against this fortified city or at an earlier hour if the forces under your command are attacked by mine.

As your notice is sent for the purpose of providing for the safety of non-combatants, I give thanks to your excellencies for the humane sentiments you have shown and state that, finding myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women and children who are now lodged within the walls.

Very respectfully, and kissing the hands of your excellencies,

FORMIRE JAUDENES,

Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

On August 9 the American commanders united in a formal demand for the surrender of the city:

HEADQUARTERS U. S. LAND AND NAVAL FORCES,

MANILA BAY, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, August 9, 1898.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SIR:—The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women and children, in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the defenses of the walled town in which they are gathered, will, we feel assured, appeal successfully to the sympathies of a general capable of making the determined and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces and without hope of succor.

We therefore submit, without prejudice to the high sentiments of honor and duty which your excellency entertains, that surrounded on every side as you are by a constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your front and deprived of all prospect of reinforcement and assistance, a most useless sacrifice of life would result in the event of an attack, and therefore every consideration of humanity makes it imperative that you should not subject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accordingly, we demand the surrender of the city of Manila and the Spanish forces under your command.

Very respectfully,

W. MERRITT,

*Major-General, United States Army,
Commanding Land Forces of the United States.*

GEORGE DEWEY,

*Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, Commanding
United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station.*

The Governor-General's reply of the same date stated that the council of defense had considered the matter and declared that the demand for surrender could not be granted, but he offered to consult his government if sufficient time were allowed him for the communication by way of Hong Kong. This request was declined for the reason that further delay, with little prospect of results favorable to the Americans, would subject the troops in the trenches, unnecessarily, to great exposure and the unhealthy conditions of a bivouac during the rainy season.

The main batteries in defense of Manila being so situated that an attempt to reduce them by bombardment from the sea would almost certainly have been attended with loss of life among non-combatants in the city and great damage to neutral property, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt decided that an effort should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of intrenchments, which, with its flank on the seashore, was open to the fire of the Navy. As the army was without siege guns, the reduction of Fort San Antonio, where the Spanish line began, was to be accomplished by the guns from the ships, to prepare the way for the assault.

All the troops were in position at an early hour on the morning of the thirteenth, with General Anderson in command, he having moved his headquarters from Cavité to the brigade camps in anticipation of the attack. General Greene's brigade was stationed to the American left, along the beach, and inland across the Calle Real, the First Colorado, Eighteenth United States Infantry and Third United States Artillery being in the trenches, while the remainder of his force, consisting of the First California, First Nebraska and Tenth Pennsylvania, constituted the reserve. The brigade under General MacArthur was located to the right, about half a mile inland on the Pasay road, opposing Blockhouse 14 and the left of the Spanish trenches.

The insurgent forces were unable to restrain their impatience and for several hours before the operations commenced maintained a general fusillade along their lines, provoking a considerable fire of small arms and cannon from the Spaniards.

The division and brigade commanders were to be guided by the following instructions, issued the previous day :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH
ARMY CORPS. MANILA BAY, P. I., AUGUST 12, 1898.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL OFFICERS IN CAMP REGARDING
THE POSSIBLE ACTION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 13.

The navy, under Rear-Admiral Dewey, is to sail at 9 o'clock in the morning, August 13, moving up to the different positions assigned to the warships, and open fire about 10 o'clock. The troops are to hold themselves in readiness, as already agreed upon, to advance on the enemy in front, occupying the intrenchments after they are so shaken as to make the advance practicable without a serious disadvantage to our troops. In case the navy is delayed in dismounting the enemy's guns and leveling the works, no advance is to be made by the army unless ordered from these Headquarters. In the event of a white flag being displayed by the enemy on the angle of the walled city, or prominently anywhere else in sight, coupled with a cessation of firing on our part, it will mean surrender, as the Admiral proposes, after having fired a satisfactory number of shots, to move up towards the walled city and display the international signal, "SURRENDER." If a white flag is displayed, this will be an answer to his demand ; the troops will advance, in good order and quietly.

The Headquarters will be on board the *Zafiro*, which has been placed at the disposal of the Commanding General by the Admiral. Six companies of the Second Oregon Regiment, now quartered at Cavité, will accompany these Headquarters, to be used in occupying and keeping order in the walled city in the event of necessity. If the white flag is displayed, the Admiral will send his Flag Lieutenant ashore, accompanied by a Staff Officer from these Headquarters, who will bring word as to the proposition made by the enemy. The troops in the meantime will advance and, entering the enemy's works by our left flank, move in such positions as may be assigned them by orders from these Headquarters. This is not intended to interdict the entrance, if possible, by the First Brigade or part of the troops over the enemy's works on the right. It is intended that these results shall be accomplished without the loss of life ; and while the firing continues from the enemy with their heavy guns, or if there is an important fire from their intrenched lines, the troops

will not attempt to advance unless ordered from these Headquarters.

In the event of unfavorable weather for the service of the guns on board ship, the action will be delayed until further orders.

Memorandum of the positions to be occupied by the troops after entering the enemy's defenses will be carried by the Chief of Staff, General Babcock, and will be complied with as far as is practicable.

WESLEY MERRITT,
Major-General.

At 9 A. M., the fleet, accompanied by the *Zafiro*, steamed toward Manila, from Cavité, taking a position opposite the magazine fort, with the *Zafiro* abreast of the camp as near shore as her draft would permit. The fleet of foreign warships which had hitherto been at anchor off the walled city steamed out of the line of fire. The *Olympia* at 9:40 sent two challenge shots from her 8-inch guns in the direction of the Malaté fort, quickly followed by a 6-inch shell from the *Petrel*. One of these shots struck the water, ricocheted, and exploded at the base of the fort. As the fire was not returned and the expected white flag failed to appear, after a brief pause, the flag-ship, with the *Petrel* and the *Raleigh*, opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy and rapid-fire projectiles which was continued for half an hour against the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments and the magazine fort.

When it was believed that Greene's brigade could move, the fleet was signalled to cease firing and a column from the First Colorado Regiment left the trenches and deployed rapidly forward between the Calle Real and the beach; another line from the same regiment advanced swiftly up the beach in open order. The skirmishers were compelled to halt and lie down, however, on account of the continued firing from the fleet, where evidently the signals to stop firing had not been observed. When the cannonading from the fleet finally ceased, the second and third battalions of the First Colorado moved up from the trenches and all pushed forward rapidly, the column to the right keeping up a steady fire on the enemy's works to cover the advance of the line on the beach. The latter line forded the creek, waded along the beach and en-

tered the fort, which was found deserted, where the American flag was hoisted ; meanwhile the second and third battalions advanced toward the trenches flanking the fort, passed over them, finding them vacated, and joined the first battalion beyond on the Calle Real. The fort being taken without resistance, the Eighteenth Regular Infantry moved forward and was met by a sharp fire from the woods near Cingalon and Paco, and one battalion deployed to the right of the road in formation for attack. The enemy was using smokeless powder and it was therefore impossible accurately to locate his position, but his fire was replied to by volleys and the advance was kept up by a series of determined rushes until the abandoned Spanish trenches were reached. Simultaneously with the advance of the Eighteenth Infantry, the Third United States Artillery moved up from their position on the extreme right and occupied the trenches in their front. The reserve then came up and was ordered to follow toward Manila by the beach.

Meantime the First California had joined the First Colorado beyond the fort on the Calle Real and the two regiments were advancing through Malaté. They were checked by a heavy fire from a second line of defense along the road from Malaté to Cingalon, which was replied to and subdued after an engagement lasting about fifteen minutes. The advance then continued toward Manila, the First California and the Eighteenth Infantry moving along the Calle Real, while the Colorado Regiment took the right flank and the First Nebraska took the beach. In this formation the brigade proceeded through Malaté and Ermita, in the face of a straggling fire from the direction of Paco, reaching the Luneta just south of the walled city at about 1 P. M. A white flag was flying at the southwest corner of the city wall. Here word was received by the brigade commander that negotiations for surrender were in progress. A force of nearly 1,000 Spanish troops who had retreated from Santa Ana through Paco, probably driven in by the insurgents, and who doubtless had conducted the fire on the right flank of the Americans, were met at the Paco road. They surrendered to Greene and were ordered inside the city. The walls of the town were lined with armed Spaniards, who, in returning the fire from a party of insurgents, killed one man and

wounded two others in the California regiment. A considerable force of the insurgents had penetrated to the walls from the direction of Paco, expecting to enter the city and raise their flag. To prevent this a battalion of the Third Artillery was sent down the Paco road to hold them in check.

In accordance with the instructions given the brigade commanders by General Merritt, Greene's troops then moved to the east around the walled city, crossed the Pasig river and occupied positions on the north side for the protection of lives and property there.

During the advance of Greene's troops from the fort, two little captured gunboats, the *Barcelo* and *Callao*, moved along abreast of them close in shore, and rendered valuable assistance to the advancing column by a vicious fire from their rapid-fire guns. The commanders of these small craft showed admirable courage in taking them within easy range of the enemy's heavy ordnance.

Meantime some sharp fighting had occurred in General MacArthur's advance on the right along the Pasay road. Soon after the naval attack commenced, the Astor Battery successfully engaged in a spirited duel with an opposing battery, and Battery B of the Utah Artillery opened fire on Blockhouse 14. There was no response to the fire of the latter battery but the opposition to the Astor Battery was quite stubborn and was subdued only after a hot contest. About eleven o'clock, when it was known that the attack of the Second Brigade on the Malaté fort had been successful, a general advance was begun. Blockhouse 14 had been abandoned by the Spaniards and the United States flag was hoisted over it. Here a battalion of the Twenty-third Regular Infantry was left to intercept any possible advance of the insurgents toward Manila. The Minnesota and North Dakota regiments, with parts of the Fourteenth and the Twenty-third Infantry and the Astor Battery, moved along the Pasay road. At a point just south of Cingalon a blockhouse was found burning and a scattering fire from the enemy was encountered. As the forward movement was pressed, the intensity of this fire increased until it developed into strong opposition at Blockhouse 20 in the village mentioned, which was

occupied by a strong detachment of infantry. Here the advance party of the American line, consisting of volunteers from the Astor Battery and the Minnesota regiment, was obliged to retire after reaching a point within eighty yards of the blockhouse. A rough work was hastily improvised and held with great gallantry by a firing line of about fifteen men until the main body of the troops came up. The Americans directed their fire from behind the village church, stone walls and intrenchments hastily constructed in the street. The opposition, though obstinate, succumbed to the steady fire of the Americans and the advance was resumed toward Malaté. The engagement lasted for an hour and a half and resulted in the loss of four killed and thirty-six wounded. This action was probably the most hotly contested of the day, but it was the last stand against MacArthur's advance and the city was entered through the Paco district without further incident.

The swampy condition of the ground and the heavy undergrowth which concealed the enemy rendered the movements of MacArthur's troops extremely difficult and hazardous. The station of MacArthur's troops after the surrender included the Ermita and Malaté districts and extended north to the Pasig River.

The losses of the day in the First Brigade amounted to four killed and thirty-eight wounded; in the Second Brigade, two killed and five wounded. The previous losses in the trenches were fourteen killed and sixty wounded, making a total of one hundred and twenty-three casualties in the taking of Manila.

While the operations on shore were in progress, the *Zafiro* had remained with the fleet. At the appearance of the white flag on the city walls, representatives of General Merritt and Admiral Dewey were sent ashore in the launch of the Belgian Consul, which that official courteously placed at their disposal, to communicate with the Captain-General. Upon the return of these officers the international signal, "The enemy has surrendered," was displayed from the masthead of the *Olympia*. General Merritt with his personal staff then returned with the Belgian Consul to the walled city, entering through the Pasig River, which was so filled with sunken hulks

as to render the ingress very tortuous and difficult. Landing at the northwest corner of the city, the party, headed by the Belgian Consul, moved along the Paseo de Santa Lucia, passed through the walls and entered the Cathedral, where the acting Governor-General and his adviser were in consultation. After the general terms of surrender were agreed upon, General Merritt proceeded to the city palace of the Governor-General, which was soon filled with the Spanish officials who had come to make formal transfer of their offices. The terms of surrender, which were signed by General Merritt and the Captain-General, were subsequently incorporated in the formal terms of capitulation as arranged by the officers representing the two forces. A part of the Second Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from Cavité, disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost guard; at 5:45 P. M. the Spanish colors were hauled down, the flag of General Merritt was run up on the palace and the American flag was displayed and saluted by the guns of the fleet.

The city was filled with Spanish troops driven in from the intrenchments and regiment after regiment lined the streets in readiness to deliver up their arms. The colonel of the Oregon regiment was designated to receive the arms and deposit them in a place of security. The Governor-General's palace was temporarily used as a repository for the captured arms and accoutrements.

The trophies of the battle of Manila amounted to \$900,000 in public funds, 13,000 prisoners of war and 22,000 stands of arms.

After the battle the insurgent forces gathered outside the American lines endeavoring to gain admission to the town, but strong guards were posted and General Aguinaldo was given to understand that no insurgents would be allowed to enter with arms. A few of the houses in the suburbs, whose occupants had taken refuge in the town, were looted by the insurgents in spite of the vigilance of the Americans. Considerable fear was evinced among the Spanish forces inside the city that a massacre would be attempted by the insurgents, and they were very anxious to unite with the Americans against them.

The headquarters of the General Commanding were established in the city office of the Governor-General immediately after the surrender and steps were at once taken to inaugurate a government of military occupancy. General MacArthur was appointed provost marshal-general and civil governor of the town. General Greene was made director of financial affairs and placed at the head of the customs and internal-revenue department. Lieut.-Col. Whittier was appointed collector of customs and Major Whipple of the Pay Department, a bonded officer, was made custodian of the public funds to control and disburse all Spanish moneys from whatever source derived.


A proclamation was issued to the people of the Philippines, under date of August 14, 1898, and published in all the newspapers of the city, in English, Spanish and native dialect, concisely reciting the conditions then existing in the island as the result of the operations of the American Army and Navy; setting forth the form of government to be adopted, the methods of its administration, military and civil, the privileges to be afforded to neutral nations in Philippine ports under United States authority, the protection to be accorded to places devoted to religious worship, the arts and sciences, education, etc., and finally assuring the people that they would not be molested or disturbed in their persons and property so long as they preserved the peace and performed their duties towards the representatives of the United States, except so far as might be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.

It was not until August 16 that a cablegram was received announcing the signing of the peace protocol and the proclamation of the President directing a cessation of hostilities. This was at once communicated to the Spanish authorities and resulted in a formal protest from the Governor-General regarding the transfer of public funds then taking place, on the ground that the protocol was dated prior to the surrender. The delivery was insisted upon, however, and was finally made under protest.

The operations around Manila were not marked by any conspicuous feature in the way of hard fighting, with heavy loss,

or any particularly brilliant military manœuvres; but for a body of men, a large proportion of whom were newly organized and hastily equipped and very few of whom had ever participated in an engagement, to enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to deploy rapidly and guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, to disarm quietly an opposing army more than equalling their own in numbers and finally, to prevent all rapine, pillage and disorder, and gain complete possession of a city of 300,000 inhabitants, who were stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside trenches, was an accomplishment of which only the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier, ably and skilfully handled by his regimental and brigade commanders, was capable.

Wesley Merritt
Major General
U. S. Army.



Perry J. Heath

CHAPTER XIV.

THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT.

BY

HON. PERRY S. HEATH, First Assistant Postmaster General.

“**W**E want no wars of conquest. We must avoid the temptation of territorial aggression. War should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed.”

These were the ringing words of William McKinley, when he took the oath of office as President of the United States, on the 4th of March, 1897, with the shadow of an impending conflict with Spain resting darkly over him. From the views thus expressed he never deviated during all the trying period that afterwards intervened. When every agency of peace had failed, and war became inevitable, he accepted all of its grave responsibilities, just as, after the protocol of peace had been signed, he declared that where the flag had once been raised it should not be hauled down with his consent, and that, as far as in him lay, he would carry out to their logical and legitimate conclusions the results achieved by the war.

More fully than any one else Mr. McKinley appreciated, when he entered upon the duties of Chief Executive, the dread responsibilities which a declaration of war would impose. He knew that though war might be demanded or proclaimed by the people of any nation—Imperial, Monarchical or Republican—the responsibilities for its conduct and for its results must fall upon the Executive. He comprehended the peculiar difficulties which surrounded our relations with Spain, the greatest of these being that which had the least popular consideration—the possibility that a declaration of war with Spain would bring about the hostile intervention of other European Powers, intimately connected with that country by

ties of common interest and family relationship. Traditions and international understandings, the Monroe Doctrine, the inviolability of which has so recently been asserted by this country), and questions of politics and religion all aided to complicate the situation. While it is true that each of the great political parties in the campaign which preceded the election of President McKinley had condemned in strong terms the existing condition of affairs in Cuba, and declared a readiness to exhaust every effort to secure to the people of that island the blessings of freedom and good government, no pledge was given by either party which could, even by inference, be held to bind the Government of the United States to take up arms to accomplish the end which was rhetorically advocated.

When Mr. McKinley left his home in Canton, Ohio, to assume the duties of the Presidency, he had in mind a plan, which he had carefully thought out, for the emancipation of Cuba and the establishment of an independent form of government in that island. His purpose was to bring about this result by a series of swift and positive diplomatic movements, which included an appeal to motives of humanity and justice, and an array of the more powerful, if less disinterested, motives of self interest. There can be little doubt that one of his leading ideas for the pacification of Cuba was the surrender of Spanish sovereignty to be brought about by diplomatic negotiation or by friendly purchase, the United States to be either the direct purchaser or the guarantor in behalf of an independent Cuban Republic. He immediately proceeded to put in operation all the agencies of diplomacy to secure an amelioration of the condition of the people of Cuba. Contemporaneously with these efforts he called Congress in extra session, to enact laws which should place the industrial, commercial and agricultural interests of our own country upon a more satisfactory basis. He asked Congress, before transacting any other business, first to provide sufficient revenue to administer the Government faithfully, without the contraction of further debt or the continued disturbance of our finances. In the light of events that followed, it may well be claimed that Divine Providence shaped the ends to which the Presi-

dent directed the nation. Without the revival of prosperity, which almost immediately followed the legislation recommended,—the enactment of which consumed time and tended to create a feeling of unrest on the part of those who desired speedy action in Cuba,—there could not have been the national cohesion which enabled us to secure the results afterwards achieved.

During this extra session, called only to consider economic questions, events in Cuba so progressed as to excite the public mind almost beyond the limits of repression. General Weyler's policy of concentration, inaugurated February 16, 1896, removed from the provinces controlled by the Spanish army the rural population, including women, children and helpless old people. The massing of these in the neighborhood of the cities, and the leaving of them there to die of starvation, had reached a culmination of horror which shocked the civilized world. The President issued an appeal to the people of the United States to relieve the necessities of these innocent sufferers; Congress made an appropriation for the purpose; and the noble organization of the Red Cross, and, later on, many newspaper and private agencies of benevolence were drawn to their assistance.

Agitation for the recognition of Cuban Independence, or for forcible intervention by the United States, was rampant all over the country, sustained by the pulpit, the press and the lecture forum. Resolutions by the hundred were adopted at public gatherings and forwarded to the President, almost as urgent in tone as those addressed to President Lincoln prior to the Proclamation of Emancipation. So many Americans, impelled by righteous indignation at the stories of Cuban wrongs, had entered the service of the Cuban army of freedom that there was scarcely a Congressional District which did not number one or more of these recruits, whose relatives were importunate in beseeching their Representatives in Congress to take speedy measures to put an end to the struggle.

Expeditions, unauthorized by international law, but quite generally sanctioned by public sentiment, fitted out in our ports to carry arms, ammunition and men to aid the cause of

Cuba Libre, became so alarmingly frequent and formidable that the President ordered a special patrol by revenue cutters and naval vessels of our coast adjacent to Cuba, and directed the appointment of special officers of the Department of Justice to prosecute the offenders against our neutrality laws. Among those intercepted and prosecuted as the result of these measures was General Calixto Garcia, the Cuban patriot, whose death in December, 1898, while on a mission of peace and conciliation to the City of Washington, was generally deplored.

To the different delegations from Congress who waited upon him to urge immediate action, President McKinley, with the frankness which has always characterized his dealings with the legislative branch of the Government, explained his plans and his aspirations for a peaceful settlement, and asked them to give him further time. Congress trusted the President, and respected his wishes by adjourning the extra session without taking decisive action on the Cuban question.

Diplomatic efforts to effect an adjustment were continued with increased vigor. The President, it is understood, went just as far in his demands as he could within the constitutional limits of his power, stopping short only of such action as might be construed into a practical declaration of war. Spain replied, in her customary manner, by promises and prevarication. The pressure of public sentiment increased in volume. Local militia organizations, covertly or openly abetted by governors of States, and many individual citizens of military training, undertook the organization of volunteer forces to proceed to Cuba to aid in the liberation of its people. Political parties and geographical lines were ignored. The men who carried on the agitation were those who had fought on each side of the most desperate civil war of modern history.

To withstand this pressure until the time was ripe; to continue to enforce our neutrality laws in the face of a hostile public sentiment; and scrupulously to observe all our international obligations towards Spain, imposed upon the President duties which called for the exercise of the highest executive ability and tact.

When the 356 members of the House of Representatives

and the ninety Senators, fresh from intercourse with their people, met in regular session of Congress on the 6th of December, 1897, it was as the commingling of many streams forming one mighty flood of public sentiment in favor of the immediate evacuation of Cuba by Spain, or an open declaration of war by the United States as the alternative. The President addressed to Congress a thoughtful, firm, but temperate message. Summarizing the historical facts, he reminded Congress that our relations towards Spain and Cuba had been almost a continuous question since the first enfranchisement of the colonial possessions of Spain in the Western Hemisphere in 1823, and that the possibility that some other European Power might take advantage of the weakness of Spain's hold upon Cuba to establish a foothold on that island to the detriment of the United States, had called forth repeated declarations that this country would permit no disturbance of Cuba's connection with Spain, unless in the direction of independence, or the acquisition of the island by the United States through purchase.

While maintaining in his communications to Congress the reticence which must accompany uncompleted negotiations, and withholding any statement of precise propositions, so as to avoid embarrassment to the Government of Spain, he stated that our new Minister to that country (General Stewart L. Woodford) had been instructed to inquire seriously whether the time was not ripe for Spain, of her own volition, moved by her own interests, to make proposals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony; and also instructed to intimate, in plainest terms, that the United States, as a neighboring country, with large interests, both commercial and humane, in Cuba, could not be required to wait much longer for the restoration of peace and order in that island. The President still counselled a last appeal to peaceful negotiation. Forcible annexation of Cuba by the United States, he said, would be an act of criminal aggression. Recognition of the belligerency or of the independence of the Cuban Republic he also put aside, for the reason that the essential qualifications of sovereignty required by international law had not, in his judgment, been yet attained. De-

nouncing General Weyler's concentration order as an act, not of civilized warfare, but of extermination, he gave full faith to the declarations of the new Spanish Government of Premier Sagasta, which had succeeded that of Premier Canovas, under whom this cruel policy originated, that it would be reversed, and that a broad and liberal scheme of Home Rule or Autonomy would be granted to Cuba. These propositions he thought were in the line of a better understanding between this Government and that of Spain. He felt that it was honestly due to Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stood irrevocably committed.

At the same time he added these pregnant words :

“Sure of the right, keeping free from all offence ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens, and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity, to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action shall be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world.”

This declaration was afterward abundantly fulfilled. On the night of the 15th of February, eleven weeks after the assembling of Congress, the United States battleship *Maine*, while on a friendly visit to the harbor of Havana, and lying at a mooring especially assigned to her by the Captain of the port, was destroyed by a submarine mine, and in this catastrophe two of her officers and 264 of her crew perished.

The horror and suspicion which this occurrence created in the minds of the President and his advisers were increased by the fact that Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee at Havana had cabled, suggesting delay in sending the *Maine* to that city, on the ground that the Spanish authorities professed to think her presence had some ulterior purpose, and would obstruct

autonomy and most probably produce a demonstration. This telegram was received after the *Maine* had sailed for Havana.

Those who saw President McKinley the night this fateful news was received say that the anguish depicted on his face was as great as that which Abraham Lincoln exhibited when he visited the battlefield of Gettysburg. He knew then that all his efforts to avert a war, of which no one could foretell the duration or extent, had been unavailing.

This was the crucial moment in the President's life; a turning point in the life of the Republic. Then the sturdy characteristics of firmness and readiness of mind derived from his ancestry were displayed. Mr. McKinley, as is well known, is of Scotch-Irish descent. The crest of "James McKinley the Trooper," head of the Scotch clan of McKinlay, from whom the McKinleys of Pennsylvania and Ohio descended, was an olive branch clasped in a mailed hand. The motto accompanying this emblem implied Moderation and Patience. Its literal reading was, "Not too much." In transition from Scotland to the North of Ireland the "a" of the name was changed to "e," and under the Scotch-Irish name of "McKinley," the ancestors of the present President of the United States came to America, where, in York County, Pennsylvania, his great grandfather, David McKinley, a gallant private soldier of the War of the Revolution, was born.

These old heraldic bearings derived new significance in the present crisis. The "olive branch" had been extended for eleven months; the "mailed hand" was now to come into play. Not for the first time was William McKinley, the soldier, called upon to take heroic assumption of responsibility, but never before in so vast a theater and with the world for a spectator. William McKinley was a gallant soldier in the war of 1861-5. He entered that war as a private and emerged as a Major. He participated in many battles, and won promotion for distinguished services. He knew what war meant, and had shown his capacity in positions of great difficulty and responsibility.

An incident recorded of him in that struggle illustrates the self-reliance of the man, and the qualities which were now to be brought into operation on a far grander scale. The story, as told by one of his biographers, is this:—

“ At the battle of Opequan, McKinley (who, like his ancestor of Revolutionary fame, had entered the war as a private, but who was now a Captain and Aide on General Crook's staff) was sent with an order to General Isaac H. Duval to move his command quickly to a position on the right of the Sixth Corps ; but Duval, not knowing the topography of the country, asked the young aide, ‘ By what route shall I move my command?’ Captain McKinley was without definite orders or knowledge of the country, but having a general idea of the direction of the water courses and location of the troops, replied, ‘ I would move up this creek.’ Duval then said, ‘ I shall not move without definite orders.’ McKinley knew that any delay was hazardous, and so, acting on his own view of the position of the armies, at once replied: ‘ This is a case of great emergency, General, and so I order you, by command of General Crook, to move your command on the road up this ravine to a position on the right of the army!’ The movement proved exactly right, and Duval's command was soon in position to do effective work. It drove the enemy in confusion from their works and contributed to the victory of the day. Still it is not hard to conjecture what would have been the young aide's fate, if the order had been a mistake.”

The admirable equipoise of Mr. McKinley's character, and his readiness to meet emergencies whenever they occurred, and however unexpectedly they confronted him, have been manifested on many occasions since the termination of this great epoch in American history. Three years before he was called to enter upon the duties of Chief Executive of the Nation, when he was filling a similar but less exalted position, that of Chief Executive of the great State of Ohio, disturbances of a most threatening character broke out among the coal miners. Governor McKinley assumed personal direction of the State troops sent to suppress rioting, and by his firmness and moderation averted what threatened to be a sanguinary and widespread disturbance.

His twelve years' service in Congress, his experience in other walks of life, in all of which he acquitted himself in the most trying circumstances with credit and distinction, marked



PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

LYMAN J. GAGE
Sec. of Treas.

J. W. GRIGGS
Attorney Gen.

JOHN D. LONG
Sec. of Navy.

JAS. WILSON
Sec. of Agric.

WM. R. DAY
Sec. of State.

C. N. BLISS
Sec. of Int.

R. A. ALGER
Chas. Enroy Smith
Postmaster Gen.

him as the man destined for the hour when the storm of foreign war broke over the United States.

On the day after the news of the destruction of the battleship *Maine*, the President was visited by nearly every member of Congress, urging immediate warlike action. He counselled prudence and delay; he asked them all to suspend judgment before determining the responsibility for the tragic occurrence. In point of fact, he sustained the wise cable message sent by Captain Sigsbee of the *Maine* in announcing the disaster.

President McKinley knew—none better—that the country was not prepared for war. We had an army of but 27,500 men, while Spain had sent 135,000 troops to Cuba alone. The Spanish Navy, on paper at least, was equal, if not superior, to that of the United States. Very little had been done since the war of 1861-5 in the way of fortifying our sea coast or providing siege guns or fixed ammunition. It is related that at this juncture a distinguished army officer reported to the President, "If we should go to war with Spain to-morrow, we have not enough small ammunition for a continuous battle of two hours."

Nevertheless a caucus of the House of Representatives, confined to no one political party, decided almost unanimously on an immediate declaration of war; and a sufficient number of members of Congress were present at this conference to indicate that the strength of the war party in both Houses was sufficient to override even a Presidential veto.

The President had asked Congress, at the beginning of the session, to await the result of Spain's new policy of granting autonomy to Cuba, and of reversing General Weyler's order of concentration. The hopes of peace which these propositions held out failed him at this critical juncture. Our Consuls in Cuba reported the continuance of such sickening scenes of starvation, cruelty and death in the camps of the reconcentrados that the correspondence, though called for by Congress, was for the time prudently withheld by the President from publication, lest in the excited state of the public mind it might prove a spark in the powder magazine, already dangerously near explosion. These Consuls also reported that autonomy was an absolute failure; that coercion and

bribery had been tried in vain to induce Cubans of character to give countenance to the movement. Sr. Manuel Rafael Angulo, sent to Washington as a Delegate from the so-called Colonial or Autonomist Government of Cuba, about this time cabled Governor-General Blanco at Havana, through the Spanish Minister in Washington, that it was necessary, in order to offset what he termed "the perfidious machinations of Lee and his copartners," to have a cable message sent him giving the names of representative native-born Cubans of standing who adhered to the Autonomist Government. When the reply was received on April 15th, 1898, he wrote despairingly to Sr. José Maria Galvez, President of the Council of the so-called Colonial Government at Havana, that the names which had been forwarded to him were all "Peninsulares" (that is, Spaniards), not Cubans; that he had seen the President of the "Chamber of Congress" by appointment, and had also had an interview with the Honorable John Addison Porter, Secretary to the President, at the White House, who had made it apparent that if the Autonomist solution was to be well received in the United States it must be shown to be, not a Spanish proposition, but a Cuban; also that it must be shown that affairs had changed in Cuba, not in appearance only, but substantially.

Autonomy was thus admitted to be a subterfuge, even by its originators, and the promised reforms a failure.

Amid all these discouragements the President remained undismayed; his courage never failed him; he abated none of his high purposes; and Congress showed its unlimited confidence in him by an act which excited the wonder and admiration of Europe. On the mere suggestion of the Executive, by a unanimous vote of both Houses, on the 9th of March, 1898, an appropriation of fifty million dollars was made "for the national defence and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the direction of the President." It is a matter of history that Congress subsequently supplemented this grant by authorization to negotiate a three per cent loan to the extent, if necessary, of \$400,000,000, only half of which was called out, and which was subscribed by the people in sums ranging from twenty

dollars upwards, no one subscription accepted exceeding five thousand dollars.

Immediate steps were taken by the President so to utilize the fund created by the special appropriation of \$50,000,000 as to place the country on a war footing. Agents were sent abroad to purchase all available warships before the outbreak of hostilities brought the neutrality laws into force. On the suggestion of the President, the four swift ocean steamers of the International Navigation Company were chartered and fitted out as cruisers and scouts, and other vessels were bought for colliers and transports. At home every arsenal and navy yard, and all private firms engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war, were put to work at their full capacity, by night as well as by day.

On the 11th of April, the President addressed a message to Congress, setting forth in detail the final efforts he had made, through diplomatic channels, by means of Minister Woodford at Madrid, to bring about an amelioration of the condition of the people of Cuba, and the reply of the Spanish Government, which remitted the question of the settlement of terms of peace with the Cuban insurgents to the so-called Insular Congress of the pretended Autonomist Government of Cuba. "With this last overture," he said, "in the direction of immediate peace, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of his effort."

The President referred to the destruction of the *Maine* as a tragic horror, increasing the elements of danger and disorder, and asked that Congress authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

On the same day he sent to Congress the delayed Consular correspondence relating to the atrocities perpetrated on the reconcentrados of Cuba.

On the 19th of April, after nine days' debate and conference, Congress passed a joint resolution calling upon Spain to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as might be necessary to carry this resolution into effect. This was in effect a formal declaration of war.

On the morning of the 21st of April, before he could present this ultimatum to the Spanish Government, Minister Woodford received his passports, and immediately afterwards Minister Polo y Barnabe withdrew from Washington. On the 22nd of April the blockade of the north coast of Cuba was proclaimed by President McKinley, and on the 25th of April Congress passed an act declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and Spain.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to follow in detail the events of that brief and glorious struggle, but only to indicate some of the prominent incidents of the President's personal participation therein. Every movement, great or small, received the benefit of his personal consideration, and of the experience he had gained in the War of 1861-65, the animosities arising from which his efforts have done so much to obliterate. It was indeed fortunate for the Government and the people of the United States that a man occupied the Executive chair who was by birth and training so well equipped to perform the duties devolving upon him as was William McKinley. In the prime of life, 55 years of age, his mental and physical vigor sustained by a life of conspicuous rectitude and his administrative powers enforced by years of trying experience, he entered the arena with every qualification to command the esteem of his countrymen and to insure also the respect of the governments of other Nations. In the selection of the general officers to command the volunteer forces he ignored sectional lines, calling to his aid distinguished army officers who had worn the gray to co-operate with those who had worn the blue, thus presenting to the world the imposing spectacle of a United Nation of seventy millions of people—a

“Tower of strength,
“Which stood four-square to all the winds that blew.”

When 200,000 volunteers responded promptly to the President's call, he said: “I feel that the American people have committed these boys to my hands;” and he watched over the minutest details of their equipment, encampment, sustenance, hospital accommodation and transportation, not contenting himself with the reports of his capable Chiefs of Department, but going directly to the Bureau officials who had the actual work in charge. The President spent hours every day following the movements of the campaign with pin points on the maps in the war room of the White House, studying out every possible condition and contingency. He knew neither rest nor recreation from the hour when hostilities commenced until the protocol of peace was signed. Like Lincoln, he never slept when there was duty to perform.

The cabinet met frequently, sometimes twice a day. It was by the President's personal direction that Secretary Long issued the famous order to Admiral Dewey to proceed to the Bay of Manila, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet, and take possession of the harbor and the city. It is said that when the President announced to the Cabinet his determination to strike this decisive blow at the power of Spain in the East, the audacity and gravity of the proposition produced a silence which could be felt, and which was not broken for several minutes. The President carried his point, and the result is known of all men.

When the land attack on Santiago was determined upon, the President asked how many siege guns were ready to be taken to Santiago, and the reply was that fifteen or twenty were at command. The President contended that not less than eighty were necessary, and it was not his fault that eighty were not sent. Thus he looked after the details of preparations for battle.

Direct telegraphic communication was established between Playa del Este, the Cuban cable terminus on the Santiago coast, and the Executive Offices at the White House in Washington, and was maintained during and after the battles of

San Juan and El Caney. General Shafter's camp was near Sevilla, within easy communicating distance of Playa del Este. The interchange of cable messages was rapid, and on the part of our Commanding General indicated a desire to retreat or to ask for a parley with the Spanish Commander.

On the 3rd of July, General Shafter cabled that he had the city of Santiago well invested on the north and east, but, as he added significantly,—“with a very thin line.” He said that as he approached the city he found the defences so strong that it would be impossible to carry it by storm with his present forces, adding: “I am now seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Santiago, so as to get our supplies to a large extent by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate a thousand.” Then he spoke of his own health and that of his generals, and of his efforts to get Admiral Sampson to force the entrance of the harbor. Of himself he said: “I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably have to go to the rear to-day. General Young also very ill, confined to his bed; General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made last night.”

Other dispatches followed, and one in particular was spoken of in the press dispatches some days after its receipt, as follows:

“There was some talk in the Cabinet to-day about the telegram General Shafter sent on Sunday morning, to the effect that he would have to have reinforcements before he could proceed. Just what was said is not known. It is learned that the telegram contained suggestions which were stricken out. It is claimed that if these statements had been made public the country would have been greatly worried on Sunday.”

The public did not then know, nor till some time afterwards, how firm was the grasp which the President kept on the progress of events. On the 15th of July, 1898, he directed this dispatch to be sent:


“WASHINGTON, July 15, 1898, 9:20 P. M.

“MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFER, *Playa del Este* :

“The President and Secretary of War are becoming impatient with parley. Any arrangement that allows the enemy to take their arms had as well be abandoned once for all, as it will not be approved. The way to surrender is to surrender, and this should be fully impressed on General Toral.”

Once more the result justified the President's judgment. Santiago was surrendered, and with it a force nearly double that of the investing army.

In every movement of the war, as well as in the peace negotiations that followed, the President's firm hand was felt, and the country has surely just cause to be proud of the humane and Christian policy by which he sought to avoid a war; the prudent and patriotic foresight with which, when war became inevitable, he postponed its outbreak until the country was ready for it; and the marvelous skill, courage and judgment with which he so directed affairs, aided by the invincible valor of our sailors and soldiers, as to bring about an early, honorable and glorious peace.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Perry S. Heath". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned in the lower right quadrant of the page. The letters are fluid and connected, with a prominent loop at the end of the word "Heath".





Jno. W. Darril.

CHAPTER XV.

WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE.

BY

HON. J. W. DANIEL, Member of Committee on Foreign Relations.

THE causes of the war between the United States and Spain are to be found in the geography, in the past history, in the racial and institutional differences between the two peoples and in the cherished principles of American polity which are essential to our interest, peace and safety. Were I to enumerate them, I should say that they lie in the proximity of Cuba to the United States; in our Monroe Doctrine; in the incapacity, corruption and cruelty of Spanish rule; in the weakness and irritating incidents of our diplomacy with Spain; in our extensive commerce with Cuba, and the large investments of American capital there; and finally, in the destruction of the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor on the night of February 15, 1898. The war with Spain has been called a war of humanity; and, to a certain extent, it was, as is demonstrated by the generous contributions of our Government and people to relieve the suffering Cubans. But it was no less a war of national interest, dignity and honor.

The Senate of the United States has played an important part in shaping the policy of our Government with reference to the war and the questions which produced it, but this policy cannot be appreciated without fully understanding the causes of the war and the incidents that led up to it. In some respects the Senate has more intimate relations with our foreign affairs than has the House of Representatives. It shares with the President the power of appointing officers, including the ambassadors, ministers and consuls who represent us in foreign lands. It shares, also, with him the power

of making treaties. By reason of its smaller membership and its greater freedom of debate, the sense of the body can be more readily collected, expressed and fashioned into measures. The Committee on Foreign Relations is the organ of the Senate in the consideration and presentation of questions relating to our foreign affairs. When the Cuban revolution broke out, this Committee was composed as follows :

John Sherman, Chairman ; William P. Frye, Cushman K. Davis, J. Donald Cameron, Shelby M. Cullom, Henry Cabot Lodge, Republicans ; John T. Morgan, George Gray, David Turpie, John W. Daniel, Roger Q. Mills, Democrats.

The Committee was kept busy from the incipency of the revolution to its close in considering the numerous and vexatious questions to which it gave rise. Contemporaneously other foreign affairs of great magnitude arose, which likewise required serious consideration, especially the Venezuela Boundary question, the Armenian massacres, Hawaiian annexation and the General Arbitration Treaty. From time to time the Committee took the evidence of witnesses as to the conditions in Cuba, and many communications and resolutions were laid before it. Numerous reports were made to the Senate, some of which were able and exhaustive discussions of international law questions, such as the Monroe Doctrine, arbitration, neutrality, belligerency, the rights of American citizens and the construction and interpretation of treaties and statutes.

The Senate took the initiative in dealing with the great issues arising concerning Cuba, and it is believed that the measures which it favored were in consonance with the spirit of our institutions, with our necessary political relations to the island of Cuba and with that sense of justice toward a people struggling for liberty which best befitted the first republic of the Western world.

It also initiated some less consequential though eminently worthy measures, such as that proposed by Mr. Gallinger authorizing the expenditure of \$50,000 for the relief of suffering Americans in Cuba, and that proposed by Mr. Proctor authorizing the officers of our army in Cuba exercising separate commands to furnish subsistence, medical and Quartermasters' supplies to destitute inhabitants. It concurred without a dis-

senting voice in the action of the House, which was equally unanimous, in placing fifty millions of dollars in the hands of the President to be used for war purposes;—an act of questionable policy from the point of view of constitutional criticism, but bespeaking clearly the confidence of Congress in the President and the unbounded patriotism with which all men were ready to sustain him.

The narrow space of this article forbids that I follow the course of debate in the Senate or even refer to the many able and eloquent speeches which were made during the successive Congresses that dealt with the Cuban struggle. They were as a rule of a high order and up to the highest standard of deliberative assemblies; but it is of the action of the body that I am to treat, and this prevents the reference that I should be often prompted to make to the excellent suggestions and eloquent addresses of particular Senators.

The late Cuban revolution broke out in February, 1895, on the eve of the adjournment of the Fifty-third Congress. Since that period there have been two sessions of the Fifty-fourth Congress, under Cleveland's administration, and three of the Fifty-fifth, under the administration of McKinley.

When the first session of the Fifty-fourth Congress convened, on December 2, 1895, President Cleveland said in his message:—

“Cuba is again gravely disturbed, and an insurrection, in some respects more active than the last preceding revolt which continued from 1868 to 1878, now exists in a large portion of the eastern interior of the island, menacing some populations on the coast.”

But he exhorted Congress against sentimental sympathy with the Cubans and declared that—

“Neither the warmth of our people's sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, nor our loss and material damage consequent upon the futile endeavors thus far made to restore peace and order, nor any shock our humane sensibilities may have received from the cruelties which appeared to specially characterize this sanguinary and fiercely conducted war have in the least shaken the determination of the Government to fulfil every international obligation.”

At this time the revolution, which had been organized under the leadership of Jose Marti and Maximo Gomez, was ten months old. Numerous skirmishes had taken place between the Cubans and Spaniards. Marti had been killed and Gomez wounded. Martinez Campos, the most distinguished general of Spain, had succeeded Callejas as Captain-General, only to get his laurels dishevelled. The Cuban Convention had adopted a constitution. Betancourt had been chosen President, Maso Vice-President, and Maximo Gomez, a hero of the Ten Years War and a native of San Domingo, had been made General-in-Chief, with Antonio Maceo as his Lieutenant. A provisional government had been organized with its capital at Cuitas. Laws had been enacted for the collection of taxes and the establishment of post-offices. Fifty thousand Cuban volunteers were in arms, and Gomez and Maceo were riding over the island perplexing and baffling the armies of Spain marshalled for their subjugation. Maceo a little later appeared in sight of Havana.

This was the seventh insurrection that had agitated Cuba during the present century and it was soon evident that it was the most serious. Should the belligerency of the Cubans be recognized? This was the first question presented. Belligerency is a state of war. To recognize it is to accord to those on both sides engaged in it the rights of war. Many resolutions were soon offered in the Senate favoring the recognition of belligerency, Senators Allen and Call being the first to advocate their passage.

The strongest argument against such action on the part of the United States is to be found in the message of President Grant delivered to Congress during the Ten Years War, in which he opposed any sort of recognition of the Cubans, on the ground (1) that it would authorize the right of search on the high seas of vessels of both parties and would subject those carrying arms and munitions of war, which might now be transported freely in vessels of the United States, to detention and possible seizure; (2) would give rise to countless vexatious questions; (3) would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents; (4) would invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recog-

nized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the high seas ; and the further fact that it would require the enforcement of a large and onerous code of neutrality on our Government. But to this it might be answered, (1) that as belligerency is a fact, it was but just that the fact should be recognized, with its attendant consequences ; (2) that it is no offence to a foreign nation to recognize a state of war within its borders, Abraham Lincoln having been himself the first by the implication of his proclamation blockading southern ports, to recognize the Southern Confederacy, which he afterwards overthrew ; (3) that it is in the interest of humanity, as said by our Supreme Court, that the rights of war should be accorded whenever war prevails ; (4) that while the right of search of our vessels on the high seas by Spain might occasionally be annoying, it was not an inconvenience of a very grave nature ; (5) that a different policy pursued in the Ten Years War had brought no good result ; (6) that while recognizing belligerency would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, such responsibility on the part of a bankrupt nation like Spain was not a matter of momentous consequence, for in releasing her we would transfer the responsibility to the insurgents who, representing the inhabitants of Cuba, were just as likely to make good their responsibility as the Spaniards. Further, that a mercantile consideration of that kind should not stand in the way of national honor and humanity. Eventually, by the treaty which we have just ratified with Spain, we have taken upon ourselves the burden of her debts to American citizens for property injured, and twenty millions of claims, or more, have already appeared and been filed at our State Department. So that the upshot of this objection is that we have been victimized by our own refusal to recognize the belligerency of the insurgents in the pursuit of that straightforward policy which our code of national ethics dictated. Above all there lay a still weightier consideration. We were not dealing with a far distant land like Armenia, where the cruelties of the Turk provoked resolutions of protest on the part of the Senate. We were dealing with a practical question involving a neighboring people. The lovely and fruitful island of Cuba, des-

cribed by Columbus as "the most beautiful island that eyes ever beheld, filled with excellent ports and profound rivers," is a part of the American Continent and only one hundred miles from our shores. It is about the size of the State of Virginia and is capable of supporting many millions of inhabitants. As it is the nearest of the West Indian group to our coast, so it is the largest and most populous and the richest in wealth of mine, field, forest and orchard. With spacious harbors, long mountain ranges, well-nigh impenetrable fastnesses and jungles, it is easily defended, and its topographical, like its geographical, position makes it a strategic point of primary importance to American contemplation. It is naturally a military and naval outpost of the United States. It is the key of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. It stands sentinel to the approaches of the cities and harbors of our southern coast. It commands the eastern outlet to the projected canal which must ere long connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whether by the Nicaraguan or Panama route. Havana, its metropolis, was the rendezvous of the Spanish armaments launched against the South American republics in the early part of this century. It is the most important of all the lands which come within the purview of our Monroe Doctrine. By that doctrine we have separated Cuba from the sphere of European influence and intervention. No European nation, in the face of that doctrine, would now think of recognizing Cuban revolutionists as belligerents, and still less would any European monarchy incline to recognize the independence of a Cuban Republic.

On the contrary, we are bound to the island and its people by the strongest ties. In 1809 Jefferson declared the desirability of Cuba in our Union and answered the objection, that if we received it no limit would be drawn to our future acquisitions, by the reply that "it could be defended without a navy, and that this develops the principle which ought to limit our future." In recent times the spread of the British Empire over the earth, the tendency of smaller states to consolidate in great confederacies and the concurrent tendency of greater states to appropriate the possessions of weaker ones

have all conspired to quicken American interests in the island and to make plain the path of destiny and duty. But for the Monroe Doctrine, that island, which once fell into the hands of England in 1762, would long since have fallen into English hands again or those of some grasping European nation.

The debate on the Cuban question had scarcely begun in the Senate when, on the seventeenth of December, 1895, was announced a message from President Cleveland on the Venezuelan Boundary controversy, in which he informed Congress of the declination of Great Britain to arbitrate that question with Venezuela and invoked the Monroe Doctrine, as applicable to constrain "the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela."

The Monroe Doctrine, as formulated by President Monroe in 1823, in warning the allied powers of Europe against joining Spain to subjugate the South American republics, is the simple declaration that we

"should consider any attempt (of the monarchies of Europe) to extend their system to any portion of our hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

President Cleveland declared this doctrine

"essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government; it was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and can not become obsolete while our Republic endures."

He combated the British idea that it was not founded on the general consent of nations, by declaring that it

"finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced."

The vigor of this message, challenging Great Britain to war over a boundary line in Venezuela, is in striking contrast

to the President's warning against "sentimental sympathy" with the Cubans and his deferential regard for Spanish sovereignty. It was against the extension of the monarchical system on this continent that Monroe had uttered his doctrine, and the principles which led to the Venezuelan message would have seemed to call for the President's full sympathy in the Cuban struggle and for his readiness to recognize those engaged in it. Beyond this, the Monroe Doctrine has its corollary which touches keenly our national honor. It warned Europe against interference in the affairs of the American Continent; and in doing so, as the Hon. Thomas F. Bayard, Secretary of State during Mr. Cleveland's first administration, said—

"The United States has proclaimed itself the protector of this Western world, in which she is by far the superior power, from interference by European governments."

The same idea, logically extended, was expressed by Senator Lindsay, of Kentucky, during the debate, when he said—

"We have made ourselves the keeper of this brother and, if we shrink from the duties which we have voluntarily assumed, the blood of that brother will cry out from the ground against us."

Denying to Cuba the right to be rescued from the Spanish wolf by any European alliance such as we had with France during our own Revolution, placarding her coasts with notices to all the world, "Hands off," we could not play the dog in the manger and ourselves withhold at least a moral and sympathetic support to her suffering people. Against such unspeakable wrongs as that little island suffered under Spanish rule our intervention was clearly warranted.

This corollary of the Monroe Doctrine is part of it to all minds which follow the logic of this manly and just declaration. It is a doctrine necessary to our defense and to our dignity and honor as a nation. There was nothing original in Monroe's message, but this does not detract from its author's glory, which lies in the responsibility he bravely assumed against embattled Europe and in the good judgment he

exercised in the deliverance of the message. President Madison, in 1811, had uttered like sentiments with respect to Spain in the Floridas, and their germs will be found in the nature of our institutions and in our geographical situation. It was simply the embodiment of an idea in every thoughtful mind, just as the Declaration of Independence was the embodiment, by Jefferson, of the matured conviction of his generation and his country. Moreover, the fact that all our great statesmen, including our Presidents from John Quincy Adams to Grover Cleveland, have reaffirmed this doctrine, and that the people have thoroughly responded to every utterance is an assurance of its rectitude and of its fixity as a part of the American law, as much as any clause of our written Constitution.

The Senate has the honor of being the first political branch of the government of the United States to indicate its realizing sense of these American principles during our recent troubles. They found expression on January 28, 1896, when Mr. Morgan, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported Mr. Call's resolution, with two resolutions as a substitute, the first declaring that the war in Cuba should be conducted on civilized principles, and the second that the President be requested to interpose his friendly offices by the recognition of belligerent rights to the Cubans. Mr. Cameron, from the same Committee, reported a minority resolution of the Committee, to the effect that the President be requested to interpose his friendly offices with Spain for the recognition of the independence of Cuba.

On February 5, 1896, Mr. Morgan, under instruction from the same Committee, reported the following concurrent resolution as a substitute for those previously presented :—

“Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring therein), That, in the opinion of Congress, a condition of public war exists between the Government of Spain and the Government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba; and that the United States of America should maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States.”

On the twenty-eighth day of February, 1896, it was adopted by the following vote :—

(See Record, Part 3, 54th Cong., 1st Session, p. 2257.)

YEAS—64.

Allen	Cullom	Jones (Ark.)	Proctor
Allison	Daniel	Kyle	Quay
Bacon	Davis	Lindsay	Roach
Baker	Dubois	Lodge	Sherman
Bate	Elkins	McBride	Shoup
Berry	Faulkner	McMillan	Smith
Brown	Frye	Mantle	Squire
Burrows	Gallinger	Martin	Stewart
Butler	Gear	Mills	Teller
Call	Gibson	Mitchell (Ore.)	Thurston
Cameron	Gorman	Morgan	Turpie
Cannon	Gray	Nelson	Vest
Carter	Hawley	Pasco	Walthall
Chandler	Hill	Peffer	Warren
Clark	Irby	Perkins	White
Cockrell	Jones (Nev.)	Pritchard	Wilson

NAYS—6.

Caffery	George	Morrill
Chilton	Hale	Wetmore

NOT VOTING—18.

Aldrich	Gordon	Palmer	Tillman
Blackburn	Harris	Pettigrew	Vilas
Blanchard	Hoar	Platt	Voorhees
Brice	Mitchell (Wis.)	Pugh	Wolcott
	Murphy	Sewell	

This resolution by the Senate was a signal triumph for those who contended that—

(1) The war in Cuba had assumed the proportions that merited recognition ;

(2) The policy of recognition of belligerency was humane and just ; and that

(3) Congress might fitly express its opinion upon the subject.

But it was a concurrent resolution only—that is, a mere expression of opinion, without efficacy of a legislative character. It was received in the House with applause, but that body subsequently passed a resolution of its own, by way of amendment to that of the Senate, though differing little in import. Subsequently it receded from its amendment, and on April 6, 1896, concurred in the resolution of the Senate by a vote of 247 yeas to only 27 nays.

President Cleveland ignored these resolutions of Congress. Affairs in Cuba grew worse and worse. In February, 1896, Captain-General Don Valeriano Weyler took command. A more brutal monster never encumbered the earth. With fire and sword he ravaged the land, and a reign of terror ensued such as even Cuba had never known before, for he "Out-heroded Herod" in deeds of violence and blood. The inhabitants were driven into the towns in indiscriminate bands of old men, women and children, and herded together in pestilential camps without food, medicine or shelter. There they perished by thousands and tens of thousands, amidst scenes of anguish and horror that no language can adequately describe.

When Congress met December 7, 1896, President Cleveland informed them that the insurrection in Cuba continued with all its perplexities; that it was not possible to perceive any progress toward the pacification of the island, but that the situation had not in the least improved; that, though Spain held Havana and the seaports and all the considerable towns, the insurgents still roamed at will over at least two-thirds of the island; that the industrial value of the island was fast diminishing; that both parties were engaged in the wholesale annihilation of property, and that the rural population had been required to concentrate in the towns. He declared that the spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjacent country, by nature one of the most fertile and charming on the globe and hardly separated from our own territory, should engage our serious attention. He pointed out further that our citizens had from thirty to fifty millions invested in railroad, mining and other enterprises in the island, and that we were deeply interested in a commerce which amounted in 1893 to one hundred and three millions, in 1894 to ninety-six millions. While still enjoining our non-interference, he further declared that when the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection had become manifest, and

"It is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence; and when a hopeless struggle for its reinstatement has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless

sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."

It was now evident that something more than sentimental sympathy was involved in our relations to Cuba. It was also evident that the President recognized the principle which the Senate asserted, that our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain might be superseded by higher ones. In no event did our obligation to Spain require that we should not recognize the patent fact that there was war in Cuba; and the President's vague, indefinite postponement of any specific recommendation was taken as an indication that his patience would be long exercised before he got beyond the expression of generalities.

Both political parties, in their platforms of 1896, had expressed the sympathy so profoundly felt by the American people in the Cuban struggle, and the people generally concurred in the declaration of the Republican platform that Spain had lost control of Cuba and was unable either to protect property or lives of resident Americans, or to comply with its treaty obligations.

Numerous resolutions were offered during this short session of Congress but nothing of moment was done, and soon the Cleveland administration passed away, leaving all the questions which had arisen during the war as a heritage to its successor.

On the fourth of March, 1897, President McKinley was inaugurated, and in anticipation thereof President Cleveland had convened the Senate in special session. The inaugural address made no allusion to the war in Cuba.

On the sixth of March, 1897, President McKinley called Congress in extra session. Accordingly, on the fifteenth of March the first session of the Fifty-fifth Congress convened. The message of the President was confined to recommendations touching a tariff revenue bill and was silent on the question of the war in Cuba. But soon the Calendar thickened, as in previous sessions, with resolutions on this subject. Mr. Allen introduced a resolution recognizing the

political independence of Cuba, and Mr. Morgan offered a joint resolution, which read as follows:—

“Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a condition of public war exists between the Government of Spain and the Government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba; and that the United States of America shall maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States.”

This resolution was passed on May 20, 1897, by a vote of 41 yeas to 14 nays, the vote being as follows:—

YEAS—41.

Bacon	Cullom	Lindsay	Rawlins
Baker	Davis	McBride	Shoup
Bate	Deboe	Mantle	Stewart
Berry	Foraker	Mason	Thurston
Butler	Gallinger	Mills	Tillman
Carter	Gorman	Morgan	Turner
Chandler	Hansbrough	Nelson	Turpie
Chilton	Harris (Kan.)	Pasco	Walthall
Clark	Heitfeld	Pettigrew	
Clay	Jones (Ark.)	Pettus	
Cockrell	Kenney	Pritchard	

NAYS—14.

Allison	Gear	Hoar	White
Burrows	Hale	Spooner	Wilson
Caffery	Hanna	Wellington	
Fairbanks	Hawley	Wetmore	

NOT VOTING—33.

Aldrich	Gray	Morrill	Sewell
Allen	Harris (Tenn.)	Murphy	Smith
Cannon	Jones (Nev.)	Penrose	Teller
Daniel	Kyle	Perkins	Vest
Earle	Lodge	Platt (Conn.)	Warren
Elkins	McEney	Platt (N. Y.)	Wolcott
Faulkner	McMillan	Proctor	
Frye	Martin	Quay	
George	Mitchell	Roach	

Thus a second step was taken by the Senate toward the recognition of Cuban belligerency. It affirmed, by implication, the right of Congress to make direct recognition of a condition of war in a foreign country. It was contended in debate that this was the exclusive province of the Executive.

But war is a fact, and the right of the political powers of the Government to recognize that fact has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in a number of cases, and was abundantly demonstrated by Henry Clay when chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and must exist in the nature of things. Whoever is invested with discretion to deal with facts, either in making or administering laws, must of necessity have the power of discriminating between them and recognizing them as they are. Those who so contended were vindicated in their opinions by this decisive vote in the Senate. The joint resolution went to the House and there disappeared, as no Committee on Foreign Affairs had been appointed and as the House had declined to equip itself with the machinery of general legislation.

The President, during the session, transmitted a list of claims of citizens of the United States against Spain and also a list of citizens arrested since February 24, 1895, with correspondence relative to their imprisonment.

The subject of the war was debated from time to time on one or another of the resolutions offered, but no important action was taken.

When the second session of Congress met on December 6, 1897, it was greeted by a message from President McKinley which fully considered the Cuban situation, and he justly regarded it as the most important problem pertaining to our foreign relations. He had entered his firm protest against the policy of extermination which had been inaugurated by Spain, had at last demanded the instant release, or speedy trial, of American citizens under arrest and had applied the funds appropriated by Congress to the relief of Americans suffering in Cuba.

The assassination of Canovas and the succession of Sagasta to the leadership in Spain had been contemporaneous with the departure of our Minister, General Woodford, to the Court of Spain, and the new Spanish Government had indicated a change in policy which had somewhat ameliorated the conditions. Weyler had been superseded by Blanco as Captain-General, and a less vigorous régime had been established. But the war still raged with no sign of abatement;

and our Consul-General Lee, whose firm and intelligent course had inspired great confidence in his opinion, testified in concurrence with the general view that the Cubans could not take the towns, nor the Spaniards subjugate the country, and that both sides were conducting a warfare of waste and ruin, and of indefinite duration.

Under these circumstances the President declared that of the untried measures there remained only recognition of the insurgents as belligerents ; the recognition of the independence of Cuba ; neutral intervention to end the war, by proposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. He added :

“ I speak not of forcible annexation ; for that, under our code of morality, can not be thought of.”

He opposed any sort of recognition of the Cubans, on the grounds stated by General Grant during the Ten Years War, which we have already quoted, but withheld any specific recommendation of his own, declaring that :

“ the near future would demonstrate whether or not a righteous peace is likely to be attained.”

The message was followed by numerous resolutions touching the subject, such as had been offered in previous sessions ; and while the devastating struggle continued in the island, the debate rolled on in the Senate from day to day and from week to week, and a patient people still listened to the cries of woe and looked upon the scenes of horror which had so long tortured the very soul of the nation.

Suddenly, on February 16, 1898, the news was flashed over the land that on the night before, the U. S. battleship *Maine* had been blown up in Havana harbor and 266 of her crew had suddenly passed to a fiery, or watery death. The note of the Alpine hunter's horn, it is said, agitating the air, sometimes disturbs the balance of the accumulated avalanche and sends it hurling down the mountain side. This incident settled the fate of Cuba and culminated in the termination of Spanish rule in America.

A board of naval officers, of which Admiral Sampson was chairman, investigated it and reported that the explosion

must have occurred from an extraneous cause. Consul-General Lee, who was near by at the time and quickly on the scene of action, testified to the same effect. Some believed that it was the direct work of the Spanish authorities; others, that it was done by some Spanish sympathizer without governmental agency; still others made the far-fetched suggestion that the insurgents had committed the crime to induce American intervention. An interesting incident of this session was the visit of Senators Proctor, Money, Gallinger and Thurston to Cuba. They related their observations to the Senate, and their harrowing accounts of the acute conditions there existing stimulated the general feeling that the time for action on our part was near at hand. A little later the Committee on Foreign Relations, consisting of Senators Davis, (who had succeeded Mr. Sherman as chairman upon his becoming Secretary of State), Frye, Cullom, Lodge, Clarke, Foraker, Morgan, Gray, Turpie, Daniel and Mills, concluded that—

“The destruction of the *Maine* was compassed by the official act of the Spanish authorities (and the ascertainment of the particular person is not material), or was made possible by a negligence on their part so willing and gross as to be equivalent in culpability to positive criminal action.”

They expressed their belief that recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans, if it had been given seasonably when it was suggested by concurrent resolutions to that effect passed by Congress, would have—

“caused a speedy termination of the war without involving the United States in the contest,”

but that now it would fall short of meeting the situation. They might have repeated the remark with reference to the failure of the House of Representatives to concur in the joint resolution of the Senate recognizing Cuban belligerency.

At this time Spain was engaged in the last hopeless effort to bring about an armistice with renewed promises of autonomy, and our Minister at Madrid, General Woodford, was still parleying with the Spanish Ministry upon some vague prop-

osition, which it was thought might placate the indignation of the American people by assurance from Spain of a stable government based on the participation of the Cubans therein.

But the day of diplomacy had passed, and the press of the country clamorously called for, while the people impatiently expected some decisive word from the President. Indisposed to war and having done all he thought he could to prevent it, the President spoke that word on April 11, 1898, in a message to Congress, in which he reviewed the Cuban revolution and recommended the forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the dictates of humanity and following many historic precedents where neighboring states had intervened to check the hopeless sacrifice of life by internecine conflict beyond their borders, justifying themselves on national grounds.

He added these words :—

“ It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settlement.”

Two days afterwards, April 13, 1898, the committee on Foreign Relations through their chairman submitted an able report in favor of intervention and recommended the adoption of the following resolutions :—

Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions in effect.

Whereas, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

A minority, consisting of Messrs. Turpie, Mills, Daniel and Foraker, concurred in the report, but favored—

“The immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba as organized in that island as a free, independent and sovereign power among the nations of the world.”

The resolution as originally offered by Mr. Foraker had contained such a provision, and on the motion of Mr. Turpie the words were inserted in the first clause “and that the Government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of the island.” The debate on this question was deeply interesting.

The suggestion of the President, of neutral intervention—of hostile constraint on both parties without any recognition of rights to the insurgents—was specially opposed as out of keeping with the respect which this Republic should show to a neighboring people following its example. Abraham Lincoln in the House of Representatives on February 12, 1848, declared that “any people, anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government and form a new one that suits them better.” This is a most valuable and sacred right and a right which we hope and believe is to liberate the world. It was by the exercise of this right that the United States became a free nation. It was this right that the Cubans were exercising against the most odious and cruel despotism that has

ever oppressed any land on the American continent. It was but just that we, who were the first to proclaim the right, should be the first to accord it to our neighbors. Besides, the consideration weighed with some that the recognition of the Cuban Government would give us a competent authority and ingratiate our country into its confidence and good will. It is the destiny of the island ultimately to be annexed to the United States, and a liberal policy would best pave the way to that consummation.

Eager and impatient crowds filled the Senate galleries and awaited the result of the debate, while the press of the country, in morning issues and extra editions, warned the Senate that the Spanish fleet of Cervera was heading under full steam to attack American ports, and that while the Senate debated "Rome might perish." Every Senator except the lamented Walthall, who was then sick and soon afterwards departed this life, was present.

By a decisive vote the Senate supported the view that the Republican Government of Cuba should be recognized, and the amendment to that effect was carried, the vote being as follows:

YEAS—51.

Allen	Gallinger	Mason	Roach
Bacon	Harris	Mills	Smith
Baker	Heitfeld	Mitchell	Stewart
Bate	Jones (Ark.)	Money	Teller
Berry	Jones (Nev.)	Murphy	Thurston
Butler	Kenney	Nelson	Tillman
Cannon	Kyle	Pasco	Turley
Chandler	Lindsay	Penrose	Turner
Chilton	McEnery	Perkins	Turpie
Clay	McLaurin	Pettigrew	Vest
Cockrell	Mallory	Pettus	White
Daniel	Mantle	Quay	Wilson
Foraker	Martin	Rawlins	

NAYS—37.

Aldrich	Fairbanks	Hoar <i>Mass</i>	Sewell
Allison	Faulkner	Lodge "	Shoup
Burrows	Frye <i>Mass</i>	McBride	Spooner
Caffery	Gear	McMillan	Warren
Carter	Gorman	Morgan	Wellington
Clark	Gray	Morrill	Wetmore
Cullom	Hale <i>Mass</i>	Platt (Conn.)	Wolcott
Davis	Hanna	Platt (N. Y.)	
Deboe	Hansbrough	Pritchard	
Elkins	Hawley	Proctor <i>vt</i>	

ABSENT—1.

Walthall

Upon motion of Mr. Davis, an additional amendment was adopted, without dissent, declaring :—

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

Then by a vote of 67 to 21 the resolutions thus amended were adopted.

The House of Representatives struck out the clause of the resolutions recognizing the Republican Government in Cuba. A conference committee was appointed and, at a late hour of the night, the Senate concurred in the action of the House, by a vote of 42 to 35 and the resolutions without recognition of the Cuban Republic were adopted. This meant war.

Spain speedily declared war against the United States, and on April 25, 1898, a resolution, which originated in the House and speedily passed the Senate, was approved by the President, declaring war with Spain to have existed since April 21, and authorized the President to—

“use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into active service the militia of the several States to such extent as might be necessary.”

Six days later Admiral Dewey's fleet, which had sailed directly, under orders, for the Philippine Islands, destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, and the beginning of the end was at hand.

On July 3, 1898, history repeated itself, and the Spanish fleet of Cervera, endeavoring to escape from Santiago Bay, was sunk by the American fleet under Commodore Schley, Admiral Sampson, its nominal commander, being temporarily absent in consultation with the commander of our land forces.

On July 17, after the brilliant assaults of the American army had shown the futility of further resistance, the Spanish army at Santiago surrendered. On the first of January, 1899,

the American army took formal possession, under Gen. J. R. Brooke, of the island of Cuba, and the career of Spain on the American Continent was closed.

On the twelfth of August the protocol of a treaty was signed at Washington by W. R. Day, our Secretary of State, and Jules Cambon, the Ambassador of France, representing the Spanish Government, by which it was agreed, with a view to the establishment of peace between the two countries, that Spain should relinquish all claims to sovereignty over, and title to, Cuba; should cede the island of Porto Rico to the United States, and such island in the Ladrones as might be selected by the United States; that the United States should occupy the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace that should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. It was also agreed that Cuba and Porto Rico should be immediately evacuated by Spain and that Commissioners, appointed by the two Governments, should make arrangements accordingly; that each government should appoint not more than five Commissioners to treat of peace, their meeting to take place at Paris not later than October 1.

At the time when this protocol was signed, our naval forces under Commodore Dewey and our land forces under Gen. Merritt were besieging Manila, and Gen. Aguinaldo, with the Philippine forces, was assisting us.

The President appointed Hon. W. R. Day, who resigned the Secretaryship of State to accept the commission; Hon. Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Hon. W. P. Frye and Hon. George Gray, members of that Committee, and Whitelaw Reid, Esq., of New York, as Commissioners on behalf of the United States. On October 1 they met at Paris the Commissioners appointed by the Queen of Spain.

The work of the Commission was long and laborious, but it was concluded by a treaty, signed at Paris, December 15, 1898, which was communicated to the Senate on January 4, 1899, by the President. The treaty fulfilled the provisions of the protocol with respect to Cuba and Porto Rico and the island in the Ladrones which was to be ceded to the United States.

By the third article Spain ceded the whole Philippine archipelago to the United States, and the United States agreed to pay to Spain \$20,000,000 within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty.

It was also provided that the United States should for ten years admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippines on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States; that we would send back to Spain, at our own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces, and that the arms of the soldiers in question should be restored to them. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, ammunition and materials of all kinds belonging to the land and naval forces in the Philippines and Guam should remain the property of Spain. Mutual release and return of prisoners of war was provided for, and the United States undertook to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

There was mutual relinquishment of all claims, national and individual, for indemnity of any kind that arose out of the war. But this, like the return of prisoners of war, operated as a heavy burden upon the United States and a trivial burden on Spain, for many thousands of Spanish prisoners were in our hands, entailing considerable cost for their transportation home, and the claims of our citizens against Spain and her insurgent subjects during the Four Years' War are variously estimated at from \$5,000,000 to \$20,000,000.

The debate on the treaty occurred in secret session and is not reported. But in open session resolutions were offered by Senators Vest, Bacon, Allen and others defining the principles of our government with reference to the annexation of territory. It was shown by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court that annexation carried with it the principles of our Constitution as to the rights of the inhabitants to the equal protection of the laws and as to the uniformity of tariff and revenue laws as applicable to them.

Under the constitution, a vote of two-thirds of the Senators present is requisite to ratify a treaty, and for some weeks it

seemed as if such a vote could not be obtained. The main objection to the treaty was directed against the cession of the Philippine archipelago to the United States. The islands are 7,000 miles from the United States, and they are tenanted by a heterogeneous population incapable of assimilation with our own people. The climate is such that our white race cannot establish their homes in the country and colonize it. The islands must, in the nature of things, become a mere dependency, where the many must be ruled by a few of alien blood.

As a real-estate investment, the experience of the modern colonizing nations indicates that it will not be a success. But, beyond these and other considerations of public policy, we had made the Filipinos our allies in dispossessing Spain of the islands, and it seemed to many inconsistent with the honor of this nation that, when our mutual efforts had been successful, we should ourselves take the tainted title of Spain and step into her shoes to force a government upon the inhabitants against their will.

These considerations alone moved many Senators to oppose the treaty. There were others scarcely less cogent. Defended by the ocean east and west, the United States is to-day impregnable. With the Philippine Islands to defend, we have a weak spot which will be immediately assailed in the event of war between this and any other great nation, and which will require vast expenditures of men and money to protect.

Our institutions are free. The Malay race has never founded a free state, nor do they seem to be capable of doing so. By the treaty we incorporate the twelve to twenty thousand islands into our territory and make eight millions of these strange people American citizens. It is true that we do not invest them with political rights, but they are our citizens nevertheless, and we become permanently responsible for them and their government and bring them under a free constitution which has no place for subject peoples. It was admitted by the opponents of the treaty that we could not leave the islands in the hands of Spain, nor incontinently withdraw and let them be appropriated by any other nation. But it was contended that temporary military occupation,

after the fashion of our occupation of Cuba, with friendly offices to the inhabitants to enable them to form a stable government, was the better policy to pursue; and that from that point of view we could satisfy all equitable demands upon us and shape our future course consistently with our interests and without the assumption of the permanent obligations that the acceptance of sovereignty entailed.

On Saturday night, February 4, 1899, the forces of Aguinaldo most improvidently attacked the American Army at Manila, but were mowed down like grass and repulsed. The Monday following the Senate voted on the treaty. Up to that morning the necessary two-thirds vote in favor of it had not been assured and its defeat seemed probable. When the roll was called the issue seemed still doubtful, but when the vote was announced it stood as follows:—

VOTE ON THE TREATY.

FOR RATIFICATION.

Aldrich	Faulkner	McBride	Ross
Allen	Foraker	McEnergy	Sewell
Allison	Frye	McLaurin	Shoup
Baker	Gallinger	McMillan	Simon
Burrows	Gear	Mantle	Spooner
Butler	Gray	Mason	Stewart
Carter	Hanna	Morgan	Sullivan
Chandler	Hansbrough	Nelson	Teller
Clark	Harris	Penrose	Thurston
Clay	Hawley	Perkins	Warren
Cullom	Jones (Nevada)	Pettus	Wellington
Davis	Kenney	Platt (Conn.)	Wolcott
Deboe	Kyle	Platt (New York)	
Elkins	Lindsay	Pritchard	
Fairbanks	Lodge	Quay	Total 57.

AGAINST RATIFICATION.

Bacon	Gorman	Mills	Roach
Bate	Hale	Mitchell	Smith
Berry	Heitfeld	Money	Tillman
Caffery	Hoar	Murphy	Turley
Chilton	Jones (Arkansas)	Pasco	Turner
Cockrell	Mallory	Pettigrew	Vest
Daniel	Martin	Rawlins	
			Total 27.

ABSENT AND PAIRED.

Messrs. Cannon and Wilson, for, with Mr. White, against, and Messrs. Proctor and Wetmore, for, with Mr. Turpie, against.

Thereupon, and thereby, all the Philippine Islands became a part of American territory and all their people American citizens, except indeed that citizens of Spain may within a year preserve their allegiance to that kingdom by formal declaration before a court of record of that intent.

The Spanish Cortes by a small majority refused its approval of the treaty. But this was not essential. The Queen Regent's signature was affixed to it March 17, 1899, and as soon as formal exchanges of the ratification are made the war with Spain will be a thing of the past.

Pending the consideration of the treaty Mr. McEnery offered the following resolution :—

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, etc. That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of said islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States. But it is the intention of the United States to establish on said islands, a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said islands, to prepare them for local self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands.

Upon this he vainly endeavored to get a vote before the treaty was ratified. Failing in this it was considered afterwards, and Mr. Bacon offered the following amendment which was lost by a tie vote, the Vice-President voting against it.

Resolved, further, That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the Government of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the Government and control of the islands to their people.

The vote stood as follows :—

YEAS—29.			
Bacon	Gorman	Lindsay	Quay
Bate	Gray	McLaurin	Rawlins
Berry	Hale	Martin	Smith
Caffery	Harris	Money	Tillman
Chilton	Heitfeld	Murphy	Turner
Clay	Hoar	Perkins	
Cockrell	Jones (Arkansas)	Pettigrew	
Faulkner	Jones (Nevada)	Pettus	

NAYS—29.			
Allison	Hanna	Morgan	Simon
Burrows	Hawley	Nelson	Stewart
Carter	Kyle	Penrose	Teller
Chandler	Lodge	Platt (Conn.)	Warren
Deboe	McBride	Platt (New York)	Wolcott
Fairbanks	McEnery	Pritchard	
Frye	McMillan	Ross	
Gear	Mantle	Shoup	

NOT VOTING—32.			
Aldrich	Davis	Mills	Thurston
Allen	Elkins	Mitchell	Turley
Baker	Foraker	Pasco	Turpie
Butler	Gallinger	Proctor	Vest
Cannon	Hansbrough	Roach	Wellington
Clark	Kenney	Sewell	Wetmore
Cullom	Mallory	Spooner	White
Daniel	Mason	Sullivan	Wilson

The McEnery resolution was then adopted by the following vote :—

YEAS—26.			
Allison	Gear	McEnery	Pettus
Burrows	Gray	McLaurin	Platt (N. Y.)
Chandler	Hale	McMillan	Quay
Deboe	Hanna	Mantle	Sullivan
Fairbanks	Harris	Mason	Teller
Faulkner	Kyle	Nelson	
Frye	Lodge	Perkins	

NAYS—22.			
Bacon	Hawley	Morgan	Simon
Bate	Hoar	Murphy	Smith
Caffery	Lindsay	Pettigrew	Stewart
Carter	McBride	Platt (Conn.)	Warren
Clay	Martin	Rawlins	
Cockrell	Money	Ross	

NOT VOTING—42.			
Aldrich	Elkins	Mitchell	Turley
Allen	Foraker	Pasco	Turner
Baker	Gallinger	Penrose	Turpie
Berry	Gorman	Pritchard	Vest
Butler	Hansbrough	Proctor	Wellington
Cannon	Heitfeld	Roach	Wetmore
Chilton	Jones (Ark.)	Sewell	White
Clark	Jones (Nev.)	Shoup	Wilson
Cullom	Kenney	Spooner	Wolcott
Daniel	Mallory	Thurston	
Davis	Mills	Tillman	

This *ex post facto* resolution was not considered by the House of Representatives, and interest in the subject had now waned as it was not believed that any explanatory resolution of Congress could affect the significance of a treaty negotiated by the President and the Senate, and which must remain the supreme law of the land until changed by competent authority. The terms of the resolution were contradictory to the terms of the treaty, and being ineffective as an amendment or alteration thereof would merely indicate the vacillations of opinion, without in any respect changing the situation. Annexation "for better or for worse" had taken place with all its necessary consequences and no obscuration of the fact could in any wise affect it. Future Congresses will receive the subject as an appropriate matter for legislation, and they alone can deal with it.

In closing hostilities with Spain, we succeed to problems in our new possessions which only time, patience and wisdom can rightly solve. The exploits of our soldiers and sailors, the patriotism with which all classes and sections have sustained the Government, with our tremendous exhibition of national power and spirit, have made a deep impression upon the civilized world and exalted the pride of American citizenship. The relations of friendship between ourselves and the mother country have been cemented, and the whole English-speaking people has been brought into the communion of a race patriotism that is full of hope and inspiration. The last vestige of sectional legislation that grew out of our civil dissensions was erased from our statute books and to-day there is no citizen disfranchised. The President has had the satisfaction of commissioning ex-Confederate and ex-Union soldiers in our volunteer Army to fight side by side; and, as the whole people have supported him, so he in turn with an equal grace and magnanimity has delighted to confer trust and honor without regard to the past strife of sections or present political difference. A people so nobly disposed and so thoroughly united may surely regard their future with confidence and self-reliance, and go forth to grapple with whatever difficulty confronts them, "rejoicing as a strong man to run a race."

But we should not leave the war without reflecting upon

the lesson of local self-government which it teaches. Least of all the colonizing nations has Spain been able to learn it, and without it she has wasted her courage and her substance in vain. The discoverer and mistress of the Western world, the conqueror and founder of a great European empire and the possessor of many islands of the sea has no longer an acre of ground on the continent which she discovered, and is shrivelling up within her own borders while she feeds upon bitter memories. Without conception of human rights or democratic institutions, and with no regard for them when forced to realize their existence, the Empire of Spain has perished under the inflexible rule as to the survival of the fittest—has perished because it showed itself unfit to endure.

Froude in his book on the West Indies relates that after the Revolutionary War, the King and the cabinet of Great Britain, fancying that other colonies would follow the example of secession set by the United States and declare their independence, despairingly granted them local rights and autonomous charters. To their surprise these measures appeased the spirit of discontent and her colonies were drawn in closer and more fraternal relations to the mother country.

The British Ambassador at the Court of France recently proclaimed the beneficial influence of our independence upon Great Britain as well as upon ourselves. America taught the mother country a lesson. She had the wisdom and the magnanimity to learn it and apply it; and the consolidation and expansion of her empire may be largely attributed to it. Spain could never learn that lesson. Her mind seemed to be closed and her heart hardened against it and, as she recalls the dust of Columbus back to the land to which he gave a continent and the dream of universal dominion, she receives the last instruction from this Republic, which all nations should attend, that a government which does not rest upon the recognition of the rights of man and the community must surely fall.

Jno. W. Darril.



Prof. James
A. Drighly.

CHAPTER XVI.
PROVIDING THE "SINEWS OF WAR."

BY
HON. NELSON DINGLEY, Chairman Committee on Ways and Means.

IT has been justly remarked by an intelligent financial writer that "the same energy and adaptation of means to ends which marked the exploits of the army on the land and the navy on the sea, also marked the financial administration of the war with Spain."

Up to the time of the destruction of the U. S. Battleship *Maine* in the harbor of Havana, on the 15th of February, 1898, the administration and the country believed that the war with Spain would be averted through peaceable pressure brought to bear on the Spanish ministry: and consequently no preparations for an armed conflict were entered upon. While the hope of a peaceful solution continued to be entertained, pending the inquiry into the blowing up of the *Maine*, yet the administration in the meantime quietly took measures to contract for needed ammunition and supplies—of which there were almost none on hand,—relying on the assurances of leading members of Congress that appropriations would be forthcoming when required.

The excitement so increased in this country, in consequence of rumors that the naval board of inquiry would probably find that the *Maine* was destroyed by external agencies, that, on the 7th of March, the President summoned to the White House the chairmen of the Finance Committee and Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means and Committee on Appropriations of the House, with several other leading members of both houses, to confer with him on the critical condition of affairs.

The conference resulted in a decision to appropriate immediately fifty millions of dollars "for national defence." Chairman Cannon of the Committee on Appropriations, on the same day, introduced in the House a joint resolution to this effect, which practically unanimously passed the House on March 8, and also the Senate on the next day. The object in making this appropriation, which it was proposed to draw from the cash balance in the Treasury, was to put the country measurably in a position to enter into an armed conflict, in case one could not be avoided. For this preparation, time was indispensable.

With great difficulty the armed conflict was averted for six weeks, and during this time every effort was put forth partially to prepare the country for war, so far as coast defences and military and naval supplies were concerned. Before these preparations could be adequately made, the report of the Naval Board of Inquiry on the destruction of the *Maine*, the detailed statements of visiting Senators and Representatives as to the fearful condition of the reconcentrados in Cuba, and the apparent indifference of Spain to the situation, so stirred public sentiment in this country that Congress on April 19 passed a joint resolution, approved by the President on the succeeding day, directing armed intervention, if necessary, to end the unbearable situation in the Island of Cuba, and secure the independence of the people of that country.

The President on the same day, April 20, presented this ultimatum to Spain, and the Spanish Minister accepted it as a declaration of war, and immediately demanded and was given his passports, notwithstanding the President had allowed Spain till April 23 to reply. April 25 the two houses of Congress passed a joint resolution formally declaring war against Spain.

For ten days previous to this culmination, the majority members of the House Ways and Means Committee, after conference with the President and Secretary of the Treasury, had been giving their attention to the preparation of a bill "to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures." This bill was introduced in the House by Chairman Dingley on the 23d of April—the day of the expiration of the ultima-

tum to Spain—and referred to the Ways and Means Committee. The Committee on Ways and Means, after considering the bill April 25 and 26, ordered it reported; and on the latter day Chairman Dingley reported it to the House.

The bill was based on the estimates of the officials of the war and navy departments, that the war would cost about \$50,000,000 per month. It was thought desirable not only as a measure of precaution, but also as a potent factor in creating the impression in Spain and Europe that this country had the ability and disposition to push the war with the utmost energy, to provide the means for carrying it on for at least one year, in case it should continue that length of time; and to impose such additional internal taxes, making use in part of the stamp taxes levied from 1864 to 1872, as would strengthen the credit of the government by providing means for paying the interest and gradually extinguishing the principal of necessary loans.

The bill, as reported, provided for additional internal taxes, estimated to yield about \$90,000,000 per annum, of which \$33,000,000, it was estimated, would come from doubling the tax of \$1 per barrel on fermented liquors, \$15,000,000 from doubling the 6 cents per pound tax on tobacco and increasing the tax on cigars and cigarettes, \$5,000,000 from the imposition of a special tax on dealers in tobacco and cigars, \$2,000,000 from an increase in the tax on tonnage in the foreign trade, and \$38,000,000 from a documentary and proprietary stamp tax, based substantially on the stamp-tax acts enacted near the close of the War of the Rebellion.

To provide whatever additional means might be required to prosecute the war, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to borrow on the credit of the United States, from time to time, whatever amount should be required, not to exceed five hundred millions, and to issue therefor ten-twenty, three per cent bonds, to be offered at par as a popular loan.

An important section was added, not as a war measure but as a permanent provision to guard against any temporary deficiency of revenue in the future, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue one-year three per cent certificates of

indebtedness, not exceeding one hundred millions to be outstanding at any one time—the object being to provide means to meet any temporary insufficiency of revenue to pay current expenditures, and thus avoid either bankruptcy or the necessity of using for this purpose the greenback redemption fund, or (what is the same thing) the demand notes which have been presented and redeemed, a necessity which from 1893 to 1896 created the “endless chain” that came so near resulting in serious disaster.

The bill was taken up for consideration in the House April 27, and, by agreement, was debated in the committee of the whole for three days, and on the last day was opened to amendment.

The opposition to the bill was directed almost entirely against the section authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow whatever amounts might be required, outside of the revenue for war taxes, to meet the expenditures of the war. The opponents contended that instead of borrowing and issuing interest-bearing obligations therefor, more revenue should be raised by an income tax, and that the so-called “seigniorage” of the silver bullion of the Treasury, estimated to amount to \$42,000,000, should be utilized by using that amount of silver certificates against it; and \$150,000,000 additional U. S. demand notes or greenbacks should be issued, through which means, it was contended, the people could be relieved of the burden of interest-bearing obligations.

To these contentions the friends of the bill replied, that, inasmuch as the Supreme Court of the United States had decided that a Federal income tax is unconstitutional, unless imposed on the basis of population—a condition which made such a tax impracticable—the income-tax plan was a proposition to remand the government for means to carry on the war to the proceeds of a law suit already decided against us; that the silver “seigniorage” idea ignored the fact that there can be no seigniorage or profit in coinage until coinage actually takes place; and that the proposition to issue additional demand notes or greenbacks, without providing the means for their payment, rests on the “fiat” idea of money, and has been shown by experience to be not only mischievous and

dangerous, but in the end the costliest finance to which our people was ever subjected.

The income-tax amendment was defeated by a vote of 171 to 134; the silver "seigniorage" amendment was ruled out on a point of order; and the additional greenback amendment was lost by a vote of 147 to 106.

All amendments offered, except such as were presented by the Committee on Ways and Means, were rejected, and April 29 the bill passed the House by a vote of 181 to 131, "present" 1, not voting and paired 42; as follows:

YEAS—181.

Acheson,	Davidson, Wis.,	Jenkins,	Ray,
Adams,	Davison, Ky.,	Johnson, Ind.,	Reeves,
Aldrich,	Dayton,	Johnson, N. Dak.,	Robbins,
Alexander,	Dingley,	Joy,	Royse,
Arnold,	Dolliver,	Kerr,	Russell,
Babcock,	Dorr,	Ketcham,	Sauerhering,
Baker, Md.,	Dovener,	Kirkpatrick,	Shannon,
Barham,	<i>Driggs,</i>	Knox,	Shattuc,
Barney,	Eddy,	Kulp,	Sherman,
Barrows,	Ellis,	Lacey,	Showalter,
Bartholdt,	Evans,	Landis,	Smith, Ill.,
Beach,	Faris,	Lawrence,	Smith, S. W.,
Belden,	Fenton,	Littauer,	Smith, Wm. Alden,
Belford,	Fischer,	Loud,	Southard,
Belknap,	<i>Fitzgerald,</i>	Loudenslager,	Southwick,
Bennett,	Fletcher,	Lovering,	Spalding,
Bingham,	Foote,	Low,	Sperry,
Bishop,	Foss,	Lybrand,	Sprague,
Booze,	Fowler, N. J.,	<i>McAlee,</i>	Steele,
Boutell, Ill.,	Gardner,	McCall,	Stevens, Minn.,
Boutelle, Me.,	Gibson,	McCleary,	Stewart, N. J.,
Brewster,	Gillet, N. Y.,	<i>McClellan,</i>	Stewart, Wis.,
Broderick,	Graff,	McDonald,	Stone, C. W.,
Bromwell,	Griffin,	McEwan,	Stone, W. A.,
Brown,	Grosvenor,	McIntire,	Strode, Nebr.,
Brownlow,	Grout,	Mahon,	Sturtevant,
Brumm,	Grow,	Marsh,	Sulloway,
Bull,	Hager,	Mercer,	Tawney,
Burleigh,	Hamilton,	Mesick,	Taylor, Ohio,
Burton,	Harmer,	Miller,	Tongue,
Butler,	Hawley,	Mills,	Updegraff,
Cannon,	Heatwole,	Minor,	Van Voorhis,
Capron,	Hemenway,	Mitchell,	Wadsworth,
Chickering,	Henderson,	Moody,	Walker, Mass.,
Clark, Iowa.,	Henry, Conn.,	Morris,	Walker, Va.,
Connell,	Henry, Ind.,	Mudd,	Wanger,
Cooper, Wis.,	Hepburn,	Northway,	Ward,
Corliss,	Hicks,	Olmsted,	Weaver,
Cousins,	Hilborn,	Otjen,	<i>Wheeler, Ala.,</i>
Crump,	Hill,	Overstreet,	White, Ill.,
Crumpacker,	Hitt,	Parker, N. J.,	Williams, Pa.,
<i>Cummings,</i>	Hooker,	Payne,	Wise,
Curtis, Iowa,	Hopkins,	Pearce, Mo.,	Young.
Curtis, Kans.,	Howe,	Pitney,	
Dalzell,	Howell,	Powers,	
Danford,	Hull,	Pugh,	

NAYS—131.

<i>Adamson,</i>	<i>Davis,</i>	<i>Latimer,</i>	<i>Robb,</i>
<i>Bailey,</i>	<i>De Armond,</i>	<i>Lentz,</i>	<i>Robertson, La.,</i>
BAKER, ILL.,	<i>De Graifenreid,</i>	<i>Lester,</i>	<i>Robinson, Ind.,</i>
<i>Ball,</i>	<i>De Vries,</i>	<i>Lewis, Ga.,</i>	<i>Sayers,</i>
<i>Bankhead,</i>	<i>Dinsmore,</i>	LEWIS, WASH.,	<i>Settle,</i>
BARLOW,	<i>Dockery,</i>	<i>Linney,</i>	SHAFROTH,
<i>Bartlett,</i>	<i>Elliott,</i>	<i>Little,</i>	SHUFORD,
BELL,	<i>Fitzpatrick,</i>	<i>Livingston,</i>	SIMPSON,
<i>Benner,</i>	<i>Fleming,</i>	<i>Lloyd,</i>	<i>Sims,</i>
<i>Benton,</i>	FOWLER, N. C.,	<i>Love,</i>	SKINNER,
<i>Berry,</i>	<i>Fox,</i>	MCCORMICK,	<i>Slayden,</i>
<i>Bland,</i>	<i>Gaines,</i>	<i>McCulloch,</i>	<i>Smith, Ky.,</i>
<i>Bodine,</i>	GREENE,	<i>McDowell,</i>	<i>Sparkman,</i>
BODKIN,	<i>Griffith,</i>	<i>McMillin,</i>	<i>Stallings,</i>
<i>Bradley,</i>	<i>Griggs,</i>	<i>McRae,</i>	STARK,
<i>Brantley,</i>	GUNN,	<i>Maddox,</i>	<i>Stephens, Tex.,</i>
<i>Brenner, Ohio,</i>	<i>Handy,</i>	<i>Maguire,</i>	STOKES,
<i>Brewer,</i>	HARTMAN,	MARTIN,	STROWD, N. C.,
<i>Broussard,</i>	<i>Hay,</i>	MAXWELL,	<i>Sullivan,</i>
<i>Brucker,</i>	<i>Henry, Miss.,</i>	<i>Meyer, La.,</i>	<i>Sulzer,</i>
<i>Brundidge,</i>	<i>Henry, Tex.,</i>	<i>Miers, Ind.,</i>	SUTHERLAND,
<i>Burke,</i>	HOWARD, ALA.,	<i>Moon,</i>	<i>Swanson,</i>
<i>Carmack,</i>	<i>Howard, Ga.,</i>	<i>Norton, Ohio,</i>	<i>Talbert,</i>
CASTLE,	<i>Hunter,</i>	<i>Norton, S. C.,</i>	<i>Taylor, Ala.,</i>
<i>Clardy,</i>	<i>Jones, Va.,</i>	<i>Ogden,</i>	THORP,
<i>Clark, Mo.,</i>	JONES, WASH.,	<i>Osborne,</i>	<i>Underwood,</i>
<i>Clayton,</i>	KELLY,	<i>Otey,</i>	<i>Vandiver,</i>
<i>Cochran, Mo.,</i>	<i>King,</i>	PETERS,	<i>Vehslage,</i>
<i>Cooney,</i>	<i>Kitchin,</i>	<i>Pierce, Tenn.,</i>	VINCENT,
<i>Cooper, Tex.,</i>	<i>Kieberg,</i>	<i>Rhea,</i>	<i>Wheeler, Ky.,</i>
<i>Cowherd,</i>	KNOWLES,	<i>Richardson,</i>	<i>Wilson,</i>
<i>Cox,</i>	<i>Lamb,</i>	RIDGELY,	Zenor.
<i>Davey,</i>	<i>Lanham,</i>	<i>Rixey,</i>	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1.

Baird.

NOT VOTING—42.

<i>Allen,</i>	<i>Cranford,</i>	<i>Meekison,</i>	<i>Tate,</i>
<i>Barber,</i>	<i>Davenport,</i>	NEWLANDS,	<i>Terry,</i>
<i>Barrett,</i>	<i>Ermentrout,</i>	<i>Odell,</i>	TODD,
<i>Brosius,</i>	<i>Gillett, Mass.,</i>	<i>Packer, Pa.,</i>	<i>Warner,</i>
<i>Campbell,</i>	<i>Hinrichsen,</i>	<i>Pearson,</i>	Weymouth,
<i>Catchings,</i>	<i>Hurley,</i>	<i>Perkins,</i>	White, N. C.,
<i>Clarke, N. H.,</i>	<i>Jett,</i>	<i>Prince,</i>	<i>Wilber,</i>
<i>Cochrane, N. Y.,</i>	<i>Lorimer,</i>	<i>Quigg,</i>	<i>Williams, Miss.,</i>
<i>Codding,</i>	<i>Mahany,</i>	<i>Shelden,</i>	Yost.
<i>Colson,</i>	<i>Mann,</i>	<i>Snover,</i>	
<i>Connolly,</i>	<i>Marshall,</i>	<i>Strait,</i>	

Republicans in Roman; Democrats in Italics; Populists and Silver men in Small Caps.

The bill went to the Senate April 30, and was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance. A majority of this committee, composed of six Democrats and one Populist, reported back the bill, May 12, with the bond and certificate provisions stricken out, and amendments for the issue of one hundred and fifty millions of new greenbacks, and the im-

mediate coinage of forty-two millions of so-called seigniorage from the silver bullion in the Treasury and the issue of silver certificates thereon; while the five Republicans of the committee, composing a minority, reported in favor of the retention of the House provisions for the issue of certificates of indebtedness and bonds, reducing the amount of the latter to three hundred millions.

Both the majority and minority of the Finance Committee concurred in reporting amendments to the House bill giving a rebate of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, on sales of beer stamps, striking out the special tax on dealers in tobacco and the tax on tonnage, slightly reducing the proposed House rate on cigars and cigarettes, levying a special annual tax on bankers, brokers, proprietors of circuses etc., theatres, billiard and pool rooms; and imposing a tax on inheritances and legacies in estates exceeding ten thousand dollars, and on refineries of oil and sugar producing more than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars annually; and also providing for a stamp tax on bills of lading, and on sleeping and parlor car tickets; with other amendments of an immaterial character.

The new internal taxes proposed by the amendments reported by the Senate Finance Committee, were estimated by them to produce fifty millions additional to those provided by the House bill, nine millions of which it was estimated would be derived from the legacy and succession tax, five millions from the special taxes on brokers etc., and thirty millions from the additional stamp taxes, raising the stamp taxes, as the Committee estimated, to sixty-eight millions, and as the two House taxes proposed to be dropped (the tax on dealers in tobacco and the tax on tonnage) aggregated seven millions, the net increase over the House bill was estimated at forty-three millions.

The bill was taken up in the Senate May 16 for discussion and amendment. The House bond and certificate of indebtedness provisions, offered by the minority of the Senate Finance Committee, were restored by a vote of 45 to 31; the greenback amendment, reported by the majority of the Finance Committee, was defeated by a vote of 45 to 31; the seigniorage amendment, somewhat modified, was adopted by

a vote of 48 to 31; and all the other amendments reported by the Committee were adopted by the Senate.

An amendment offered by Mr. Tillman, of South Carolina, imposing a duty of ten cents per pound on tea—the only tariff provision in the bill—was adopted by a vote of 48 to 32.

On June 4 the bill, as amended, passed the Senate by a vote of 48 to 28, and 13 not voting and paired, as follows:

YEAS—48.

Aldrich,	Foraker,	Lodge,	Platt, N. Y.,
Allison,	Frye,	McBride,	Pritchard,
Baker,	Gallinger,	<i>McEnery,</i>	Sewell,
Burrows,	Gear,	McMillan,	Shoup,
<i>Caffery,</i>	<i>Gorman,</i>	Mantle,	Spooner,
Carter,	Hale,	Mason,	Thurston,
Chandler,	Hanna,	Mitchell,	<i>Turpie,</i>
Clark,	Hansbrough,	Morrill,	Warren,
Davis,	Hawley,	<i>Murphy,</i>	Wellington,
Deboe,	Hoar,	Nelson,	Wetmore,
Elkins,	KYLE,	Perkins,	Wilson,
Fairbanks,	<i>Lindsay,</i>	Platt, Conn.,	Wolcott.

NAYS—28.

ALLEN,	<i>Clay,</i>	<i>McLaurin,</i>	<i>Rawlins,</i>
<i>Bacon,</i>	<i>Cockrell,</i>	<i>Mallory,</i>	<i>Roach,</i>
<i>Bate,</i>	<i>Daniel,</i>	<i>Martin,</i>	STEWART,
<i>Berry,</i>	<i>Harris,</i>	<i>Money,</i>	<i>Sullivan,</i>
<i>Butler,</i>	<i>Heitfeld,</i>	<i>Pasco,</i>	<i>Tillman,</i>
CANNON,	<i>Jones, Ark.,</i>	PETTIGREW,	<i>Turley,</i>
<i>Chilton,</i>	JONES, NEV.,	<i>Pettus,</i>	<i>White.</i>

NOT VOTING—13.

Cullom,	<i>Mills,</i>	Quay,	<i>Vest.</i>
<i>Faulkner,</i>	<i>Morgan,</i>	<i>Smith,</i>	
<i>Gray,</i>	Penrose,	TELLER,	
<i>Kenney,</i>	Proctor,	<i>Turner,</i>	

Republicans in Roman; Democrats in Italics; and Populists and Silver men in Small Caps.

The bill as amended by the Senate was promptly non-concurred in by the House, and sent to a conference by the vote of the two Houses on June 6.

The conferees were Senators Allison, Aldrich and Jones of Arkansas, on the part of the Senate; and Representatives Dingley, Payne and Bailey, on the part of the House.

The conferees met on the same day in the Senate Finance Committee room, and daily thereafter till June 9, on which day the Republican majority of the Senate and House conferees reached a final agreement.

The conference report was presented in the House by

Chairman Dingley at 5 o'clock P. M. of the same day, and after a debate of three hours (a recess to 8 o'clock having been taken after the reading of the report) was agreed to by the House at 11:30 o'clock P. M., by a vote of 154 to 107—the division running on the same lines as those shown in the passage of the original bill.

The Senate took up the conference report the next day (June 10), and agreed to it at 5 P. M. by a vote of 43 to 22, and 24 not voting and paired, as follows :

YEAS—43.

Aldrich,	Fairbanks,	<i>Lindsay,</i>	Perkins,
Allison,	Foraker,	McBride,	Platt, Conn.,
Baker,	Frye,	<i>McEnery,</i>	Pritchard,
Burrows,	Gallinger,	Mantle,	Quay,
<i>Caffery,</i>	Gear,	Mason,	Shoup,
Carter,	<i>Gorman,</i>	<i>Mitchell,</i>	<i>Turpie,</i>
Chandler,	Hanna,	<i>Morgan,</i>	Warren,
Clark,	Hansbrough,	Morrill,	Wellington,
Cullom,	Hawley,	<i>Murphy,</i>	Wilson,
Deboe,	Hoar,	Nelson,	Wolcott.
Elkins,	KYLE,	Penrose,	

NAYS—22.

<i>Bacon,</i>	<i>Cockrell,</i>	<i>Martin,</i>	<i>Rawlins,</i>
<i>Bate,</i>	<i>Daniel,</i>	<i>Mills,</i>	<i>Roach,</i>
BUTLER,	<i>Heitfeld,</i>	<i>Money,</i>	<i>Sullivan,</i>
CANNON,	<i>Jones, Ark.,</i>	<i>Pasco,</i>	TELLER.
<i>Chilton,</i>	JONES, NEV.,	PETTIGREW,	
<i>Clay,</i>	<i>McLaurin,</i>	<i>Pettus,</i>	

NOT VOTING—24.

ALLEN,	<i>Harris,</i>	Proctor,	<i>Tillman,</i>
<i>Berry,</i>	<i>Kenney,</i>	Sewell,	<i>Turley,</i>
Davis,	Lodge,	<i>Smith,</i>	<i>Turner,</i>
<i>Faulkner,</i>	McMillan,	Spooner,	<i>Vest,</i>
<i>Gray,</i>	<i>Mallory,</i>	STEWART,	Wetmore,
Hale,	Platt, N. Y.,	Thurston,	<i>White.</i>

Republicans in Roman ; Democrats in Italics ; and Populists and Silver men in Small Caps.

The act to "provide ways and means to meet war expenditures," as finally agreed to by both houses, and approved by the President on June 13, provided for the increase of the internal tax on fermented liquors to two dollars per barrel, with a discount of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on stamps purchased—making the tax practically \$1.85 per barrel ; for the increase of the internal tax on tobacco to 12 cents per lb., with an increase to \$3.60 per thousand on cigars and cigarettes weighing more than three pounds per thousand, to one dollar per thousand

on cigars weighing less, and to \$1.50 per thousand on cigarettes weighing not more than three pounds per thousand; for special annual taxes, after July 1, on bankers, brokers, pawnbrokers, proprietors of theatres, museums and concert halls in cities of over twenty-five thousand population, proprietors or agents of circuses and other public exhibitions for money, and proprietors of bowling alleys and billiard tables, and on certain manufacturers of and wholesale dealers in tobacco—retail dealers in tobacco and cigars being exempted; for stamp taxes after July 1 on certain specified certificates, documents and other instruments, including checks, bills of lading issued by railroads, express companies and other common carriers, telegraph and long-distance telephone messages, sleeping and parlor car tickets, insurance policies, medicinal proprietary articles and preparations, chewing gum and bottled wine; for excise taxes on refiners of sugar or petroleum on the gross amount of their business in excess of \$250,000; for an excise tax on legacies and distributive shares of personal property, where such property shall exceed the value of ten thousand dollars; and for an excise tax on manufacturers of mixed flour for the purpose of securing the marking of the same.

The only tariff provision in the bill was one imposing a duty of ten cents per pound on tea imported after the passage of the act, which was estimated to yield ten millions annually. The Senate amendment for the coinage of the so-called "seigniorage" of silver bullion in the Treasury was dropped, and a provision simply reciting the coinage clause of the unrevoked provisions of the silver purchase act of 1890, as it is being executed, substituted for it.

The uncertain elements in the estimates of the revenue that would be secured by the internal-revenue provisions of the War-Revenue Act, lay in the receipts from the stamp taxes, which were variously estimated, and from the tax on inheritances and legacies, which were estimated by the Senate Finance Committee at nine millions per annum. The lowest estimate of the aggregate war revenue was nine millions per month, or \$108,000,000 per annum, and the highest twelve and one-half millions, or \$150,000,000 per annum, with ten millions per annum additional from the customs duty on tea.

The receipts from the internal-revenue provisions of the War-Revenue Act (additional to the revenue derived from the internal taxes levied by previous laws), based on the receipts for the first three months, are estimated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the fiscal year which will end June 30, 1899, as follows :

From Tobacco etc.	\$16,000,000
From Fermented Liquors etc.	33,000,000
From Stamp Taxes, Schedules A & B	40,000,000
From Special Annual Taxes on Bankers etc.	7,000,000
From Legacies and Successions	3,600,000
From Gross Receipts of Refineries.	400,000
	<hr/>
	\$100,000,000

NOTE. The receipts from legacies the first three months were only \$375,337, but after sufficient time has elapsed to close up estates of persons deceased since July 1st, 1898, it is believed the tax on gross receipts will be more than the estimate.

The full text of the two sections of the War-Revenue Act, authorizing the issue of bonds and of certificates of indebtedness, is as follows :

SEC. 32. That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to borrow from time to time, at a rate of interest not exceeding three per centum per annum, such sum or sums as, in his judgment, may be necessary to meet public expenditures, and to issue therefor certificates of indebtedness in such form as he may prescribe and in denominations of fifty dollars or some multiple of that sum ; and each certificate so issued shall be payable, with the interest accrued thereon, at such time, not exceeding one year from the date of its issue, as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe : *Provided*, That the amount of such certificates outstanding shall at no time exceed one hundred millions of dollars ; and the provisions of existing law respecting counterfeiting and other fraudulent practices are hereby extended to the bonds and certificates of indebtedness authorized by this act.

SEC. 33. That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to borrow, on the credit of the United States, from time to time, as the proceeds may be required to defray expenditures authorized on account of the existing war (such proceeds when received to be used only for the purpose of meeting such war expenditures), the sum of four hundred

million dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, and to prepare and issue therefor, coupon or registered bonds of the United States in such form as he may prescribe, and in denominations of twenty dollars or some multiple of that sum, redeemable in coin at the pleasure of the United States after ten years from the date of their issue, and payable twenty years from such date, and bearing interest payable quarterly in coin at the rate of three per centum per annum; and the bonds herein authorized shall be exempt from all taxes or duties of the United States, as well as from taxation in any form by or under State, municipal or local authority: *Provided*, That the bonds authorized by this section shall be first offered at par as a popular loan under such regulations, prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, as will give opportunity to the citizens of the United States to participate in the subscriptions to such loan, and in allotting said bonds the several subscriptions of individuals shall be first accepted, and the subscriptions for the lowest amounts shall be first allotted: *Provided further*, That any portion of any issue of said bonds not subscribed for as above provided may be disposed of by the Secretary of the Treasury at not less than par, under such regulations as he may prescribe, but no commissions shall be allowed or paid thereon; and a sum not exceeding one-tenth of one per centum of the amount of the bonds and certificates herein authorized is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay the expense of preparing, advertising and issuing the same.

In view of the fact that Congress had either appropriated, or proposed to appropriate, \$361,000,000 to provide for the expenditures of the war up to January 1, 1899, in response to the estimates of the war and navy officials; and in view of the further fact that the war revenue up to that time would not be likely to exceed fifty-five millions, and the available cash balance in the Treasury (exclusive of the one hundred millions greenback redemption fund and the fifty million working balance required for the operations of the Treasury), would not exceed seventy millions more—leaving a balance of at least two hundred and thirty millions of the appropriations

to be provided for, Secretary of the Treasury Gage thought it wise, immediately after the approval of the War-Revenue Act, to take measures to invite popular subscriptions for two hundred millions of the three per cent bonds authorized to be issued and sold.

There were many financiers who pointed to the fact that the four per cent loan of 1925 was then selling in the market at a premium which netted three and a quarter per cent interest to the investor, and to the further fact that the war-revenue law practically withdrew the proposed loan from the competition of large investors, by providing that "in allotting said bonds the several subscriptions of individuals shall be first accepted, and the subscriptions for the lowest amounts shall be first allotted," and doubtfully shook their heads at the possibility of placing a loan of two hundred millions bearing only three per cent interest, without the payment of a single dollar in commissions, and with the expenditure of less than one-tenth of one per cent for clerical help, stationery, engraving and printing and distributing.

The success of the loan went far beyond the expectations of the most sanguine believers in the patriotism and ability of our people, and contributed powerfully to impress on Spain and on Europe a profound conviction of the unity of our people in support of the war, and of the unlimited extent of our resources.


Notwithstanding subscriptions were limited to thirty days, yet when the loan closed on the afternoon of July 14, tenders had been made by about 320,000 persons for \$1,394,000,000, or nearly seven times the amount offered.


The popular character of the tenders is shown by the fact that there were 230,000 subscriptions for \$500 or less—a large number for \$20, \$40 and \$50—amounting in the aggregate to \$101,000,000, or more than half the entire loan; while the other \$99,000,000 was taken by about 70,000 subscribers, no one of whom received over \$4,500. Not a single syndicate or corporation or individual subscribing for over \$4,500, was able to obtain a dollar of the loan.

It is probable that the remarkable success of this popular

loan was as potent a factor in bringing the war to an early and successful close as a victory on the land or the sea.

The war was much shorter than was anticipated, and for the first time in our history less costly than was estimated by the War and Navy Departments and appropriated for by Congress. The estimates and appropriations up to January 1, 1899, were \$361,000,000, to meet which \$325,000,000 were provided; while the actual expenditures up to that time were only \$200,000,000, or \$220,000,000 including the amount which it is proposed to pay Spain for improvements in the Philippines, leaving a balance in the Treasury of about \$100,000,000 (in addition to the greenback redemption fund and a working balance of \$50,000,000) to meet the extraordinary expenditures in excess of the war revenue necessitated for some time by the new responsibilities imposed upon us by the successful results of the war.





From a photograph by Purdy of Boston, Copyright 1897

John P. Purdy

CHAPTER XVII.

THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR.

BY

HON. JOHN D. LONG, Secretary of the Navy.

OUR new navy, which has come out of the war with Spain with so much credit and renown, dates from the administration of President Arthur, when Mr. Chandler was Secretary of the Navy. The first ships were the *Chicago*, *Atlanta*, *Boston*, and *Dolphin*. John Roach builded, not better than he knew, but apparently better than anybody else knew. He and Secretary Chandler not only laid the foundation of our present magnificent navy, but gave an impulse to iron naval ship building in this country which has resulted in the creation of American ship yards capable of turning out as good work as any in the world. An infelicitous attempt was made to discredit the little *Dolphin* as "structurally weak," but she has circumnavigated the globe and has come out of the recent war equal to every demand and sound as a nut.

Secretary Whitney, with continuing ability and foresight, enlarged the work which was begun under Mr. Chandler, and was followed in the same lines by Secretaries Tracy and Herbert, each adding to the number of our war ships and developing in every way our naval power.

When I entered upon my duties in March, 1897, the Navy, though not large compared with the navies of one or two foreign powers, was well equipped and well prepared. A high professional spirit animated its officers; the Bureaus and leading naval stations were officered by chiefs alive to their responsibilities, zealous and progressive. It is fair to say that after the last above named date no new life or force was infused into the administration of the Navy. These were already there. The fleets went on, as during the year before, in the

gunnery and target practice and manœuvres at sea. They were supplied at home and abroad with ammunition, coal, medical and other supplies, so that they were ready for any emergency, and the credit of their substantial preparedness when war came belongs to no one man nor to any one year.

And yet it was the preparation of a small Navy, almost pathetically small as compared, for instance, with that of Great Britain. It had seen no war service; its battleships, gunboats and torpedo boats were untried. To appreciate the situation we must forget the glory and confidence felt in it everywhere to-day and remember that a year ago it had very little popular hold. At the first muttering of the storm with Spain, it was an open question whether her naval power was not equal to our own. She had ships of the finest and most recent naval construction; she had gallant and educated officers and brave seamen; she had ready access to every resource which the skill of Europe could supply in the way of naval construction, armament and ammunition. It was with a consciousness of these facts on our part that, when the possibility of war became apparent, the work of providing for its exigencies, which had been begun and carried on so well already under the ordinary conditions of past years, was continued strenuously and earnestly by the same agencies to meet the extraordinary demands which war would bring.

As early as January, 1898, the increasing tension of our relations with Spain put the Navy Department on its guard. The fleet in Atlantic waters had been largely engaged during the previous years in enforcing the neutrality laws, and great vigilance had been exercised in preventing the fitting out and departure of filibustering expeditions from our coast. Recognizing the importance of retaining experienced enlisted men in the service, the Commander-in-Chief of the European station was directed, on the 11th day of January, 1898, not to discharge men whose enlistments were about to expire. This was probably the first important order given in contemplation of war. On January 17, the Commander-in-Chief of the South Atlantic station was informed of the critical condition of our relations with Spain and directed to proceed with the *Cincinnati* and *Castine* from Montevideo to Para, Brazil. On the

same day, the *Helena*, then on her way to the Asiatic station, was ordered to await instructions at Lisbon; and the *Wilmington*, on her way to the South Atlantic station, was ordered to await instructions in the West Indies. On January 26, the Commander-in-Chief of the European station was ordered to assemble his squadron at Lisbon, and on the next day the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic station was ordered to retain the men whose enlistments were about to expire.

For several years prior to the incoming of the present Administration, it had been the policy of our Government to refrain from sending naval vessels to Cuban waters. This policy was now reversed, and in the Fall of 1897, the North Atlantic squadron, following the formerly established custom, and so without just cause of offense to Spain, was ordered south for the purpose of winter evolutions and practice. The next step was for our naval vessels to resume friendly visits to Cuban ports; and after conference between our Secretary of State and the Spanish Minister, in which the subject was "discussed and accepted," the authorities at Madrid and Havana were informed that the U. S. S. *Maine* would be forthwith instructed to call at the port of Havana.

The order dispatching the *Maine* was sent January 24, the ship being at that time off Dry Tortugas, Florida. The telegram directing this movement was as follows:

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1898.

SICARD, *Key West*:

Order the *Maine* to Havana, Cuba, and make friendly call, pay his respects to the authorities, particular attention must be paid to usual exchange of civilities. Torpedo boat must not accompany *Maine*. The squadron must not return to Key West on this account.

The *Maine* was received in Havana with every mark of official courtesy. Reports from her commanding officer, however, and other sources, indicated from the first that this visit was received with disfavor.

A little after one o'clock, on the night of February 15, my daughter came into my apartment at the Hotel Portland, woke me from a sound sleep, and gave me a dispatch which she had just received from a Western Union messenger boy

in the hallway, with the information that it was of great importance. It was the famous dispatch from Captain Sigsbee announcing the destruction of the *Maine*, and was as follows:

HAVANA, February 15, 1898.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Washington, D. C.:

Maine blown up in Havana Harbor at 9:40 to-night, and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send light-house tenders from Key West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above. No one has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until further report. All officials believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy.

SIGSBEE.

It was almost impossible to believe that it could be true, or that it was not a wild and vivid dream. As my eyes went over and over the letters, I seemed to see between the lines the harbor at Havana, lying under the shadow of night, suddenly rift with a column of fire and startled with the thunder of the explosion of the noble battleship. Commander Dickins was at that time, in the absence of Captain Crowninshield, acting Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and I sent the dispatch to him with a short note written in lead pencil as follows:

DEAR DICKINS:

I have just received this terrible telegram. Please have request attended to at once by telegram in ordinary language, not using cipher.

Commander Dickins reported a little later at my hotel. I was sitting in a small room adjoining the hotel office with two or three newspaper correspondents, who had already heard the news and had come to me for confirmation of it. Dickins was ordered to send to the naval station at Key West instructions to dispatch a vessel to Havana with medical assistance. He then went to the White House to inform the

President of the catastrophe. The following telegram was sent to Captain Sigsbee:

SIGSBEE, *Havana*:

The President directs me to express for himself and the people of the United States his profound sympathy with the officers and crew of the *Maine*, and desires that no expense be spared in providing for the survivors and caring for the dead.

LONG.

The telegram of Captain Sigsbee did much to hold public opinion in check and to assist the Department in securing in the public mind as dispassionate a view as possible of the disaster, and a suspension of judgment until the facts could be investigated.

A Board of Inquiry was appointed on February 19 to investigate and report to the Department the cause of the explosion. It consisted of Captain W. T. Sampson, Captain F. E. Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander Wm. P. Potter as members, and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix as recorder. They proceeded to Havana and began their investigations on the 21st day of February. A most thorough and exhaustive examination of the wreck was made, and the Board reported on the 21st day of March that the *Maine* had been destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, but that the responsibility could not be fixed upon any person or persons. The most cursory examination, even by a non-technical eye, of the drawings which accompany the report is convincing that the cause of the disaster must have been from the outside. The impression has prevailed that the Department was cognizant of the nature of the findings of the Court long before they were received in Washington. This, however, was not the case. At one time the advisability of having the report telegraphed in cipher was considered, but the proceedings were so protracted and the preparations for any emergency had reached such a stage that this step was not deemed necessary.

On February 25, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic station, Commodore Dewey, was ordered to assemble the squadron under his command at Hong Kong and to retain the *Olympia*, which was under orders to proceed to San Fran-

cisco. Instructions were given, outlining his conduct and duty in the event of hostilities. The *Baltimore*, then at Honolulu, was directed to join the Asiatic squadron and a large supply of ammunition was sent to Honolulu by the *Mohican* and transferred to that vessel.

The Department, as early as March 3, issued instructions to the Office of Naval Intelligence to make special inquiries of our naval attachés in Europe as to what men-of-war and torpedo boats could be purchased abroad. They were directed to submit estimates of cost and to report upon the condition of purchasable ships. It was considered important to secure any war vessels which might be in the market, not only to strengthen our own navy, but to prevent them from coming into the possession of Spain, and it was necessary that any purchases made abroad should be concluded before the outbreak of hostilities, which, under the neutrality laws, would then make their purchase impracticable.

With a view to these and other proper expenditures, Congress passed, on March 9, the Emergency Bill, appropriating \$50,000,000 for National defence. A Board was at once appointed for the purpose of examining such vessels of our own merchant marine as were deemed suitable for naval purposes. With the ample means thus provided, the purchase of vessels, ammunition, guns and all classes of naval war material went rapidly on. The inquiries set on foot in Europe showed the impossibility of obtaining war ships in any number in foreign markets. On the day of the passage of the Emergency Appropriation, the Naval Attaché at London was authorized to negotiate for the purchase of two cruisers then building in England for the Brazilian Government, the *Amazonas* and the *Almirante Abreu*. This purchase was successfully concluded and the United States flag was hoisted March 18 on board the *Amazonas*, renamed the *New Orleans*, which soon afterwards became an efficient part of our naval war fleet. The *Almirante Abreu*, since then named the *Albany*, was far from completion, but one vessel could not be bought without the purchase of both. An officer was sent to Europe with instructions to negotiate for other vessels, but made no purchases. The Naval Attaché at

Berlin purchased at Elbing, Germany, a torpedo boat which was renamed the *Somers*. Unfavorable weather and other causes prevented her prompt departure for the United States, and when war was declared she was in an English port, where she remained. The cruiser *Diogenes* was purchased from the Thames Iron Works on April 2, 1898, and there placed in commission as the *Topeka*. The *Nictheroy*, afterwards renamed the *Buffalo*, was purchased at Rio Janeiro and the *Manly*, a very small torpedo boat, was purchased in Europe.

The statement of the armed vessels actually bought affords but a meager idea of the number of vessels the purchase of which was under consideration from time to time, and for some of which extensive negotiations were carried on. Of those really desirable, few could be obtained, and great care was necessary to avoid burdening our navy list with a number of obsolete craft, for many of which exorbitant prices were asked. A number of colliers were purchased abroad, as it was not practicable to obtain enough suitable vessels for this purpose in the United States, and they proved of great value during the war.

A naval war board was established early in March, and continued in session at the Department throughout the war. Its services were of great value, although there was at first an inclination in the public mind to carp at such a board and to make it the easy target of criticism; but no institution was ever more thoroughly vindicated. The time of the Secretary of the Navy, like that of every other Cabinet officer, is so much taken up with interviews and routine work, that it was a great relief to me to refer questions relating to naval movements to this board, which, in the quiet of its room, aided by maps and charts, and constant telegraphic communication, was able to give professional and undivided consideration to every problem that arose. Its duty was to consider and outline the strategical policy of the Department. Under it were prepared, for the consideration and signature of the Secretary, orders bearing upon this policy, and to it were referred all information received of the movements of the Spanish naval forces and everything bearing upon the operations of the war. Its permanent members were Rear-Admiral Montgomery

Sicard, U. S. N., Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. (retired), and Captain A. S. Crowninshield, U. S. N.:—Admiral Sicard, a man of long and copious naval experience, and of the most painstaking deliberation; Captain Mahan, the famous naval author, quick, earnest and competent; and Captain Crowninshield, through whom all orders to ships in commission are issued and who is in direct touch with the personnel of the navy as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

In the meantime, the *Columbia* and *Minneapolis*, in reserve, had been ordered to prepare for service. The *Brooklyn* had been ordered to proceed from La Guayra to Hampton Roads, in contemplation of the Flying Squadron. The Commanders-in-Chief of stations had been ordered to husband ammunition and to keep their vessels filled with the best coal obtainable.

The *Helena* and *Bancroft* had been ordered to the United States, and the Commander-in-Chief of the European station had been ordered to attach the *New Orleans* to his command and proceed home. The *Oregon* had been ordered from Bremerton, Washington, to San Francisco, with a view to bringing her around to augment the Atlantic fleet, and the *Cincinnati*, *Castine* and *Wilmington* had been ordered to proceed from Para, Brazil, to Port Antonio, Jamaica.

The report of the *Maine* Court of Inquiry was received at the Department on March 24. Lieutenant-Commander Marix brought it into my office about ten o'clock in the morning, and after reading the findings of the Court I went with him to the White House, where they were read by him to the President, and I recall that both the President and myself were much struck with their brevity. This report was forwarded to Congress on March 28 with a special message.

Congress having passed an act authorizing the appointment of officers in the navy and marine corps in such numbers as might be required, to serve for the period of the emergency created by war with Spain, the Department appointed boards to conduct the examination of applicants. As a result 856 officers were commissioned for temporary service.

On March 3, the navy yards at Brooklyn, Boston and League Island were instructed to enlist seamen, firemen and petty officers for general service, and the enlisted force was

steadily increased as vessels became available for service, until, on August 15, the date on which it reached its maximum, there were 24,123 enlisted men in the service.

The purchase of auxiliary ships, under the efficient direction first of Assistant-Secretary Roosevelt and then of his successor, Mr. Allen, went on as rapidly as possible. As fast as purchased, they were sent to the navy yards and to certain private establishments for such changes as were necessary for their use by the navy. The old monitors, which had been laid up in reserve, were placed in commission and were provided with crews from the naval militia of the states and stationed at important ports along the coast. A system of coast defense and coast signal service was devised and was ready to be put in operation upon the outbreak of hostilities.

The total ships added to the navy numbered 128. The maximum fighting force separated into classes was as follows :

Battle ships (first class)	4
Battle ship (second class)	1
Armored cruisers	2
Coast-defense monitors	6
Armored ram	1
Protected cruisers	12
Unprotected cruisers	3
Gunboats	18
Dynamite cruiser.	1
Torpedo boats	11
Vessels of old Navy, including monitors	14
Auxiliary navy :		
Auxiliary cruisers	11
Converted yachts	28
Revenue cutters	15
Light-house tenders	4
Converted tugs	27
Converted colliers.	19
Miscellaneous	19

On April 20, Congress passed the resolution directing the President to intervene in Cuba. In order to understand the situation of the navy on this date, let us recall that the North Atlantic Squadron, under command of Captain W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., was in the vicinity of Key West. The *Oregon* had reached Atlantic waters on her way to join the North

Atlantic Squadron; the North Patrol Squadron, for the protection of the Atlantic coast between the capes of the Delaware and Bar Harbor, had been organized under command of Commodore J. A. Howell, U. S. N.; the Flying Squadron, under command of Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. N., had been assembled at Hampton Roads; the Asiatic Squadron, under command of Commodore George Dewey, was at Hong Kong, China; and the Pacific Squadron, under Admiral Miller, was at different points on the Pacific coast.

Commodore Dewey, having carried out his orders to retain the men whose enlistments were about to expire, to proceed to Hong Kong, China, with the squadron under his command and keep his fleet full of the best coal obtainable, to retain the *Olympia*, to purchase two supply vessels, and to arm and man them, and having been reinforced by the *Baltimore*, and received full instructions outlining his duties, was ready for the outbreak of hostilities. The following dispatch was sent to him :

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1898.

DEWEY, *Hong Kong* :

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.

LONG.

Upon the request of the Governor of Hong Kong, Commodore Dewey left that place on April 25 and proceeded to Mirs Bay, China, where the arrival of the United States Consul from Manila was awaited. The squadron sailed on April 27 and arrived at Manila on the morning of May 1. The brilliant action of the squadron in passing the mines and forts at the entrance of the harbor, and in engaging and destroying the Spanish fleet under Admiral Montojo, is without parallel in naval history. It is described in other chapters of this book.

News of this great victory was first received through the public press, via Madrid. The official dispatch, sent by the

McCulloch to Hong Kong and transmitted from that place, was not received at the Department until May 7. It was dated Manila, May 1, and being of some length was received in piece-meal. The fact of its arrival at once became known, and many correspondents and others had gathered in the big reception room of the Department eagerly awaiting its translation.

The news was received with the greatest enthusiasm. It announced the complete destruction of the Spanish fleet, without injury to our squadron and without the loss of a single man. Another dispatch, received from Commodore Dewey on the same day, dated Cavité, May 4, announced that he had taken possession of the naval station at Cavité and destroyed its fortifications, that he controlled the bay completely and that he could take the city at any time. The gratification of the Department at the receipt of this news it is difficult to state. Aside from the moral effect of the victory, coming almost immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, and the inspiring influence it had on the personnel of the entire naval service, it relieved the Pacific coast from all danger of attack and all shipping in the Pacific ocean from fear of capture. An immense saving to the country was effected by the decrease in marine insurance rates which followed in consequence.

The force under Commodore Dewey consisted of the *Olympia*, flagship, *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Petrel*, *Concord*, *Boston*, the revenue cutter *McCulloch* and the supply ship *Zafiro* and collier *Nanshan*. The Spanish squadron was composed of the *Reina Cristina*, flagship, the *Castilla*, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Marques del Duero*, *General Lezo*, *Argos*, *Velasco* and transport *Isla de Mindanao*. All the ships of the Spanish squadron were sunk or burned, and the casualties on the Spanish side amounted to about 400 killed and wounded.

This victory made Commodore Dewey deservedly famous, and gave him rank with the most distinguished naval heroes of all time. Nor was his merit most in the brilliant victory which he achieved in the battle fought with the utmost gallantry and skill, waged without an error, and crowned with

overwhelming success. It was still more in the nerve with which he moved from Mirs Bay to Manila harbor; the genius of his conception of attack; the high commanding confidence of a leader who has weighed every risk, prepared himself for every emergency, and has that unflinching determination to win and that utter freedom from the thought or possibility of swerving from his purpose, which are more than half the battle. It was a man of resolution and power, who, at that vast distance from home, with his little fleet shut off by the neutrality laws from every port, bearing the fate of his country in his hand, was equal to the emergency and met it as serenely and masterfully as if it were an incident of an ordinary voyage.

On May 7 the following message was cabled to him: "The President, in the name of the American people, thanks you and your officers and men for your splendid achievement and overwhelming victory"; and on the 10th he was informed that the thanks of Congress had been tendered him and the officers and men under his command, and that he had been promoted to the grade of Rear Admiral. Admiral Dewey established a blockade of the harbor of Manila, and the Department at once took steps to reinforce this squadron. The *Charleston*, which had been previously sent to Honolulu, sailed for Manila on June 4 with the chartered steamer *City of Peking*, and the transports *Australia* and *City of Sydney*, carrying the first detachment of troops.

The *Charleston* had orders to stop at the Island of Guam, in the Ladrões, and to demand the surrender of that place with all officials and persons in the military service of Spain. She arrived at the Port of San Luis d'Apra on June 20, and on the next day received the surrender of the Island. After taking on board the Governor and Captain of the Port and all officers and men in the Spanish service, she sailed for Manila, where she arrived on June 30. Further to reinforce the Asiatic squadron, the *Monterey* sailed for Manila, with the collier *Brutus*, on June 11, and the *Monadnock* on June 25, accompanied by the collier *Nero*.

On June 18, information was received of the sailing of the Spanish home fleet, under Admiral Camara, for the Philip-

pires. Admiral Dewey was kept informed from day to day of the progress of this squadron, and as soon as information was received that it had passed into the Suez Canal, the Eastern squadron was formed under command of Commodore Watson, and a statement given to the press that this fleet would sail at once for the coast of Spain. This action induced Admiral Camara's squadron to return to Spain. The reinforcements, however, which the Department had dispatched to Admiral Dewey, so strengthened the force under his command that no anxiety was felt on his account. During the continuance of hostilities, the conduct of affairs in the Philippines, under Admiral Dewey, merited the warmest commendation of the Department.

On May 26, he was advised that it was desirable not to have any political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands which might incur liability to maintain their cause, and on June 14 he was directed to report fully any conferences, relations or co-operations which he had had with Aguinaldo. Admiral Dewey's reply showed that he had acted with great discretion, and that while his relations with the insurgent leader were cordial, and he had exercised a strong influence towards having the insurgents conduct their war in a humane and civilized manner, he had refrained from any recognition of the insurgent cause or any action which committed this country to support it. Upon the arrival of General Merritt, the joint operations of the Army and Navy were begun, which resulted in the surrender of Manila on August 13.

In the conduct of the war in the Atlantic, three objects were in view, the most important of which was the blockade of Cuba. It was believed that the establishment of a close and efficient blockade, which would prevent supplies and munitions of war from entering the island, might induce the Spanish to capitulate before the conclusion of the rainy season.

The next important object was the destruction of the Spanish fleet. In order to introduce supplies and munitions of war into Cuba, it was necessary for the Spanish to raise

the blockade, and this could only be accomplished by defeating our fleet, or by evading it and reaching a port in Cuba.

The third consideration was the protection of the Atlantic sea coast of the United States.

With these purposes in view, the Department in March directed the monitors to join the squadron under Admiral Sicard, and detached the *Massachusetts* and *Texas* from his command and ordered them to proceed to Hampton Roads, where the Flying Squadron was organized. The *Brooklyn*, *Minneapolis* and *Columbia* were also attached to this squadron. It was stationed at this central point in order that it might go to any port on the Atlantic coast which should be menaced by a Spanish fleet, or be able promptly to reinforce the fleet in Cuban waters should the Spanish endeavor to raise the blockade.

Captain W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., was assigned to the command of the North Atlantic fleet on March 26 to succeed Rear-Admiral Sicard, U. S. N., whom, on account of his health, it was found necessary to relieve from this onerous and exacting duty. Upon the detachment of Admiral Sicard, Captain Sampson was the senior officer present. He was thoroughly familiar with the personnel and matériel of the fleet and with all the arrangements which had been made immediately before the war, and the Department had every confidence in his judgment and professional ability. Upon the outbreak of hostilities on April 21, he was assigned to the command of the United States naval force on the North Atlantic station with the rank of Rear Admiral.

It proved to be a wise selection in every respect. It is fair to say greater mere naval responsibilities rested on Admiral Sampson than on any other officer during the war. They were discharged with great ability and without error. The number of ships and men subject to his command was larger than those of any other officer. His duties were of a complicated and very onerous character; they began with the beginning of the war and lasted until its close. Aside from the routine of correspondence and the details of so extensive and exacting a command, there were three great objects to be accomplished by him. First, the maintenance of the blockade

of the island of Cuba; second, the pursuit and destruction of the Spanish Atlantic fleet; third, the work of convoying, landing, and co-operating with, the Army in the movement upon Santiago and afterwards upon Porto Rico. How thoroughly all this was done is now matter of history.

The command of the Flying Squadron upon its formation was given to Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. N., who was informed that, in case of the juncture of the Flying Squadron and the fleet under Admiral Sampson, he would be placed under command of Admiral Sampson.

At 6:30 A. M., on April 22, Admiral Sampson sailed from Key West with the squadron under his command, and in execution of the President's orders of April 21, at once established a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba from Bahia Honda to Cardenas.

The instructions to Admiral Sampson were that he should make every effort to capture or destroy the Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gun-boats which were stationed along the coast of Cuba. He was expressly directed not to expose the squadron under his command to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago or other strongly fortified ports of Cuba, or Porto Rico, as it was deemed of prime importance that our vessels should not be risked to capture or injury before the Spanish squadron had been met and defeated.

At the beginning of the war it was the opinion of Admiral Sampson, urged strenuously by him and concurred in by Captains Evans, Taylor and Chadwick, that a strong attack upon the batteries at Havana would compel the capitulation of that place, but in view of the undesirability of sending troops to Cuba, especially until the more formidable vessels of the Spanish navy had been destroyed or captured, this course was deemed to involve risks which in the exercise of a wise discretion were judged inadvisable. It was clear to the Department that our battleships should be exposed to no risk of destruction until they could meet those of the enemy.

Information having been received that a Spanish gun-boat had been seen off the New England coast, the *Columbia* and *Minneapolis* were ordered from Hampton Roads to make a

cruise in the waters between Newport, R. I., and Eastport, Me., calling at different ports for the purpose of reassuring the inhabitants of the cities and towns in that section.

The fleet under command of Admiral Sampson had become so large with the additions of the auxiliary ships that it was necessary to provide for a division of the many duties with which he was charged, and two Commodores were sent to serve under his orders, the senior, Commodore Remy, to command the naval base at Key West, and the junior, Commodore Watson, to be given a command afloat.

Upon the withdrawal of our attachés from Spain, it became very difficult to secure information regarding the prospective movements of the Spanish fleet, and a secret service was organized in order to keep the Department informed of the resources, condition and plans of the Spanish naval forces. An officer was sent to Europe, who followed and reported the movements of the naval force under Admiral Camara, and another officer proceeded to Cadiz, reporting the strength of the Spanish vessels there, and later, to the West Indies for the same purpose. Information was also received from a variety of other sources.

It was exceedingly important to secure early advices as to the departure and destination of the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera. On April 28, the Department was informed that it was probable that part of the Spanish flotilla would leave the Cape de Verde Islands that night. The agent of the Department was authorized to charter a steamer to follow the Spanish squadron and report the direction taken. On April 29 this agent reported that four cruisers and three destroyers had sailed, and on the next day this vessel returned to port and cabled that the Spanish flotilla when last seen was continuing west at full speed.

Steps were at once taken to ascertain, at the earliest possible moment, the presence of these vessels on this side of the Atlantic, and the *Harvard* and *St. Louis* were sent to sea under sealed orders, with instructions to cruise to the eastward of the Windward Islands on certain lines specifically laid down.

Explicit instructions were given as to the length of time to

remain on this duty, and the method of communicating with the Department in the event of sighting the Spanish fleet. The ships were required to make at least three hundred and thirty-six miles a day on the trip from New York to the cruising grounds.

Admiral Sampson was promptly informed of the sailing of Cervera's squadron and of its strength, and given an outline of action in the event of certain contingencies, such as the appearance of this fleet on the Atlantic coast of the United States, or their entry into San Juan or other ports in West Indian waters.

On April 30, instructions were sent to cut the cable on the south coast of Cuba. On the next day the *Yale* was sent to sea with instructions similar to those given the *St. Louis* and *Harvard*, to proceed to the Island of Porto Rico and cruise around that island.

On May 4, Admiral Sampson sailed east from off Havana for the purpose of observation, and, continuing in that direction, arrived at San Juan, Porto Rico, on the 12th. His purpose in going to San Juan was to make a reconnoissance to ascertain if the Spanish fleet was in that port. Finding that the Spanish squadron was not there, he bombarded the fortifications and turned westward again in order to cover Havana and prevent any attempt to raise the blockade. Telegrams were received from the *Harvard* and *St. Louis* on the 11th, stating that they had been unable to get any news of the whereabouts of the Spanish squadron. On the 12th the *Harvard* cabled from St. Pierre, Martinique, that the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, *Furor*, had arrived that day at Fort de France, Martinique, and later departed, and that a fleet of five large vessels had been seen off the coast, probably the Spanish.

This was the first information the Department had of the whereabouts of Admiral Cervera's squadron. Early the next morning, May 13, Commodore Schley, at Fortress Monroe, Va., was instructed to get ready for sea immediately, and later in the day directed to proceed at once to Charleston, S. C. The *Minneapolis* was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to cruise between Monte Cristi, Haiti, and Caicos Bank, Baha-

mas, and the *St. Paul* was ordered to cruise between Morant Point, Jamaica, and the west end of Haiti. Admiral Sampson and the Naval Station at Key West were informed of the sighting of the Spanish squadron and of the orders to the *St. Paul* and *Minneapolis*, and the importance of keeping in touch with the movements of the Spanish was emphasized.

On May 14, the Spanish squadron was reported at the Island of Curacoa. The Naval Station at Key West was promptly given this information and instructed to keep a close lookout in Yucatan Channel, as the enemy might round Cape San Antonio or enter the Gulf of Mexico. The orders to the *St. Paul* of the 13th were revoked, and that ship was directed to proceed at utmost speed to Key West. Admiral Sampson was instructed to return with all possible dispatch to Key West. The information regarding the enemy's squadron and the orders to Admiral Sampson were received by him on the 15th, by the torpedo-boat *Porter*, the squadron being then off Puerto Plata, Haiti.

Admiral Sampson, upon receipt of these dispatches, sent the *Yale* to cruise between Jamaica and Cuba; the *Harvard* was instructed to cruise in Mona passage and on the north side of Porto Rico Island; and the *St. Louis* was ordered to cut the cable at Santiago and at Guantanamo, Cuba, then at Ponce, Porto Rico, and then to proceed to St. Thomas about May 19 to await orders. He advised the Department of the disposition made of these vessels and that the squadron was proceeding at best speed to Key West.

Information was received which induced the Department to believe that Admiral Cervera's squadron would proceed from Curacoa to the Gulf of Venezuela to coal. The *Harvard* was informed of this at St. Pierre, Martinique, on the 15th, and directed to endeavor to get and keep in touch with the Spanish fleet. A telegram was sent to Cape Haitien, to be sent thence to the *Minneapolis*, to the same effect, and the *St. Paul* at Key West was instructed to proceed to Cape Haitien and communicate. After sending these dispatches, the aforementioned telegram from Admiral Sampson was received regarding the disposition of the auxiliary cruisers, and the Department instructed the *Harvard* at Martinique to obey the

orders of Admiral Sampson rather than the Department's order of the 15th.

The Naval Station at Key West was instructed to be ready to coal the North Atlantic Squadron and the Flying Squadron upon arrival, and Admiral Sampson was directed to reinforce the Flying Squadron by an armored vessel and such torpedo boats, if any, as he thought fit, and send this squadron to Cienfuegos. He was given the choice of remaining on the blockade of Havana, or of proceeding with the squadron under orders for Cienfuegos.

The Flying Squadron arrived at Key West on the morning of May 18, and Admiral Sampson arrived on the *New York* on the same afternoon. At this point he received the instructions of the Department above mentioned and gave Commodore Schley the choice of remaining with the blockading squadron off Havana, or proceeding with the Flying Squadron to the south coast of Cuba. From a strategical point of view it seemed probable that the Spanish squadron would endeavor to make the port of Cienfuegos or Santiago. Commodore Schley preferred to remain in command of the squadron destined for Cienfuegos, and after coaling sailed at 9 A. M., on the 19th, for that port, with the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts* and *Scorpion*. Later on the same day, information was received to the effect that the Spanish squadron had arrived at Santiago. The *Minneapolis*, at St. Thomas, and the *St. Paul*, at Cape Haitien, were given this information, and ordered to proceed off Santiago. Information and instructions to the same effect were sent the next day to the *Harvard* off the north coast of Porto Rico, the *St. Louis* at Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, and the *Yale* at Cape Haitien. Admiral Sampson was informed at Key West of this report and advised to send word to Commodore Schley to proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command. Admiral Sampson reported that he deemed it best to let the Flying Squadron remain at Cienfuegos until a report could be had from the auxiliary vessels at Santiago or more definite information received as to the presence of the Spanish squadron there. On May 20, the *Iowa*, *Castine* and *Merrimac* sailed by his order to Key West to reinforce the squadron under Schley.

On May 21, Admiral Sampson left Key West for the blockade of Havana, having, at 3 A. M. of that day, sent the *Marblehead* with the order to Commodore Schley to proceed to Santiago. On May 23, a dispatch was received from the *St. Louis* from St. Thomas, stating that the Spanish fleet was not at Santiago de Cuba at 7 P. M., of May 18, and that it was not off that port at 8 A. M., May 19. The log of the *Colon*, which has since come into possession of the Department, shows that the Spanish fleet anchored in the harbor of Santiago at 8:20 A. M., May 19, from which it is evident that the *St. Louis* must have missed the Spanish fleet by a very few minutes.

No information having been received from Commodore Schley, and it being of vital importance to verify the report of the arrival of the Spanish squadron at Santiago, and, if there, prevent it from again getting out of the reach of the Department on the high seas, the cable office at Mole St. Nicholas was directed, on the 25th, to deliver to the first American vessel arriving in port, the following message: "Where is the Flying Squadron? Await further orders at Mole." Later in the day, a dispatch was received from Commodore Schley dated May 22, sent by the *Harvard* from Mole St. Nicholas, reporting his arrival off Cienfuegos on May 21, and stating that he was not informed as to whether the Spanish fleet was in that port or not.

The *Harvard* reported that she had left Santiago on May 24; that on the same day the *Minneapolis* had left that port for Cienfuegos to report to Schley; that the Spanish fleet had not been seen and no information had been obtained respecting its recent movements. The *Harvard* was promptly directed to "Proceed at once and inform Schley and also the senior officer present off Santiago as follows: 'All Department's information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department looks to you to ascertain facts and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action.'" This dispatch was delivered to Commodore Schley on the morning of May 27, the squadron being at that time between 20 and 25 miles to the southward of Santiago.

On May 26, a telegram, received from Commodore Schley, dated May 24, off Cienfuegos, stated that coaling off Cienfuegos

was very uncertain: that he had ascertained the Spanish fleet was not at that place and that he would move eastward on the next day, the 25th, and communicate from Nicholas Mole, Haiti; but that he could not blockade if Spanish squadron was at Santiago, on account of want of coal.

The orders which had been sent to Commodore Schley by the *Marblehead* on the morning of May 21, directing him to proceed to the port of Santiago, were not received until the morning of the 24th, whereas the duplicate orders sent later on the same day by the *Hawk* were received by Commodore Schley early in the morning of May 23, which shows the wisdom of sending two vessels with these very important orders.

The Department having this information, expected the squadron under Commodore Schley to reach Santiago some time during the 24th.

In the meantime, the fleet under Admiral Sampson had been guarding the Nicholas Channel in such a manner as to prevent the approach of the Spanish squadron from the east to Havana.

On May 26 he wired the Department that not having heard from Commodore Schley and "as the Spanish squadron may have evaded at Santiago and attempted to reach Havana by Cape San Antonio, I have moved westward to provide against this contingency. Will attempt to cover Havana from both directions."

Later on the same day he cabled the Department, which dispatch was received on the morning of the 27th, that he had received information from Schley under date of May 23, as follows: "Am not satisfied the Spanish squadron is not in Cienfuegos, Cuba," and also added that "He states he will remain off Cienfuegos keeping squadron ready for emergency. He reports *Adula* entered into Cienfuegos May 23; learned probably from her, as she left, if the Spanish squadron was in port. I think that he has gone probably to Santiago de Cuba. To assure this, I send *Wasp* to Cienfuegos to-night. If he has not left, this will enable him to reach Santiago de Cuba before I could do so."

Commodore Schley, upon the receipt, on May 27, of the Department's telegram by the *Harvard* from Mole St. Nicholas, sent a reply by the same vessel which was transmitted from Kingston on May 28, acknowledging receipt of the Department's telegram, and stating that he could not remain off Santiago on account of the coal supply; that he much regretted his inability to obey the orders of the Department; that he was forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of the Yucatan channel, and that he had been unable to ascertain anything positive respecting the enemy.

It is difficult to state the anxiety which this dispatch caused the Department. It was the most anxious day in the naval history of the war and was the only instance in which the Department had to whistle to keep its courage up. It was received on the afternoon of the day on which the President and his Cabinet reviewed the Army Corps at Camp Alger. The feeling that the Spanish fleet might leave the harbor of Santiago was a heavy weight upon the President's mind. To deal with it was not difficult when its whereabouts were known, but to feel that it might leave the Cuban coast, that its movements might be lost track of, and that it might appear at any time on the coast of the United States, was depressing beyond measure. The despatch was not given out.

The most energetic measures were at once taken to endeavor to hold our footing at Santiago, and Admiral Sampson, who had received information that Commodore Schley could not maintain the blockade at that place, sent the *New Orleans* and *Sterling* on the 27th with orders to him "to remain on the blockade of Santiago at all hazards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are in that port," and gave instructions for the sinking of the collier *Sterling* to obstruct the channel of the harbor in case he should leave Santiago.

Admiral Sampson was promptly advised of the receipt of Schley's telegram that he had gone to Key West with his squadron for coal, and was asked "how soon after the arrival of Schley at Key West could you reach Santiago de Cuba with the *New York*, *Oregon*, the *Indiana* and some lighter vessels and how long could you blockade there?" To this Admiral Sampson replied that he could reach Santiago in

three days, could blockade indefinitely, and would like to start at once with the *New York* and *Oregon*, arriving in two days, and added:

“Do not quite understand as to the necessity of awaiting arrival of Schley, but I would propose meeting and turning back the principal part of the force under his command if he has left.”

Admiral Sampson was at once instructed to proceed to Santiago. Further orders were sent to Commodore Schley, to Port Antonio and to Kingston:

“It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet is in Santiago and report. Would be discreditable to the Navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately. All military and naval movements depend upon that point.”

Later on the same day, the 29th, a more reassuring dispatch was received from Commodore Schley, sent from Port Antonio, stating that he would endeavor “to coal in open sea and retain position off Santiago until coal supply of larger vessels is reduced to the lowest safe limit.” The squadron under his command had proceeded west, on its way to Key West, to a point about forty miles in a direction to the southward and westward of Santiago, and, on the afternoon of May 28, returned in the direction of Santiago and arrived at a point about ten miles to the southward of that port shortly after dark. On the morning of the 29th, the *Cristobal Colon* was seen in the entrance of the harbor.

Admiral Sampson was at once instructed to proceed with all possible dispatch to Santiago, with the *New York*, *Oregon* and such other vessels as he might desire, and instructions were sent to Schley, at Kingston, to “hold on at all hazards. *New York*, *Oregon* and *New Orleans* are on the way.”

Admiral Sampson left Key West at 11 P. M. on May 29 with the *New York*, *Oregon*, *Mayflower* and *Porter*, and arrived at Santiago on the first of June at 6 A. M., and immediately established a most thorough and effective blockade of that port.

On June 4 the Department was advised of the sinking of the *Merrimac* in the channel of Santiago in the early morning

of June 3, by Asst. Naval Constructor Hobson and a crew of seven men. This dispatch further reported that the crew of the *Merrimac* were prisoners of war. The story of this thrilling achievement is elsewhere told.

In order to enable the fleet to remain indefinitely on the blockade of Santiago, it became of great importance to secure a harbor of refuge where the ships could take shelter in case of storm, and where repairs could be made and the coal supply replenished. With this object in view, the *Marblehead* and *Yankee* took possession of the bay of Guantanamo, which is situated a short distance to the eastward of Santiago, on June 7. On June 10, the first battalion of marines was landed here for the purpose of holding this port, and, although for the next three days they were almost continuously under the fire of the Spanish, they succeeded in driving off the enemy and in maintaining their position. This action reflected great credit on the Marine Corps.

As soon as it was ascertained definitely that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, it was determined to send a force of U. S. troops to that point, and the Department arranged a suitable convoy for the transports which had been assembled by the War Department at Tampa. The expedition rendezvoused off Rebecca Shoals, Florida, at 8 P. M. on June 15, and was successfully convoyed to Santiago, where the troops were landed by aid of the Navy, and the joint operations of the Army and Navy then began.

On June 21, the Department divided the North Atlantic fleet into squadrons, and assigned Commodore Watson to command of the first squadron, detached Commodore Schley from command of the Flying Squadron and assigned him to command of the second squadron, and directed Commodore Remy to exercise command over all vessels within signaling distance of the Naval Station at Key West.

Information having been received that the Spanish home squadron, under Admiral Camara, had passed Cape Bon Tunis going to the east on June 22, Commodore Watson was directed to hold himself in readiness to sail, with the *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *Newark*, *Yosemite*, *Yankee* and *Dixie*, for St. Michaels, Azores. The Northern Patrol Squadron, under command of

Commodore Howell, was ordered to Key West to strengthen the blockade, and Admiral Sampson was instructed to give Commodore Howell command of the first squadron of the North Atlantic fleet upon the relief of Commodore Watson.

On June 28, a blockade was proclaimed of the entire southern coast of Cuba from Cape Cruz to Cape Francis and of the port of San Juan, Porto Rico.

It is not a part of this article to treat of the detailed operations of the fleet under Admiral Sampson, and it is sufficient to say that the blockade was maintained so effectively, both by day and night, that the exit of the Spanish squadron was not possible without a decisive engagement.

From the first day of June the most thorough arrangements had been made for bottling up the Spanish fleet in Santiago. The ships were stationed in a semi-circle about six miles from the entrance of the harbor during the day, and much closer in at night, and the ships were instructed to keep searchlights directed on the entrance of the harbor from dark to dawn. A standing order was issued that, in case the enemy endeavored to escape, the ships must close in and engage as soon as possible.

As is well known, Admiral Cervera's squadron, upon the investment of the City of Santiago by the Army and Navy, attempted to leave the harbor, on the morning of July 3, and was completely destroyed in an action which in its brilliancy and decisiveness stands side by side with the battle of Manila.

Although the Commander-in-Chief was some miles away at the beginning of the action, his plans were followed by Commodore Schley and the captains of our ships, which closed in with great gallantry, spirit and effectiveness, and the result showed in a striking manner how important an element in naval warfare are the officers in command and the men behind the guns. In this battle both won and deserved immortal fame. It is difficult to account for the inefficiency of the Spaniards, who are brave men, and for their overwhelming defeat, except upon the ground of the greater accuracy of our own fire, the splendid spirit and dash of our attack, and the fact that the enemy, instead of making a stand-up fight, had only in mind to escape.

News of this victory was not had until late on the evening of the 3d. Early on the morning of that day, information was received that a retreat of the Army before Santiago was contemplated, and that the fleet under Admiral Cervera had succeeded in making an exit from the harbor and escaping.

The official dispatch from Admiral Sampson was not received until about mid-day on the 4th. It announced the entire destruction of the Spanish squadron, consisting of the *Cristobal Colon*, *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, *Maria Teresa* and two torpedo-boat destroyers, the *Pluton* and *Furor*. In this action, only one man was killed on our side and our ships suffered no injury of any account.

After the surrender of Santiago on July 17, the Army expedition, under General Miles, was convoyed to the southern coast of Porto Rico by the *Massachusetts*, *Columbia*, *Yale*, *Dixie* and *Gloucester*.

The city of Ponce, Porto Rico, surrendered, on July 26, to a small squadron composed of the *Dixie*, *Annapolis*, *Gloucester* and *Wasp*, and on August 1, the *Gloucester* and *Wasp* took possession of Arroyo.


Throughout the entire period of the war the blockade of the coast of Cuba was prosecuted with great vigor, and much service of an extremely arduous and wearying character was rendered by the vessels on this duty. The incidents of the blockade are described elsewhere.

The history of the Navy during the war is one of continued efficiency and success. It is in many respects unprecedented. Two of the greatest naval victories of all time were won, practically without loss of life, injury to person, or damage to naval property. Not a gun was lost or a flag captured by the enemy. The health of our men and officers during the whole time was as good as if it had been a period of peace instead of war. While the Navy was well prepared at the beginning, it must be remembered that, owing to the large increase in the number of enlisted men and volunteer officers, and of auxiliary ships with their armament and equipment, a vast amount of work was necessary, but it was done without delay or friction, and there was no emergency for which the Navy

was not ready. Yachts were converted into gunboats and fought as efficiently as if they had been encased in armor. Great transport ships were converted into cruisers. Naval vessels convoyed the army, and it was our seamen who landed the troops at Santiago. Supplies of provisions and clothing were furnished in the most satisfactory manner. Three great supply ships, capable of carrying meats, vegetables and other provisions sufficient to maintain fleets for months, were afloat. The repair-ship *Vulcan*, equipped in the most thorough manner with every appliance for repairing our ships and engines at sea, was in constant attendance upon our fleet, and was a navy yard in itself. Distilling vessels and a hospital ship were marked features. Medical arrangements were perfect; and the whole condition of the Navy reflects the highest credit, not only upon officers and men afloat, but upon the successive Assistant-Secretaries and the Commandants of naval stations and especially upon the Chiefs of Bureaus at Washington, who were charged with the duty of equipping, provisioning and supplying the ships of the fleets.

More gallant officers and men never served on board ship. The professional spirit which animated them cannot be too highly praised. It was not confined to any one branch of the service—it animated the officer on deck, the engineer in the bowels of the ship, the marine at his post, whether afloat or ashore—zeal and pride in his corps was the characteristic of each man. There was not only the joy of the contest, the love of adventure, the element of pluck and courage, but a fine sense of loyal service, of patriotic devotion and of the determination to win. In the glare of the glory of Manila, Santiago and the sinking of the *Merrimac*, there is danger of overlooking the repeated instances of conspicuous and heroic individual gallantry which were occurring almost every day and of which the official reports are full. It is only as we read the complete accounts of the war that each individual receives the due recognition of his services, and each act of gallantry its meed of praise. It is also to be said that on both sides there was a great deal of chivalrous feeling and that no personal animosity towards the foe was exhibited. When the battle was over, nothing could exceed the tenderness and care with which our officers and

seamen risked their lives to rescue and protect the foemen whom they had vanquished. War is a horror of hardship and bloodshed, but if anything can relieve its dark shadows, it is the spirit with which the war with Spain was undertaken and with which also it was fought to a swift and victorious end.

A large, elegant handwritten signature in black ink, reading "John D. Long". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent, sweeping flourish at the end of the name.

Dec. 24, 1898.



Samuel J. Edge

CHAPTER XVIII.

WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

BY

HON. LYMAN J. GAGE, Secretary of the Treasury.

IT is well said that final judgment cannot be passed upon events still recent. This applies to the financial history of a war as well as to the operations of fleets and armies. Not until years after the civil war closed was there fully comprehended the depth of that struggle as measured by the problems met and solved in raising money. Now that time has set its seal on the efforts of those who achieved or failed in that fearful conflict, the financial trials of a generation ago are better understood. We know well to-day the effects of measures then adopted and their influence on subsequent affairs, while we see in a clearer light what was actually accomplished at the time by the Government for the Union in the resort to many expedients for procuring funds; and we realize more fully how the Confederacy suffered, in depreciated paper currency, a repetition of the direful and well-nigh hopeless days which marked the financial story of the Revolution.

As the events of the Spanish-American War are yet of yesterday, no more will be attempted now than to tell as simple a story as possible of the war operations of the Treasury Department.

All ages have recognized that money is the essential in conducting war. Centuries ago Cicero declared: "Money is the sinews of war"—a trite phrase, which has not lost force by repetition in all the years since it was uttered. In fact, as time has gone on, it has gained in strength until it is regarded now as an axiom. Money is indispensable, and the power of the war chest has perhaps never been better demonstrated than during the late conflict from which we have emerged

There is a vast difference in time and in methods since Alexander led his legions over the hills of Greece to conquer the world. To-day this modern republic of ours stands foremost for a different world conquest, a struggle in which is involved the advancement of humanity and civilization. In the olden days, when warriors fought with spear and shield and battle axe, their methods of subsistence were as primitive as were their weapons of warfare. They lived in large part upon the country, as we term it, by foraging and plunder. To-day no army is well organized without a commissary department, equipped to the point of perfection, for it has come to be realized that soldiers fight best when they are well fed. I may be pardoned in this connection for relating a story told by Rear-Admiral Schley. Recently, when he served as a member of the Porto Rican Evacuation Commission, a Spanish member of that body said to him: "How do you account for the easy manner in which your countrymen have so overwhelmingly defeated mine?" To which the Admiral replied: "General, you must get down to a fundamental principle; you cannot expect men to fight who are not fed, nor soldiers to win victories who are not paid."

Vast changes have taken place even in recent times in the methods of conducting maritime warfare. The tendency in this respect has long been toward an increase of expenditures. The cost of a single battleship runs into the millions, while to refill once all the vessels of our navy with ammunition costs more than six millions of dollars. The necessity for such an outlay of treasure during the war for independence would have broken the spirit of even the indomitable Washington, and no nation of this time not rich in material resources could expect to prosecute war successfully.

Naturally enough, the chief function of our Treasury Department during the recent conflict was to keep the war chest supplied. The main purpose of this chapter will be to tell a simple story of how this was done. Incidentally, however, the writer may be permitted to recount with pride some of the achievements of other branches of the Treasury service in the war with Spain.

Not many realize how vast an organization is the Treasury

Department. In the last annual report of the Secretary there were no less than twenty-seven chapters, devoted to as many different branches. These by no means include all the Treasury services, for there are yet several important subdivisions which are not made the subject of an annual report.

Ever since the very beginning of Cuban troubles the United States Treasury Department has had more or less of a share in them as represented by the efforts of this Government to enforce the neutrality laws as they relate to vessels. The first expedition in January of 1895, intended to carry arms and ammunition to the little band of insurgents who were even at that time making ready for the revolution which was proclaimed shortly afterwards on Washington's birthday, was apprehended at Fernandina, Florida, by officers of the Treasury Department. The arms and boxes of ammunition on board the *Lagonda*, their first vessel, were cast overboard into the bay to escape capture by the Treasury's collector of customs. From that time until the actual breaking out of hostilities between the United States and Spain, the Treasury Department was vigilant and active in maintaining neutrality. Expedition after expedition was circumvented or captured, and much annoyance and expense resulted from these efforts. A long coast line furnished ample opportunity for the successful embarkation of men, guns and ammunition for Cuba. The Florida Peninsula was also a base which was frequently used for illicit expeditions, and therefore the coasts of the Peninsula and Gulf were patrolled by revenue cutters of the Treasury Department, and collectors of customs were under strict orders to take the most effective steps at their command to prevent violation of the law. The revenue cutters engaged were the *Boutwell*, *Colfax*, *Forward*, *Hamilton*, *McLane*, *Morrill*, *Windom* and *Winona*. As the revolution in Cuba progressed, the burden of maintaining neutrality as between nation and nation increased. The continued complaints of the Spanish Government against the landing of expeditions in Cuba were met by every effort the Department could bring to its command; yet, notwithstanding a well-ordered patrol, both by the cutters and vessels of the navy, and despite the vigilance of customs officers, arms and ammu-

nition are alleged to have reached the insurgents from the United States, although in no such quantities as frequently reported. This part of the Treasury work prior to the war was committed to the care of the Bureau of Navigation, and much of its time, ordinarily given to the consideration of questions relating to American merchant vessels and the protection of American seamen, was devoted to the extraordinary work which grew out of the struggle of the Cuban insurgents to throw off the yoke of Spain.

Later on, when war between the United States and Spain had been declared, this same Bureau of Navigation performed an important part in regulating the exports of coal from this country. One of the earliest precautionary measures of Congress was a joint resolution, approved April 22, which authorized the President to regulate the export of coal or other material used in war from any seaport of the United States. The execution of this resolution was delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, and under his direction the Bureau of Navigation from time to time framed regulations and instructions. It was recognized by the Treasury Department that the commanders of Spanish fleets would have a problem of no mean proportions to solve in obtaining adequate supplies of fuel and provisions with home ports 3,000 miles away. Our naval plans were drawn with the intent to increase the enemy's difficulties in this respect, and it was therefore designed that we should take Porto Rico. It was also realized that the loss of that island to them as a base of supplies would intensify their necessities and increase the probability of their obtaining fuel from accessible neutral points, the latter being stocked with coal from the United States. So far as known, however, in view of the efforts of the Department, no coal or other material used in war reached the Spanish forces from the United States. The regulations and instructions at the same time were so framed as to permit coal exporters to take full advantage of the opportunity afforded by the strike in the Welsh collieries, and an actual increase of about 7 per cent in our coal exports for May and June over the exports for the same months in 1897 was recorded.

In the interests of American commerce—both present and

future—efforts were made by the Treasury Department to confine the list of contraband articles within the narrowest practicable limit. The following list actually promulgated will probably be accepted by maritime nations for some years to come :

Absolutely contraband.—Ordnance ; machine guns and their appliances, and the parts thereof ; armor plate, and whatever pertains to the offensive and defensive armament of naval vessels ; arms and instruments of iron, steel, brass or copper, or of any other material, such arms and instruments being specially adapted for use in war by land or sea ; torpedoes and their appurtenances ; cases for mines, of whatever material ; engineering and transport materials, such as gun carriages, caissons, cartridge boxes, campaigning forges, canteens, pontoons ; ordnance stores ; portable range finders ; signal flags destined for naval use ; ammunition and explosives of all kinds ; machinery for the manufacture of arms and munitions of war ; saltpeter ; military accouterments and equipments of all sorts ; horses.

Conditionally contraband.—Coal, when destined for a naval station, a port of call, or a ship or ships of the enemy ; materials for the construction of railways or telegraphs, and money, when such materials or money are destined for the enemy's forces ; provisions, when destined for an enemy's ship or ships, or for a place that is besieged.

The revenue-cutter service took an active and creditable part in the war with Spain. It is provided by law that the revenue cutters shall, whenever the President so directs, cooperate with the Navy. It is not in derogation of the rights of any other department to claim that what they did contributed as well to the glory of the Treasury Department, of which they form, in times of peace, an integral part. Under the law referred to, there were with the Navy thirteen revenue cutters, carrying sixty-one guns, ninety-eight officers and five hundred and sixty-two enlisted men. Of these, eight cutters (forty-three guns), fifty-eight officers and three hundred and thirty-nine men, were in Admiral Sampson's fleet and on the Havana blockade ; one cutter (six guns), ten officers and ninety-five men, were in Admiral Dewey's fleet at Manila, and four cutters (twelve guns), thirty officers and

one hundred and twenty-eight men, co-operated with the Navy on the Pacific coast.

In addition to services rendered by vessels with the naval forces, there were seven others, carrying ten guns, thirty-three officers and one hundred and sixty-three men, with the army, engaged in patrolling and guarding mine fields in various harbors from Boston to New Orleans.

At the battle of Manila, the *McCulloch*, Captain D. B. Hodgsdon, efficiently performed the duties assigned by Admiral Dewey. During that engagement the *McCulloch* was stationed near the line of moving ships, in order that she might instantly assist in withdrawing any that might be disabled. While so stationed, the cutter was frequently subjected to the fire of the battery on Sangley Point. This happened whenever the line was out of range of the guns in that battery. As the guns of the battery could not be depressed so as to fire upon the fighting ships, they were trained upon the *McCulloch*, which, however, fortunately escaped injury. It was this vessel that carried to Hong Kong the dispatches announcing to the government and to the world the victory. Until November, 1898, the *McCulloch* remained with the fleet in Manila, serving in the capacity of a dispatch vessel, and frequently on special duty. The cutter was assigned by the Admiral to light the mouth of the Pasig River the night after the battle of Manila, and guard the fleet from possible attacks of torpedo boats. It was frequently employed in patrol duty in Manila Bay, stopping and searching ships seeking entry. Early in September the *McCulloch* was sent by the Admiral to Batangas, where it captured the insurgent steamer *Abbey*, which was reported to have sailed from Macao with 3,000 stands of arms for Aguinaldo's troops. Admiral Dewey having received some additions to his fleet of fighting vessels, she was returned to the Treasury Department and ordered to San Francisco, her permanent station. Here the vessel will be engaged, as all revenue cutters are, in preventing violations of the revenue laws, and in those benevolent efforts which have characterized the winter cruising of our service, in the saving of lives and in patrolling the coast in stormy weather, guarding the safety of ships and passengers.

At the battle of Cardenas, May 12, the revenue-cutter *Hudson*, Lieutenant Frank H. Newcomb commanding, sustained the fight against the gun boats and shore batteries of the enemy, side by side with the navy torpedo-boat *Winslow*, and when Ensign Bagley and half the crew of the last-named vessel had been killed, and her commander wounded, rescued from certain destruction the vessel and survivors of the crew. On that same day the *Windom*, Captain Maguire commanding, engaged a shore battery at Cienfuegos and destroyed the rendezvous of the Spanish troops there. The *Manning*, Captain F. M. Munger commanding, was in many engagements with the shore batteries of the enemy. Rear-Admiral Howell and Commodore Remy have officially commended the service for its valuable assistance.

Another important branch of the Treasury service contributed its most efficient vessels to the navy. It will be well remembered that the light-house tender *Mangrove* gained distinction by capturing alone the Spanish auxiliary cruiser *Panama*. This was the richest prize of the war. The *Panama*, with a large cargo of provisions for Havana, had sailed from New York prior to the declaration of war, and there was much anxiety in the blockading fleet that she might escape into Havana with provisions enough to supply that city for some time. The *Mayflower*, the *Maple*, the *Mangrove* and the *Armeria* were transferred to the navy, and they all rendered conspicuous service during the war.

At the time that probability of war with Spain became pronounced, the Light-house Establishment numbered among its officers several who are distinguished for their achievements during the war. Commodore (now Admiral) Schley was chairman of the Light-house Board, while Captain Robley D. Evans, of the battleship *Iowa*, Commander Theodore F. Jewell, of the *Minneapolis*, Commander William M. Folger, of the *New Orleans*, and Commander George F. F. Wilde, of the ram *Katahdin*, occupied important trusts in the service.

As soon as it became apparent that open hostilities were likely between the United States and Spain as the result of the latter's troubles with her colonies in the West Indies, the

Light-house Service began preparations for the new conditions that would be imposed by war with a foreign maritime power. A comprehensive plan was devised by which the service in all its parts could be made an efficient aid to the naval and military branches. Provisions were made for the prompt removal and replacement of buoys and daymarks, and for changing their conditions and characteristics. The extinction and re-lighting of light-houses, beacons and lighted buoys, and making changes in the characteristics of lights on short notice, was regarded as specially important, particularly in the case of lights marking important channels and approaches to harbors. Every effort was made to equip this branch of the public service so that it might still render its customary aid to navigation and at the same time furnish no advantage to the enemy.

A small allotment from the appropriation of \$50,000,000 for the national defence, amounting to \$75,000, and subsequently another of \$38,500, was made to enable the Light-house Board to carry out the plans for rendering aid to the naval and military establishments, while at the same time maintaining its own regular service. Telephone and telegraph lines were built between light-houses, submarine cables laid, and light keepers were provided with signal flags to enable them to communicate with vessels. Many of the light-houses were utilized as stations in the line of coast signal stations which was established all along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The tenders of the service not transferred to the navy rendered valuable assistance in several important harbors in planting and protecting the submarine-mine defenses, and, upon receipt of notice from the War Department of the establishment of mines, the lights marking the approaches to harbors were extinguished in whole or in part, and changes in the buoys were made at important seacoast ports. Friendly mariners were notified of changes; but during all the war no seacoast light was extinguished, and no light not extinguished was otherwise modified. The extinction of harbor lights was not a direct measure of defense, but was necessary to prevent injury to the mines liable to be caused by merchant vessels passing during the night.

At some points on our coast natural conditions are so insurmountable that light-houses cannot be built. At each of these places light-ships are anchored. These were prepared at any time to seek safety upon the appearance of the enemy. The Light-house Board reports that, while a naval attack on the coast did not occur, and the system of coast communication did not have the actual test which such an attack would have given it, most valuable experience was gained.

Among the questions to which the war has given rise is that in regard to neutralizing the light-house service in time of war. In view of the intimate relations between this service and coast defense, it is said by the Board to be impracticable to neutralize the whole service, but it is highly desirable that certain light stations and all light vessels and tenders employed only in their regular duties as such should be neutralized. This suggestion corresponds in some respects to that which has recently been revived by the New York Chamber of Commerce in reference to extending the same immunity to private property on the sea as that which is granted to private property on land. The subject has already been considered by the President, and in his last message to Congress he recommended that the Executive be authorized to correspond with the Governments of the principal maritime powers with a view to incorporating into the permanent law of civilized nations the principle of the exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or destruction by belligerent powers. Such questions as these are significant of the tendency of modern civilization to confine warfare within as narrow limits as possible, and are greatly to be commended.

The United States Signal Service is of comparatively recent origin. According to the report of its Superintendent, it was organized in conformity with the recommendations of a board convened by the Navy Department, October 18, 1897, "for the purpose of considering the establishment of coast signal stations for naval defence." The establishment of such a service was a new problem which confronted the Government. That it was so easily and satisfactorily solved is due in large part to the fact that the Government already had in existence

a line of life-saving and light-house stations along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. "The crews of the Life-saving Service," says the Superintendent of the United States Signal Service, "for ten months in the year (August to May) constantly patrol the beaches from Maine to Texas, and no vessel can approach within sight of the coast and escape their attention, while the light-house keepers and observers of the Weather Bureau have exceptional facilities for noting the approach of ships." That these stations were availed of to the fullest extent may be realized from the fact that of the 233 stations which formed those of the Coast Signal Service, 139 were furnished by the Life-saving Service and 49 by the Light-house Establishment.

Under the provisions of a special act of Congress, the 139 stations of the Life-saving Service performing coast signal duty were kept open and manned during the months of June and July, the inactive season, when the crews would otherwise have been laid off. The value of this branch of the service in time of war may be better understood by the fact that keepers and crews are well drilled in the signals of the international code, and their thorough discipline is such that they may at a moment be relied upon to perform effective service in aid of either the military or naval branch.

The unexampled rapidity with which our armies and fleets overwhelmed the enemy happily rendered it impossible for Spanish ships to threaten the coast. There was, therefore, no opportunity for measuring the importance of the signal stations, but the naval officer in charge of the system reports that the service would have effectively answered every purpose of its establishment had occasion called. As a matter of fact, it did render valuable service by advising the Navy Department of the movement of Government vessels. The most notable was the report of the arrival of the battleship *Oregon* on the coast of Florida, after its long cruise from the Pacific.

The United States Marine Hospital Service is another branch of the Treasury Department which had its measure of added duties to perform in consequence of the war with Spain. It rendered aid to the army and the navy in the care of sick or injured soldiers and sailors, many of whom were

treated at the various hospitals of the service. By arrangement with the War Department, officers of the Marine Hospital Service were detailed for duty on vessels used by the army as transports. While so stationed, it was their duty to assist in keeping the ships in good sanitary condition and free from infection. This was a matter of no easy accomplishment in view of the fact that during the summer season these transports were in constant movement between infected ports and ports of this country. It being a great—if not the greatest—duty of the Marine Hospital Service to prevent the introduction of epidemic diseases into the United States, that service was called upon to establish regulations for the landing of troops at Montauk Point. These regulations, carefully complied with by the officers of the army, effectually prevented the spread of any disease from among our fever-stricken soldiers who came direct from the battlefields of Santiago to their own country.

Yet another Treasury Service performed meritorious work in connection with the war. Before the outbreak of hostilities, but with this possible contingency in view, the Coast Survey steamers *Bache* and *Blake* were engaged on hydrographic work on the southern coast. The former made a re-survey of Tortugas Harbor and approaches, this being a suitable gathering place for war-ships. The work was intended to bring out also the possibilities of that harbor as a coaling station for deep-draft vessels. After the destruction of the *Maine* the *Bache* was employed in the transportation of divers and wrecking material to Havana and in carrying back the dead and wounded. She was placed at the disposal of the Commander of the North Atlantic Squadron the morning following the disaster. The *Blake*, in April and May, made a re-survey off Key West to develop a harbor for war-ships at our southernmost port.

During the war the issue of charts to the general public was discontinued, the entire supply being practically confined to the Army and Navy. The work of printing charts was carried on night and day. In part, the war-room at the White House was equipped by the Coast and Geodetic Survey. Four large wall maps were prepared for the use of the Presi-

dent. These were hung in the war room and were suitably provided with small pin flags, thus enabling the Executive to follow the movements of the land and sea forces. Many detailed maps of various localities were also furnished, and special information was collected as needed by the President.

While the faithful work performed in each of the above-named services was of great value, yet the most important function of the Department was to provide funds for the carrying on of those successful naval and military operations which added so much to the glory of our arms.

In devising plans for the financial administration of a war, it is the duty of those who have in charge so important a trust to have regard to two things: (1) the procuring of funds promptly, and in amounts sufficient to meet instantly all demands of the military and naval departments; (2) in so procuring funds to have great care that the public credit be not impaired. As a corollary to the latter consideration there should be strict attention paid to the industrial condition of the country itself, for it may be readily perceived that anything which operates injuriously upon the business of the country must also impair the nation's credit. It was the hope and aim of those who had to do with the financial administration of the war that these things should be accomplished.

War expenditures began practically with the blowing up of the *Maine*. It is true, some preparations had been made in view of the possibility of a conflict with Spain, but so far as these are concerned they were not reflected in the withdrawal of moneys from the Treasury. When, however, that sad event occurred, possibility became probability, and the regular appropriations, made annually with a view to the maintenance of the military and naval establishments on a peace basis, were rapidly exhausted. The cash balance stood, at the close of February, 1898, at \$227,224,000. This by no means represented the amount which would have been available for war purposes. It is our fixed policy to maintain, at all events, the integrity of a fund in the Treasury, amounting to \$100,000,000, in gold, known commonly as the "gold reserve." Upon this base of safety depends the stability of

more than \$900,000,000 in other forms of money, and to undermine this foundation, already too narrow, if measured by the standard which prudent business men employ, would be to threaten our whole financial structure. Having regard, therefore, to the maintenance of the public credit, this fund should not be impaired unless the nation's necessity should be greater than the danger which would follow from a resort to it. Of the remaining \$127,000,000, some \$33,000,000 were held in trust for the redemption of notes of national banks, either in process of liquidation or which were voluntarily engaged in retiring circulation: \$14,000,000 must be held for the redemption of Pacific Railroad bonds, due January 1, 1899; \$13,000,000 of fractional silver and minor coins must be practically deducted, because a large part were worn and uncurrent, and from that fund the country's needs for small change must be satisfied. These deductions left but \$67,000,000, and it was not to be forgotten that, while every energy should be employed for war preparations, civil establishments must not be the subject of any neglect. Thus some \$30,000,000 or \$40,000,000 were required to be kept on hand as cash to be used for the ordinary functions of the Government. "That amount," says a writer on war finances, "corresponds to the cash on hand which a merchant keeps in the till to make change, or to meet small bills." So this available cash balance of \$227,000,000 at the close of February, 1898, shrank, when measured by the Government's ordinary needs, to barely \$25,000,000 or \$30,000,000.

We had so long been a peace-loving nation, and it has been so contrary to our traditional policy to maintain large armies, and, until recently, to maintain a fleet worthy of the name, that our commendable tendencies in the one direction, and our reprehensible neglect, perhaps, in the other, rather invited the hasty and ill-considered action of the enemy in suggesting early in March the recall of Consul-General Lee. This act, hostile in its nature, and following so soon after our country had been plunged into the depths of sorrow by what many believed to be the wanton destruction of a ship and its crew, resulted in more pronounced activity looking to the national defense. The President without delay conferred with

the leaders in both Houses of Congress. The result of this conference was that the House, on March 8, and the Senate the following day, without discussion and by a practically unanimous vote, passed a bill appropriating \$50,000,000 for the national defense. There has been a question whether or not a still larger appropriation would not have had the moral effect of aiding diplomatic negotiations, but the appropriation was not made for that purpose, for the Government energetically began the work of preparation which was contemplated by the act. The sum made available was to be expended under the direction of the President. In disposing of it to the best advantage, the Executive allotted to the several Departments amounts in accordance with the requirements of their respective services, as follows: Navy Department, \$29,723,274.22; War Department, \$18,944,627.68; State Department, \$393,860.89; Treasury Department, \$170,000.00; total, \$49,231,762.79.

Activity in preparation for the coming conflict was now the order of the day. Others will tell how speedily the army and navy were placed on a war footing by means of the money thus made available by Congress. The United States Secret Service, a bureau of the Treasury Department, devoted its energies to the breaking up of the spy system which had been established by Spanish officials at Montreal. How successful this work proved to be is elsewhere told by the Chief of the Service.

Until the last moment the President and other conservative officials earnestly hoped that war might be escaped through the medium of diplomacy. That was not to be, however, and Congress, April 23, passed the declaration of war and made it effective from the 21st of that month. For the first time in a half century the United States were at war with a foreign nation. The storm had broken and it came swiftly. No years of apprehension, no careful, patient effort to husband resources as is done by nations expecting war; but the country was brought suddenly face to face with conditions which imperatively required the immediate raising of large sums of money. The enemy, while impoverished, and in a measure exhausted by long continued troubles with its colonies, had,

nevertheless, almost at our door an army fully equipped, variously estimated in the strength of men to be six or eight times that of our own. On the sea Spain was believed to be nearly, if not quite, equal in the number of ships and guns, and in the fighting strength of the men who manned them. The enemy was instantly ready; so must we be. With the first call for volunteers—a call which met with noble response—came the necessity for immediately providing adequate revenues to meet new and extraordinary situations. Allotments from the appropriation of \$50,000,000 for the national defense could be depended on only in part for equipping, transporting and maintaining the thousands who rushed to the aid of their country. Congress was therefore soon called upon to supply deficiencies, both for the naval and military services, and it was also called upon to provide means for speedily filling the war chest. In view of what has already been said, and of the following list of appropriations made on account of the war, this duty was imperative:

For the national defense, Act March 9, 1898,	\$50,117,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies, Act May 4, "	34,625,725.71
Naval Appropriation Act, May 4, 1898, amount of increase over preceding naval appropriation act,	23,095,549.49
Fortification Appropriation Act, May 7, 1898, amount of increase over act as passed by House,	5,232,582.00
Naval Auxiliary Act, May 26, 1898,	3,000,000.00
Additional clerical force, War Department, Auditors' offices, etc., Act May 31, 1898,	227,976.45
Life-saving Service, Act June 7, 1898,	70,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies, Act June 8, 1898,	18,015,000.00
Appropriations in act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, June 13, 1898,	600,000.00
Army, navy and other war expenses for six months, beginning July 1, 1898, in general deficiency act,	226,604,261.46
Expenses of bringing home remains of soldiers,	200,000.00
Total,	<u>\$361,788,095.11</u>

Committees in Congress conferred with the heads of various Departments as to their necessities, and on May 3 the

Secretary of the Treasury appeared before the Senate Committee on Finance and was questioned as to the necessity for increased revenues and appropriations. The result of these and other conferences was the War Revenue Act of June 13, 1898. Pending the discussion of its provisions in the House and Senate, the available cash balance in the Treasury, which on April 23 had been reduced to \$220,364,000, or rather, as previously explained, to \$20,000,000 or \$25,000,000 could be relied upon to furnish the ready means for carrying on the operations of the war.

It ordinarily happens that any scheme by which new taxes are to be provided must fail of being thoroughly efficient in time of war by reason of the fact that much time is consumed in placing it in operation. The main point, aside from avoiding unjust and oppressive taxation, in framing the war revenue legislation of 1898, was to place the Treasury in a position where it would be at once in receipt of additional funds. It was beyond the power of any one to tell how long the war would continue. Experience, drawn from other perilous times counseled in favor of two courses for raising money—one by borrowing, the other by levying additional taxes. It was obvious that the whole of any great sum could not be raised by taxation within the time it would be required for use, nor could any great sum be raised within a short period without oppressing the people and seriously affecting the financial, commercial and industrial interests of the country. On the whole, it seemed best (and it is believed both the present and future will bear witness to the fact that it was best) to borrow at once a sum sufficient to maintain active and aggressive operations, and at the same time, by the imposition of additional taxes, to give assurance to intending subscribers to the contemplated issue of bonds that the war loan would have behind it a substantial increase in the revenues.

With the beginning of the new calendar year, the tariff act, which had become operative July 24, 1897, had begun to fulfil the promises of its supporters that it would provide sufficient revenues for the ordinary needs of the government. Close observers of its subsequent operation were convinced that when full recovery had come from the abnormally heavy

importations of the spring of 1897 the act would produce all the revenue that was required. It therefore was not deemed prudent to modify any of its provisions. In explanation of the bill to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures Mr. Dingley said :

“ They (the Committee on Ways and Means) naturally have had recourse to the legislation of the period of the Civil War, when so large an amount had to be raised, and they have found, after a careful consideration of the question of taxation, that on the whole it is better at the present time, and we trust that that may be all that may be necessary, that about \$100,000,000 additional revenue should be raised, and that entirely through internal revenue legislation. Hence, the war revenue bill which has been reported provides for internal revenue taxes exclusively. These taxes have been selected, first, because we have the machinery for the collection of them now, and they can be collected with but slight additions to the force and with but slight increase of expense. We have selected them also because they were a source of revenue successfully seized upon during the Civil War, and because they are taxes either upon articles of voluntary consumption or upon objects where the tax will be met by those who are ordinarily able to pay them ; and we have refrained from putting a tax in a direction where it would be purely upon consumption, unless the consumption were an article of voluntary consumption, so that the consumer might regulate his own tax, following what is the accepted rule of taxation in all countries, with a view of imposing the least burden and disturbing the business of the country as little as possible.”

The bill was introduced in the House April 25, 1898, and it passed that body April 29 by a vote of 181 to 131. It was the subject of much consideration by the Senate Finance Committee, and with amendments was reported to the Senate May 12. It passed that body June 4 by a vote of 48 to 28. The report of the Conference Committee was agreed to in the House June 9, and in the Senate June 10. Three days later it received the approval of the President, and by the terms of the act went into effect the next day, except where in some cases July 1 was specified.

Prior to the passage of the act, the more important internal revenue taxes were grouped under three heads. Those under the head of spirits yielded, for the fiscal year 1898, \$92,500,-

000; those under the head of tobacco, \$36,000,000, and those subject to tax under the head of fermented liquors, \$39,500,000. By the war revenue act, the taxes on fermented liquors and tobaccos were doubled, while there was no addition made to those on spirits. Some comment has been made as to why this third group was not also subjected to additional taxes. The main reason lies in the fact that, with spirits already taxed \$1.10 per proof gallon, it was believed the revenue-producing capacity of that group had been fully utilized, if not exceeded. There is a maximum revenue point in all taxes upon articles which are the subject of voluntary use. It is doubtful if a tax of \$2.20 a gallon on spirits would have added greatly to Treasury receipts. In addition, the legitimate trade in spirits by reason of over-production was already depressed, and additional taxes in this direction would have proved neither profitable to the government nor anything but ruinous to the private interests involved.

A tax of ten cents a pound on tea imported into the United States was provided, and it was estimated that the revenue to be derived from this source would amount to not less than \$10,000,000 a year. It had been seriously contemplated, when the Dingley act was under consideration, to subject tea to the same tax levied by the war revenue act. The main argument, aside from the revenue-producing qualities of such a tax, was that its imposition would result in an improvement in the quality of tea imported. Low grade and adulterated teas could not afford to pay the specific rate of ten cents a pound, and the result would be that teas of higher grades would form the bulk of importations. Such had been the working of a similar tax imposed by Great Britain. By the act of March 2, 1897, however, Congress had taken steps to prevent the importation of spurious and adulterated teas, and under its provisions the Treasury Department had organized a Tea Board for the purpose of selecting standards with which all subsequent importations were to be compared. The new tax on tea, therefore, served a double purpose—that of providing considerable additional revenue, and at the same time of contributing to the efforts to secure better teas for consumption in the United States.

A tax known to the old internal revenue schedules, in vogue during the Civil War and for some years thereafter, was revived—taxes on patent and proprietary medicines and toilet articles, on chewing gum, and on wine. Certain new taxes on business were also provided. These were levied on bankers, brokers, museums, concert halls, circuses and other public exhibitions, bowling alleys and billiard and pool rooms. Taxes were also levied on refiners of petroleum and sugar, and on pipe line companies. Stamp taxes were also revived and applied to various business transactions, as represented by bonds, debentures, certificates of stock and of indebtedness, bills of exchange, bank checks and drafts, and, in fact, a variety of instruments, including telegraph dispatches, express receipts, passenger tickets, etc.

Opportunity was also taken to incorporate in the act provisions subjecting mixed flour to certain taxes and restrictions. This was not done, of course, in aid of the public revenues, but to regulate an industry which had become as objectionable as that of the production of oleomargarine, which, under a previous internal revenue law, had been subjected to similar restraints. The operation of the law for the first six months of its existence indicated that it would produce about \$100,000,000 a year.

That part of the law which relates to loans authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue certificates of indebtedness, payable not exceeding one year from the date of issue, to the amount of \$100,000,000. This provision was designed to enable the Secretary to provide the public treasury with funds in case it should be necessary to do so in a quicker manner than could be done by availing himself of the provisions relating to the issue of bonds. It did not become necessary to resort to the issue of such certificates.

Section 33 of the act authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow on the credit of the United States \$400,000,000, or so much thereof as might be necessary to defray expenses authorized on account of the war, and to issue bonds therefor in denominations of \$20 or some multiple of that sum, redeemable in coin at the pleasure of the United States after ten years from the date of their issue,

payable twenty years from such date, and bearing interest payable quarterly in coin at the rate of 3 per centum per annum. The section also contained a provision that "The bonds authorized by this section shall be first offered at par as a popular loan, under such regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury as will give opportunity to the citizens of the United States to participate in subscriptions to such loan, and in allotting said bonds the several subscriptions of individuals shall be first accepted, and the subscriptions for the lowest amounts shall be first allotted." The law also provided that an appropriation not exceeding one-tenth of one per centum of the amount of the bonds and certificates authorized be appropriated to pay the expense of preparing, advertising and issuing the same.

It was decided, under this authority, to ask the people of the United States to subscribe to a loan of \$200,000,000. It was believed that that sum, together with the additional taxes to be derived from the revenue provisions of the act, would be sufficient to meet the expenditures which would be incurred before Congress would again meet in December. Most of the large war appropriations had been made available only until the 31st of that month.

The war loan of 1898 was one of the great successes of the war. It exhibited the power of the public credit, and increased our financial prestige both at home and abroad. No sooner had it become apparent that Congress would give the Secretary of the Treasury the authority above described than the Department began to arrange for the floating of the loan. After the report of the Conference Committee had been agreed to in both Houses, the Executive approval being certain, all the energies of the Department were directed toward asking the people of the United States, the moment the President should put his signature to the act, to subscribe for bonds to the amount of \$200,000,000. Late in the afternoon of Saturday, June 11, the Public Printer was placed in possession of copy for circulars, pamphlets, blanks and forms relating to the call. When the Department opened for business on the Monday morning following, the immense work of printing had been done, and 4,000,000 impressions

of the various papers referred to were ready for delivery. A mailing division had already been organized in the Department, engaged in preparing envelopes, so that on the very day the act received the Executive approval the Secretary of the Treasury sent broadcast through the land the call for subscriptions to the loan. Every effort possible was made to make the loan what it was intended by Congress it should be—a popular one. All the banks in the country, both State and national, were invited to co-operate with the Secretary; the great express companies tendered their services free of cost; all the money-order post-offices were charged with the receipt of subscriptions, and every newspaper in the country was asked to lend its aid in disseminating information concerning the loan. With few exceptions this was freely done, and as a result of all these agencies combined it is probable that few citizens of the United States were not aware that the Government had asked the people to subscribe to its bonds.

The books of the loan were open for a period of thirty-two days, closing July 14. The clerical work during this time and subsequently was something unprecedented in the history of national loans. It was not possible at the time to utilize any considerable number of clerks from the regular force, owing to the fact that the war had greatly increased the ordinary business of the Department in all its branches. It became necessary, therefore, to organize immediately a temporary force. This work was intrusted to Assistant Secretary Vanderlip. The number of persons employed on this force varied, according to requirements, from 350 in the latter half of June to 600 at the close of August. Nor was it possible to do the work in the Treasury building. For the loan of 1898 the "new city post-office building," not yet completed, was used. The ground floor of this structure was hastily prepared, and all during the summer months the several hundred clerks of the temporary force were there engaged in receiving, recording and scheduling subscriptions to the loan. Here, also, the first deliveries of bonds were made, a branch of the office of the Register of the Treasury having been organized for that purpose. Experienced clerks from the De-

partment were placed in charge of the respective divisions, and, notwithstanding the unprecedented character of the undertaking, and its immensity, the work was satisfactorily performed. Some idea of its extent may be had from the fact that, during the thirty-two days the books were open, more than 320,000 subscriptions were received. Of these, 291,850 subscribers were successful. Great as was the total of subscriptions, it was evident that many having large sums to invest were deterred from subscribing because of the belief that the loan would be absorbed by those who had invested small sums. The most sanguine supporters of the popular-loan idea had estimated that not more than thirty or forty million dollars would be covered by subscriptions in amounts of \$500 and less. As a matter of fact, subscriptions of this class absorbed more than half the loan, those who had subscribed for \$500 or less being allotted bonds to the amount, in round numbers, of \$101,000,000. The remaining \$99,000,000 was taken by 59,626 people, whose subscriptions ranged from \$520 to \$4,500 each. The line between the successful and the unsuccessful subscriber was drawn at the latter figure, each of those who subscribed for amounts of \$4,500 receiving only 1,300 of the bonds. One thing in particular operated to encourage people of small means to invest in the loan. It was confidently believed that such subscriptions would by no means take the greater part of the bonds, and as an encouragement to the humble investor the Secretary of the Treasury had announced in his call for subscriptions that all of \$500 and less would receive immediate allotments. This feature, while successful beyond expectation, had also its evil results. The discrimination in favor of people of small means was the invitation to many to submit fictitious subscriptions, or subscriptions signed by persons who were to have no interest in the bonds. Every obstacle the Department could interpose was placed in the way of such subscriptions. Many millions of dollars in suspected subscriptions were suspended; where the cases were plain they were returned outright, or the persons through whom they were submitted were given an opportunity to explain their interest. Thousands of such subscriptions, involving millions of dollars, were rejected as

the result of the Department's searching investigations, and the energetic efforts of the Department no doubt deterred others from submitting so-called "dummy" bids.

The loan was a success from the very moment the books were opened. It had been doubted by some of the ablest financiers of the country whether the Government could float a loan in time of war at so low a rate of interest as 3 per cent. There was apparently just reason for this misgiving. The old 4's and 5's were quoted at such rates in the market as to bring to the holders approximately $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, a slightly larger rate than the Government proposed to attach to bonds issued while the country was at war. To those who were fearful of failure the Secretary of the Treasury pointed out that the bonds of the new loan would find a market among the national banks, because, under present conditions, they were more valuable as a basis for circulation than either the bonds of 1904 or 1925. It was shown that a national bank doing business on a capital of \$100,000 would, with the old bonds as a basis for circulation, make a profit of only \$65.10, while with the new 3's a bank doing business with the same capital would make a profit of \$1,437.50 in a year. It was represented also that the business welfare of the country required that the loan, above everything else, should be a success. It was as important in this respect as a victory in the field or on the sea, in fact more so, for, if the war loan of 1898 had failed, the disaster would have been greater than would have been the defeat of General Shafter's army at Santiago or the American fleet blockading that port. The result was shown in the patriotism manifested by groups of leading financiers in the country, some of whom submitted offers to the Government guaranteeing to take the whole or any part of the loan which the people should leave unsubscribed. In fact, one syndicate offered to take \$100,000,000 of the loan at a slight premium. Not many days had passed after the books were open, therefore, when it became certain that the loan would be subscribed for many times over. Very nearly fourteen hundred million dollars was the amount subscribed for in all, or seven times the total of bonds offered. The results set forth in a strong light


our vast resources in wealth, just as the patriotic rush to arms exhibited our strength in men.

On the day the loan closed Santiago fell, thus presaging the end of the war. Short as was the struggle, it had not been without much loss of precious lives and great cost in money. It will be for others to recount the deeds of those who fell; it remains for me to tell the less thrilling story of the cost to the public treasury. By December 31, when most of the war appropriations expired by limitation, war expenditures had reached a total of \$195,000,000. The tendency of such expenditures, during the last three months of the year, showed slight decreases; but they were still such as to indicate that the cost, as given above, will be much enlarged.

By the end of the calendar year, also, the Government had received into the Treasury almost the entire \$200,000,000 on account of the war loan. In receiving and disbursing large sums drawn from and returned to the markets, it was the intention to prevent, if possible, any derangement of commerce or the industries of the country. This, it is believed, was successfully accomplished. Large expenditures, in part, offset the equally large receipts; but these could not be made to coincide to such an extent as to maintain equilibrium. The Secretary of the Treasury, therefore, provided that in paying for the bonds of the loan subscribers might do so in instalments, which would have the effect of obviating the sudden withdrawals of money from centers where it might otherwise be productively employed. Deposits in national banks were also largely increased by equitable distribution throughout the country. These accounts, on the day the books of the loan were opened, stood at \$27,948,000 and had been increased to \$95,900,000 at the end of the year.

During all the course of the war it was the constant effort of the Department to do nothing which would interrupt the returning tide of prosperity. Never was there, at any time during the struggle, any appreciable stringency in the money market; in fact, for the whole of the year 1898, no alarming upward tendency of rates was noticeable, except immediately succeeding the destruction of the *Maine* and during the period of uncertainty which preceded the declaration of war. Even the

certainty of war itself, with all its disturbing influences, furnished only a basis for improving conditions; thus, while the nation emerged from the conflict victorious upon sea and land, its credit also had been preserved, nay strengthened, and the business of the country had expanded rather than diminished. It will not often fall to the lot of any nation to be so singularly fortunate in any of these respects.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "James J. Sage". The signature is written in dark ink on a light-colored background. The letters are fluid and connected, with a prominent initial "J" and a long, sweeping underline.



Penaturn

CHAPTER XIX.

U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO.

BY

MAJ.-GEN. LEONARD WOOD, U. S. V.

THE American control of affairs in the Province of Santiago began with the surrender of the Spanish Army, July 17, 1898.

The problem which presented itself was a very complex one and included everything, from the feeding and care of the Spanish prisoners of war to the thorough and complete reestablishment of the Civil Government.

In the city was that portion of the population which had not fled to Caney and the Spanish prisoners of war, these latter amounting to between 11,000 and 12,000 men. Round about it was encamped the American Army of approximately 20,000 men and the Cuban forces under General Garcia of about 4,000. Four miles away was the village of Caney with some 17,000 or 18,000 refugees. It was the beginning of the most unhealthy season of the year. Already the American Army were feeling seriously the frightfully depressing influence of the climate, and fevers of all types were prevalent, especially malarial fever in all its various forms and some few cases of yellow fever.

Scattered along the road between Santiago and Siboney were various hospitals and detention hospitals with cases of a suspicious character. Within the city, affairs were in a very disorderly and demoralized state and the sanitary condition was as bad as it could have been.

The American Commander, General Shafter, immediately devoted himself to getting the American Army into the best possible camps, as near good water as practicable and in reach of the supplies of which we had a great abundance, but of

which we had been unable to avail ourselves on account of the bad roads. The condition of the roads was due principally to the excessive amount of rain which had converted them into perfect quagmires, through which wagon-trains struggled painfully and slowly, carrying only a small portion of the average load. At the same time he was also selecting a suitable camp for the Spanish prisoners of war and making the necessary arrangements to feed them and take as good care of them as possible. The General's headquarters at this time were in Santiago in the old palace of the Civil Governor, where I had also established my headquarters on being assigned to the command of the city.

My duties were to maintain order in the city and do all that I could toward improving its sanitary condition and to look after the welfare and well-being of its inhabitants. It is very difficult for Americans who have clean towns to appreciate the condition in which we found the city of Santiago. It is an old, tumble-down place, interesting and picturesque in many ways, but at this time it was frightfully dirty and full of filth, dead people, dead animals and all kinds of refuse. The people were generally sick and terror-stricken from the siege and the frightful effects of starvation and disease. It was difficult to work with such material, and at first very arbitrary measures had to be employed to get men to do the necessary sanitary work. This was accomplished however by rounding up, under military guard each morning, a certain number of men and putting them to work for the day. At night they were lined up and paid a dollar apiece. The same methods were employed to obtain wagons to haul away the refuse. None of our Army wagons were available as they were all required to haul rations out to our camps and to the Spanish prisoners of war, so we had to depend on such wagons as we could find in the city. Their owners were either afraid or unwilling to work, and the only way we could get them was to order the chief of police to assemble all sorts of wagon transportation at a certain point each morning. The collection of wagons was then sent out in detachments under military guard to do the work of the day whatever it happened to be. The city was at once divided into districts and a

thorough house-to-house inspection made as rapidly as possible, the most unsanitary sections and houses being especially reported upon and made the subject of immediate action. At the same time, while this was being done, it was necessary to maintain a very rigid system of police to prevent looting and robbery, as the city was practically without any local government and full of people thoroughly demoralized. The sick had also to be looked after as well as we could. There were no less than 15,000 reported among the population, who had to be taken care of and fed. Food and medicine had to be furnished to all charitable institutions, also to the sick of the Spanish Army of whom we had over 2,000. The people were returning from Caney where they had been exposed to great hardships and undergone great suffering. They nearly all came back either actually sick or just beginning to break down. The hospitals were overcrowded with people and were found to be almost entirely without food and entirely without medicines and surgical supplies. The same conditions prevailed in the orphan asylum and the asylum for old people. There was absolutely no money in the city treasury and, outside of rice, some flour and coffee, there was no food in the city. In fact there was a condition of the utmost demoralization and destitution. This, combined with the well-known unhealthiness of the city and its reputation for being one of the hotbeds of yellow fever in the island, made the situation extremely grave. All about the city in every direction, extensive earthworks had been thrown up and land torn up for other purposes, all of which tended to increase tremendously the already prevalent malaria and to produce the worst types of this disease. From all the surrendered province the smaller towns were sending in appeals for food and assistance. The harbor was full of transports loaded with food and supplies which we were getting on shore and distributing as rapidly as possible. Nearly all the lighters had been destroyed and the docking facilities were very limited, hence this work was necessarily interfered with a good deal and rendered slower than would otherwise have been the case, but those having it in charge did the best they possibly could under the circumstances and deserve credit for the result

which they obtained. In criticizing their work it must be remembered that they struggled with great difficulties, not the least among these being the fact that it was impossible to get suitable workmen. The population was demoralized and sickly, and the men employed were able to do only a portion of the work which robust men could have done. However, at the end of a week we had the sanitary renovation of the worst portions of the city well under way and had removed all the dead people from the houses and the dead animals from the streets, burying the one and burning the other. The death rate, as a direct result of the hardships of El Caney and the upturning of the earth, was rapidly increasing, and it now reached the rather alarming proportion of nearly 200 per day. Many of the cases were suspicious and it was extremely difficult to get undertakers and others to dispose properly of the dead. So great was this difficulty that it was finally resolved to burn them, as a means of getting them out of the way and as a preventive of further infection. This was accomplished in a rather crude but effective manner with a grating of railroad iron, piling the bodies upon it, mixed with grass, sticks, etc., and saturating the whole with kerosene. This measure seemed to meet with the entire approval of the people and undoubtedly resulted beneficially.

The municipal police were reorganized and given all possible support, and the condition of the public order in the city soon became excellent. The Spanish prisoners of war gave us absolutely no trouble and were as law-abiding a set of men as I have ever seen. Physicians had been appointed to the different hospitals and rations regularly issued to the sick. One Court of the First Instance was in operation and also the municipal courts of the city. The Spanish prison which was found full of political prisoners, was thoroughly inspected and all those held for political reasons were promptly released. Large working parties were set to work on the water-system, repairing the injuries done during the siege and making every effort to get it into efficient working condition. Large temporary crematories were established outside the city where all infectious materials were taken and destroyed.

A yellow fever hospital was established on an island in the

harbor and relief stations for the distribution of rations and medicines put into operation throughout the city. At each of these relief stations food was issued from 7 A. M. till dark. No effort was made to issue rations in exact amounts, but every one strove to give the people, who applied, that which they most needed. This work was very successful, thanks to the liberal issue of supplies sent to the Army and also to the large amount of Cuban rations on hand and the very liberal assistance of the Red Cross. The results of this systematic work were soon apparent, both in the appearance of the city and in the health and condition of the people. The place had become comparatively clean and the death rate sensibly decreased. A spirit of confidence soon began to appear among the people. Public order became excellent and robberies and disorders of rare occurrence. The Cuban people deserve great credit for the orderly manner in which they conducted themselves and the self-restraint which they displayed in these very trying days of reorganization.

In August the Spanish prisoners of war were removed and the American Army of invasion also, the latter being replaced by Volunteer troops. These were established as rapidly as possible in suitable camps about the city and at the various towns throughout the conquered territory, and every effort was made to put them in as good sanitary condition as possible.

General Lawton had succeeded General Shafter as Commanding General of the Department. General Garcia had visited the city and had been received with every consideration and honor which we could show him, and he seemed to appreciate fully the attentions which he had received.

The Cuban Army in the province was rapidly disintegrating and the people going back to their homes. There were some disorders in the interior, robberies, etc., but considering the situation and conditions these were remarkably few.

The school system of Santiago was reestablished, a local Board of Education having been appointed and some twenty schools started in the city under native teachers. People showed a keen appreciation of the advantages offered them and the number of schools had to be rapidly increased. At

the present time there are, including the kindergarten, some sixty schools. The hospitals had in the meantime been thoroughly renovated and supplied, as far as it was possible for us to do so, with the necessary medicines and apparatus. The municipal courts were put on a better footing and sanitary work in Santiago and other cities was being pushed as rapidly as possible. The health of the Volunteers who replaced the Regulars was far from good and, although given every attention in their food, shelter, etc., we found that the amount of sickness among them was very great; in fact it was very evident that the sickness was due, not altogether as we had at first supposed to the exposure and service incidental to the campaign, but really principally to the effects of the climate. Those of us living under the best conditions obtainable were almost as much subject to the fever as others. In short I do not believe that the large amount of sickness in the Army of invasion was due to anything else than the effects of the climate and exposure during the campaign. Troops can be kept in Cuba in fairly healthy condition, provided they are given good shelter and kept at a fair elevation above the sea. It is very important that they should be in buildings under heavy roofs, well protected from the sun. Good health cannot be maintained in tents. I believe that if we use the caution which the British have observed in Jamaica and elsewhere, we can obtain the same results and maintain an army in a state of efficiency and good health. Mounted troops will however be able to do much better duty in this island than foot troops, for the vegetation is so dense that a march is extremely hot work, and in the rainy season the men are always wet from the brush, mud, etc., under foot.

In October General Lawton went home on sick leave having had a long siege of fever and I was left in command of the Department. The situation as it then stood was:—the city of Santiago had been pretty well cleaned up and in fairly good running order; a fair condition of confidence and good order existed throughout the surrendered territory; the people were beginning to return from Jamaica and other outside places, whither they had gone to escape the war. During October a general renovation of all public buildings and a

systematic repair of the streets of the city and roads about it was commenced, about one thousand men being employed. Schools were increased both in Santiago, Guantanamo, Manzanillo and other large towns of the province. The evacuation of the province by Spanish troops was completed and the towns up to this time held by them were put through the same process of renovation which had taken place in Santiago. At this time the most wretched of all portions of the province was the District of Holguin where the people were found in a condition of the greatest destitution and suffering, and the whole district thoroughly infested with smallpox. Active measures were taken to stamp this out, the people of the district being vaccinated and some of the small infected thatched villages destroyed. Clothing and medicine in large supplies were obtained both by purchase and from the various charitable contributions; a large corps of medical men were put to work; military quarantine was established and every energy devoted to bringing the district into a state of normal health and establishing wholesome sanitary conditions. This work was under the immediate charge of Colonel Duncan N. Hood, 2d. Immunes, who had as his chief medical officer, Captain Robert S. Woodson, U. S. A., with an able corps of Cuban assistants, chief of whom was Colonel Felipe Veranes of the Cuban Army. All these gentlemen deserve the greatest credit, as their work was of the highest degree of efficiency and thoroughness and as the service rendered to the people of the afflicted district was invaluable. They established large isolation hospitals and in the comparatively short time of six weeks had the disease thoroughly under control and at the present time it has been practically stamped out.

The light-houses throughout the Department were reestablished in October. Extensive plans for reopening of roads which had been abandoned for many years were completed; indigent rations were sent to the interior towns within our reach and every effort made to get the people away from the larger towns and scattered upon their plantations throughout the Department. The end of December found the condition of the province as regards public health excellent with the exception of the remains of the epidemic in Holguin. The

rural police of 250 men had been established, divided into four companies and stationed in the large towns in different parts of the province. These men are thoroughly acquainted with the country and also with the disorderly element. They have rendered efficient service up to date and they will, I believe, be able to maintain order throughout the interior. Municipal government in all the larger towns has been re-established and these different towns made self-supporting as far as possible. The courts, including the Supreme Court, have been put in thorough working order; freedom given the press, and the people granted a Bill of Rights which gives them the privilege of free assemblage, a guarantee of prompt trial and right to give bail for all offenses not capital. Good public spirit is rapidly developing and the people are all interested in the welfare of the province and the improvement of the public service. Especially is this true of the interest in the schools, which is very keen, and in the establishment of a thorough judicial system. They are all anxious to have a modification of the existing methods of procedure and also to have a public school system on the same basis as the public school system of the United States. There is a strong spirit abroad for provincial and municipal autonomy, which spirit, while it recognizes the necessity of a Central Government, wishes it to be as limited in its jurisdiction as possible and as inexpensive as consistent with efficiency.

The revenues of the province are ample for the maintenance of the present form of government and for the support of the necessary police, etc., as well as the maintenance of several thousand men engaged in public works, such as road building and harbor improvements. Several hundred miles of road have been built. Plans for water-works and harbor improvements in the larger towns have been completed, and in Santiago the Barber Asphalt Company are laying five miles of pavement, at the same time putting in modern sewers and a modern water-system, as the work is completed. Dredging plans for the harbor have been finished and work is about to begin. In addition to paying the expenses of the Civil Government, \$220,000 was saved from the customs revenue of the province between July 17 and Dec. 31, 1898. This will be

devoted to payment for the pavement and partial payment for the dredging. The improvements are much needed and the people are anxious to assist in every way in these public works.

The present condition of the province is one which promises well for the future and if the details of the Civil Government are not pressed upon them too rapidly and if they are left to assimilate and absorb what has already been given them, before attempting more advanced problems, good results may be expected. The people as a class are kind and impulsive in disposition and are sincerely anxious to learn and to improve. One thing must be remembered and that is that a solid foundation must be built before the superstructure is put on. There is needed:—reform in the courts and methods of procedure; honest municipal administration with thorough rooting up of old and corrupt methods accompanied by much needed sanitary reforms, etc.; construction of proper hospitals and schools; also a thorough reformation of the present educational methods with the construction of suitable buildings; honest work for honest pay, and an entire avoidance of the former ruinous system of multitudinous office-holders in the ruined public buildings of towns with empty treasuries, ghastly hospitals and impossible streets.

General





J. Estrada Palma.

CHAPTER XX.

THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION.

BY

GEN. T. ESTRADA PALMA. Delegate Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cuba.

AFTER the peace of Zanjon, in 1878, the Cuban leaders for the most part left Cuba and scattered through Spanish America and the United States. A great many individuals and families later followed their example and it may be broadly stated that nearly all the Cubans outside of Cuba, after the termination of the ten years war, were in sympathy with the idea of Cuban independence. José Martí conceived the idea of organizing the Cuban immigration into a revolutionary party and succeeded in establishing clubs throughout Central and South America, Mexico, Santo Domingo, Jamaica, Haiti and in many cities of the United States, particularly in the cigar-manufacturing centers. These clubs were united to form what was called the Cuban Revolutionary Party. They elected a president, who was called a Delegate, and a treasurer, the Delegate naming the secretary of the party.

The following are the by-laws of the Cuban Revolutionary Party:

ARTICLE 1st. The Cuban Revolutionary Party is established with the object of accomplishing, by the united efforts of all men of good will, the absolute independence of the island of Cuba, and with the object of aiding a similar movement for Porto Rico.

ARTICLE 2nd. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not intend to precipitate war in Cuba inconsiderately, nor to begin a movement crudely and inharmoniously, at the expense of the country, but to bring about an organization approved by all the various elements and in accord with them all, which

will undertake a war, brief in duration, whole-hearted and single-aimed, for the purpose of establishing peace, opportunities of work and consequent happiness, for all the inhabitants of the island.

ARTICLE 3rd. The Cuban Revolutionary Party will bring together all the revolutionary elements now existing and, without degrading compromises with any man or body of men, will unite in the common movement all the elements, so that war may be conducted in a thoroughly republican spirit and method, with the sole aim of establishing a nation able to guarantee the happiness of its own children and to fulfil in the history of the Continent the difficult duties that its geographical situation entails.

ARTICLE 4th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not propose to perpetuate in the Cuban Republic, under new guises and with new words, the spirit of tyrannical authority and the bureaucratic composition of the colony but to found and to insure, in the untrammelled and free exercise of the legitimate rights of man, a new nation, sincere in its democracy and able by honesty, stability and hard work to cope with the dangers that nearly always attend a novel condition of society existing among a people suddenly brought out of bondage into freedom.

ARTICLE 5th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not propose to give over Cuba to the oppression of a dominant victorious party that will look on the island as its prey by right of conquest. It seeks only to insure by all legitimate means, which the freedom and protection of foreign countries offer it, the war which will be for the dignity and welfare of all the Cubans; and to deliver to all the inhabitants a liberated country.

ARTICLE 6th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party is established to found one free and united country in which the elements of organization will, from the first, work together to overcome the dangers threatening them at home and abroad, to substitute reform and good order for the economic disorder in which the financial system of the island is now and to prepare it for its immediate development.

ARTICLE 7th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party will endeavor not to utter an indiscreet word, or do any indiscreet action which might attract the ill-will of other peoples or countries with whom it is the duty of Cuba, not only from motives of prudence but of affection, to maintain friendly relations.

ARTICLE 8th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party has for its purposes :

1st. To unite in a continuous and common effort for Cuba's liberty all the Cubans residing in foreign lands.

2nd. To encourage sincere and cordial relations among the political and historical factors and agents in and out of the island which can contribute to the swift success of the war, and to aid and strengthen all the institutions that after the war shall be established and founded in consequence of it.

3rd. To disseminate in Cuba the knowledge of the spirit, aims and methods of the revolution and to bring all the inhabitants of the island to one mind with a spirit favorable to victory, in order that war may speedily be conducted without unnecessary risk to Cuban lives.

4th. To collect funds for the realization of that programme and to open every possible source for the war, and

5th. To establish discreetly, with countries friendly to us, relations which will tend to accelerate with the least possible blood and sacrifice the successful issue of the war and the foundation of the new republic which is indispensable to American equilibrium.

The members of the clubs contributed funds which were remitted to the treasurer who expended the moneys on the order of the Delegate.

José Martí was elected the first Delegate and undertook the work of opening and maintaining correspondence and communications with those in various parts of Cuba who were likely to respond to a call to arms in favor of the independence of their country. The preliminary work of organization lasted several years. At the end of that time Martí had conferred with all the principal veteran leaders of the ten years war, who had agreed that General Maximo Gomez, then residing in Santo Domingo, should be the Commander-in-chief of the coming revolution.

As the Spaniards did not allow the inhabitants of Cuba to own rifles without permits, plans had to be made for the shipment of arms as well as munitions to the island. Accordingly a large supply of war material was purchased and when all plans had been perfected and the various agents in Cuba had notified Martí that the people were ready to rise, three vessels, the *Baracoa*, the *Amadis* and the *Lagonda*, were chartered to take the various generals and their followers, to-

gether with the arms, to Cuba. The landings were to be simultaneous and in several parts of the island. General Gomez was to take one vessel, General Maceo another, and Generals Roloff and Sanchez the third. Unfortunately the *Lagonda* was seized in Fernandina, Fla., by the United States authorities, as were also the arms and munitions. As the plan had failed Marti notified all those concerned that for the time being the uprising had to be postponed. This seizure occurred about the middle of January, 1895. Efforts made for the restitution of the war material were successful. The people of Matanzas notified Marti that to delay the uprising was extremely dangerous as they were likely to be imprisoned and their secret deposits of arms and munitions discovered by the Spanish authorities. As a result Marti sailed for Santo Domingo to join Gomez having previously designated the 24th of February as the day on which the uprising in Cuba should take place. On his leaving the United States, the affairs of the Cuban Revolutionary Party were left in charge of Benjamin J. Guerra, the treasurer, and Gonzalo de Quesada, the secretary. After the death of Marti in May, 1895, an election was held by the clubs constituting the Cuban Revolutionary Party and the writer was elected Delegate.

During the ten years war, the interests of the Cuban revolution abroad were attended to by a body of men who were known as the Cuban Junta. This name was revived by the newspapers and by those familiar with certain affairs and was applied to designate the Cuban Delegation, which has been commonly known as the Cuban Junta.

On the establishment of a civil government by the Cuban Revolutionists in the fall of 1895, I was elected by the Constituent Assembly as Delegate Plenipotentiary abroad, being vested with the fullest powers of representation as to all matters pertaining to Cuban interests, including diplomatic relations. The Delegate was empowered to appoint all employés or representatives and to remove them at his pleasure, to receive, collect and invest all funds, to raise money by issuing securities or otherwise, to purchase and ship war material, to represent the Cuban Government at Washington and to appoint representatives with diplomatic functions to other countries.

The funds for the expedition to Cuba were all furnished by the Delegation; there was no private enterprise. After Marti and Gomez from Santo Domingo and the Maceos and their followers from Costa Rica had been landed in Cuba in April, the first large expedition to land was that led by Roloff and Sanchez in the summer of 1895.

It will be remembered that after General Martinez Campos's defeat by Maceo at Peralejo, the former withdrew to Bayamo and sent to Santa Clara and Puerto Principe for reinforcements. It was then that Roloff and Sanchez were landed on the south coast of Santa Clara and the organization of that province was perfected before Martinez Campos could extricate himself from Bayamo. The next expeditions sent by the Delegation landed in the province of Santiago, the one under Francisco Sanchez Echevarria, the other under Carlos Manuel de Céspedes. In January, 1896, General Calixto Garcia sailed from the city of New York with a large supply of arms and ammunition, on the steamer *Hawkins*, which unfortunately foundered at sea, a number of the men and crew being drowned. The steamer *Bermuda* was then procured and Garcia was about to leave the harbor of New York when, on the 24th of February, he was arrested with over one hundred companions, the vessel and cargo being both seized. General Garcia was admitted to bail and, as soon as the *Bermuda* was released and the cargo partly restored, sailed for Cuba, landing in Santiago where he fought until the end of the war.

Towards the end of December, 1895, when the invasion of the western provinces by Gomez and Maceo was attracting so much attention, the Delegate prepared and presented a petition to the Government of the United States, asking that belligerent rights be granted to the Cubans. The Delegate, accompanied by Mr. Gonzalo de Quesada and Mr. Horatio S. Rubens, counsel of the Delegation, went to Washington and Cuba's case was presented to Secretary Olney and to the members of Congress. Much opposition was encountered by reason of the fact that the Cubans had adopted the policy of destroying the cane-fields in order to cut off the resources of Spain, some plantations being owned by citizens of the

United States. This opposition was soon overcome, and towards the end of January, 1896 a resolution was presented to the Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations favoring the recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans. The manifold duties of the Delegate necessitated his frequent visits to New York, where the office of the Cuban Delegation had been established, and in consequence he appointed Mr. Gonzalo de Quesada as Chargé d'affaires at Washington so that the interests of Cuba might constantly be represented at the capital.

From the very first all possible efforts were made to secure the sympathy and support of the American press, as being the best medium possible for spreading propaganda in favor of the insurrection, throughout the United States. At all times access was given to the representatives of newspapers who were ever ready to state the Cuban case as it was explained to them. Notwithstanding all charges to the contrary, not a dollar was spent by the Cuban Delegation for the support of the American press, which did so much to rouse that popular opinion which ultimately compelled the effective intervention of the United States in Cuba.

The amount of good done to the cause of Cuba by the newspapers cannot be overrated; although it is true that many false and exaggerated reports were published, the Delegation at no time stood sponsor for them. From the very first the rule was adopted to publish nothing but what the Delegation was convinced was true and which might be proven, if necessary. The circulation of pamphlets, while effective to a certain extent, was found to be almost useless with public men, who receive so many pamphlets in their mail that they tossed them directly from the desk to the waste basket. Accordingly, every member of the House of Representatives and of the Senate was visited in person and the cause of Cuba was pleaded. The result was that, backed by the progress of the Cuban invasion of the western provinces and later on by the wonderful campaign of Maceo in Pinar del Rio, the question of the recognition of belligerent rights of the Cuban insurgents became the most prominent one before Congress. Information of all kinds was asked for by the friends of Cuba

who favored recognition, as material for the preparation of their speeches, and no adequate idea can be formed of the amount of labor necessary to supply this demand alone. The debates had to be attended daily in order to supply data for the correction of misstatement of facts and for the contraversion of the arguments used by the friends of Spain. As a result, nearly the whole night had to be spent in drawing up memoranda for use on the following day. It will be remembered that the debate on the first resolution favoring the recognition of belligerency, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority in both Houses, lasted several months. While this work was being carried forward the newspapers were not neglected and at the same time a heavy correspondence from all the United States and foreign countries had to be attended to, funds raised, arms and ammunition bought, vessels procured and expeditions sent to strengthen the equipment of the Cuban forces, there being throughout the war thousands of men who had taken the field, but who were entirely unarmed. At the same time communications had to be maintained between the Delegation and the Civil Government in Cuba as well as with the Commander-in-chief and the Commanders of the various provinces. Questions of policy were thus determined on and the most urgent needs of the various Army Corps were ascertained. The means of communication were extremely precarious and the utmost care had to be taken in the selection of the persons who were entrusted with the correspondence. Employés of regular steamship lines, either native Cubans or well-known sympathizers, would carry the correspondence at great personal risk and deliver it to the secret agents or committees in the Cuban ports who then undertook to dispatch the letters to their destination, and to return the answers through the same channels. When communication became more systematic in the island, the Delegation ordered an issue of postage stamps of various denominations and sent them to the proper authorities in Cuba. ?

During the progress of the invasion, because of the rapidity of the movements of the Cuban troops and the uncertainty of finding them in a prescribed district at a certain

time, it was impossible to land war supplies for their use. Even after Maceo had returned to the province of Pinar del Rio, many months had to pass before an expedition could safely be sent to him, because of the extreme vigilance and number of Spanish cruisers guarding the coast of Pinar del Rio and the large number of Spanish troops who were patrolling the coast.

A deposit of arms and ammunition had been made at Key West, which were intended to be sent to Cuba when opportunity offered, and some of these were placed on the sailing vessel *Competitor* with Colonel Munson and about forty men. After landing most of the men and a portion of the cargo on the coast of Pinar del Rio, a Spanish gunboat captured the vessel and its remaining cargo, together with a number of the crew. There being some American citizens among the prisoners, the United States intervened in their behalf, prevented their execution after they had been condemned to death and ultimately succeeded in obtaining their release. The few thousands of cartridges which were landed by the *Competitor* were safely delivered to Maceo, who made good use of them by administering a signal defeat to the Spaniards in the battle of Cacarajicara. Subsequently the Delegation succeeded in landing several important expeditions in Pinar del Rio, one of which carried a dynamite cannon, which had been previously tested. This was successfully used by Maceo, for the first time in actual warfare. This expedition was in charge of General Rius Rivera who afterward succeeded Maceo in command of the Province of Pinar del Rio and who was subsequently captured by the Spaniards. The Delegation used its judgment in sending supplies to the island, selecting such provinces for immediate relief as appeared to be in most urgent need. Although the forces throughout the island were all necessitous, nevertheless care had to be taken to land resources in the places where they were least exposed to capture by the Spaniards and where, for the time being, there were important operations.

The problem of sending supplies became more and more difficult as time went on. It was harder to leave the shores of the United States with a cargo than it was to land it in

Cuba. President Cleveland issued two proclamations several months apart, calling upon all citizens and residents of the United States to respect the neutrality laws. The utmost rigor was exercised by the Federal authorities, who, in their anxiety to avoid the possibility of all claims by Spain against the United States for violation of neutrality, proceeded rather too far in restraining the sailing of expeditions. The best proof of unjust discrimination against the Cubans, in this particular, is that the Government failed in every prosecution to obtain a forfeiture either of the vessel or its cargo. There were a great many of these prosecutions which put the Delegation to great expense and caused it to lose valuable time in the landing of much needed supplies in Cuba. An extensive system of espionage was established along the Atlantic coast by the Spaniards, who virtually were put in control of all the machinery of the Treasury Department and even of the Navy to prevent the sailing of supplies.

All that was needed was a fair amount of suspicion aroused in some Spanish agent and complaint founded thereon, to obtain an order for a revenue cutter or naval vessel to proceed to the point from which the expedition was supposed to be about to sail and to have the local United States District Attorney and Marshal prepared to seize, arrest and prosecute. It was decided over and over again that the shipment of arms and munitions to the Cuban insurgents was not a violation of the laws of neutrality, but nevertheless the seizures and prosecutions continued.

Aside from the extraordinary official vigilance and stringency, the continued risk of discovery made it necessary to change the point of shipment in each succeeding expedition, or at least to vary the plan of sailing. There was, too, constant danger that the crews of the vessels would give information to the authorities. This indeed happened at least on their return from the landing in Cuba in almost every instance where a large vessel demanding a numerous crew was used. No matter how well these men were paid, the Spaniards almost invariably succeeded in bribing some of them to testify. At one time there was a prosecution of those who were on board or managed the expedition, every time a ves-

sel returned to the United States. Of the large number of prosecutions of individuals for the violation of the neutrality laws, only three were successful. The men convicted were Captain Wiborg, Captain John D. Hart and Dr. Joseph J. Luis, in the order named. With the captains there was comparatively little trouble. One indeed turned informer and succeeded in convicting Dr. Luis and another meditated the surrender of an expedition to the Spaniards. This was discovered, however, before he could do any harm. The Spanish agents offered liberal rewards to the captains who were known to be in the service of the Delegation to give information concerning plans or to betray the landing point in Cuba, but without success. There was never a more honest and loyal set of men than these. The one who took the largest number of expeditions to Cuba is Captain John O'Brien, popularly known as "Dynamite" Johnny O'Brien. Among the others who served faithfully and well are Captains Morton and Edward Murphy who have since died, Captains Lewis, Dickman, Wiborg, Riley and Samuel Hughes, the last of whom was particularly brave and dashing. He even took his wife with him on two occasions.

It was found to be extremely dangerous to notify the Cubans in the field that an expedition would be landed at a given point, at a certain time, because any movement of the Cuban troops towards the coast would become known to the Spaniards, who, immediately suspecting the true reason, would dispatch a large body of troops to the neighborhood and send several gun-boats to control that part of the coast.

It was for this reason, as well as the practical difficulties of making the landing in any other manner than by surf-boats, that it was found necessary to send men with the arms, whose duty it was to load the small boats, row them ashore, land the supplies and then either transport them inland or bury them while they went into the interior to notify the Cuban troops of the landing place. Considering the great difficulties attending the proper organization, dispatch and landing of these expeditions, it is really remarkable that there were so few losses.

In the course of the revolution, the Delegation lost three

steamers, which foundered at sea, all under nearly the same conditions. It is a curious fact that each of these vessels was lost in the month of January, the *Hawkins* in 1896, the *Commodore* in 1897 and the *Tillie* in 1898. In each case, the pumps, which had been properly tested before starting, were found to be clogged when the critical moment came and other circumstances tend to show that there was foul play. In each instance, the Spanish officials in the United States were aware that the vessel was about to sail, but made no attempt to prevent it. The *Hawkins* and *Commodore* with the *James H. Woodall* were the property of the Delegation, while the *Tillie* was merely chartered. The Delegation made it a rule to charter rather than to buy a vessel, because of the fact that after the first expedition the vessel would be the subject of a continuous and strict surveillance, and the hiring of a crew for such a vessel would be fraught with grave danger of having a spy or a traitor appear on board.

The vessels used at various times in this service were the *Bermuda*, the *Three Friends*, the *Laurada*, the *Dauntless*, the *Horsa*, the *James H. Woodall*, the *Leon*, the *Monarch*, the *Somers Smith*, the *George W. Childs* and the *Commodore*, which made two successful trips before she foundered.

These expeditions were in charge of the chief of expeditions, General Emilio Nuñez, and Dr. Joaquín D. Castillo, who alternated in taking them to the Cuban shores. Colonel Federico Pérez Carbó also landed a number of them, once being attacked by two Spanish gun-boats, which he succeeded in outrunning.

Hardly was one expedition landed before another had to be undertaken and in all thirty-six expeditions were landed successfully. It was thus that the Cubans were supplied with arms and ammunition. It meant the running of a blockade by the United States vessels to leave the American shores and the running of the Spanish blockade in Cuba, followed by almost certain seizure of the vessel on her return, and the prosecution of the Captain and the representative of the Delegation who happened to be on board.

The most strenuous efforts were made by the Spanish agents and diplomatic representatives to have the Delegation

prosecuted and convicted, but they failed to obtain the necessary evidence to convict under the law.

Possibly no better recommendation for the value of the work done by the Delegation can be given than the statements of the Spanish Ministers at Washington, Señors Dupuy, de Lome and Polo, who told Secretary of State Day that if the United States Government had closed up the Delegation there would have been an end to the war in Cuba. This statement was also repeatedly made by the Secretaries of Foreign Relations of the Spanish Cabinet at Madrid, as may be seen in the Spanish Red Book, transmitting to the Cortes the diplomatic correspondence between Spain and the United States.

The work of carrying supplies to the men in the field was continued even after the declaration of war between Spain and the United States, and many of the men who had served the Delegation were used by the American government to great advantage in their various capacities. The Delegation had always a number of skilful Cuban pilots, representing various parts of the island, and these were of great value in selecting the best localities for disembarkation. Of course, as time went on, the men engaged in these expeditions became experts, so that landings were ultimately made in about half the time which was at first consumed. As the difficulties placed in the way of departing from the United States increased, it was found best to charter both a sailing vessel which could carry a large cargo and a steamer which, after making a landing, would return for a second and sometimes even a third cargo, to the place where the schooner was lying in wait.

The largest expedition was that landed by the *Laurada* in the port of Banes, where she remained twenty-six hours unloading in sight of a Spanish fort. Naturally, these expeditions cost much money and the question was frequently asked, where did the Cubans get it.

The organization of the Cuban Revolutionary Party was kept intact until December, 1898 and the various clubs contributed with the utmost regularity. When an extraordinary effort was to be made, they were advised of the fact and

always responded most loyally. Besides this source of income, there were private contributions from individual sources, one Cuban lady in particular contributing more than one hundred and twenty thousand dollars.

On the death of General Antonio Maceo, the Cubans all over the world contributed to an extraordinary collection, to prove that, despite the great blow the revolution had received, it was a fight for principle and not because of the prestige of any one leader. The Cuban colony of Paris alone contributed more than one hundred thousand dollars on this occasion. Besides these sources of income, there were the taxes collected by the Cubans in the island, which in the year 1895 to 1896 aggregated over four hundred thousand dollars. In addition, some bonds were sold for cash, or given in part payment for the charter of vessels, postage stamps were sold and later silver souvenir coins.

There was comparatively very little money contributed to the cause by the American public, but the sympathy of the people was perhaps in the end just as practicable and even more effective in winning independence for Cuba.

While the collection of funds was a matter necessitating a great deal of detail work and much care, the disbursements were equally onerous.

Not one dollar was paid out of the treasury, except on a written order of the Delegate, to which a receipt was attached. The order specified the amount and purpose of the expenditure and the receipt had to be signed before the money was paid over. A receipt was also given for each item as it was contributed to the treasury.

Besides the expenditures for the war material and expeditions, there were large amounts spent monthly to maintain abroad the families of some of the principal officers of the revolution. While the amounts thus paid were very moderate in each instance, being in fact just sufficient to enable the recipients to live in the most modest way possible, the sum total was a considerable sum. Railroad transportation for the men who accompanied the expeditions and their maintenance while in this country, together with the necessary office expenses of the Delegation, swelled the amount to very

respectable proportions. The amount expended in telegrams and cablegrams alone was very considerable.

It may readily be imagined that the problem of keeping a fair balance in the treasury for an emergency was constantly occupying the mind of the Delegation. To attend to any one of the numerous branches of work charged on the Delegation demanded a great amount of detail work, and to attend to all the branches simultaneously, for none could be neglected, was a Herculean task. In forming a proper estimate of the services rendered by the Delegation, this fact should be constantly borne in mind.

While, therefore, funds were being raised to equip the army, the campaign in Washington was being carried on most vigorously to obtain the recognition of belligerent rights.

The passage of the concurrent resolution by Congress, in April, 1896, favoring the recognition of the Cubans, was followed by a period of expectancy, which however did not signify that no work was being done. The friends of Cuba in Congress were kept constantly informed of the progress which was being made by the revolution, and reassured that under no circumstances would Cuba accept anything short of her absolute independence. An effort was made to re-cast the resolutions, and adopt them in the form of a joint resolution which would compel some action, either favorable or otherwise, by President Cleveland, but Secretary of State Olney warned Congress in advance that the President maintained the right of recognition to lie solely with the Executive and that he would accordingly reject the resolution. For this reason the matter was not pressed any further at the time.

As the time for the election of a President to succeed Mr. Cleveland approached, efforts were successfully made to have both the great political parties adopt a plank in their platform favorable to Cuba.

On December 21, 1896, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously reported in favor of a resolution which had been previously offered by Senator Cameron, wherein it was resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

“That the independence of the Republic of Cuba be, and

the same is hereby acknowledged by the United States of America.

“Be it further resolved, That the United States will use its friendly offices, with the government of Spain, to bring to a close the war between Spain and the Republic of Cuba.”

Again Secretary Olney announced that Congress had no power of recognition, this time doing so publicly. No action was taken on this resolution as President McKinley had been elected and all eyes were turned on him.

The policy of extermination had been inaugurated by Weyler and the consequent horrible conditions were depicted by the Delegation from reliable reports. This was found an additional, strong argument for some action by the United States in respect to Cuban affairs.

The truth of these statements was established when President McKinley, on May 17, 1897, asked Congress for a \$50,000 appropriation for the indigent American citizens of Cuba.

On May 20, the Senate adopted the resolution introduced by Senator Morgan, recognizing the belligerent rights of the Cubans.

Despite all efforts, these resolutions could not be brought before the House of Representatives for a vote, because of its peculiar rules, although there was an overwhelming majority of Congressmen ready to vote for its adoption.

The work on propaganda was continued despite all obstacles, and public opinion became stronger and stronger in favor of putting an end to a condition of affairs which was a disgrace to civilization. The message of President McKinley in December, 1897, though conservative, admitted a state of horrors and suggested the possibility of action in the near future.

Even so far back as Mr. Cleveland's administration, efforts were being made by the American Government to have Spain grant liberal reforms or autonomy. As soon as this became known, the Delegation protested most vigorously that no half measures would be acceptable to the Cubans, and demonstrated to the Cuban sympathizers in Congress the futility of such a plan.

Nevertheless, negotiations apparently continued and, as

the position of the United States became stronger on behalf of Cuba, Spain began to make promises of autonomy and even to frame a scheme of reforms, which was formulated just about as Congress was assembled in December, 1897. The Delegation took up the proposed legislation and discussed it *seriatim* and proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, to any fair-minded man, that the whole plan was a trap and a mockery, framed only for the purpose of preventing action on the part of the United States, while the policy of extermination could be carried on. Even while showing the utter inadequacy of the proposed scheme of autonomy, the Delegation never ceased to declare that even an ideal plan, guaranteed by the American government, would not be accepted by the Cubans, who had declared their unalterable determination to fight on to independence or death. From this time on, the popular interest was so intense, that the daily mail of the Delegation increased to an enormous extent and, as every letter was invariably answered, its force had to be increased. Although general instructions were given as to the manner in which communications should be answered, there were hundreds of special inquiries which demanded more careful consideration and diplomatic replies.

As a natural result of the popular interest or perhaps as the original cause of it, the newspapers devoted themselves with renewed ardor to the cause of Cuba and a constant stream of reporters seeking news and interviews were received at the offices of the Delegation, even late into the night.

Hundreds of visitors appeared at the Delegation daily, to give gratuitous advice or to seek information or to give personal expression to their sympathy, while the number of men who applied to be sent to Cuba to fight the Spaniards was legion. These latter were informed that the Cubans needed arms, not men, and that the Delegation would not violate the neutrality laws of the United States by enlisting men.

Another great drain on the time of the Delegation was the horde of adventurers offering their services for some desperate deed, such as the assassination of Weyler, the blowing up of the palace in Havana, or of the Arsenal, or of some Spanish man-of-war. Untold inventors insisted on explaining their

apparatus or their plans, so that everything from a sub-marine boat to an airship had to be discussed.

Under the auspices of the Delegation, various meetings were held by the Cubans at which autonomy was rejected, and a manifesto was signed by all the prominent leaders to the same effect. When arguments in favor of the autonomic plan were published in the papers by Spanish statesmen, the Delegation forthwith refuted them, but despite all its efforts the American administration apparently believed that Spain was acting in good faith and that the Cubans were unreasonable.

The hypocrisy and bad faith of Spain was made manifest by the letter which Minister Dupuy de Lome wrote to Señor Canalejas. This was taken from the desk of Canalejas at Havana and brought to the United States by the man who took it, to serve his countrymen, and delivered to the Delegation. It was decided to give the letter the broadest publicity, inasmuch as it showed just how Spain was deceiving the United States. The letter was given to the press and the very morning of its publication it was delivered to the President. The Delegation was prepared to prove its genuineness in case that should be attacked, but de Lome rendered that unnecessary by admitting the authorship.

The letter was given to the President, to be disposed of as he saw fit, and when Canalejas claimed it as his property, it was given up to him.

It has been repeatedly asserted that the de Lome letter was stolen by agents of the Delegation in this country or abstracted from the mails but this is absolutely untrue.

Whatever may have been the effect of the assertions contained in this letter in official circles, the effect on the American public was profound. The insults to President McKinley contained in the letter made the people indignant, while the chicanery of Spain was made most manifest.

Within a few days after the publication of this letter, the battleship *Maine* was blown up in Havana harbor.

There now followed a period in which delicacy prevented the Delegation from obtruding Cuba's woes, while the whole American people were mourning the dead of the *Maine*.

The lull was short-lived, however, for enormous pressure was now brought to bear on the Delegation to persuade the Cubans to accept an armistice. High officials at Washington, representatives of European bankers, and even the church of Rome joined in trying to persuade Spain to grant an armistice and the Cubans to adopt it. The Delegation firmly refused to consider the proposition, stating that the Cubans would continue to fight while acceptable terms might be discussed, but that under no consideration would an armistice be accepted, particularly when the wet season was shortly coming on and thus Spain would be spared the expense and danger attending a summer campaign. It also pointed out that the Cuban army could only subsist on the resources of the country, which would be no longer possible if an armistice were accepted. In such a case, the Cubans would have had to die of starvation, to disband, or to be driven by their necessities into breaking the agreement for an armistice and again to live on the country. Documents expounding the Cuban view were frequently filed by the Delegation with the Secretary of State.

When fairly satisfied that the Cuban autonomy plan had failed in practice, a scheme was suggested whereby Spain was to retain suzerainty, Cuba occupying the same relation to Spain that Egypt does to England. This too was rejected, with the explanation that the Cubans would never be satisfied until the Spanish flag was forever removed from Cuban soil.

Then came the final message of President McKinley and renewed agitation in Congress.

Up to the very last moment, the Delegation insisted that some declaration be made recognizing the independence of Cuba and at last succeeded in having the resolution passed with the fourth paragraph containing the Teller amendment, which declared that the United States would exercise no control or sovereignty in Cuba, except for the purposes of pacification. The declaration that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent was much fought against, but finally was incorporated in the resolution.

After the declaration of war between Spain and the United States, the Delegation organized several expeditions of hundreds of Cubans, which conveyed to Cuba arms and munitions

sent by the American government, placed its pilots and managers of expeditions at the disposal of the United States, and indicated the places where much needed rations could be landed to save their starving countrymen.

When the peace protocol was signed, the Delegation, at the request of the American authorities, sent the news to the Cubans in the field, at the same time advising them as to the terms of the protocol, which was on the lines of the resolution of intervention.

After the proclamation of the protocol, the Delegation still continued to place the questions, which would certainly arise, before the American authorities and to suggest the measures which in justice to the Cubans should be taken.

The pending prosecutions were at the request of the Delegation dismissed, and money, which was deposited as bail, was restored and used by the Delegation in furnishing food to the needy and aiding the families of Cuban officers and others to return to Cuba.

Fully confident that the pledges in favor of Cuba would be religiously carried out by the United States, the Delegation was arranging to close its offices, when in November the Assembly of Representatives authorized the Delegate and *Chargé d'affaires* Quesada to remain at their posts in representation of the Cubans.

The Cuban Revolutionary Party was, however, dissolved by proclamation of the Delegate.

At present writing, the work of the Delegation is about ended and in a few days the offices will be closed.

The Delegation is content to be judged by the results of its labors.

J. Estrada Palma.



John E. Wickie

CHAPTER XXI.

THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR.

BY

JOHN E. WILKIE, Chief Secret Service Division, Treasury Department.

THERE was nothing spectacular about the work of the Secret Service men during the Spanish-American war, for there were wholly lacking the military features which the public so generally associated with that branch of the Government's service. In the War of the Rebellion Col. Baker's men were operating in the enemy's country surrounded by all the perils that menace a spy in hostile territory. There were hairbreadth escapes and thrilling experiences of the most sensational character. Penetrating the enemy's lines, securing information of his strength, position and probable movements—these were the tasks set for the daring fellows who composed the Secret Service force in the War Department in the early sixties. Not so in the last war. The late secret service campaign, if it may so be termed, was one wholly of defense and protection. It was believed that every large center of population was infested by foreigners of anarchistic tendencies who might seize the opportunity for the execution of plots against the officers of the Government or against the welfare of the community at large. It was also believed that Spain would attempt to secure official information of our plans and movements, and it was to checkmate the moves of these two dangerous classes that the Treasury Department Secret Service devoted its energies.

When Col. Baker's force was disbanded at the close of the Rebellion, the counterfeiting of government obligations had grown to such appalling dimensions that the Service was reorganized as a branch of the Treasury Department for the suppression of this and other crimes against the Government, but

for the last thirty years the Secret Service Division as we know it to-day has existed for the purpose of suppressing counterfeiting, and its operations are limited to that field by the phraseology of the appropriation bill to which it owes its existence. Under the terms of this bill the operatives of the division could not be reimbursed for any services rendered in any other direction, and therefore, on the 16th of April I prepared the following letter to the Honorable Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury :

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, SECRET SERVICE DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 16, 1898.

THE HONORABLE,

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

SIR :

Owing to recent international complications, the Secret Service Division has been called upon to supply men for special detail outside of the duties prescribed by the appropriation from which they are paid. In order that this additional expense may be properly and promptly met, and that this Division may be in a position to respond instantly to any such demand upon its force, I respectfully request that the sum of five thousand dollars be allotted to this Division from the fifty-million-dollar defense fund, said five thousand dollars to be employed in defraying the expense of such special investigations as we may from time to time be called upon to make.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN E. WILKIE, *Chief.*

The application was at once approved by the Secretary, who instructed Assistant Secretary Vanderlip to go with me to the White House and secure the President's approval. A very brief statement was sufficient to satisfy President McKinley that the apportionment was justified, and the Division was supplied with the necessary funds for commencing active operations.

During the last two weeks of April and the early part of May, I perfected, as far as possible, the organization of an auxiliary secret service force. It was my aim to leave the regular force of the Division free to pursue its legitimate la-

bor of looking up counterfeiters. It was a time of great public excitement, when the clever criminals who follow this particular branch of law-breaking would find it easier to carry on their operations, and I did not feel that it would be wise to interfere with the routine of the Department. For the auxiliary force, the requirements were comparatively simple. Experience as a detective was desirable, but a knowledge of Spanish was even more important. The secret service office in the Treasury Department was inundated with applications for positions. I think I could have put into the field a brigade of detectives, but out of all those who applied, hardly two per cent were selected. The applications came from all parts of the United States, from Canada, from Mexico and from Cuba. The force as finally organized was made up wholly of Americans, the majority of whom had, at one time or another, resided either in South America, Spain or Cuba. They were men of unusual intelligence and education, and in volunteering for secret service work were actuated wholly by motives of the highest loyalty and patriotism.

April 21, the Spanish Minister, Señor Polo y Bernabe, and his suite left Washington. Their programme, as announced, included a direct run to neutral territory and a short stay in Toronto, which was their first objective point. It was added that they would sail within a few days for the other side.

As it was the desire of this Government that no harm should come to the ex-Minister, while it was extremely unlikely that anything would happen to mar his journey to Canada, it was deemed wise to provide him unostentatiously with an escort, and two members of the Secret Service Division therefore accompanied the ministerial party as far as Niagara. While these two agents were introduced to Señor Polo, and were known to the other members of his party, I sent, by another route, two capable men, who arrived in Toronto about the time that the departing Minister reached there, and through whom I was kept informed of their movements.

That there was, beyond any question, a deliberate determination on the part of Spanish representatives to secure inside information as to the intentions of those directing the military

and naval operations of the United States forces, became a matter of absolute certainty before the war was two weeks old. The Downing case, so-called, demonstrated that some members of the Spanish ex-Minister's party in Canada were devoting themselves to this particular kind of work; and it may not be amiss to go somewhat into detail in considering one of the earlier sensations of the war.

Among the members of Señor Polo's suite, who was making his headquarters at Toronto, was Señor Ramon Carranza, who had been naval attaché of the legation here. To the agents in Toronto, it seemed that this officer received the greater number of suspicious visitors, and his callers therefore came in for a close surveillance. On the morning of May 6th, Lieutenant Carranza received in his private apartment a black-eyed, dark-faced young man of sturdy build, and for an hour and a half they were engaged in earnest conversation. The greater part of their talk is recorded in the Secret Service Division at Washington. It resulted in the absolute engagement of the stranger as a secret informant. It appeared that he was an Englishman by birth, that he had been naturalized, that he had served as a petty officer on the *Brooklyn* in the United States Navy; that he had lost his place, and that he was willing to give the Spanish agent the benefit of the knowledge he had acquired while in the navy, and to obtain for him at Washington and at the governmental navy yards, certain other information which would be of benefit to the enemy. He received explicit instructions from Lieutenant Carranza as to the forwarding of any information he might obtain. The cipher code that he was to use was explained to him, and an address in Montreal was given to him where all the information was to be forwarded. At the conclusion of his talk with the Lieutenant, he left the room and proceeded to an obscure hotel in Toronto, where he had been staying, accompanied by an agent of the Service. He was to leave Toronto that afternoon. A Secret Service man saw him aboard the train, and saw his ticket by way of Buffalo and the Lehigh Valley and Baltimore & Ohio Roads to Washington. All of this information, including a careful description of the suspect, was wired to me by one of my men, and it was a simple matter, when his

train arrived the following morning, to identify the first paid agent of Spain who came to the Capital. All unconscious of the fact that every movement was being watched, the man made his way to a lodging-house in E Street, where he left a black hand-bag that he was carrying, and started out for a walk which included a visit to the Navy Department. Two hours after he arrived he returned to his boarding-house, from which he emerged an hour later and made his way to the general post office. While he stopped at the window to purchase a stamp, one of the men who had been shadowing him slipped in through the office of the Postmaster, and was at the letterdrop when the suspect, after affixing a stamp, dropped a letter through the slot. It was sealed with red wax, and was addressed :

FREDERICK W. DICKON, ESQ.,
Dorchester St., 1248, Montreal, Canada.

It was brought to my office and opened. It read as follows :

WASHINGTON, Saturday, May 7, '98.

A cipher message has been sent off from Navy Department to San Francisco, directing the cruiser *Charleston* to proceed to Manila with five hundred men and machinery for repairs for Dewey. A long cipher has been received from Dewey at the Department at 3:30 P.M. They are translating it now. Cannot find it out yet. I heard important news respecting movements of colliers and cruiser *Newark* at Norfolk Navy Yards; also about the new Holland boat, as to what they intend to do with her and her destination. I shall go to Norfolk to find important news. My address will be Norfolk House, Norfolk, Virginia, but shall not go until Tuesday.

Respectfully yours,
G. D., in haste.

A copy of this letter, with the report of the agent who had overheard the conversation between Lieutenant Carranza and the spy in Toronto, was presented to the Adjutant General of the War Department, and he advised an immediate

arrest. Assistant Secretary Meiklejohn directed Captain Sage of the 8th Artillery, stationed at Washington Barracks, to report to me at the Treasury Department, with two men. At eleven o'clock that night, accompanied by Chief Clerk Moran of the Secret Service Division, and Eugene Crist, then an emergency employé of the Division, and afterward an officer in the District troops in the Cuban campaign, I secured admission to the house where the suspect was rooming, arrested him, turned him over to Captain Sage, and searched his apartment. His name was then learned for the first time. It was George Downing. The landlady of the establishment stated that he had been there a week before and that he had left, telling her that he was going to Virginia. His cipher code, several envelopes directed to the same address in Montreal as that borne by the letter we had seized, some other papers, and something less than \$200 in money, were taken to headquarters. The fact that he made absolutely no resistance when arrested, as well as his demeanor at the time, was an absolute indication of guilt; and, two days later, overwhelmed by the weight of his guilty knowledge and shame at the betrayal of the Government to which he had sworn allegiance, he hanged himself to the bars of his cell.

The tremendous activity of all the various branches of the War and Navy Departments, in preliminary precautionary measures, attracted a vast amount of attention; and the knowledge that there were in this country a very large number of Spanish sympathizers, resulted in a natural uneasiness as to the possible interference, by the use of high explosives, with ship-building operations, ammunition manufacturing and so on. Among the earliest work of the Division there were many cases of suspected spies at the various navy yards, and in and about manufacturing establishments having government contracts. A number of powder-mill explosions, occurring in various parts of the country just about the time that hostilities were begun, were very generally charged up to emissaries of the enemy, but it was not satisfactorily established in a single instance that the disaster was due to outside causes. Every manufactory in the country, where explosives and ammunition were being made to fill "rush" orders

from the government, was testing its capacity. Most of them were running night and day, extra hands were at work and the possibilities of accident were multiplied almost a hundred fold. I feel perfectly safe in saying that not a single government factory was attacked or damaged by spies.

A patriotic public, jealous of the interest and safety of its country, supplied the Secret Service Division with a good deal of material for investigation. After the Downing episode, the letters relating to the presence or acts of suspicious strangers increased greatly in number. Most of these undoubtedly were founded on trifling suspicion, but considerably more than a thousand cases were considered of sufficient importance to warrant an investigation by agents of the Service. In the majority of instances it was discovered that the suspected persons had been injudicious in their conversation, or had been too outspoken in their friendship for Spain, and it was found necessary to interfere only where the individuals had expressed a determination to do something if the opportunity presented itself. Such persons were watched for a while, and then, if necessary, warned that the Government was aware of their sentiments and intentions, and that any attempt on their part to make a move against the interests of the United States would be followed by arrest. In the majority of cases this was sufficient to cause a subsidence of any enthusiasm there might have been, or any determination to act as a spy. Of the thousand or more suspects who were reported to the Secret Service Division, more than six hundred men and women were under close surveillance for longer or shorter periods. There were professors, diplomats, doctors, merchants, cigar-makers, marines, electrical experts, government employés of foreign birth and uncertain antecedents, capitalists, milliners, dress-makers, society women and servants.

On the 16th of May, the President having affixed his signature to an application I made for a further allotment of fifty thousand dollars for the emergency force of the Division, I was able to cover more satisfactorily and completely the points of army mobilization, and all of the cities where it seemed advisable to locate the agents of the Service. Montreal, Toronto, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Newport

News, Savannah, Jacksonville, Tampa, Key West, Mobile, New Orleans, Galveston and San Francisco were the principal points of activity. Through the Gulf States there was a large foreign element of Spanish extraction, that was heartily in sympathy with Spain; and in Mobile and New Orleans, especially, there were combinations of tobacco smugglers and foreign cut-throats, whose operations it was extremely desirable to watch. In consorting with the members of these gangs, agents of the Secret Service ran greater risks than fell to the lot of the average man in the Service. The only plotting, however, that promised to amount to anything, had its origin in the active brain of Lieutenant Carranza; and every agent employed by him to operate in the interests of the enemy, who came into the United States for that purpose, was detected and arrested.

One of these plans, of an exceedingly interesting character, developed in the latter part of May. The Spanish agent, with the co-operation of some Canadian private detectives, elaborated a scheme to secure information for the benefit of the Spanish commanding officers in Cuba and Manila. For their purpose they needed men of military experience, and, by offers of liberal pay and promises of future reward commensurate with the success of the undertaking, they secured the services of several ex-members of the Canadian militia. The Canadian assistants of the Spanish agents picked up these men, and, after satisfying themselves of their willingness to embark in the scheme, they showed them to Lieut. Carranza, who approved the selection. In brief the plan was this:—The men were to proceed to Tampa and San Francisco and enlist in the American troops bound for Spanish territory, were to make themselves acquainted with every possible feature that could be of any benefit to the Spanish officers; were to proceed with the troops to the objective points, and, at the first favorable opportunity, were to leave the American lines and surrender themselves to the Spanish outposts. Each of the men was to be provided with a ring, upon the inner circumference of which were engraved the words, "Confianza Augustina." As soon as the Spanish lines had been reached, the spy was to send this ring by a courier

to the commanding general, who had been instructed that the wearer of the ring would be the bearer of some information. He was then, upon being escorted to the Spanish headquarters, to give the officer the benefit of the knowledge that he had acquired of the American forces and plans.

Of three men picked out for this service, one was to go to San Francisco, and two to Tampa. The one selected for the San Francisco-Manila expedition, after having been provided with his railway transportation and advance funds, concluded that the assignment was one not wholly creditable to an Englishman, and confided to his former colonel the details of the proposition that had been made to him. His action in giving up the project was applauded, but it led to an assault upon him by employés of the agents who had secured his services, and he was compelled to leave the Dominion to escape more severe punishment. The two men who went to Tampa in the furtherance of the Spanish scheme were ill-fated. One of them enlisted and was arrested because of his suspicious actions; the other tried to enlist and, failing, set himself about securing information to be forwarded to Montreal. This man—Frank Arthur Mellor—who was masquerading under the name of Miller, was a guest at the Almeria Hotel at Tampa. On Tuesday, May 24, the following telegram addressed to him was received :

Cannot telegraph money to-day. Move from where you are and telegraph from some other town. Write fully re stocks at once. Will wire money and instructions on receipt.

SIDDALL. B

Mellor was taken in charge by an agent of the service, and questioned as to the identity of his Montreal correspondent. He claimed that his communications with Montreal were wholly innocent in their nature, but he failed to explain satisfactorily what he meant by the information "re stocks," which seemed to us altogether too suggestive of information about movements of troops. With such facts as had been obtained at Tampa in my possession, I started an investigation at Montreal, and soon established that Siddall was a character who was being used as a "blind" by agents in the pay of Car-

ranza; and a further investigation made it quite clear that Mellor was one of the men engaged in pursuance of the plan originated by Lieut. Carranza. This was more than confirmed later, when the young Englishman whose conscience had troubled him as soon as he realized what his engagement with the Spanish agents meant, was brought back from England and prevailed upon to tell the entire story of his connection with the Spanish agents. If anything were needed to complete the evidence against Mellor, it was supplied in an unexpected way; by Lieut. Carranza himself. Two days after the arrest of Mellor at Tampa, Lieut. Carranza, then living at 42 Tupper Street, Montreal, wrote a long letter to a relative occupying a high position in the Spanish Navy, in which he made a number of statements concerning his duties at Montreal, and lamented the fact that their best spies had fallen into the hands of the Americans. He referred specifically to the arrest of Mellor at Tampa, without naming him, but as Mellor's was the only arrest, on the day mentioned, at Tampa, the inference was irresistible.

The Carranza letter furnished one of the sensations of the war, for it supplied to the United States Government the one thing which was most needed to rid this Continent of the men who were most actively engaged in maintaining the Spanish spy system. A very careful and close watch had been kept upon Carranza and his associates, with the hope that it might be possible to make out a case strong enough to induce the British Government to expel them from British territory. This watch upon Carranza included occasional visits to his house by Secret Service agents,—of course without his knowledge. One of these visits was made on the morning of Friday, the 27th of May. The agent was accompanied by two American friends, a gentleman and a lady, and their call was for the ostensible purpose of examining the house with a view to renting it furnished when the two months' lease held by the Spanish gentleman should have expired. Lieut. Carranza and Captain du Bosc were at breakfast at the time of the call. The visitors were shown through the establishment, and in the bedroom of Lieut. Carranza the agent saw an official-looking letter, sealed and stamped, ready for mailing, lying upon the

dresser. Conjecturing that any document addressed to Madrid, emanating from either of the Spanish officers, would probably be of value to the United States Government, he slipped the letter into his pocket, and later in the day started it for Washington in the hands of an American railroad engineer, who carried it with him to the end of his run into Vermont, and then entrusted it to the United States mail service. It reached Washington Saturday night, and Sunday I had it translated. It was as follows :

MONTREAL, 26th of May, 1898. TUPPER STREET, 42.
TO HIS EXCELLENCY SR. DON JOSÉ GOMEZ Y MAY.

MY DEAR DON JOSÉ:

It was my belief that they would have appointed you to command the Cadiz fleet, and it was my intention to have sent you a telegram asking that you would take me with you to meet you in the Antilles, or wherever you might say. The case has not turned out thus, however, and it seems as though God were not on our side, because the election of Señor Camara, I fear, will be fatal, although he may have a good chief of staff. No one could possibly suit him, because he is very capricious, and besides is not a hard worker; on the contrary, he is lazy and would pay no attention to the advice of any one. You will not take this for flattery, but to-day no one but you and Don Pasquale Cervera should have command of our fleet, and that is the belief of the younger element of the personnel. Now there is no remedy, and may God shed his light upon him and keep him in his hands. I wrote to the Minister, and with the confidence due to my special duties I said to him, on sending a clipping from a newspaper containing a telegram from Cadiz, speaking of our fleet and of its Admiral, that it was not Señor Camara but you who should command it; and that we, the lower personnel, who have traveled about a little, know you very well. It may be that this action may have made a bad impression upon him, but I don't care, because if I can do so, I shall leave the service when this war is finished. I have been left here to receive and send telegrams and to look after the spy service which I have established, or, I had better say, am establishing here, because, until a very little while ago, I was not permitted to do as I pleased. We have had bad luck because they have captured our two best spies, one in Washington, who hanged himself—or else they did it for him—and the other day before yesterday in Tampa. The Americans are showing the most extraordinary vigilance.

I do not wish to remain here without taking an active part in the war, and I desire duty in which I can take the initiative and do something. I shall be extremely gratified to have a ship in order to run the blockade, or a torpedo boat. However, if there is no other remedy, I would go perfectly willingly on board a large ship. I am very sorry that the war finds me so low in rank, for it offers opportunities for any one who wishes to work and to risk himself. I cannot believe that Don Pasquale could be in Santiago as reported by the American press. He entered it on the 18th, and if he had gone immediately to Havana he would have met only two monitors in front of it. I make it out that he entered that place only to coal, and for the moral effect it would produce in Spain. Suppose he went out Friday, the 20th, if he had gone to the North and through the Providence Channel, he would have passed into Havana right under the noses of the Americans, who had only small cruisers; for Schley was at sea on the night of Thursday, Sampson on that of Friday, and on that of Sunday, the 22d, he took the lower channel for the East, and on Wednesday turned back towards Havana. Schley's squadron has been reinforced by the *Iowa*, and Sampson's by the *Oregon*. I believe that in war one has to tempt fortune. If it had not been because Sampson was afraid that Don Pasquale might go to Havana and that Schley would not be there, or our confidence is well grounded that he found himself very short of ammunition after the bombardment through the stealing in the Ordnance Department, the fact remains that it was logical for him to remain near Santiago and Cienfuegos, and, if he could not prevent the entrance of our squadron, to shut it up, and thus close its campaign, as those people over there already believe it closed. But I cannot believe such a stupid thing possible. I suppose that he went to the South or Porto Rico and that he had ordered a cruiser or two there to cover the *Terror* and that he will appear at San Juan the 27th or 28th. He will coal there and will rest a day or two and will then return to delay and annoy them and delay the invasion. The *Vizcaya* and the *Oquendo* at least need to go into dry-dock. I telegraphed to Don Pasquale on the morning of the 20th when I knew he was in Santiago, saying that the squadrons were at Key West. He did not answer me. That afternoon there came another telegram from Madrid saying he had left Santiago. I continued sending messages to General Blanco in respect to all the movements, and now, so far as I know, Don Pasquale has arrived at Porto Rico, where I shall try to correspond with him. If he should have set out for Martinique or Havana, having twenty-four hours advantage, he would have arrived before now. I am very much afraid lest they attack Porto Rico by sea and land and put off the attack on Havana.

They are not going to do more than try to take the latter, and they think then, if they destroy our fleet, of taking the war into Spain with Havana already in their power. They have no confidence in their army but they have in their navy, and they are afraid of our army and yellow fever, because if the men should begin to die in Cuba there would be a tremendous row, as they are not like our people. Anyway, we shall see when there is news of the fleet. I expect it to-morrow. With them cleaning their hulls at the Keys, we should be able to clean something in three days at Porto Rico. Each day that passes is worse for us on account of the almost total lack of preparation. If the Cadiz squadron is to come to bombard Boston, Portland and Long Island, they can do it now, but after a few months it will be too late. I think, if we are to have any success in this matter, it will be through treating for peace by yielding Cuba and having them recognize the debt. If we do not do this soon, it will be too late and we shall lose Cuba and Porto Rico and all that this war has cost us, and in addition we shall be charged with the Cuban debt for which our Treasury is responsible. There is no doubt here that we cannot continue this war, in which we have nothing to gain, and may lose our three colonies and be ruined for fifty years. In the matter of money there is no patriotism here. Proof is given by the bank, which ought to have bought gold, although at a premium of one-hundred per cent, and issued notes against it in the same or a slightly greater quantity. With one hundred and fifty millions it has made thirteen hundred millions. This is the moment of the year at which, instead of returning twenty-three or twenty-four per cent, it returns only twelve or fifteen. As regards its buying gold, exchange has gone down, and if in buying four hundred millions it issues five hundred millions, paying six hundred or seven hundred, inasmuch as the state subscribes at the rate of five per cent, this would represent to the bank an interest of about three per cent, and its dividend would have gone down very little. The bank is the nation, and with the nation it has grown rich by offering paper money, which it did not have in its treasury, and by getting interest on that which it really never had given out. But, whatever the bank does, nobody dares object except those who have no money in their pants if they should call for it.

I have written to the Minister, but I did not give him so much news of the fleets as to you, because I had other things to speak of. If you should see him you might give him some news. We shall see when they relieve me and send some one here to work and not amuse himself. I can imagine your anxiety for Francisco and the rest, an anxiety

that we share. Their terrible ships do not go as fast as ours by perhaps two and a half miles. As for the monitors, they do not count for much; they can be used only to bombard in a smooth sea, and besides cannot go fast, and carry very little coal. They have delayed Sampson the whole voyage.

My regards to Raphael and his daughters, and you know how much your kinsman and subordinate loves you.

RAMON CARRANZA.

I should be glad to have you write me your opinions. You know how much I appreciate them. If the squadron is in Cuba, they are going to destroy its wretched fortification and sink a couple of steamers in the mouth. They have already telegraphed to Key West for them to see if they have got them there, and the inventor, Holland, offers his submarine boat to destroy the mines.

It will be seen at once that the statements in the early part of the letter, gave to this Government exactly what it had been waiting for; and the information was so convincing in its nature, that, upon receiving a photographic copy of the original, the British Government ordered both Lieutenant Carranza and Captain Du Bosc, to leave the country. The fact that the letter was in the hands of the Secret Service Division at Washington, was not made public until about a week later. In the meantime, the agent who had secured the letter was ordered away from Montreal, to make it absolutely certain that his identity should not be discovered, and the Spanish officers were at their wits' end to account for the disappearance of their compromising letter. An unfortunate private detective in Montreal was suspected of being responsible for its disappearance, but it was impossible to sustain the charge in court, and the case was dismissed. When the letter was given to the public, a vigorous denial of its accuracy was made by its author, but his denial could not stand against the evidence of the document itself. With his removal from the field of activity, the Spanish spy system received its death-blow.

John E. Wickie



D. A. R. HOSPITAL CORPS.

MISS MARY DESHA, Assistant Director.

MRS. DANIEL MANNING,
President-General D. A. R.

MRS. FRANCIS S. NASH, Assistant Director.

MRS. AMOS G. DRAPER,
Treasurer.

DR. ANITA NEWCOMB MEECE,
Director.

CHAPTER XXII.

WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR.

BY

MRS. AMOS G. DRAPER, Treasurer D. A. R. Hospital Corps.

IF, as a noted orator said, "In raising your monuments to the heroes of war, one should honor not only the heroism and patriotism of the dead soldier, but that of the mother who gave him birth and of the faithful, self-sacrificing nurse, who in many cases lost her life in the effort to save his," surely no history of the American-Spanish war can be complete without some mention of the part in it sustained by women. In all preceding wars mothers have given their best-beloved to their country, and hundreds of women in other times of need have pressed eagerly forward to do all they could to relieve the suffering. But in this war women have not only, as in previous ones, responded to the call of duty, but also for the first time in the history of our country their freely-offered services have been formally accepted, and an organization of women has been recognized, not as an auxiliary, but as temporarily a part of the Medical Departments of the Army and Navy and subject to their orders. During this war the trained woman nurse has obtained for herself a position unique in history, and the relief work undertaken by women in every section of the United States has been so helpful as to lead the Surgeon-General of the Navy to say in his official report: "In this war, woman has done her perfect work."

As it was evident to all thinking persons early in the year '98 that war would soon be declared, various chapters of Daughters of the American Revolution and other patriotic organizations passed resolutions, which were forwarded to the

President and other officials, offering their services in case war should be declared. No definite plan of help was proposed by any of them beyond collecting supplies which might be used in case of need. Acting therefore upon a suggestion from the War Department, the Board of Management of the National Society D. A. R., (Mrs. Daniel Manning, President General) after passing several resolutions indicating a desire to be of use, on April 27, '98, offered its services to the Surgeons General of the Army and Navy, as an examining board for female nurses.

It was known that the Surgeon-General of the Army had received a number of applications from women for positions as nurses but that a lack of sufficient clerical force to examine properly into the qualifications of the different applicants had rendered it impossible for him to take any steps toward engaging women as contract nurses up to that time. It was thought that women nurses might also be needed in the Naval Hospitals. The Surgeon-General of the Army, as we see from his annual report,

“foreseeing the necessity for a large force of trained nurses at the general hospitals, applied to Congress (April 28, 1898), for authority to employ by contract as many nurses as might be required during the war, at the rate of \$30 per month and a ration, the pay to be furnished from the appropriation of the Medical and Hospital Department. This was very promptly granted.”

On the same day the offer of the Daughters of the American Revolution was accepted, as is seen by the following letters.

“The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy Department heartily approves of the proposition of your Committee to form a corps of able, trained nurses from whose number competent nurses may be promptly detailed for such service as may be required in caring for the sick and wounded during the present war.

The standard of competency of these nurses will be left entirely to the discretion of your Committee. The Bureau places the same reliance on your judgment as it does on your patriotism, and it rests assured that a manifestation of the same loyalty and the same zeal in good works will be shown in the labors of your Committee as was shown by your ancestors,

whose never-failing support and devotion sustained the courage of their husbands and brothers in the struggle of the Nation for independence.

Very respectfully,
(Signed) W. K. VAN REYPEN,
Surgeon General, U. S. Navy."

" I have received a large number of applications from trained nurses and other patriotic ladies who are willing to serve as nurses, but have been obliged to answer all of these offers to the effect that no trained nurses are needed at present, and I am uncertain as to what our requirements may be in the future. It is not my intention to send any female nurses with troops to Cuba, and in case we have a number of good hospitals established I expect to depend principally upon our trained men of the Hospital Corps for service as nurses in the wards. I should, however, be glad to avail myself of the services of a certain number of female nurses for the care of special cases and for the preparation and distribution of special diet in the hospitals. I appreciate very highly the offer of the National Board of Management of the Daughters of the American Revolution and am quite willing to turn this whole matter over to your Committee, giving you the applications now on file and those which may hereafter be received, and allowing you to select proper persons for the service required in case I have occasion to call for the assistance of trained female nurses.

In this case I would expect you to answer all letters of inquiry and to keep a list of eligibles from which to make your selections in case of a call from me. This list need not be a long one, and it is desirable that those selected should be from different parts of the country. Residents of Washington should not have a preference in this selection over those of other cities. As a rule, I think it would be better to have women of not less than thirty and not more than fifty years of age. They should, of course, be able to present proper testimonials as to training, capacity and character. No special legislation will be necessary in order to make appointments if the services of female nurses are required. The compensation will be \$30 a month, with board, and lodging accommodations in the hospital where this is practicable.

I shall be glad to confer with your Committee at any time, and remain,

Very respectfully yours,
(Signed) GEO. M. STERNBERG,
Surgeon General, U. S. Army."

The Board adopted the plan, as endorsed by the Surgeons-General of the Army and Navy, appointing the following officers:—Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee, *Director*, Miss Mary Desha, Mrs. Francis S. Nash, *Assistant Directors* and Mrs. Amos G. Draper, *Treasurer*. The Surgeons-General were then promptly notified that the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was formed and ready for work.

May 3, the Surgeon-General of the Army referred to the Corps six hundred applications and letters from women and organizations of women, offering services; May 16, the Surgeon-General of the Navy referred one hundred and forty-two of similar character, and thereafter all applications from women for hospital positions in the Army and Navy, whether sent to the President, Secretary of War, Members of Congress or the Surgeon-General, were referred to the Corps for examination, action and filing.

While all applicants were no doubt actuated by a spirit of patriotism and desire to serve their country, their qualifications ranged from having served one season successfully in light opera to twenty years of successful experience as trained nurse, superintendent, etc. The standard set by the Surgeon-General of the Army was adhered to; a set of questions prepared by the Hospital Corps and approved by the Surgeons-General was sent to each applicant, whose letter indicated any evidence of hospital training. Those designated for service were required, except in a few emergency cases, to be not only graduates from a regular training school but to be endorsed by their superintendents.

On May 7, a request was received from the Surgeon-General of the Army for the names of three (afterwards increased to four) surgical nurses for duty at the Military Hospital at Key West, Fla., and on May 13, they signed contracts and left for Key West. On the same day the names of six female nurses for the Hospital Ship, *Relief*, were called for by the Surgeon-General of the Army. From that time on, orders were being received, and were filled, sometimes at the rate of 150 a day, from the list which on April 28 we were told "need not be a long one." On September 7, the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was relieved from further duty by the Surgeon-General

of the Army, having selected over nine hundred nurses from almost every State east of the Rocky Mountains, for service in twenty-two different Army hospitals, and six for service at the Naval hospital at Norfolk, Va. Between five and six hundred of these were selected between August 15 and September 7.

The Chief Surgeons at Jacksonville and Montauk appointed directly many persons. These in addition to the nurses who failed to sign contracts and those who were qualified by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps but were not ordered to duty until after September 7, increased the number to twelve hundred, more than a full regiment! These figures do not include the faithful band of volunteer nurses or those employed in the service of the Red Cross Auxiliary and other patriotic organizations, of whom mention will be made later.

Thirteen of the contract nurses, Isabella R. Bradford, Sister Anastasia Burke, Sister M. Elizabeth Flanagan, Margaret J. Greenfield, Sister Mary Larkin, Katherine Stansberry, Sister Mary Agnes Sweeney, Irene S. Toland, M. D., Ellen May Tower, Margaret N. Tricoche, Minerva Turnbull, Clara H. Ward and Sister Caroline Wolfe, died in service. Many more, like the soldiers they nursed, were so enfeebled by disease, as to be practically dependent upon others for support for weeks and months. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

While Miss Dix was appointed Superintendent of nurses in 1861 by the Secretary of War, and served in that position until the close of the Civil War, trained nursing as a profession was then unknown, and this is the first time that trained nurses have been recognized as a part of the Medical Department of the Government. That the idea of women nurses in the regular military hospitals was not acceptable to many of the Commanding Surgeons at first, was of course to be expected. But the fact remains that in every instance where their services were allowed, (often in the face of much opposition) within a short time the Surgeon Commanding asked for more, considering their presence a necessity. The following extracts are cited as examples of many that could be given if space permitted. The first is from Major Dewitt, Surgeon

Commanding the Hospital at Fortress Monroe, where only thirty-four of the seventeen hundred patients died.

“I am satisfied that whatever success we may have had in the treatment of our sick and wounded, has been in a great measure due to the skill and devotion of the female nurses.”

Major Mearns, Surgeon Commanding the John Blair Gibbs General Hospital, says:

“In patriotism, courage and patient endurance of hardships, the female contract nurses. . . . have risen above the standard of enlisted men, and I am compelled to compare them in these respects with the soldiers of the regular army of the U. S.”

Like all other “persons employed in hospitals,” the contract nurse is required to “wear habitually during the war, on the left sleeve of the coat, midway between the shoulder and elbow, a brassard or arm badge, consisting of a red cross on a white ground,” in accordance with the treaty of Geneva. This, and the fact that in many instances her maintenance was paid entirely or in part by the Red Cross Auxiliary No. 3, has given rise to the erroneous impression among many persons, that she was a volunteer nurse, working in the service of the “American National Red Cross.” The Hospital Ship, *Relief*, owned by the Government, whose women nurses were designated by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps and engaged by the Surgeon-General, was supposed by many persons to belong to the “civil society” above mentioned because, according to the treaty, it carried the Geneva cross flag at the fore whenever the National flag was flown.

Various organizations, religious and otherwise, applied for permission to serve in the military hospitals. These were declined, but the service of many members of the organizations, applying *as individuals* were gladly accepted. This is notably the case of the Sisters of Charity, Sisters of Mercy, Sisters of the Holy Cross, Sisters of St. Joseph and Sisters of the American Congregation, all of the latter order being daughters of Indian Chiefs—Cheyennes and Sioux. Two

hundred and forty-three of these served, 218 of them being designated by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps.

This is the first time that Roman Catholic Sisters have signed contracts as individuals. They did it cheerfully in this instance, realizing the principle at stake and being desirous of aiding and not hindering the Government in its efforts to secure the highest grade of nursing for its men. Of the value of their services Colonel Hoff writes from Chickamauga:—

“No words can express my sense of obligation to the kind Sisters for their admirable work with, and tender care of our sick. . . . Please return to the Sisters my sense of obligation to them, and the hope that I may feel at liberty to call upon them under like circumstances in the future.”

Dr. Almy says in a letter from Montauk:—

“In fact, it is due to their untiring work that every one says that the ‘Annex’ is the model hospital here. I would wish to state that I consider them a great and indispensable help in the military hospitals.”

Other equally appreciative letters could be given.

Miss Ella Lorraine Dorsey, a “high private in the D. A. R. Hospital Corps,” was given the privilege and duty of examining and filing all papers in relation to the Sisters, and to her kindness I am indebted for the data concerning them.

The following extracts from the annual report of the Surgeon-General:—

“A number of patriotic societies offered to provide the hospitals with nurses, but the Committee referred to, answered its purpose so well that I did not feel the need of additional assistance and was relieved from what would otherwise have been a serious responsibility;”

and from a letter received from Major Carter, Surgeon Commanding Leiter Hospital:—

“I cannot refrain from expressing my admiration for the care and discretion exercised by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps in the selection of nurses; and I beg leave to express my highest appreciation of the invaluable aid they afforded the management of Leiter Hospital;”

and scores of other letters give an idea of the value set upon the services rendered by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps. The best proof, however, of the thoroughness of the work of selection lies in the fact that not one of the nurses designated by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was discharged for "misconduct or neglect of duty."

One shudders to think what might have been the result if nurses had been chosen by political influence alone, nor can one refrain from admiring the wisdom and forethought of the Surgeon-General of the Army for his persistent refusal, in the face of much adverse criticism, to appoint women nurses in the beginning, until their credentials could be properly examined, and for his continued adherence to the high standard of excellence first maintained.

That it would have been impossible for any woman or corps of women, living in one locality to have obtained such results, is self-evident. The Daughters of the American Revolution were peculiarly fitted for this work. Not only were its members alive to all patriotic deeds; they were thoroughly organized and embraced all classes of society, all political parties and all shades of religious belief. Two of the officers of the Hospital Corps were daughters of Union men, and two of Southern veterans. April 30, a circular letter had been sent by the Board to its 582 chapters in every state in the Union, calling upon them for assistance. This was promptly responded to. Committees, usually consisting of physicians' wives, were formed to which were referred the credentials of applicants from that section. One wealthy woman in Boston came to town twice a week and opened her house to receive the applications of nurses and visited personally the physicians, patients and hospitals to whom references were made, before giving her endorsement. Women of wealth and influence in Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia, Rochester and St. Louis were equally efficient, many of them remaining at home through the entire summer to fulfil the duties of their office. Their work was ably supplemented by the Associated Alumnae of Trained Nurses and other organizations of similar character, as well as by the superintendents of training schools who rendered

invaluable assistance. These and many others worked zealously for the good of the cause, without hope of reward, satisfied with the consciousness of duty well performed.

When the hospital at Fortress Monroe was opened a new difficulty arose. In a tent hospital, there were and necessarily could be no accommodations for women nurses. Realizing the necessity, however, Mrs. Walworth, Director-General of the Woman's National War Relief Association, telegraphed to the Hospital Corps;—"If the Surgeon-General will send eight nurses designated by you to Fortress Monroe, we will pay their board." Within two hours the nurses had been appointed by the Surgeon-General and were on their way.

This Society deserves more than a passing mention. Not only did it pay the board of the nurses above mentioned; it supplied thousands of dollars worth of delicacies to the hospital at Fortress Monroe, engaged cooks in order that the food might be served in the most palatable manner, and furnished medicines and supplies to many of the transports setting out for Porto Rico. Many a poor soldier has reason to bless the day that his surgeon, young and inexperienced, who let his medicine case be taken on board ship with other baggage and thus found it inaccessible, met Mrs. Walworth and was given a fresh supply of needed articles. When the poor fever-stricken remnant of our gallant army was landed at Montauk, Miss Helen Gould, whose generous gift of \$100,000 had been gratefully accepted by the Government some time before, was chosen to represent the Association and, from that time until the last tent was pitched, she and other officers of the Association might be seen, ministering to the sick and affording help in so many ways that the thanks of Congress were tendered her for her manifold services.

Miss Reubena Walworth volunteered as a nurse at the beginning of the war and was employed by the Association. She labored most zealously at Fortress Monroe and at Montauk and finally lost her life in the Detention Hospital, beloved by all with whom she came in contact.

Early in July one great deficiency was seen in the method of supplying women nurses to the military hospitals as they

were needed. Since Congress had provided no special fund for their transportation, considerable delay had always occurred before they could reach their destinations, and as these hospitals were rapidly filling up with patients, in consequence of the outbreak of typhoid and malarial fevers in the different camps, the effect of such delay became daily more dangerous. The Red Cross Society for the Maintenance of Trained Nurses, Auxiliary to the American National Red Cross Relief Committee, Auxiliary No. 3, through its Acting President, Mrs. Winthrop Cowdin, who was always keenly alive to the needs of the soldier and the nurse and on the alert to supply them if possible, offered to make good this lack. Five hundred dollars was placed in the hands of the Treasurer of the D. A. R. Hospital Corps as Acting Treasurer, which was afterwards increased to \$5,500, to meet transportation expenses of nurses, ordered directly from Washington. The transportation expenses of over 400 others was paid from New York to their posts of destination. Owing to this generous contribution, nurses were ordered by telegraph by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps to proceed at once to their posts of duty, being assured that their transportation would be refunded them, without waiting for the official papers necessary under the old system. In this way they were ready for service several days, sometimes a week earlier, and there is no doubt that much suffering and some lives were saved thereby. This Society also provided maintenance for 43 nurses at Fortress Monroe, 150 at the Sternberg Hospital, Chickamauga, furnished supplies in great abundance to the nurses and men at many of the hospitals, most especially those of Sternberg and Montauk, supported over 200 nurses sent by permission to different hospitals in this country and in Cuba, and richly earned for itself the encomium of Major Rafferty of Fort Hamilton :

“Were I to choose the most worthy and successful body of workers from among all the generous people who have been rendering such beautiful aid to our sick and wounded, I should unhesitatingly point to your Auxiliary for the Maintenance of Trained Nurses.”

This Society also lost by death one of its efficient workers,

Miss Phinney, who after serving faithfully at the Leiter Hospital succumbed to the physical and mental strain.

Nor did the D. A. R. Hospital Corps content itself with being merely an examining board for nurses. From the first week in May when we undertook to supply 500 hospital shirts, till the last of September, when we reported \$60,000 in money and supplies received and forwarded, it formed one of the channels into which poured the great stream of relief work undertaken by women throughout the entire country. From the 236 chapters and societies contributing, it sent supplies to every general hospital in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico and Manila and to many of the field and division hospitals, started a diet kitchen at Fort McPherson, Ga., gave employment to many women, whose relatives were in the war, and furnished patterns of garments needed in hospitals to hundreds of applicants.

In Connecticut the relief work was thoroughly organized under its energetic State Regent. One had but to telegraph to New Haven, and whether the request was for collapsible rubber bath-tubs, straw matting beds or food delicacies, it was granted instantly.

In many of the towns in New York and Pennsylvania, notices were read from the different churches calling upon the people to unite, and War Emergency Relief Boards were formed, frequently with a Daughter of the American Revolution at the head. One in Cleveland, Ohio, having 188 auxiliaries in the city and surrounding towns, contributed over \$9,000 in money and sent 365 boxes of clothing and supplies. In Rochester, N. Y., the work begun under the auspices of the Irondequoit Chapter, D. A. R., soon outgrew its quarters, and a large organization called the Rochester War Relief Committee was formed which embraced 118 organizations in Rochester and in the towns of western New York. These contributed thousands of dollars in money and supplies to different camps and hospitals wherever the call seemed most urgent. Mite boxes were placed in different hotels and public places in Detroit, and the result, mostly in pennies, was wisely expended in fruits and other delicacies for the sick.

The Daughters of the Confederacy in Virginia and in Texas

contributed most generously to the cause. Contributions both in money and supplies were sent by them through the D. A. R. Hospital Corps to several hospitals, chiefly to Pablo Beach, 18 miles from Jacksonville, where a large convalescent hospital was established for convalescents and others who had become debilitated through climatic influences. Mrs. Fitzhugh Lee worked unceasingly for the good of the soldiers stationed there and herself supervised many of the details of relief work.

Other societies, notably the King's Daughters, Woman's Relief Corps, Council of Jewish Women, Rathbone and Pythian Sisters, Ladies of the G. A. R., Temperance Unions and many Church Societies, both Catholic and Protestant, lent willing aid to our efforts to serve our country.

Our support came from all classes; from the richest to the poorest, from those in perfect health to the woman who, although confined to her bed, cut out 108 flannel bands and later wrote, "I have so enjoyed the pattern you sent me," from the old lady of 83 who faithfully served her country during the Civil War to the boy of ten, who culled from newspapers and magazines the choicest and brightest clippings and sent them in envelopes to the different hospitals.

The office in Washington was open from 8 A. M. to 11 and 12 P. M. When, one by one, the many efficient volunteer helpers were obliged to leave town, and one of the officers even was unable to render further assistance, the others uncomplainingly lengthened their own hours and no call, whether for nurses or supplies, at whatever hour of the day or night it might be received, was unheeded. In reviewing the work one can only echo the words of a most faithful worker: "We are learning a great lesson here and that is in finding out the best in hundreds of people we never could have met but for such a crisis. I believe more than ever in humanity."

It is an historical fact that the decision of the Government to send the Hospital Ships, *Scandia* and *Arizona*, to Manila was hastened, if not actually inspired, by the efforts of a woman who at her own expense came to Washington from Portland, Oregon. Almost on her knees she begged the military authorities to send relief to the men, many of whom had been school boys under her tuition. Like the importunate

widow in Bible times, she would not be denied. Letters were sent by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps to the State Regents of all States west of the Rocky Mountains, informing them of the good deeds of their Eastern Sisters and inciting them to effort in the same direction. This met with the same generous response that had been accorded all other appeals to the patriotism of women, and our boys at Manila had reason to echo the prayer made by members of a Kentucky Regiment who stood with uncovered heads, as supplies were being brought in, and said, "God bless the Daughters of the American Revolution."

As the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was organized for service in the Army and Navy, the money and supplies passing through its hands were spent under the direction of the Surgeons General. In this way duplication of charitable gifts was avoided and every garment sent and every dollar expended was appreciated to the fullest extent. If the supplies reached their destination and were of service in alleviating suffering, what does it matter that in many cases they, as well as the nurses furnished by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps, were credited to the American National Red Cross, which in the minds of many persons stands for all that is good and true? That they did relieve suffering and were sent where they were most needed has been abundantly proven. Extracts from a few letters chosen at random, from many in the possession of the Daughters of the American Revolution are given.

"It is not possible within reasonable limits, to set forth all the varieties of help afforded by the D. A. R. But whether it was nurses, supplies, wines, waters, clothing or cooks that were needed, the D. A. R. were ever ready to meet the demands. Thanks and gratitude are particularly due to the Cincinnati Committee and its able Chairman. No request of any sort was made to them in vain. And their promptness and business-like methods were deserving of the highest commendation."

"There was not a single article that was not needful. . . . The thermometers, medicine glasses, swabs, slippers, handkerchiefs, sponges, soaps, bay rum, fans, etc., etc., in a word each and every article will meet its proper recognition in discharge

of our labor and will contribute largely to the comforts and also pleasure of the sick, all of whom with us, seem to be very refined and of respectable appearance, some mere boys, and all looking to the nurses now as their own friends and relations."

"The grape juice, soups and other delicacies came just as they were most needed, and the poor convalescents enjoyed all so much. We divided the good things among the nurses and rejoiced in them as much as the sick, for there is nothing harder than to have the care of sick, and not have wherewith to nourish them as their condition requires."

In the beginning the D. A. R. Hospital Corps had taken upon themselves the privilege of supplying each nurse with a dozen aprons, which were furnished by the different Chapters, according to their ability, at the rate of from one to seventy-five dozen. As the demand for nurses increased, the stock became exhausted and with fear and trembling the question was put to the Chairmen of different Committees by Miss Desha, Assistant Director, who had been placed in charge of this matter: "Shall we supply these later nurses with aprons?" As quick as the wires could carry the message, came the first response, "Let us keep our word. Rochester ready in one week with twenty dozen." This was followed with similar messages from Chicago and Elmira, but the climax was reached when Louisville responded that 200 dozen were awaiting our orders, thus completing our quota.

The D. A. R. Hospital Corps was only one outlet for the activity of the "Daughters." A War Committee, with Mrs. Daniel Manning, Chairman, and Mrs. Russell A. Alger, Vice-Chairman, was formed. They sent food and clothing to many different hospitals and purchased a launch for the Hospital Ship, *Missouri*, of which Major Arthur writes;

"The launch proved of the very greatest utility in bringing our sick on board. We put all the recumbent patients in the launches on litters, and towed those able to sit up in the ship's gig, behind. In this way we transferred one hundred and six patients from the shore to the ship in an hour and three quarters."

Many members gave as individuals, like the woman in Phil-

adelphia who, when the news of the battle of El Caney was received, telegraphed the President, "How can \$600 best be expended for soldiers at Santiago?" The reply, "Soups, Franco-American," was hardly received before they were bought and ready for shipment on the first transport.

Others took upon themselves the care of the families of the soldiers and sailors, both regulars and volunteers. Rents were paid; food and clothing given to the destitute; and as far as possible, employment obtained for the women who, especially in the case of the Regulars, were often left stranded with no means of obtaining a livelihood and no money to enable them to go where work could be found.

The official report of the work of the D. A. R. places the amount contributed at \$350,000, and every Daughter will remember with pride the additional fact that Miss Clara Barton, the President of the American National Red Cross, is a charter member and Honorary Vice President General of the D. A. R., that Mrs. Walworth, Director-General of the Woman's National War Relief Association, is one of its founders, and that Miss Helen Gould is also a "Daughter."

The Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association called upon all the women of that State to help fit out the Hospital Ship, *Bay State*, which, although designed primarily for the use of the Massachusetts soldiers was given to the Government to be used as the needs demanded. This ship, like the *Solace*, *Relief* and *Missouri*, is said to have been loaded to the water's edge with medical supplies, delicacies and clothing suitable for the comfort of the sick and wounded.

The Legion of Loyal Women, as an auxiliary to the American National Red Cross, contributed large supplies of food and clothing to the various camps, and individual members established diet kitchens at several hospitals and rendered other valuable assistance.

The W. C. T. U. opened lunch rooms and "Rest rooms" near all the camps, making them as inviting as possible that the tired soldier might be induced to while away his leisure hours there, and avoid the pitfall of the neighboring saloons.

No history of the part taken by woman in this war can be complete without mention of the American National Red

Cross, which with the various other societies bearing the name "Red Cross," some of them auxiliary to, and all animated by the same noble purpose, contributed more than half the supplies furnished to the various camps during the war. For while it is true that most of the incorporators and many of the officers are men, all women are proud of the fact that the President, Miss Clara Barton, is a woman. To the *State of Texas*, with her party of doctors and nurses on board, was given the honor of being the first ship to sail into Santiago after the surrender. Her nurses were the first women to minister to the sick and wounded in Cuba and hundreds of men and women "rise up to call her blessed."

The Red Cross of California, the Red Cross of Oregon and the Red Cross of Seattle have taken a very prominent part in the relief work of the war. Men and women nurses have been sent to Manila by them, a hospital established, and thousands of dollars worth of supplies of all sorts forwarded to the Philippines.

While women as well as men realize that "In union there is strength," and most of the relief work was carried on by organizations, there are several notable exceptions. Five women, Clara Barton, Anna Boulogny, Margaret Chanler, Helen Miller Gould, and Annie Wheeler, received the thanks of Congress for their deeds of generosity and mercy, and hundreds of others gave in equal measure, according to their ability.

As the war drew to a close and the men were allowed to return to their homes, patriotic women all over the country united to make their journey as comfortable as possible. Home-made bread, cakes, lemonade, etc., were taken to the different stations and served to the wan, gaunt specimens of humanity, many of whom said that it was the first nourishing food they had eaten for months. Nurses and doctors were employed to go into the cars and examine the patients; permission was obtained to remove those who were unable to travel further and to place them in hospitals; and assistance was rendered to the convalescent. At one station in Pennsylvania a man was found lying in the broiling sun, with face as yellow as a lemon. The passers-by were afraid to go near him

as it was reported he had yellow fever. A woman physician, a Daughter of the American Revolution, went up to him, and finding after examination that he was suffering simply from a severe case of malaria, had him conveyed to a hospital, took care of him herself until other nurses could be obtained and had the satisfaction of seeing him discharged, quite convalescent, within a few days.

I wish I might truthfully say that the supplies poured out in such abundant measure, "twice trodden and running over," always reached those for whom they were intended, or that all suffering was, as it ought to have been, relieved by them. That such was not always the case thousands, alas, can testify. This is in very few instances the fault of the senders, but like many other things, can be accounted for by the general unpreparedness of our country for war. In a few hours, spent at one of the hospitals, I saw seriously ill patients obliged to lie on the floor of a tent, although an ample supply of cots were only two miles away and had been for days, but for lack of transportation facilities they could not be obtained. On my return to the station I saw gallons of milk standing in the hot sun where it had been all day, because no wagon could be found to take it to the typhoid patients, who were suffering for lack of it. All who were interested in the work know that in every hospital there were times when there would be a lack of necessities, and times when necessities, comforts and luxuries even were received in such abundance that they could not be utilized.

Such things will inevitably occur, until the Surgeon-General of the Army has as full power accorded him as is given to the Surgeon-General of the Navy, and until all relief work in time of war or national disaster is organized under one or more national societies, in harmony with the Government and under its control, and whose chiefs shall be either elected by the people or appointed by the Government or both. Then and not till then will the greatest possible good be given the greatest number of people at the least expenditure of money and strength.

Different commanders have vied with each other in disclaiming the honor for their victories, giving it to the "men behind

the guns." Shall no word of praise be given to the woman, who, by her skill in restoring the sick to health and by her furnishing the needed supplies when the men were exhausted, rendered them capable of winning victories? It was a glorious thing to stand firm, and make the famous charge at San Juan. Was it not also glorious for a woman, reared in the Northern climate, to offer her services as nurse for soldiers stricken with the dread yellow fever, and then when on her arrival at the hospital she found that, while there was no lack of trained nurses like herself, no one could be engaged to properly prepare the food, to go herself into the kitchen, and for five weeks prepare with her own hands the broths and soups necessary for several hundred sick and convalescents? It required true courage and patriotism to lie in the trenches day after day, uncomplainingly, although wet to the skin, as so many of our brave men did. Was no courage or patriotism shown by the pleasure-loving, young girl, who cheerfully relinquished a trip to the sea-shore and performed routine clerical work day after day, in order that the money thus saved might be expended in delicacies for the wounded, —or by the woman, who, employed in the service of the Government during the day, worked until midnight all through the hottest summer ever known in Washington, in order that "haply some life might thereby be saved," or by the woman in Cleveland, who packed box after box through the long summer days, until at last she fainted at her self-imposed task, and was carried away to suffer for weeks from the effects of her labors,—or by the poor laundry women who worked over hours, without pay, that the shirts sent to the soldiers might be soft and clean as only freshly-laundered linen can be,—or by the colored cook, who for two days, steadily, in a hot kitchen, strained and prepared the grape-juice, which was so refreshing to the fever-stricken patients,—or by hundreds of women, whose deeds come to the mind of every reader of these pages, wherever in this great country he may be?

Not long ago the earthly remains of the brave men who died in Cuba and Porto Rico were brought home, to be interred in that beautiful and historic spot, Arlington, where the heroes of many a war are resting. The President

and other high officials of the Government were present to do them honor ; flags were put at half-mast ; Government offices were closed ; the whole nation mourned. In honoring them, however, we should not fail to respect the memory of the young physician, Dr. Irene Toland, who, as soon as she was told that yellow-fever had broken out among the soldiers and that her services were needed, left an extensive practice in St. Louis and was sent to Cuba. After restoring many to health by her efficient nursing, her strength was exhausted and she died at Santiago, having as truly given her life in the service of her country as any soldier who fell on the field of battle. Nor should we forget Sister Mary Larkin and Ellen May Tower who lost their lives in Porto Rico that their patients might live.

When the Government erects at Arlington its well-deserved tribute to the men, whose names are on the roll of honor of their country, close beside it should stand a slender marble shaft, inscribed "Sacred to the memory of the women who gave their lives in response to their country's call."

Bill Merrill Draper



O. O. Howard
Major-General
(Retired)

CHAPTER XXIII.

CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN, ARMY AND NAVY CHRISTIAN COMMISSION.

PERSONAL GLIMPSES OF ITS WORK.

BY

MAJ.-GEN. O. O. HOWARD.

ON the 3rd of September, 1861, I lost my first brigade command. It was caused by my promotion, passing as I did from a senior colonelcy to the rank of a Brigadier General of Volunteers. While waiting under McClellan for an assignment to a new brigade, I was living with my Adjutant General and some friends in what was called the *chain-building*. It was in Washington, near the New York Avenue Presbyterian church, where General Scott had once roomed.

Having at the time but little official business on hand, I spent many hours with the members of the Young Men's Christian Association, of which institution I was a member. The Washington branch, which I was helping, had immediately undertaken an active Christian work in the regiments, as soon as they came to be stationed in and around the District of Columbia. These efforts were similar to those before the Spanish War, lately undertaken and carried forward by our young men, particularly in the local branches near State encampments.

About the same time that we in Washington set up our Christian standard and were unfurling it in that part of the United States Army, a central committee in Philadelphia showed itself with a larger outlook. This committee sprang from the Young Men's Christian Association of the United States.

George H. Stuart, an eminent Christian merchant of Philadelphia, became, upon invitation of the committee, the conspicuous President of the new organization, soon christened: "The Army Christian Commission."

I have regarded the Washington enterprise of 1861 as a stepping-stone to the Commission—to that grand body of men and women (for women's organizations were soon multitudinous and auxiliary) who raised millions of dollars and carried by their delegates essential comforts, proper literature and breezes of home-life to our camps and hospitals during the four dreadful years of the Civil War.

The general national association long ago became international, and through institutions of learning, academies, colleges and universities, has taken its Christian enterprises in behalf of young men into every part of every country on the globe where such institutions exist.

When the war with Spain became imminent and State camps for soldiers were located and occupied by the National Guard, at once local associations became active. They planted large-sized tents that are more like old-fashioned pavilions than army tents. Let us take for an example one such pavilion. You find it equipped with a platform at one end, which carries a desk for the secretary and a cabinet organ, with song books of different kinds and sizes heaped around it, with tables long and short usually covering the entire space of the pavilion, excepting the platform and the room occupied by benches and chairs convenient to the tables, and a few stands devoted to harmless games. On the tables are found an abundance of weekly journals, monthlies and dailies, with here and there piles of small books and booklets. But the main thing noticeable is the fine arrangement for writing: ink-wells, headed paper and patriotic envelopes by the million. As soon as one of the pavilions had been erected, there were put up outside of it, under canvas or rough boards in shanty form, a small storehouse and kitchen where the secretary-manager and his three or four assistants ate and slept and kept on hand reserve supplies. Either here or at the end of the pavilion could always be found a large tank of ice water that somehow, like the widow's barrel and cruse, never became

empty. Such was the early equipment intended for about four or five regiments for each pavilion.

To go back for a moment to the impelling force, near the first of May our grand international committee living in New York and vicinity did several things. They first called a public Association meeting of members, in the Collegiate Church (The Dutch Reformed) of the city, which was largely attended, the members coming together from all quarters and from different denominations. They established a Branch, the name of which, as finally settled upon, was "The Army and Navy Christian Commission." They then fixed headquarters at No. 3 West 29th Street, at the same place where for a long time have gathered the secretaries and helpers of the international committee, a place before and after this event full of benevolent activity and Christian interest. Two young men were selected and placed in charge as business managers, Mr. W. E. Lougee and Mr. Wm. B. Millar. The first controlled the large correspondence and the raising from the people of the necessary funds; the other appointed and regulated the field agents for each encampment and the superintendents of the pavilions. Very soon, of course, a treasurer was essential. Frederick B. Schenck, Esq., was wisely chosen, for he had the confidence of the business community.

Such was the arrangement already existing, but naturally not yet perfected, when in the same month of May, Major D. W. Whittle and I met at the Murray Hill Hotel late one evening. Our visits to the Commission made the next morning, to the *Christian Herald*, to the Secretaries of the Bible Society, to the American Tract Society and to Mr. Sankey's commercial establishment, from which came many thousands of hymns and song books, proved to be remarkably fruitful. Bibles, parts of Bibles, Testaments, books and booklets, song books and religious weeklies were generously given, boxed and sent forward to our order without charge. General Samuel Thomas kindly secured us transportation for ourselves to Chickamauga, Atlanta, Mobile, Tampa and return.

My first sight of a furnished pavilion, such as I have described, was at Camp Coppinger in the thin forest of pines

about four miles northeast of Mobile. Just outside the pavilion was the small platform temporarily removed from its place inside. The cabinet organ and all the seats had also been carried out and arranged in front of it. The soldiers were already gathered. Just after dark the benches were filled, but more men were standing on the right and left, more still in the rear—probably 2,000 altogether. Mr. Harte, from the Mobile Association, with selected singers to help him, was conducting some preliminary exercises. He was a large, well-built, healthful-looking young man of most acceptable presence and speech. It was indeed a weird scene that greeted us—all lighted up in smoke and flame by torches of the pitch-pine held in the hands of many soldiers. These were mainly regulars with a sprinkling of volunteers from the Texas regiment and from the Alabama camp just joined. Officers of every rank were gathered near the platform. As we approached—Major Whittle, Lieutenant John Howard and myself—we heard Mr. Harte making promises of our coming, so that we knew that we were waited for. It was a rousing welcome that was given us when we stepped upon the platform, for, be assured, the soldiers do not hesitate in any voluntary meeting, religious or otherwise, to cheer heartily when they choose.

It was a great delight to me to hear the hymns, especially those of a patriotic kind, that filled with their music the piny woods that night. Strong, manly voices followed up the inimitable solos with such choruses as could not be rendered elsewhere.

Major Whittle, an evangelist of long experience, who in the Civil War was my beloved staff officer and companion, accustomed to soldier audiences, never appeared to better advantage than when speaking on that occasion. He was, without doubt, specially inspired. His face shone brightly as the flambeaux waved near him, and his voice rang out eloquently as he demonstrated with extraordinary clearness what the Scriptures meant by repentance and belief in Christ. His illustrations, usually drawn from his early army associations, were fresh, pointed and convincing.

My first address at that Camp Coppinger followed that of

Major Whittle, and the subject was, "He died for me." I also illustrated my theme by several selections from my own army experience, taking cases where an officer or soldier had been killed or desperately wounded when connected with my staff or myself in campaign and battle; that is to say, where in some sense the life surrendered appeared to be given for me.

Perhaps the most marked instance among my illustrations was that of my hostler and orderly, McDonald. At the battle called Kolb's Farm, in Georgia, with my staff and orderlies I was watching some important operations not far from our front line, when McDonald was hit by a rifle ball that passed through his instep, giving him a very painful wound. He rode up near me and told me that he was wounded, while showing me his foot. He said that he should die. I told him, no; I knew the wound was painful, but did not believe it fatal. I said that if he would go back to the field hospital I would join him after the battle was over and do what I could for his comfort. He then rode away, but before departing he looked up into my face while a tear was glistening in his eye and said, "How glad I am that I was wounded and not you." I felt then, and the impression has remained with me, that McDonald gave his life for my life. When I went back to the field hospital I found that he had already been carried away to Lookout Mountain, where he was placed in hospital. He died there and was buried among the vast multitude marked "Unknown."

The soldiers at Mobile—the most of them—afterwards went to Tampa and thence to Cuba and fought in the battles about Santiago. Many of them were killed or wounded or died in hospitals. Some of them, convalescing, were sent home. I met some in the hospitals at Key West and I came up with others on the *Segurança* to New York. On board were many that had come from Santiago de Cuba. I saw one man in the social hall on the long side seat; the nurse and one or two of his comrades were near him. He lay there stretched out, pale as death, hardly breathing. The nurse said that he could not live many minutes longer. A young doctor came to him and I accompanied the doctor. I put my hand on his head and spoke to him gently, and he opened his eyes and

told me his name and his regiment and the letter of his company. His name was Corcoran of the 3d Regular Infantry. He was from Baltimore, the only son of Michael Corcoran of that city. When I turned away the doctor said, "General, you have done him more good than medicine," for the young man showed evidence of increasing life. As I was on the point of leaving the social hall, I came toward Corcoran. Just then the young man opened his eyes and looked at me for a moment and said: "Aren't you General Howard?" "Yes," I replied.

"I thought so. You spoke to us at Mobile and told us the story of Private McDonald." I sat down close to him and said gently:

"Are you trusting in McDonald's Savior?"

He answered me with decision and with more strength of voice than I had believed he could command: "Yes, I am!"

Day by day, as we moved along on the large steamer, I visited Corcoran in the forward part of the ship and found him slowly gaining strength. Once he said to me: "General, I am praying all the time."

Like McDonald, after he became a Christian, he appeared to become more and more attached to me, and was greatly delighted at a small present which I gave him, of something that had been with me for some years. He would not allow his mess-mate to take it out of his sight. I learned from his comrades that he had been a splendid soldier, in fact an athlete, and they said that it was surprising how quickly the fever had brought him to death's door.

This incident gives some idea of how we may, when we least think of it, make a lodgment in the mind and heart of an immortal soul, and how by the Divine help such a soul may enter into salvation.

I omitted to say that the Evangelical Division of the Army and Navy Commission was intrusted to D. L. Moody, the evangelist. He early made up his mind that something more than giving literature, however good, and games, however innocent, and letter-paper, however abundant, was necessary to satisfy Christian people and please the Master. He heard at the outset that there were almost no chaplains at Tampa

and many vacancies among them elsewhere. He therefore sent to Tampa many of his best speakers. They went also to Camp Alger and the camps at Chickamauga, Jacksonville, Mobile, Miami and elsewhere.

It was a little later that Major Whittle and I met a bevy of the workers at Chickamauga. Our organization was more complete at that great camp than anywhere else. We sat down in a place we called headquarters, not far from General John R. Brooke, commanding the Corps present. Our group was at his left rear, near the Signal Corps, and not far from Leiters' Station. These Christian headquarters had tents, shanties for storehouses, and a board kitchen extensive enough to accommodate at least twenty boarders, with a good Christian worker as a sort of commandant of kitchen, "to run that part of the machine." It was very delightful and very profitable to sit by Whittle's tent at a place where prayer was wont to be made, and where the Christian helpers came in from all parts of the encampment for prayer, conference and supplies. From that center they went out all over the vast forest to the twenty-eight pavilions, arranged as I have described and ready for their meetings. The pavilion we usually found filled with soldiers sitting at the tables, reading the literature, or playing some harmless games or writing letters to the home-circle or to other friends.

The singers were a great feature of our efforts; each one of them, like Maxwell or Burke, was a leader and a teacher. He could sing a solo and in a few minutes teach a regiment or brigade to sound the chorus. Maxwell at times seemed to play upon a body of men 3,000 strong as he would upon an organ or a piano. The choruses in the open air were always strong, grand, impressive. It seemed to me wonderful that there were so many good singers. The singers did more. They visited the hospitals every day, and, where they could, they sang hymns to the convalescent, and with others they went from house to house, or from canvas to canvas, to give cheer and condolence, or receive for transmission tender messages which the sick men believed they themselves would never be able again to give.

The Red Cross had a noble work, and in fact it did not dif-

fer materially from ours, because of Christian hearts like those of Dr. Gill and Miss Clara Barton, who distributed the relief. Medicines, soups and delicate fruit are themselves powerful instrumentalities to lift up human souls when they are carried in the right way to those who are in need; but these things ought we to have done and not leave the other things undone.

The Army and Navy Commission and the Red Cross Society combined, gave precious food and helpful, healing medicine to souls as well as to bodies.

The evidences of good feeling between the volunteers from different sections were not wanting in any of the large camps that we visited. In the city of Mobile our reception was cordial. The stars and stripes decorated all the streets through which we passed and floated from vertical and horizontal staffs over the hotels and other public buildings. This was far different from the Mobile of a few years ago.

On our second visit to his regiment I had the honor of formally presenting Mr. Harte, who had become my fast friend, and whom the Second Alabama had just elected as chaplain. The camp was about as far from town as Camp Coppinger, but in a different direction. As Mr. Harte and I were leaving Mobile to visit this encampment, Major Whittle with some singers and a Christian delegation went again to Camp Coppinger.

The regimental commander, Colonel Clark, in his welcome made us feel at home. He took us to his large mess-tent, introduced us to his officers and invited us hospitably to break bread with him and them at his table. All the commission who were off duty accompanied us to the pavilion. The contents of this large tent and the surroundings were like those at other places. The cabinet-organ stood by my side and helped to relieve my diffidence while speaking for the first time to a southern regiment, for I could put my arm upon the top piece and lean hard. The soldiers and the flaming, smoking torches were before me spread out like a fan. The most of the men sat down or reclined upon the ground; while the singing and reading proceeded I was looking into those young faces. How like boys the six or seven hundred seemed!

Could lads from seventeen to twenty-five have been no older in the sixties? How bright, hopeful and interested they were! A Yankee General was to address them. That night I told the story of my conversion forty-one years before this visit, and of my union for a time with a southern church at Tampa,—and I tried to show something of the Savior's love, which was as easily manifest to each of them as to me. The soldier could not be excluded, for of one commander of a hundred men our Master had said: "I have not seen so great faith, no, not in Israel."

Some young man, after I had ended my speech, shouted: "Three cheers for General Howard!" They were given with a will. I then asked them by way of response to cheer the old flag. Instantly it was done with apparent unanimity and with marked power and effect. After the last song and a benediction by the chaplain, the soldiers gathered around me, some to take my hand, while others showed their sympathy and good will by touching my arm and shoulder. I said to myself: "The old hostility is all gone!"

In the hospitals everywhere there were remarkable exhibitions of mutual helpfulness and fellowship between the sick men who had come together from various sections, particularly as soon as the patients were sufficiently convalescent to pay and return visits, going from bed to bed.

The fraternal feeling between General Fitz-Hugh Lee and myself, also between General Joseph Wheeler, Major Whittle and myself, was pronounced. It seemed hardly possible that in so many bloody battles we had actually fought against each other. Indeed, the truth is, that we never did have any personal animosity, and it rejoiced all the comrades of both sides in the old strife, who were able to participate in this war with Spain, to find themselves together, fighting [now for the same flag.

When I intimated to General Wheeler that I might have to go upon his staff, he welcomed the thought with lively acclamation.

Though Tampa enjoyed great advantages from our Christian Commission, we did not plant so many pavilions for the soldiers' convenience as at Chickamauga. The Moody Taber-

nacle left at Tampa after Mr. Moody's evangelical visit the previous winter, had been removed to "The Tampa Heights," the highest ground of the encampment, and there set up. An immense platform for singers, benches for hundreds of soldiers and a screen from the hot sun constituted the Tabernacle—that was the famous structure. Here spoke Dr. Dixon of Brooklyn, Major Whittle, Rev. Mr. Anderson of Tampa and others. Here sang Burke, Sankey and other choice singers in Israel. These talked as they sang, and sang as they talked. How the soldiers enjoyed those gatherings and profited by them cannot be told. It was these men who were to penetrate the jungles of Cuba, tread upon the stinging cactus, break down all barriers, natural and artificial, and charge in front of prepared intrenchments without faltering,—rushing up to the crests of El Caney and San Juan. Hundreds of them were not only brave and true soldiers of their country, but were soldiers of the Cross who purposed in their hearts to do and suffer the will of God.

The Army and Navy Commission established a central station and depot in the town of Tampa. Mr. Mahan of North Carolina was the Agent or Secretary in charge. The clergy of Tampa, some Christian citizens and nearly all the regimental chaplains gathered daily around our commission, and we worked together. The public places at and near the city and the Picnic Island, or some shady place near tobacco factories, were used for meetings day and night. Besides these, speakers and singers went two by two from regiment to regiment—in fact, to any place where they were permitted and welcome. They labored faithfully to hold those who were already Christians in line and tried to extend their number. In this there was abundant success.

We, all who were in fellowship at Tampa and thereabouts, rejoiced that our labor was not in vain. Of its power and usefulness as a means of prevention to waywardness and dissipation, General Shafter spoke in decided terms, General Henry publicly praised the services and many other general officers were glad to recognize and supplement them as opportunity offered. I am sure that thousands of friends at home were made glad that, by those means, prodigals were re-

deemed, and doubtful souls brought into the fruitful valley of decision, while the sick and the ailing, tenderly cared for, were not neglected.

Key West is an odd city, built on a coral flat. The attrition of ages has been so small that the soil is not deep enough anywhere for much plant or vegetable life. Its population is now about 20,000. The proximity of the place to Cuba has naturally caused the persecuted of that island to flock thither and their home work has followed them. The manufacture of cigars became the principal industry and large tobacco factories have thriven. The gathering of sponges, of shells of all sorts, the abundant fisheries and the ordinary shops for trade, together with the necessary restaurants and hotels, suggest some of the occupations of the inhabitants. But the war with Spain shut off everything except what war retains and what war brings. Key West at once became an important war port. Commodore Remey, always on his flag-ship, the *Lancaster*, commanded the entire harbor and what pertained to it in the city. The old army barracks, brushed up for temporary occupancy, were again after years filled with soldiers. The large Catholic convent was generously offered by the Sisters of Charity and accepted as an Army and Navy hospital. Other buildings in strenuous need for the sick and wounded were hired and long tents put up in yards in their neighborhood. All were furnished completely for hospital use. Naval vessels came and went; army transport ships and Red Cross steamers found here a refuge from wandering Spaniards and fierce storms at sea. Storehouses were filled with naval and transport replenishments, while docks and slips were occupied by vessels large and small to be loaded or unloaded. The population at Key West is mixed, consisting of many Cubans, some stay-at-home Spaniards who pass with Americans for Cubans, often to disgrace them, hosts of negroes and a small number of bona-fide Americans, or rather Anglo-Saxons, thrown into the interstices, naturally including the more recent importations from the Bahamas. There are churches well attended, and schools fairly good for all. But the most noticeable places of business which I have not yet mentioned are the liquor saloons. On the first available spot when you

land from the main wharf you see the "First Chance," and not far on cityward is the "Second Chance," and the corners of the street give plenty of others, more or less respectable. The more disreputable are of course only dives and brothels where all sorts of traps are set to catch soldiers when off duty and sailors "on liberty." What a fine place is Key West for unscrupulous men, such as gamblers, thieves, rumsellers and their helpers! Our Secretary and Commission manager, young Mr. Steele, arrived from New Orleans. He found a few Christian assistants. A good man and his wife took him to their home about a stone's throw from the "First Chance" and told him that he might eat and sleep at their house. Steele looked over the Key West territory thus occupied and at first felt discouraged at the miserable condition of things, though he was a tall, strong, healthful, able man of God. An idea struck him, perhaps launched by the Spirit. It was to rent that vacant tobacco factory whose gable end was toward the large wharf. It would hold on its second floor four or five hundred people. He made a good bargain, as the factory was not in use. He soon fitted it up like our field pavilions—not forgetting the cold-water tank. An aged Christian negro, James by name, generally stood by the broad doorway or near the stairs to welcome the comers, and his wife, Martha, kept the tables and their contents clear of dust. The showy outside sign and the waving flag caught my eye.

"Oh, General Howard!" cried Steele, when I came to the head of his stair-way and uttered my name, "I have been asking the Lord to send you here, but I didn't know you were anywhere near!" In that large room I had my first soldier and sailor audience sitting together. Mr. W. C. Howland, my delightful young secretary and assistant, aided in the music, while Mr. Steele and I conducted the ordinary social religious meeting. This tobacco warehouse became a stepping stone to like efforts on the *Lancaster*, invited by Captain Perry, its commander, and Commodore Remey. There I had my first experience with seamen by themselves. Probably my army language and war stories were as quaint to them as were their special sea talk and odd ocean tales to me. From this opening, Mr. Howland and I passed on to the large steamer

Saratoga, a naval-supply ship that carried us in five days on to Guantanamo. There the *Vixen* pleasantly bore us up the coast, past the famous battle grounds of both Army and Navy, as far as Santiago de Cuba.

Only one large tent (pavilion) succeeded in getting to the first front to be there where the need of Christian supply and aid was greatest, but Miss Clara Barton, whom I next met on the transport *Comal* at Santiago, was early on hand. Admiral Sampson had seen to it that the relief transport *Texas*, with Miss Barton on board, should be put into the ever-to-be-remembered harbor ahead of all the fleet. The battle being over, kind Christian supply took the lead. When I held the lady's hand I said in substance: "Miss Barton, some journals say that I have turned funds away from you—" "You could not," she exclaimed, "because our work is one!" Yes, it was one, and the Lord's method. Good tidings, bread and medicine for the needy were for our own young men and for the starving Cubans,—the well-filled pavilion conducted by the Army and Navy Christian Commission and the large relief ship at the quay pouring out her treasures for the poor and suffering under the guidance of the Red Cross Association, these were the combined manifestations of the Master's great love for men.

O. O. Howard
Major-General
(Retired)



J. B. Moore

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE TREATY OF PEACE.

BY

HON. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Counsel and Secretary of the Peace Commission.

THE rapid progress of the American arms, as narrated in the preceding pages of this volume, induced the government of Spain on the twenty-second of July, 1898, to make formal overtures for peace. This was done by a note, couched in the form of a message from the government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain to the President of the United States, and signed by the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, as Minister of State. It intimated that Spain was prepared to relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba, and expressed a wish to learn from the President the basis on which a "political status" might be established there and an end be put to a conflict "which would continue without reason should both governments agree upon the means of pacifying the island."

The note of the Duke of Almodovar was presented to the government of the United States by M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at Washington, who, in the interruption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain, in consequence of the state of war, acted, with permission of his government and the approval of that of the United States, in a friendly capacity, as the representative of Spanish interests. The reply of the President was made on the thirtieth of July, in a note which was addressed by Judge Day, then Secretary of State, to the Duke of Almodovar, and which was handed to M. Cambon for communication to the Spanish government.

The suggestion of Spain that the war might be brought to a close on the basis of an agreement as to the future status of Cuba was not accepted. On the contrary it was declared

that the "local question" as to the peace and good government of Cuba, out of which the war had grown, had by the course of events been "transformed and enlarged into a general conflict of arms between two great peoples." In the prosecution of this conflict the President had been compelled to avail himself unsparingly of the lives and fortunes of his countrymen, and untold burdens and sacrifices, far transcending any material estimation, had been imposed upon them. Nevertheless, the President was, said the note, inclined to offer a brave adversary generous terms of peace. The President's terms were then defined as follows:

"The United States will require:

"*First.* The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over a title to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island.

"*Second.* The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West-Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrões to be selected by the United States.

"*Third.* On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

"If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety, commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly authorized commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated."

The reply of the Spanish government bears as date the sev-

enth of August, 1898. In regard to Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and the island in the Ladrões, it in substance accepted, without qualification or reserve, the President's terms. In respect of the Philippines, it was less specific. Though it declared in conclusion that the government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent "accepts the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties," some of the expressions used in relation to the Philippines were not free from ambiguity. This circumstance induced the President to pronounce the note unsatisfactory and to propose, as the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding, to embody in a protocol the precise terms on which negotiations should be undertaken. This course was adopted, and on the twelfth of August the protocol was signed at Washington by Judge Day, Secretary of State, duly empowered by the President for the purpose, and by M. Cambon, French ambassador, acting under a special full power from the Queen Regent of Spain.

This protocol embodied, without qualification or reserve, the precise terms offered by the President to Spain on the thirtieth of July. It consisted of six articles. By the first, Spain agreed to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba." By the second, she engaged to cede Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and an island in the Ladrões, to be selected by the United States. The third was in these words: "The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines." The fourth provided for the appointment of two commissioners, to meet respectively at Havana, in Cuba, and San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the immediate evacuation by Spain of Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies. By the fifth, it was stipulated that the United States and Spain should each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and that the commissioners so appointed should meet in Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the ne-

gotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace. By the sixth and last article it was agreed that, upon the conclusion of the protocol, hostilities between the two countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

The way having thus been cleared for the negotiation of a peace, the two governments proceeded, in conformity with the stipulations of the protocol, to the appointment of their respective commissioners for that purpose. On the part of the United States, the President appointed the Hon. William R. Day, who subsequently acted as president of the American commission; the Hon. Cushman K. Davis, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate; the Hon. William P. Frye and the Hon. George Gray, both members of the same committee; and the Hon. Whitelaw Reid, formerly Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to France.

On the part of Spain, the Queen Regent appointed as commissioners Señor Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Senate of Spain; Señor Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, a senator of the Kingdom and formerly ambassador of the Spanish Republic to France; Señor Don José de Garnica, an associate of the Supreme Court of Justice of Spain and a deputy of the Cortes; Señor Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain to Belgium; and General Rafael Cerero, ranking General of Engineers of the first army corps.

The secretaries of the American and Spanish commissions were, respectively, the writer of the present chapter, who had lately held the office of Assistant Secretary of State of the United States and who acted as secretary and counsel, and Señor Don Emilio de Ojeda, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain at Tangiers.

On the arrival of the American commission in Paris towards the end of September, notice of its presence was given to the French government by Gen. Horace Porter, United States ambassador, and arrangements were made for its immediate presentation to M. Delcassé, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

and to President Faure. This done, the next question was how to bring the American and Spanish commissions together. All difficulty on this score was forestalled by M. Delcassé, who, with the hospitality and tact characteristic of his government and people, invited the members of the two commissions to meet each other at a breakfast at the Foreign Office. At this breakfast there were also present, besides the American and Spanish ambassadors, M. Brisson, then Prime Minister of France, and other officials of the French government. All the arrangements were faultless, and I believe it was the unanimous opinion of those for whose benefit the function was given, as it certainly was of the American commission, that an affair of the kind could not have been conducted with greater skill and propriety.

For the meetings of the joint commission, the French government set apart two large rooms in the Foreign Office, which have been the scene of many notable gatherings, among which may be mentioned the Congress of Paris of 1856. Here, on the first of October, 1898, the American and Spanish commissioners met in their first official conference. There were present all the commissioners and the American secretary, and also Mr. Fergusson, who accompanied the American commissioners as interpreter and who, as the proceedings were conducted in English and in Spanish, acted as the medium of oral communication to the end of the conferences. The functions of secretary on the Spanish side were performed by Señor Villa-Urrutia till the third session, when Señor Ojeda appeared and entered upon the discharge of his duties. The proceedings were conducted with as little formality as possible. No one was chosen to preside over the deliberations of the joint commission. The representatives of the two governments ranged themselves on either side of a long table, in the order in which they were named in their full powers, so that no question could arise as to form and precedence. The oral discussions, however, represented but a small part of the labors of the commissions. Projects and counter-projects were submitted in writing and under the rule, adopted by the joint commission, that written arguments might be filed in support of rejected propositions as well as written answers to such

arguments, most of the questions that arose in the negotiations were fully argued in writing. These arguments appear as annexes to the protocols or official minutes of the conferences.

On the proposal of the American commissioners, it was agreed that the questions before the joint commission should be taken up in the order in which they appeared in the protocol of the twelfth of August. The American commissioners therefore submitted, at the second session, a paper containing a draft of two articles, to be inserted in the treaty of peace, for the purpose of giving effect to Spain's engagement to relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba, and to cede Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and an island in the Ladrones, the island of Guam being specified as the one which the United States had selected in that group. These matters were, in the view taken of them by the American commissioners, determined by the protocol of the twelfth of August. Hence, where the protocol said "Spain will relinquish," or "Spain will cede," the draft articles said "Spain hereby relinquishes," and "Spain hereby cedes;" and to these simple stipulations, which were expressed in the very words of the protocol, were merely added certain incidental stipulations as to the transfer of public property and archives.

At the third session, the Spanish commissioners presented a counter-proposition. The substance of this proposition was that Spain should not only relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba but also transfer it to the United States, which should "at the proper time" transfer it to the Cuban people, and that the relinquishment and transfer thus made should embrace not only "all the prerogatives, powers and rights" of the Spanish crown, but also "all charges and obligations of every kind" in existence at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace, which the crown of Spain, or her authorities in Cuba, had lawfully contracted, such charges and obligations to be considered as "an integral part" of the sovereignty relinquished and transferred. The cession of Porto Rico and other ceded territory was to be made, subject to similar burdens as to charges and obligations.

It is obvious that these proposals of the Spanish commissioners presented the serious question of the assumption by the United States and in turn by Cuba of what is commonly known as the Cuban debt. This debt, for the payment of which the revenues of Cuba were pledged, was contracted by the Spanish government and its authorities for the most part during the insurrections in Cuba after 1868. In that year the so-called debt of Cuba amounted to only \$18,000,000. In 1880, two years after the close of the ten years war, it amounted to upwards of \$170,000,000. Between February, 1895, when the last insurrection broke out, and January 1, 1898, new bonds were issued to the amount of 858,550,000 pesetas, or \$171,000,000. There were also other debts, uncertain in amount, which were understood to be considered in Spain as properly chargeable to Cuba. To Spain the question of the disposition of these financial burdens was evidently more important, from the pecuniary point of view, than that of the relinquishment of territory, the attempt to retain which had given rise to them. The Spanish commissioners therefore bent all their efforts to the establishment of the position that the debts in question must follow the sovereignty of the island and must be assumed by whatever nation possessed that sovereignty. The American commissioners, on the other hand, maintained that from no point of view could the debts in question be considered as local debts of Cuba or as obligations chargeable to the island; that they were created by the government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own agents; and that the precedents which had been cited of the assumption or apportionment of debts, where a state was absorbed or divided, were inapplicable to the so-called Cuban debt, the burden of which, imposed upon the people of Cuba without their consent and by force of arms, was one of the principal wrongs for the termination of which the struggles for Cuban independence were undertaken. The American commissioners moreover contended that Spain, by her unconditional agreement to relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba, had waived the question of the debt. On these grounds the American commissioners repeatedly declined to assume the so-called Cuban debt, either for the United States or for

Cuba. The discussion continued, however, in various forms, upon successive propositions and counter-propositions, till the eighth conference, on the twenty-fourth of October, when the president of the American commission, replying to a remark of the president of the Spanish commission, brought it to a head by pointedly inquiring whether the Spanish commissioners "would refuse to consider any articles as to Cuba and Porto Rico which contained no provision for the assumption of indebtedness by the United States, or Cuba, or both." The Spanish commissioners asked for time in which to reply, and an adjournment was taken till the twenty-sixth of October. On that day the Spanish commissioners presented their answer in writing. In substance, they declared that they would not refuse to consider any articles which did not contain a provision for the assumption of indebtedness, since the "final approval" of such articles must be contingent on an agreement upon a complete treaty of peace; and they "invited" the American commissioners "to enter upon the discussion of the other points to be embodied in the treaty, at the outset to take up the discussion of the Philippine Archipelago, and to propose to the Spanish commissioners what they understand should be agreed upon in said treaty with respect to this subject."

The joint commission was thus brought face to face with the question of the Philippines. To this question the American commissioners had given much consideration since their arrival in Paris. They had heard General Merritt, who, besides presenting his own views orally, brought with him from Manila, for the information of the American commissioners, communications from General F. V. Greene and other officers in relation to the condition of things in the Archipelago. They had examined Mr. John Foreman, who, from 1880 to 1898, a period of eighteen years, had spent altogether eleven years in the Philippines and whose book on the islands is a standard authority. They had also taken the testimony of other persons, competent to speak on the subject, besides obtaining a mass of information, some in print and some in manuscript, on the various aspects of the situation. All these things they communicated either textually or in substance,

according to the circumstances, to their government, with which they were, as is always the case in these days of telegraphs and fast steamers, in constant correspondence through the whole course of the negotiations.

The proposal of the American commissioners on the subject of the Philippines was presented at the eleventh conference, which was held on the thirty-first of October. It provided for the cession of the whole group, but stated that the American commissioners were prepared to insert in the treaty a stipulation for the assumption by the United States of any existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for public works and improvements of a pacific character in the islands. On receiving this proposal, the Spanish commissioners asked for an adjournment in order that they might examine it "and either accept it or present a counter-proposal." The kernel of this reply, as it turned out, lay in the latter alternative. At the next conference, which was held on the fourth of November, the Spanish commissioners submitted a counter-proposal in the form of an argumentative memorandum, in which—after contending that the protocol of the twelfth of August did not justify a demand for the cession of the whole group and that the capture of Manila by the American forces, after the signature of that instrument, though in fact before news of its signature was received in the islands, was, in view of the agreement for a suspension of hostilities, unlawful,—they declared that the treaty of peace ought to provide for the immediate delivery of Manila to the Spanish government, the immediate release of the Spanish garrison, the return to the Spanish government of all funds and public property taken by the American army since the occupation of the place as well as of all taxes collected prior to its restoration, and for an indemnity to Spain for the damage occasioned by the detention of her troops as prisoners, to which was to be ascribed the spread of the Tagals insurrection in Luzon and its extension to the Visayas and the ill-treatment of Spanish prisoners, civil and military, by the natives. They concluded by inviting the American commissioners to present a proposition concerning "the control, disposition and government" of the Philippines which should conform to "the stipulations of Article III" of the protocol.

To this argumentative counter-proposal, the American commissioners submitted at the fourteenth conference, on the sixteenth of November, an extended reply. Obviously, the principal point at issue between the two commissions was the proposal for the cession of the group. The American commissioners did not controvert the general principle that acts of war, committed after a general suspension of hostilities, do not afford a basis for a claim of title by conquest, even though such acts be committed prior to the receipt of notice of the suspension; but they pointed out that by the third article of the protocol the United States was to "occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace," and that the occupation thus expressly provided for imported a military occupation, with all the rights and powers of government legally incident to such occupation. The great subject of controversy, however, was the effect to be given to the words "control, disposition and government." Did the stipulation that the treaty of peace should "determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines" warrant a demand for the cession of territory? Did they authorize a demand for the transfer of sovereignty over the group or any part of it?

We have seen that the words in question were first used in the note of the thirtieth of July, in which the terms on which the United States would enter upon negotiations for peace were conveyed to the Spanish government, and that the reply of the Spanish government on this point, as given in its note of the seventh of August, was unsatisfactory. The exact words of that note, which was presented in English, were as follows:

"The terms [of the President of the United States] relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of conquest, since, in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided for by the American Admiral, Manila still

holds its own and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guarantee. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines; but as the intentions of the Federal government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not *à priori* renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms as the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may render desirable.

“The government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition with the above-mentioned declarations.

“Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish government has the honor to submit in reply to your Excellency’s communication. They accept the proffered terms [i. e., the various terms offered in the note of the thirtieth of July], subject to the approval of the Cortes of the kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties.”

It may fairly be argued that the statement that the Spanish government did not “*à priori*” renounce “the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago” clearly implied that the renunciation of that sovereignty might become the subject of negotiation, and that the reply did in reality constitute an acceptance of the offer of the United States in the fullest sense, the meaning of that offer being that the question of the Philippines should be left in its entirety for future determination in the treaty of peace. Nevertheless, the President, as has been seen, declined to treat as an acceptance of his offer a reply which was capable of more than one construction. This decision was made known to M. Cambon, the French ambassador, in oral conference, and was afterwards formally conveyed to him in a note of the tenth of August, with which there was enclosed a draft of the protocol in the exact words in which it was signed two days later. The attempt to reach an agreement by correspondence was abandoned and the

terms on which negotiations were to be undertaken were embodied in a single document.

But, apart from any reservations in the note of the seventh of August, the Spanish commissioners contended that the words "control, disposition and government" did not comprehend the subject of sovereignty. In this contention they placed much stress upon the French text of the protocol. The protocol was signed both in English and in French. In fact, the French text was a translation of the English, but both texts purported to mean the same thing. In the French text the words "control, disposition and government" appeared as "*le contrôle, la disposition et la gouvernement.*" In reality, the French word *contrôle* possesses a signification less extensive than the English "control." It denotes "supervision" or "inspection" rather than the full power and authority conveyed in the word "control." But the words *disposition* and *gouvernement* have the same extensive meaning in French that "disposition" and "government" have in English. The American commissioners therefore answered that the Spanish contention would involve, practically, the elimination of the three words of the English text altogether and of two of the three words of the French text. The position of the American commissioners was that it was the object of the clause in question to leave the whole subject of the Philippines open for future negotiation and settlement. Nothing was to be considered as prejudged against either party. The effect of using the word "sovereignty" would have been to restrict the negotiations to the question of supreme power and control. The words "control, disposition and government" were broad enough to cover any form of adjustment on which the parties might ultimately agree, including that of the transfer of sovereignty.

At the fifteenth conference, on the twenty-first of November, the American commissioners, in order to bring the discussions to a close, presented a final proposition, on the acceptance or rejection of which the continuance of the negotiations was to depend. This proposition embraced the cession of the entire archipelago of the Philippines and the payment by the United States of the sum of \$20,000,000, and

in connection with this offer the American commissioners stated that, "it being the policy of the United States to maintain in the Philippines an open door to the world's commerce," they were prepared to insert in the treaty a stipulation to the effect that, for a term of years, Spanish ships and merchandise should be admitted into the ports of the islands on the same terms as American ships and merchandise. The proposition also embraced a mutual relinquishment of claims that had arisen since the beginning of the insurrection in Cuba in 1895. In conclusion, the American commissioners expressed the hope that they might receive from the Spanish commissioners, on or before the twenty-eighth of November, a definite and final acceptance of these proposals and also of the demands as to Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and Guam, in the form in which those demands had been provisionally agreed to. In this event, it would, declared the American commissioners, "be possible for the joint commission to continue its sessions and to proceed to the consideration and adjustment of other matters, including those which, as subsidiary and incidental to the principal provisions, should form a part of the treaty of peace." In particular, the American commissioners expressed a desire to treat of religious freedom in the Caroline Islands, as agreed to in 1886; of the release of political prisoners in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines; of the acquisition of the island in the Carolines variously known as Kusaie, Ualan, or Strong Island; for a naval and telegraph station; of cable landing rights at other places in Spanish jurisdiction; and of the revival of certain treaties previously in force between the United States and Spain.

During the week following the submission of this "final proposition," the Spanish commissioners made by letter various alternative proposals, as possible substitutes for the American demands. These proposals were, however, declined; and on the twenty-eighth of November the Spanish commissioners presented in conference a formal written acceptance of the ultimatum.

The treaty of peace was signed on the tenth of December. Its text will be found at the end of this volume. It covers

the subjects embraced in the final proposition of the American commissioners and such as may be considered "subsidiary and incidental" thereto. In regard to none of the additional points on which the American commissioners expressed a desire to treat, except that of the release of political prisoners, was any stipulation inserted. Proposals on all the other points were presented, but they were rejected by the Spanish commissioners, in some cases with the statement that they might form the subject of future negotiation between the two governments. In truth, after more than two months of constant negotiation and strenuous discussion, the joint commission, having reached a conclusion on essential questions, could go no further. The situation of the Spanish commissioners was from the beginning a difficult one and the time had come to bring the conference to a close. Moreover, the American commissioners had rejected various proposals of the Spanish commissioners, including one for an investigation and arbitration of the case of the *Maine* by an international commission.

It is proper as well as gratifying to state that, while the consciousness of a serious conflict of views and of interests was ever present, the intercourse of the two commissions was characterized by the uniform observance of the dictates of courtesy and propriety. Any reports that may have got abroad to the contrary were founded on misapprehension. The commissioners on both sides were too much impressed with the importance of the work committed to them to allow its performance to be retarded or put in jeopardy by displays of personal feeling, even if they had been disposed to indulge in them. The American commissioners, in the last paper submitted by them, availed themselves of the opportunity to express "their sense of the thoroughness, learning and devoted ability, no less than the uniform courtesy," with which the Spanish commissioners had conducted the negotiations then about to terminate. The president of the Spanish commission, responding to this expression, declared that "he had much pleasure in acknowledging the courtesy and consideration which had been shown by the American commissioners in their personal intercourse during the continuance of the negotia-

tions, which, however painful to the Spanish commissioners, would leave with them the personal remembrance of the attentions which had been bestowed upon them by the worthy members of the American commission."

The conferences closed with words of personal respect and good-will. In the same spirit we may cherish the hope that, with the re-establishment of the state of peace and the removal of the causes of discord that produced its interruption, the relations between the two countries will again assume the friendly aspect which distinguished them in former times.

J. B. Moore



Justin M. Carthy.

CHAPTER XXV.

WHAT ENGLAND FEELS.

BY

HON. JUSTIN McCARTHY, M. P.

THE close of the War between the United States and Spain took the general public of England even more by surprise than the opening of the war had done. The blowing up of the *Maine* made almost every one here feel well assured that an appeal to arms must follow. Even among those who had little means of forming an opinion as to whether the explosion was the result of mere accident or not, it seemed to be accepted as a kind of omen that something serious would come next. For a long time, for a whole generation, in fact, the English public had a vague general knowledge that there were constant troubles between the United States and Spain, owing to the fact that Cuba was in a state of perpetual insurrection, and that Cuba lay almost within gunshot of the shores of one of the American States. But most people here had grown accustomed to the vague general knowledge that such a condition of things could not last for ever, and were content with the assumption that it would probably last for their time, and, therefore, turned their attention away to other subjects. Of course, I am now speaking of what I may call the outer public, of the man in the streets, as that public has been described by one English writer; of the bald man on the top of an omnibus, as he has been described by another English writer. The bald man on the top of the omnibus knew that there was trouble in America because of the condition of Cuba; but the trouble had been going on so long without coming to a crisis that he had ceased to look out for a crisis as a possibility of immediate concern. But when the blowing up of the *Maine* was made

known to the world, the English public suddenly became prepared for an immediate crisis. Then a quick revulsion of feeling set in, and the general public began to think that the preparations were moving slowly, and that the war, somehow, was hanging fire. At last, the actual business of battle began, and then the impression of our friend on the top of the omnibus distinctly was that the war was destined to last for a considerable time; and, at the moment when he had made up his mind to this opinion, there came the news that the Spanish fleets were destroyed, that Spain had lost Cuba and the Philippines, and that the war was all over.

How were the sympathies of the people of England in general affected by the war and by its conclusion? I think it is not too much to say that the sympathies of the vast majority of the people in Great Britain and Ireland were thoroughly with the American cause and with the American triumph. Now, I do not desire to make this statement without some serious reservations. Among a certain minority of Englishmen, there was still a sort of old-fashioned, traditional attachment to Spain, which misled the judgment of many. Those who were thus misled regarded Spain as a grand, old, historic state, the existence of which was an important element in the dignity of Europe; a state which had at one time divided the empire of the world with England herself; a state which had waged big war with England, and been honorably defeated; a state which, later still, had been rescued from a foreign conqueror by the arms of England. Now, we must make allowance for feelings or prejudices of this kind. They are not ignoble in themselves; and even when they are unreasonable they have a sort of claim on our sympathy. Then, again, there comes in the question of religion. A certain proportion of the English aristocracy is made up of Catholics, and of Catholics who, for the most part, are inclined to old-world Tory views where political questions are concerned. Therefore, to a certain number of Englishmen, the struggle between America and Spain became a subject for the sentiment of religion to work upon, or the traditional feeling of reverence for the old order of things, and an idea that the new order was asserting itself

as an unwelcome intruder. I am far from saying that the Catholic population of England were generally in sympathy with Spain; for I know that any such saying could be founded only on a strange misapprehension; but what I do wish to convey is that a considerable number of the Catholic aristocracy gave their good wishes to Spain simply on the ground that Spain was a Catholic country and that America was not.

In Ireland, also, there was a certain difference of opinion—I am now speaking of national Ireland, not the Ireland of Dublin Castle and the vice-regal lodge. Ireland had been attached to Spain by old ties of affection; Spain, from whatever motive, had endeavored at more than one period of her history to give help to the Irish national cause. Thomas Moore, the Irish national poet, had coupled, in one of his songs, the shamrock of Erin and olive of Spain. Irish exiles had risen to great distinction in the military and civil service of Spain. I can myself remember the days when Marshal O'Donnell, Duke of Tetuan, an Irishman by descent, was Prime Minister of Spain; and it used to be commonly said at the time, that O'Donnell refused to learn English because he could not consent to converse in the tongue of his country's conquerors. Naturally, therefore, there was a feeling among a small minority of Irishmen that Spain was entitled to their special sympathy; but I can say with confidence that the minority was very small indeed. The vast majority of Nationalist Irishmen everywhere gave their cordial good wishes to America, the country which had been the shelter and the home of so many millions of their race. I believe the whole of the Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons, save for two exceptions, openly and formally proclaimed their sympathy with the United States; and if I were to mention the names of the two exceptions, the names would probably convey no manner of idea to the ordinary American reader. I am entitled, therefore, to say that the vast majority of people in these Islands admitted the justice of the American cause, acknowledged that America had forborne to the utmost limits of forbearance, and sincerely rejoiced in America's swift success.

I have very little doubt that, when the diplomatic history of the crisis comes to be given to the world, it will be made plain that the diplomatic influence of England had its important effect in warning certain European states against the dangers of any policy that might seem like intervention. I have not been a great admirer of Lord Salisbury's foreign policy in general, and do not often feel drawn into much sympathy with the conduct of a Tory Government; but I am well convinced that in this instance Lord Salisbury and the Tory Government did play a fair, a friendly and a manly part towards the United States. It might have been thought, and undoubtedly it was thought by some, that by her victory over Spain and her obtaining possession, under whatever qualifications, of Cuba and the Philippine Islands, America was taking a new and perilous departure in her political life, and might become hereafter a new and portentous element of unsettlement in the politics of the civilized world. Such a feeling as this did undoubtedly find expression here and there; but it had no real effect on the general feelings of the public. Those who were fairly well acquainted with the history of the whole question had long known that if Spain were to persevere in her methods of governing Cuba, it would at last become impossible for the United States to look with a cold neutrality at the scenes that were going on within easy reach of her own shores. A whole generation had passed away since one of our most popular writers, Anthony Trollope, who, besides being one of our foremost novelists, was a keen and sound observer of political events, gave warning to all his public that the policy of Spain in Cuba would one day force the United States to intervene. Many other English writers, newspaper correspondents among the rest, who had studied the subject from personal observation, had told the same story to their English readers.

Most of us, therefore, who take any continuous interest in foreign affairs, had long been filled with the knowledge that the time must come when the antiquated policy of Spain would have to give way to the growing influence of enlightenment and civilization. This was, in fact, the feeling of all, or nearly all, of those who belonged to what I may call the politically-instructed classes in these islands. When I speak of

the politically-instructed classes, I mean to speak of those who were prepared to form their opinions upon practical information, and were not absolutely governed by some sentiment or prejudice which took no account of actual conditions and refused to learn anything from the teaching of events. Those politically-instructed classes had long recognized the fact that in the Spanish administration of Cuba and in the republican system of the United States, mediæval barbarism and modern civilization were brought into a direct antagonism. Those who saw this could not but trust and believe that the antagonism must end in the victory of civilization. All reasonable men had to admit that America could not long endure the existence of such a system as that which was practised in Cuba, without feeling its disturbing effects upon her own condition as a state. Let us put aside, if we will, for the moment, any consideration of the claims which mere humanity must have had upon a Government based like that of the United States on the principle of human equality before the law. Let us take the coldest, the most narrow and practical, the most prosaic view of America's duty and assume that there was no occasion for her to trouble herself about the sufferings of Cuba, so long as those sufferings brought to her no manner of domestic inconvenience. Let us assume that it ought to be nothing to America, even though Cuba were deluged with blood, so long as no American blood were spilt to swell the deluge.

The plain fact was that the unceasing struggle in Cuba did lead to the shedding of much generous American blood. The sympathies of Americans were naturally drawn to the condition of that suffering Cuban population, whose efforts at independence were encountered day after day, and year after year by just such repressive measures as the Duke of Alva had employed centuries before to crush the population of the Netherlands. Many American sympathizers were constantly taking part in expeditions and efforts of all kinds to set Cuba free from the merciless domination of its Spanish rulers. New York itself became the headquarters of many an organization formed by American citizens with the avowed object of assisting the insurgents of Cuba. It would have been perfectly impossible for any application of what are called the neu-

trality laws to prevent Americans from taking personal part in organizations so humane and so noble in their purpose. I remember well having heard the late Earl Russell, Lord John Russell as he then was, boast in the House of Commons of the open manner in which he and his friends had endeavored to assist the Greeks against the Turks, although they were perfectly well aware that they were violating the neutrality laws and were pledging their own country, so far as they could do it, to the support of the Greek patriots against the brutal tyranny of the Ottoman Government. The result, of course, was that England did interfere in the end, and that the naval battle of Navarino, the untoward event, as it was diplomatically called, put an end once and for ever to the dominion of Turkey over that country which is now the Kingdom of Greece. Now, let us suppose for a moment that Greece, instead of lying at the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, had been an island lying almost within sight of one of the English shores; is it not perfectly certain that Lord John Russell and his friends would have secured the intervention of their country at a much earlier date in favor of the rescue of the Greeks from their Ottoman oppressors? Only the other day the voice of the best and most enlightened men and women in Great Britain was crying shame upon the slowness and apathy of the Great Powers in allowing the rule of the Turk to endure so long in the island of Crete. How would it have been if Crete had been an island lying within easy reach of the population of Dover or Brighton? All American statesmen had for more than a whole generation a sense of the terrible burthen which was put upon them by the action of the Spanish Government in Cuba. Remonstrance after remonstrance was tried in vain. The American Government, at one time, made the proposition that the whole subject should be referred to a conference of the civilized powers, Spain herself to be included in the consultation, and, of course, the proposal was angrily and contemptuously rejected by Spain. The wonder to most of us was, not that America should have intervened at last, but that she had not intervened long before.

Any one who had studied the question with intelligent obser-

vation, even though the Atlantic lay between him and the scene of the struggle, must have known that the hand of the American Government would sooner or later have been forced by the American people, if by no other impulse, and that Cuba would have to be cleared of the Spanish domination. This was the conviction which events were slowly bringing home to the minds of all classes of Englishmen who took any interest in what was happening beyond the range of their own national concerns. In England, no doubt, it was the fashion of many people for a long time to regard America as a land given up altogether to the culture of cotton, to the building of railways, the working of mines and the worship of the almighty dollar. Only of later years have we begun to trouble ourselves in any serious way with the purposes of American statesmanship, only of late years has it become the habit of educated Englishmen to visit the United States as their fathers and grandfathers used to visit France and Germany. Even to this day we are somewhat slow to understand the workings of American political life. I have met with many an intelligent Englishman who firmly believed that Tammany Hall was one of the State institutions of the Republic, with which the President and Congress had a direct connection.

All the same, however, there has been in this country of late a wonderful awakening of public attention to the actual condition of things in the American Republic; and every year and every week brings the people of the two countries into closer and more friendly communication. Thus it came to pass that when the knowledge was first brought home to the minds of Englishmen that war must break out between Spain and America, if Spain would not relinquish her hold on Cuba, there were ready instructors amongst Englishmen to teach the English public that the quarrel was none of America's seeking, and that even if America cared nothing as a State for the pleadings of mere humanity, she would have to consider whether her own interest as a State did not compel her to the work of intervention. We heard very little talk indeed on this side of the Atlantic about the greed of the young Republic for the acquisition of new territory. No reasonable person really supposed that the American people had any desire to

become the owners of Cuba, or felt any imperious longing to put down the pride of Spain. On the whole, I may confess that as a looker-on I am rather surprised that so little was said on this subject. Some of the few—the very few—champions whom Spain found in the English press did indeed ring the changes on the supposed inconsistency of the American Republic when it took upon itself to invade an island which could not by any possibility be claimed as a part of the Union. In one or two instances we were gravely assured that to invade Cuba was to fly in the face of the Monroe Doctrine; for there are still, it would appear, some people left among us who believe that the Monroe Doctrine pledged American statesmanship never to take account of anything that might happen outside the territorial limits of the American Union. But on the whole it must be owned that the voice of the English journals and the English people expressed a thorough understanding of the difficulties which had long beset the American Republic in regard to the condition of Cuba, and a friendly and cordial wish for the success of the American cause. Even the controversy that arose on the other side of the Atlantic with regard to the ultimate settlement of the Philippine Islands did not waken much of an echo on this side. The general feeling among politicians, among Members of the House of Commons, for example, seemed to be that America might safely be trusted to act for the best interest of humanity in her ultimate disposal of the new territory which had come within her influence; and that the business of English statesmanship was to discourage in the best way it could any attempts at foreign intervention with the work which America had found it necessary to undertake.

For the first time within my personal recollection there existed to all appearances a thoroughly friendly understanding between the parent country and the "mighty daughter," as Swinburne calls the American Republic. That friendly understanding had been growing up for some years on this side of the Atlantic. For a long time after the American Civil War there was a feeling of bitterness among certain classes in this country towards the United States. That feeling came out of the impression that England had been humiliated in

the controversy about the Alabama claims, and had been compelled to pay damages and to make a public apology. I need hardly say that such a feeling as this did not spread through the English people as a whole ; it belonged only to what is called Society, and to certain orders of men in official and political life. The men who had confidently predicted the break-up of the American Republic, the bursting of the Republican bubble, while the war was going on, were naturally the men to be angry because their predictions had proved utter failures, and were naturally more angry still when England had to pay the penalty for their prejudices and their mistakes. The class of men whose dominant influence had caused England to make mistakes at a time of momentous crisis were the very men who denounced Mr. Gladstone because of the honorable determination of himself and his official colleagues to make manful reparation for the wrong that had been done. Throughout the whole controversy about the Alabama, as throughout the whole Civil War, the great majority of the English people entertained none but friendly sentiments towards the cause of the Union. The English working-classes as a whole were heart and soul with that cause. The working-men in the towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire, who suffered most in their daily lives from the outbreak and the prolongation of the Civil War in America, were the most cordial and united in their hopes that the war might go on until its great objects should have been attained. But then it is hardly necessary to say that the true opinions of the majority of the people do not always find a ready way to the intelligence of a distant State, while that State is convulsed by civil war. The people of America, north and south, were left for the most part to form their estimate of English public opinion from the utterances of Society and of certain political organizations, and of the newspapers which represented Society and these political organizations. Only two daily journals in London, out of seven or eight, advocated the cause of the Union. Therefore, I have no doubt that an impression prevailed widely in America that the English people generally were hostile to the unity of the American Republic. Naturally such an impression gave rise to many utterances of remonstrance, anger and

complaint from disappointed Americans who believed that England ought to have been on the side of the Union, and were assured by too many English newspapers that England only desired to see the Republic broken up.

Let me refer to one single and striking illustration of the feeling which then prevailed among some leading public men in America. Take, for instance, the example of Mr. Charles Sumner. As everybody knows, Sumner had been, during all the previous part of his public career, a most cordial friend to England. When the Civil War broke out, Sumner, no doubt, fully expected that the whole heart and sympathy of the English people would go with the cause of the Union. He believed himself to be mistaken; assuming too hastily that the utterances of certain London newspapers and certain Members of Parliament were the voice of England, he felt bitterly disappointed; and he denounced England with all the force of his powerful eloquence. The effect was positively distressing to many Englishmen who had long known Mr. Sumner and always respected him, and who found themselves unable, at the moment, to make any satisfactory explanation of the hostile attitude which he had taken up. Now, it was but natural that many men on this side of the ocean should regard the language of Charles Sumner as expressing the general sentiments of the American people, and should get it into their minds that America had become the bitter enemy of England. It is easy to understand how, at such a time and under such conditions, the most utter misinterpretation of international feeling may grow up; and it is certain that for some time—indeed for a long time—after the close of the Civil War there was a want of cordial understanding between some classes on both sides of the ocean. Of course, as years went on, the feeling of bitterness on either side began to grow less and less; but between the fading of enmity and the growing up of friendship there is often a vast blank interval.

At the time of the Venezuela controversy there was a flash of angry feeling on both sides which ill-natured persons on both sides were willing, no doubt, to fan into a flame. It was soon, however, made apparent that neither on this side of the ocean nor on the other was there the slightest inclination

among reasonable men, that is, among the great bulk of either population, to bring about an international quarrel. I think a good many sober-minded Englishmen were deeply impressed by the fact that notwithstanding all our prophets of evil had been telling us, there was evidently no intention on the part of the United States to put on an attitude of hostility towards England. There were questions of what I may fairly call minor importance still awaiting settlement between the two countries, and it was made clear that the American people in general were just as anxious as the English people that these questions should be settled in a reasonable and a friendly spirit, a spirit of "give and take." While this condition of feeling prevailed in England, there came on the quarrel between America and Spain. Englishmen of the more intelligent order saw that, so far from America's desiring to force a quarrel on this country, she had a quarrel forced upon her in which all the sympathies of civilization and of humanity ought to be engaged on her side. The moment was thoroughly propitious for a good understanding between the two peoples. Englishmen could not but see that America was taking the course which the best of Englishmen would have called on England to take under the like conditions. A wave of public feeling rose up in this country which was wholly in sympathy with the action of America in regard to the Cuban troubles. It was easily seen that America had not been in training for anything that might be called a great struggle, that she had not been expecting any crisis of the kind to arise so suddenly, and most people here were prepared to find the process of national armament go on but slowly, and, as I have already said, to see a prolonged struggle with Spain. But there were two facts which particularly impressed the great bulk of the English people. One was the fact that the American President and his Government showed no inclination to rush into a war; but, on the contrary, allowed every opportunity for a satisfactory settlement on the basis of peace—a settlement which Spain could have obtained almost up to the last moment, if only her councils had been guided by common prudence, to say nothing of the spirit of Christianity and humanity. The other fact which deeply impressed Englishmen was

the readiness with which the American people threw themselves into the struggle, and proved themselves equal to any sacrifice on behalf of the national cause, and of mercy to an enslaved and a tortured population. As the war went on—short though its time of duration—it was easy for critics on either side of the ocean to find fault with the military and naval arrangements made by America. On this side of the water there was but little inclination to enter into any such criticism. Some of us could still remember the breakdown, at one time almost complete, of the English military arrangements in the Crimea; and very few indeed felt any surprise that America, in her first foreign war, should give some evidences of imperfect administration. I may, perhaps, also remark that much interest was created among intelligent readers here by the frankness and the boldness with which some of the American war correspondents criticized the arrangements made by their own naval and military authorities, and by those who were in charge of the commissariat. Of course, the English readers to whom I refer had no means of knowing whether these strictures were deserved or undeserved; but they regarded it as a healthy sign of America's public spirit that men might fearlessly find fault with the preparations which had been made for carrying on the war. I have myself heard some Americans say that the criticisms were unjust; I have heard from other sources, also American, that they were well deserved. That, however, was not the question which directly concerned the English public.

Many Englishmen could well remember the splendid service which was rendered by William Howard Russell, the war correspondent of *The Times* during the Crimean campaign, when he denounced and exposed the shortcomings of our naval and military authorities in their arrangements for the arming, and even the feeding and the clothing of the British troops. There were many at the time who complained bitterly of the course taken by Russell, and who called it unpatriotic to invite the attention of the enemy and the world to the shortcomings of the War Office administration. The general voice of public opinion, however, commended Russell for his courage, and declared that a war correspondent could not better serve his country than by ex-

posing the defective system which was leaving an army to perish. Now, I have no means of knowing whether the American war correspondents who found fault with the arrangement of the war with Spain were right or wrong in their censures; but I know that public opinion in England fully recognized the necessity for free and open criticism, and felt sure that no sound administration could suffer from it in the end. Public opinion in England, too, was much impressed by the fact that so many young Americans possessed of large private fortune and free to lead lives of mere luxury, had flung themselves heart and soul into the struggle, and shared as volunteers the worst dangers and the most painful privations of the campaign. The end came almost before we knew that the reality of the struggle had well begun; and men learned in England that Spain was without a navy and that the struggle was all over.

The public here read with delight and enthusiasm the accounts from both sides, of the generosity with which the vanquished had been dealt with by the victors, of the welcome which had been given to defeated Spanish admirals on the decks of American war-vessels, of the cheers with which American soldiers and sailors had greeted their former enemies when the strife was done. The worst characteristic of war in its distant days was the hardness of heart, the ferocity of temper which it engendered among the victors, and which, even when the battle was over and the cause adjudged, sought new expression in the further punishment and humiliation of the vanquished. No trace of this antiquated feeling was to be found on the victorious side in this Cuban campaign; victors and vanquished recognized the heroic qualities in each other, and the chief desire of the conqueror seemed to be to soften as much as possible the pangs of defeat to the conquered. Americans fully understood that the responsibility of the war did not rest upon the shoulders of the Spanish officers and men who had to do their part in the fighting, and who had done it with so gallant a spirit. Not even the rulers of Spain were alone responsible for that war. The Queen-Regent of Spain, it was well understood, had done all that lay in her power to maintain

peace; but all that lay in her power was not much, for the temper of the Spanish people was not then such as to allow of the just and wise concessions which alone could have rendered it possible for America to hold her hand.

Yet the Spanish Government and the Spanish people were not altogether responsible for the policy which led to the war. Government and people alike were visited with an inheritance of wrong, with a curse which had come down from ages of mediæval intolerance and cruelty. The temper which animated the long and futile attempt to stamp out the rebellion of the Netherland provinces had bequeathed its passion to other generations; and it seemed to many a Spaniard a part of the traditional duty of every Spanish patriot to maintain, by whatever means, and at whatever cost, the fatal gifts with which past conquest had endowed the nation. Spain is above all things an old-fashioned country; she clings to old ideas and old traditions; and her recent governments have done all they possibly could to keep her from any knowledge of the spread of civilization in the world of newer thoughts and better education outside. Then, again, as all intelligent Americans knew, Spain was divided by dynastic factions; and nothing was more certain than the fact that if the party in power were to make concessions to justice, humanity and prudence, the party out of power would take advantage of the opportunity to advertise itself as the patriot band which alone could hold for Spain the possessions she had won in her domineering days. All this was thoroughly understood by enlightened Americans; and even during the very war itself there was a certain feeling of commiseration in the American heart for the brave Spaniards who had to fight in such a cause. Therefore, the whole world could see, and the people of England readily saw, that there was no bitterness of feeling in the mind of the American conquerors, and that the close of the strife allowed victors and vanquished to shake hands and be friends again. Even among those who in this country had looked on at the struggle with eyes that were friendly to Spain, there were many who thought that Spain after all had come easily out of it and that her defeats on sea and land, and the losses of territory which those de-

feats had entailed upon her, might only be the means of giving her a new starting point from which to set out on a brighter and a happier career.

One of Spain's great troubles during many recent generations has been her ownership of those colonial possessions which she did not know how to govern, and had too much inherited pride to give up. No one can doubt the quickness, the intelligence and the general capacity of the Spanish people, and there is nothing particularly sanguine in the hope that, relieved from the burden and the curse of those ill-fated colonial possessions, she may yet come to hold a high place among the States of Europe. Spain, like Italy, will begin to do well when she gives up the vain idea of figuring as one of the great European Powers. Even the biggest and strongest of those continental Powers which we call great, cannot be maintained in the place of their ambition without the most terrible sacrifices of national prosperity and national comfort, and without the constant danger of some convulsion which may bring the whole artificial system into chaos. For Spain to attempt to imitate such a course of policy is an effort as needless as it is hopeless. It cannot be done, and there is nothing worth having to be got by it, even if it could be done. Therefore, even among the friends of Spain in this country, there were many indeed who drew some comfort and some hope for Spain out of the very wreck and welter which came of her attempt to maintain her ill-omened dominion over Cuba.

When the battle was over, and America was the victor, as everybody knew from the beginning that she must be, most of the friends of Spain drew a deep breath and felt a sense of relief that the question was settled, and that Spain was relieved of a burden far too heavy for her strength to carry. If there was any feeling of ill-will towards America among any of the English sympathizers of Spain, it certainly found no expression in the press or from the platform. I cannot remember having heard or read an unkindly or uncharitable word in this country about the policy and the conduct of the United States, when once the war was over and the swords on either side were sheathed.

Indeed there seemed to come over the great mass of the people in England a sudden feeling of positive enthusiasm for the United States. "Now at last we are brought together," appeared to be the general sentiment of England. An idea was spreading that this country owed something like reparation to their kinsfolk in America. I do not wonder at the idea. Something like a reparation was undoubtedly due. Great Britain, as a State, had often acted an unfriendly part towards the American Republic. Great Britain, as a State, had proved herself not a friend to the Republic at more than one crisis, when even the mere expression of friendship would have been an encouragement, and something like a positive help. I should say now that when I speak of Great Britain as a State I do not by any means intend to put the blame for her action on the majority of the English people. I have already shown how, during the whole of the great Civil War, the majority of the English people were cordial and thorough in their sympathy with the cause of the Union. But it often happens in human affairs that the state policy of a nation does not represent the feeling of the majority of the people. The course taken, for instance, by the English Government under Lord Palmerston at the time of the dispute about the Trent affair was one of bluster and of positive hostility which certainly was not a fair representation of the national feeling. We have learned long since on the clearest evidence that it did not represent the feeling of Queen Victoria or of her husband, the late Prince Consort. We know that it did not represent the feeling of the English Liberals who recognized the leadership of Richard Cobden and John Bright. We know that it did not represent the feelings of the educated and enlightened men who followed the intellectual guidance of John Stuart Mill. We know that it did not represent the feelings of the English working-classes. Still, it was a course which presented itself plainly to the world as the action of the English Government, and, therefore, as the action of the State. Therefore, I can quite understand the revulsion of feeling which took place in the minds of many Englishmen, when they saw the American Government stand up for the cause of humanity and civilization and carry on a war against Spain for the sake of rescuing the victims of tyranny in Cuba.

England did, in fact, owe some reparation to America; and the opportunity for discharging the debt in some sort of intelligible way was welcomed by the great majority of Englishmen. The feeling swelled into positive enthusiasm. Nothing less would content some of our public men than the expression of a hope that England and America might in the future be not merely friends but actual pledged allies. One English public man, as we all know, indulged in the utterance of a hope that the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes might before long be seen floating side by side somewhere or other—it did not appear to matter where—over a foreign battle-field. Many of the more composed observers on both sides of the Atlantic thought that this, perhaps, was going a little too fast and too far. I remember talking on the subject with a distinguished American, then on a visit to England, who had served his country well on the battle-field and in the field of literature. The opinions which he gave me were exactly in accordance with my own, and are in accordance, I think, with those of most people in Great Britain and in America. He is and always has been the friend of England and of Englishmen; but he could not see his way to any actual alliance between England and the American Republic. He pointed out that England's vast variety of enterprises outside the limits of the British Empire could hardly obtain a practical working guarantee from the people of the American Republic. I know that some distinguished countrymen of my own, both in Ireland and in the States, spoke loudly against the suggested alliance, on the ground that by strengthening England it might enable her for an indefinite time to resist the national claims of the Irish people. My own impression was quite the other way. I should have thought that an alliance, if such were possible, between England and a Republic, the essential condition of whose existence is the recognition of the principle of home rule, would make the claim of Ireland, already thoroughly recognized by the whole Liberal Party of Great Britain, absolutely irresistible. But, at the same time, I was entirely in agreement with the opinion of my American friend, that an actual alliance between England and America consigned to a formal treaty is hardly to be accomplished under the existing conditions.

That, however, is not a question into which there is any occasion for me to enter just now ; I am only concerned to note as an observer the fact that the general feeling of the English people was one of such enthusiasm towards the American Republic that a popular orator could hardly go too far in the expression of his desire for a union of heart and purpose between England and America. It is quite time that such a feeling as this should prevail. The English and the Americans are, after all, for the most part, of the same kith and kin. "Blood is thicker than water" was the exclamation of the American naval commander when he came to the rescue of the English ships on which fire was suddenly opened from the forts in the Chinese river. My mind went back to a story told of an English naval commander at a more distant date—during the war between England and America which broke out in 1812. The English naval commander was talking over the defeats inflicted on English vessels during that struggle, and he brought his reflections to a conclusion with a cheery and good-natured remark that after all we don't so much mind being beaten by American ships and American sailors, it would be a different thing if the defeat came from Frenchmen or Russians, but the Americans are only ourselves over again. Now, the feeling expressed by these two sailors, the American and the Englishman, was just the kind of feeling which prevails at the present moment among the vast majority of the English people. There is a common desire that the English-speaking races, wherever they may be settled throughout the world, by Atlantic or Pacific shores, should recognize their common kinship, and accept as far as possible a common purpose in the work of civilization.

The English people, I hope, have got quite enough of alliances with the great Powers of the European continent. England was allied forty years ago with the French Second Empire, for the purpose of maintaining the Ottoman dominion in the southeast of Europe ; and what came of the alliance ? Is there an educated Englishman living to-day who has a word to say in defence of the policy which led to the Crimean war ? Is there an Englishman who does not know that the result of the war was not to weaken but to strengthen Russia ? What

did the alliance do for England, even as regarded our relations with France? Do the French people love England now? Do we not read every day in the French press the sort of language which makes one believe that Fashoda is taking the place of Waterloo in the embittered memories of the French people? Do we not hear every day some talk of a French alliance with Russia or even with Germany, with the object of enabling France sometime or other to make England pay for her triumph in the valley of the Nile? The plain truth is that in the present temper of Europe, with the new fashion and the new passion for the acquisition of territory here and there and anywhere, in Asia and in Africa, it is impossible for England to form cordial friendship with any of the great continental Powers. Reasonable Englishmen are, therefore, beginning to feel that the time has come when England ought to look for lasting friendships elsewhere, and, that the one true and lasting friendship in her power to make, would be with her kith and kin, whose national banner bears the Stars and Stripes. No one can feel more convinced than I am that such a friendship would make for the best interests of freedom and of civilization all over the world. I believe that in the minds and the hearts of the best Englishmen of all parties such is the feeling, the hope, and indeed the conviction. There seems every reason to believe that an opportunity has now arisen for a thoroughly good understanding between the United States and England, such as never arose before since the severance of the colonies from the parent country. Indeed, at different periods of the interval between that time and the present, it has seemed as if England and America were drifting farther and farther away from each other in sympathy and in understanding. I am again anxious to point out, however, that this drifting apart was not so much the work of the populations as the work of the governing systems. The opportunity that seems to me now to have arisen is an opportunity for a greater harmony between the two States, using the word in its political sense, as well as between the two peoples. We used to hear a good deal, at one time, about "the manifest destiny" of the American Republic. The phrase with the peculiar significance once attached to it

has almost passed out of the memory of the present generation. The manifest destiny of America now is to lead the way in the culture of all the arts and the teachings which tend to the development of humanity and the growth of civilization. That destiny it is in America's own hands to accomplish for herself. She starts to the work with advantages denied to any of the older States. She is free from that debilitating load of pauperism which defective conditions and bad systems have brought upon the great States of Europe. She is not vexed with a thirst for territorial aggrandizement, having, to use the familiar colloquial phrase, "enough and to spare" of her own.

Some alarm was undoubtedly expressed in this country, and by Englishmen who are sincere friends of the American Republic and have proved themselves so at the most trying time, that the territorial conquests which the Republic has lately had to make might bring with them a desire to gain still further possessions, and, as a means to such an end, to accept the modern policy of certain European States which stretch out grasping hands in this, that and the other direction. I may say that I have not felt any fear of this kind myself, and that I do not think it is generally felt by the people of Great Britain and Ireland. Most of us have noted with satisfaction the strong protest which many Americans have made against any indulgence in such a temptation, and have settled down to the conviction that such will be the general sentiment of the American people. Only a very small minority, indeed, in Great Britain and Ireland could have, so misinterpreted the motives and the purposes of the American people as to believe, even for a moment, that the war with Spain was undertaken out of any pitiful desire for the annexation of Cuba and the Philippines. If any such desire had prevailed in America, nothing could have been more easy than to find an excuse and an opportunity long ago for putting it into action. The condition of Cuba has been a trouble to America for far more than a generation; and there was a time, undoubtedly, when a policy of conquest might have found an enthusiastic support among the populations of some of the American States. Nothing could have been more easy, at one

time or another, than to pick a quarrel with Spain, and force her into a war. There were seasons during which Spain, rent by actual civil strife, would have been in a far worse position for the maintenance of her colonial possessions than she was at the time when the war broke out at last. It is now well understood in England that America held back from a war policy as long as she fairly could, and gave Spain every opportunity of putting herself right before the world, by adopting a better system of government in Cuba. There is, therefore, no fear whatever that a cordial understanding between England and the United States could be checked by any serious misgivings on the part of Englishmen about the policy of America in the future. My own strong belief is that a cordial understanding between England and America would help the better intellects and the healthier purposes of England to set her free from the old-world traditions which regard national greatness as a question of territorial mileage. The English-speaking races, actuated by that cordial sympathy and common understanding, of which I have spoken, would open the way for civilization to spread itself everywhere, and would form a guarantee of peace such as the world has never yet seen.

We hear constant talk of what terrible evils may yet be brought upon the world by the ambition of Russia, by the ambition of Germany or of France—there is even a man of great military authority in England who has warned the world more than once against the imminent danger which may yet be threatened by the overweening ambition of China. Now, against all these menaces to the world, even including the possible passion of China to make a descent upon Europe—a danger which need hardly yet be taken into serious account—I know of no barrier so strong and worthy of reliance as a general good understanding between the two great English-speaking peoples. Even the Chinese Alexander the Great or Tamerlane, whenever he rises on the world's horizon, whose soul is swelled by the fierce desire to make conquest of Europe, might perhaps take into his calculations that in such an attempt he would have to reckon with America as well as with England. Certainly the ruler of Russia or of Germany,

whose ambition urged him into fields of reckless enterprise, would be apt to think the matter over very carefully when it was made clear to him that the English-speaking races all over the world would be likely to make common cause against any reckless disturber of the world's peace.

It is impossible to measure the influence which might be brought to bear, for the cause of humanity and good order, by such a general understanding among the English-speaking races. So far as I can observe or understand, the general feeling of the best men in England is thoroughly in favor of such an international union. I should have to come to the same conclusion, even if, like some of my own countrymen, I were opposed to such a union on the ground that the grasping policy of England might only be strengthened and encouraged by a partnership with the powerful Republic of the west. I have already explained that I have no such feeling, and that I believe, on the contrary, the policy of the American Republic would have a most wholesome influence on the policy of England. But, even if I shared the views of some of my countrymen, I should none the less be compelled to declare, as an observer, that there is just now all over England a feeling of the most cordial friendship towards America, a recognition of the purpose which has inspired her recent policy, and a thorough faith in the position which she is destined to hold as a leader of modern civilization. Such a feeling on the one side, understood and appreciated as it is sure to be on the other, opens the way for a genuine international alliance which needs no formal treaties, signed and interchanged, to ensure its value and its lasting power.

Justin M. Carthy.



Wesley A. Miles

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.

BY

MAJ.-GEN. NELSON A. MILES, Commanding U. S. Army.

OUR war with Spain had many exceptional features. Some preceded, some occurred during the progress, and some appeared after the close of hostilities. In the first place, there was a formal declaration of war before the opening of hostilities. This is not only far from being the rule in the experience of warring nations, but is a rare occurrence. For many months the nation had been expecting war. Fifty millions of dollars had been appropriated for the national defense, and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the President. Presumably that immense sum was used in the purchase of ships, arms, and the munitions of war for the Army and Navy, that new levies might be promptly armed and equipped. That the war was inevitable was apparent to every thoughtful reader of history. The statesmen of the nation had recognized the question of the duty of the Government of the United States towards Spain and the Cuban struggle for liberty, as being by far the most important problem with which we were then called upon to deal. If that did not mean something more than a mere probability of war, what did it mean? For several years previous to the declaration of war, we had energetically employed our powers, if not in the interest of Spain and against the interest of the Cuban patriots, at least to maintain our friendly relationship with the kingdom of Spain. Nearly a year in advance of the declaration of war, the unanimous voice of the people of the nation, expressed in the nominating conventions of the great political parties, was a direct command for a cessation of this policy, and its reversal. This

voice was heard, expressly recognized, and with apparent cordiality accepted by the candidates. The voice of the people was heard by Congress, and Congress responded. So clearly was the approach of war discerned that, weeks before the declaration of war, the continental powers unitedly, through their ambassadors and envoys, addressed to the Executive an expression of hope that humanity and moderation might mark the course of this Government and people; as if this Government and people had not led all the nations of all the world in humanitarian principles. This notice was not only an exceptional, but an unprecedented feature. Not only that, but it now forms a precedent pregnant with possibilities of future perplexities and dangers for this country.

War having been declared, it was an exceptional feature that our antagonist had already more than she could handle with patriots of Puerto Rica, Cuba and the Philippine Islands alone. For three years she had been steadily losing ground. Cuba was lost to Spain. The circumstances of Cortes were immeasurably less favorable than ours when he burned his ships behind him. With a few hundred followers he joined the weaker side, and with it won an empire, vastly greater in extent and numbers than our acquisitions from Spain; not only so, but with a loss of fewer of his men, all-told, than we had killed at Santiago.

Another exceptional feature was the practical unanimity of our people as evidenced in the voting of \$50,000,000, in the declarations in their political conventions, and the response to the call for volunteers. Such unanimity had never before been known in all our history. In 1861 the cause of disunion had many sympathizers in every section of the country; in 1846 more than one half the population was averse to the war; in 1812 the prospect was that whole states would have to be coerced; in 1776 the Tories were a large, vigorous and dangerous minority.

Another exceptional circumstance in our experience of war was the immense number of trained soldiers for service. It is true our regular military establishment was small, but nearly a million of the best-trained soldiers in the world stood ready as minute men to answer the call of their country in an emer-

gency. The few individuals among them, whose services were for some reason accepted, abundantly proved their experience and aptitude in camp, on the march and in action.

Some further exceptional features will present themselves in due course, as we now proceed with a sketch of the history of the war from the commencement of actual hostilities.

In conducting the preparations for war, it was reasonable that the highest executive should expect and fully consider, in dealing with military questions, the best thought, based on long experience and mature study, of the highest military and naval officials. In case their superiors in authority should decide against any advice or plan submitted and in favor of some other, then it became their duty to support the one adopted with unhesitating zeal. Such being the case, we believed that the calling for so large a number of volunteers before they could be properly equipped and especially the manner in which they were brought into service, was injudicious. We felt as Wellington must have felt in the campaign in Spain. Plagued as he was by the Spanish habit of getting together recruits first, and thinking of how to feed and equip them afterwards, he wrote :

“It will answer no purpose to bring to the theatre of war on the *Douro* or the *Ebro* crowds of starving soldiers. We shall increase our difficulties without reaping any advantage from the trouble taken in forming them. An army well equipped, disciplined, officered and instructed is far more effective than a larger one without these essential conditions.”

The President, on the 25th of April, announced to the world that Congress had declared war, and immediately directed the Secretary of the Navy to telegraph orders to the Commander of the Asiatic Squadron, then lying in the Port of Hong Kong, pointing out in diplomatic terms that, as there could be no harbor of rest within his reach, there remained for him only to commence operations; and nothing could be more superb than the promptitude with which the summons was obeyed, and a new name emblazoned high over all on the roll of naval heroism. The proclamation of neutrality by different governments having debarred our Asiatic Squadron from harbor privileges, this was recognized as the

only course open, for inaction would mean the speedy exhaustion of the supplies of the fleet, 12,000 miles from any home port and from the means of replenishing. As is usual in momentous affairs of the history of the world, and as the event proved, the man for the occasion was present. There was not a moment's hesitation or vacillation as to the course he would pursue. He at once ordered the ships of his squadron to Mirs Bay, and gave it a formation that it maintained throughout the voyage and to the end of the epoch-making battle. There was no uncertainty or doubt manifested by him, as there was when Nelson set out from Naples, the latter having obtained provisions and water through the interposition of his friend, Lady Hamilton, just prior to the battle of the Nile. On the 26th of April, Dewey set out for Manila, leading his fleet in the following order: the flagship *Olympia*, bearing the broad pennant of the Commanding Commodore; then the *Baltimore*, the *Raleigh*, the *Petrel*, the *Concord*, and the *Boston*. The revenue cutter *McCulloch*, with the transports *Nanshan* and *Zafiro*, formed a separate column to the starboard. The Commander of the squadron had never been at Manila, nor had a single one of his officers; yet he had made a study of the charts he had taken care to procure, of Philippine waters, made his plans thereon, and proceeded to put them into execution. He well knew that the enemy was informed by telegraph of his movements, and would have nearly a week in which to complete their preparations to receive him. In this he was at one disadvantage that Nelson never had to take into account. "In early morn, at dawn of May," as some poetical genius has expressed it, he found himself with his squadron intact and in order of battle, and with the order established at Mirs Bay unchanged, calmly reposing on the waters of the harbor of Manila. The change from darkness to light and from light to darkness, comes with extreme rapidity in the tropics, and as the great disk of the equatorial sun swept up from below the horizon, the squadron of the enemy was presented suddenly but distinctly to the view, formed in battle array. Its formation was very similar to that which Nelson encountered in Aboukir Bay, when he exclaimed that before the morrow his fate would be a peerage or West-

minster Abbey. We hear no such exclamation on the part of Dewey. It was about 5:30 that the attack began in both cases; Nelson in the evening, Dewey in the morning. All night long Nelson's battle raged, replete with dramatic personal incidents, and, as at Trafalgar, ship to ship, and hand to hand encounters. We hear of nothing personally demonstrative on the part of Dewey. Nelson himself describes the French position as "a strong line of battle for preventing the entrance to the Bay, flanked by enormous gun-boats, four frigates, and a battery of guns and mortars." The French ships were placed "at a distance from each other of about 160 yards, with the van ship close to a shoal in the Northwest, and the whole of the line just outside a four-fathom sand bank; so that an enemy, it was considered, could not turn either flank." The Spaniards had disposed their forces so as to cover the entrance to Cavité, the western flank of the fleet resting on Sangley Point, and the eastern flank resting on the shoal near the land on the other side of the Bay, both flanks being apparently so close to shoal water as to prevent Dewey from passing at either place, or "doubling" on them. Here the parallelism ended. No signal was flying to the breeze over Dewey like that of Nelson at Trafalgar that America "expects every man to do his duty." He simply ported his helm at once and headed for the Spaniards, followed by his ships. As was afterwards learned, the Spanish line consisted of the *Reina Christina* (flagship), *Castilla*, *Isle de Luzon*, *Isle de Cuba*, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, and the *Marques Del Duero*. Five times he slowly passed along the Spanish line of battle, back and forth, steadily closing in towards them, and working his 120 guns mounted on 19,500 tons of ship displacement against the enemy's 90 guns and 12,000 tons of ship displacement, after which he quietly went to breakfast. It was the next morning after the battle when Nelson finished his work, and estimated his loss and gains; it was immediately after breakfast when Dewey deliberately proceeded to finish the business and take an account of stock. Never in the history of the world was the superiority of intellect over mere brute force more gloriously illustrated. Every portion of the contest in Manila Bay seems to have been

carefully, though quickly, calculated and provided for in advance. The enemy had the greater number of ships and men, but the mechanical power employed was with the Americans; and contrary to all previous experience, there was no attempt at ramming or boarding and no attempt at the display of independent individual bravery. Such display was exclusively on the losing side.

It requires no great stretch of poetic license to perceive the descendants of the Gallic and Iberian Romans reminded by the sudden appearance of the descendants of the rude rovers of Angle-land, of the descents that were made by the vikings upon the maritime towns of the Bay of Biscay fifteen centuries ago. Their consternation was most natural in any event; but to those whose education and intelligence could carry their reflections back through the intervening annals, the event must have been especially portentous. May not the Filipino wonder if the landing of Dewey and Merritt at Manila shall prove as disastrous to the natives as was that of Hengist and Horsa on the Island of Thanet fourteen and one half centuries ago?

At the conclusion of the contest it was found that no one in our fleet had been killed, and only eight men had been injured,—none of these seriously. Not a single ship had received any injury that reduced her efficiency in the slightest, with the exception of one gun on the *Baltimore* struck by the same shell that caused all the wounds that were experienced by our men at the battle. We have already noticed the disproportion in favor of the Americans between the tonnage displacement and the number of guns; but this disproportion and that of the hits between the two fleets was comparatively small. That the American fleet was the stronger in battery power is no reproach to us, but the reverse; for it shows that the American Commander acted in accordance with the first principles of warfare. It was Napoleon who said that God was on the side of the heaviest battalions. Nelson always recognized that fact. When attacking superior numbers, both of men and ships, he so attacked, laying ship to ship on the flank, as to throw out of action a considerable portion of the enemy's fleet, leaving him actually superior at the point of battle.

Commodore Dewey, having gotten his superior tonnage and superior metal into the action, proceeded to use them effectively. But few of the enemy's guns could reach him at all, and such as could have reached him failed to do so because of poor gunnery, probably resulting from excitement and consternation at the terrible destructiveness of the American fire. This permitted the display of extraordinary individual heroism on the Spanish fleet, and prevented any opportunities for the same on that of their antagonists. The result was that there were none but heroes on the American fleet, because every man stood at his post and fought with deliberation, without excitement; and the Commander himself, while showing the highest quality of courage and bravery, could make no greater display personally than his lowest subordinate. Of course the coolness of the Commander in such an action is imparted to all his subordinates, and the confidence of the Commander in his men and of the men in their Commander must have been owing in no small degree to previous acquaintance and previous drill and preparation. All this preparation and superiority in the adaptation of means to ends, scientific construction of guns and appurtenances, accurate proportioning of powder ingredients, elaborate and ingenious mechanisms for handling guns and ammunition;—all such expedients being calculated and perfectly in control in advance, while it insured victory, detracts nothing from, but rather enhances the glory of the men, and especially of the leader, who achieved success.

The success of Dewey was as substantial as it was spectacular, a concurrence of circumstances extremely rare in the affairs of the world. Never before in the annals of time did a name spring more suddenly from quiet professional life into world-wide fame. In the last minute of the month of April that name was practically unknown beyond the purview of the departmental roster. Before the end of the first of May, with the speed of that appliance which girdles the earth in forty minutes, or less, that name, emblazoned on every sky, obscured the lustre of many of the maritime achievements of the past.

When war was declared, we had a regular army of 25,000 men, located in small detachments at the various military sta-

tions scattered all over our vast country. We had made a very little advance on the conditions that existed at the time of the Venezuelan embroglio, at which time we had but three high-power guns mounted and in position for service along the vast extent of coast line of the United States. Our navy had recently been increased by the addition of purchased cruisers and battleships, but they were only about half manned, and all were more or less deficient in ammunition.

Our fortifications were inadequate for the defence of the great commercial cities and important harbors, and such defences as we had were only partly equipped in guns, ammunition and men. Foreign nations regarded us as a people devoted to industrial and commercial pursuits and unworthy of serious consideration as a military or naval power, although they well understood that our reserve power and wealth were elements of strength which could be utilized if we were given time for preparation.

The Navy of Spain, as well as her Army, having been engaged in active war for years, was naturally supposed to be prepared for immediate action, and therefore capable of the greater effectiveness at the commencement of the contest; and our authorities, as the event proved, were unduly cautious in ordering aggressive movements. This was very natural under the circumstances; but had they fully comprehended the enemy's weakness, notwithstanding the appearances, as well as the excellent state of discipline of the forces manning our Navy, the obvious movement, whether for aggressive or defensive operations, was an immediate seizure of Puerto Rico. This is no new discovery. That it was a necessity of the situation could not well be overlooked. Indeed, as early as February 3 preceding the declaration of War, a retired officer, Admiral Ammen, writing from the Naval Hospital in Washington to Senator Morgan of Alabama in regard to the ostensible efforts of the Spanish authorities to organize an autonomous government for Cuba, said:

"I hope this Cuban autonomy will not be permitted to be smothered, and if attempted and ignored, that Congress will be disposed to acknowledge the independence of the Island of Cuba, which will in my belief enable them to attain it. If Spain

chooses to make war, we should at once take Puerto Rico, which will leave her without a point except the Island of Cuba. Then I would say we should knock all of their defences down except those of Havana, for the comfort and in aid of the insurgents, but not land a man on the island, as we should do on Puerto Rico, which we should occupy with a considerable force. As for Havana, we might try our hand as between her guns and our's afloat. As for the Spanish Navy, I have the idea that it is in a very bad condition, and it would be a question of relative forces whether we should engage it."

The sanitary objections to a campaign in Cuba during the summer season were well understood. The details of the expedition under the charge of Admiral Bacock of the British Navy, with Lord Albemarle in command of the military forces, in the year 1762, were accessible, and not only accessible but thoroughly canvassed. The invading force numbered about 15,000 men, almost exactly the number of our first expeditionary force to Santiago. The total loss of the British in 1762 and that of our army in the present year, including sickness, was represented by very nearly the same figures.

As the portent of war grew darker and rose higher in our political sky, it became my duty to urge with increasing zeal and earnestness the importance of early and thorough preparation. It was not in my power to do more than give warning, to point out the dangers and suggest the remedies. This much I did, or tried to do, with a persistency and earnestness limited only by the strict requirements of official courtesy. Tentage, transportation and camp equipage were insufficient for any important military operations. Congress passed a joint resolution which was approved April 20, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority on the Island of Cuba. Prior to that action Congress had appropriated \$50,000,000 for the national defence. During the period intervening, in anticipation of actual hostilities, efforts were made by the military authorities to secure material for military operations on a scale commensurate with the exigencies of the situation and on a scale far more expansive than had been adopted for a great many years. The importance of that act of Congress can be readily appreciated, as the time thus given was most opportune for se-

curing such munitions of war as were absolutely necessary to the proper equipment of an army and for securing the materials which had not previously been in demand in our country, but which are indispensable to the highest success in modern warfare. I had earnestly recommended the purchase of smokeless powder, rapid-fire and machine guns, modern rifles and such like requisites. A number of bills had been introduced in Congress looking to a re-organization and an increase of the Regular Army, but the wide divergencies of opinion on the subject might have prevented any action whatever but for the growing strain upon the relations between our government and that of Spain. These strained relations served to emphasize the need for action on the subject, and resulted in an act, which was approved by the President on the 26th of April, authorizing an increase in the enlisted strength of the Army to 62,597 men, which number was subsequently increased by a supplementary act authorizing the enlistment of 10,000 men possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates. Previous to the passage of this act, as early as the 9th of April, I had recommended the equipment of 50,000 volunteers, and shortly thereafter that an additional auxiliary force of 40,000 men be provided as a reserve and for the protection of the coasts. This would have given us an effective force of 162,597 men, which when supplemented by the auxiliary force of 50,000 natives of Cuba, I believed would be sufficient. I deemed it, however, of the first importance that this force should be well equipped and placed in the highest degree of efficiency for active service.

As early as the middle of April steps were taken for the mobilization of the regular troops, various regiments of infantry being ordered to Mobile, New Orleans and Tampa, the understanding then being that these orders were preparatory to an immediate movement to Cuba upon a declaration of war, which then seemed imminent. On further consideration, the authorities modified this order, and part of the regular infantry, with artillery and cavalry, was diverted to Chattanooga and placed in camp at Chickamauga Park. On May 10, the regular artillery and cavalry were ordered from Chickamauga to Tampa, preparatory to a movement on Cuba.

Subsequently 70,000 men were ordered to move on Cuba, and commissary stores for 90 days for the men and 30 days for the animals were ordered to be concentrated at Tampa, but the want of proper equipment and ammunition rendered such movement impracticable, and it never reached the stage of an actual attempt at departure from our shores.

The President's proclamation declaring a state of war appeared on the 25th of April, and the next day it became my duty to advise giving prompt attention to the equipment, organization and discipline of the troops for field service, and that, after being assembled, organized and sworn into the service of the United States, they would require uniforms, tentage, complete camp equipage, arms and ammunition and a full supply of stationery, including blank books for reports of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, Medical and Ordnance Departments; that they would also require complete equipment of supplies and munitions of war, hospital appliances and transportation, including ambulances and stretchers; that the officers and non-commissioned officers would have to be appointed and properly instructed in their duties and responsibilities, and that they should have some instruction in tactical exercises and other duties of the highest importance to the efficiency and health of troops in the field; that the importance of this preliminary work was urgent, as also that it should be completed in advance of the troops leaving their States; and it was furthermore strongly represented that this might be done while the general and staff officers were being selected, appointed and properly instructed, and the large camps were being secured, and stores collected therefor. It was a matter of very great concern to me that unequipped, ununiformed men by the thousands should not be collected in great camps away from their States where it would be difficult for them to be properly supplied with food, camp equipage, blankets, tentage, medical supplies and transportation facilities; for the absence of these appliances could not but cause debilitating results upon the health and strength of the men who were thus gathered together.

While the railways of the United States were engaged in transporting troops, munitions of war and supplies to Tampa

and other points of departure on the Gulf and the South Atlantic, the military authorities at Washington took steps to obtain accurate and detailed information within the limits of the prospective seat of war. Two young, energetic and intelligent officers of the Bureau of Military Information were assigned, the one to Cuba, the other to Puerto Rico, to attempt the daring and difficult duty of ascertaining and reporting conditions as they might be found to exist in the territories respectively assigned to them. Both, in the results of their efforts, gave abundant proof of the wisdom of their selection.

The emissary to Cuba, Lieutenant Rowan, having left the United States on April 9, landed April 24 at Portillo, about 70 miles west of Santiago de Cuba. He penetrated the interior, found and conferred with General Garcia, one of the most successful and brilliant leaders of the Cuban Army, and without undue delay hastened to lay, before his superiors in Washington the valuable data that he had acquired. With General Garcia's concurrence, he brought back with him two officers of that chieftain's staff, Brigadier-General Enrique Collazo and Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos Hernandez. The course of his return journey lay up to Manati on the North Coast; thence by an open boat to Nassau, New Providence, whence they arrived in the United States May 13.

It was nearly a month after Lieutenant Rowan's departure that Lieutenant Whitney sailed, May 5, from Key West for Puerto Rico, which, after a ten days' voyage, he entered and proceeded to explore under disguise, giving his attention more particularly to the southern sections of the island. He departed thence on his return June 1, and reported the results of his mission in Washington on the 9th of that month. Like the report of Lieutenant Rowan, that of Lieutenant Whitney was eminently satisfactory at Army Headquarters. He had gone on the most hazardous duty an officer can be called upon to perform. He was in constant and imminent danger of discovery, the penalty for which would have been an ignominious death from which there could have been no appeal.

Several relief expeditions carrying arms and supplies for the Cubans were organized and dispatched. The first of these

was equipped at Key West under the direction of Colonel Hall, since promoted to Brigadier General. This expedition landed under charge of Captain O'Connell of the United States Army, his assistant, Lieutenant Crofton, also of the army, being the first officer to land on Cuban soil during the Spanish-American War.

One of the most important of these expeditions was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst of the volunteer army, which sailed from Key West by way of Nassau and landed at the harbor of Banes on the north coast of Cuba, where he delivered to the Cubans, who held and continued to hold that port, 7,500 rifles, a million cartridges, 5,000 uniforms and other munitions of war and supplies of which the ten thousand veteran Cubans under General Garcia stood sadly in need. Colonel Dorst returned early in June, reported the entire success of his expedition, and received the hearty congratulations of his commanding officers, whose trust he had so thoroughly vindicated.

Meanwhile the forces gathering at Tampa, originally destined for an invasion of Cuba on a much larger scale, were being organized to a strength of five thousand with a view to a lodgment at Tunas on the south side of Cuba, where it was expected to open communication with the General in Chief of the Cuban forces, General Gomez, and support and co-operate with him in the healthful mountain region where he was understood to be operating. This expedition was designed to be under the command of Major-General Shafter, the senior officer then at Tampa, and was intended to be strong enough to effect a landing and maintain its position, while furnishing all the supplies needed by the force of General Gomez. The movement of Admiral Cervera's fleet from the Cape de Verde Islands rendered necessary the adoption of new plans, and this expedition, like the first one designed, was suspended, and in effect never advanced to the point of setting sail.

The reports of conditions at Tampa became such that at this time I determined to take the field in person with headquarters temporarily at Tampa. I issued an order to the Army designed to increase and promote the *esprit de corps* on the part of officers and men, to bring the military forces to the highest state

of efficiency, and to call forth the best energies of all the elements composing the Army, of whatever character or station, in order that they might the more speedily accomplish the objects in view through an increased zeal for the cause and an enlarged earnestness of effort. Attention was called to the high development which had been reached throughout the civilized world by the experience of the past century, and the faithful observance of laws and regulations which govern military bodies in all civilized countries, and I urged that all officers, of whatever grade, should as far as lay in their power guard and preserve the health and welfare of all under their charge, that the officers should labor diligently and zealously to perfect themselves and their subordinates in military drill, instruction and discipline; and above all, that they should constantly endeavor, by precept and example, to maintain the highest soldierly standard, to foster and stimulate that high soldierly spirit and patriotic devotion to duty which must characterize an effective army. Reciting the fact that the order was issued upon the day sacred to the memory of the heroic dead, the 30th of May, I hoped that the injunctions, from all the circumstances, would be strongly impressed, and result beneficially, most especially throughout the volunteer regiments that were so rapidly forming, and lessen the dangers that are always present with large bodies of men gathered on short notice for a great national purpose.

Definite information having been received that Cervera's fleet had been inclosed in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba by our Navy, orders were given to General Shafter, May 30, to embark his troops and proceed to that harbor for the purpose of assisting our naval forces in capturing that fleet; and on the same evening I left Washington.

Reaching Tampa on the 1st of June, I found that place crowded with an indiscriminate accumulation of supplies and war material. The confusion, owing partly to the want of terminal railway facilities and partly to the want of system in loading and billing material, appeared for a time to be utterly inextricable. The sidings from the port of Tampa for perhaps fifty miles into the interior were blocked with cars, and the resulting difficulties of the situation prevented proper

embarkation of the troops earlier than June 8, on which date the flotilla was in the act of moving to sea. This movement, however, was suspended by orders from Washington, and the expedition did not sail until the 14th. My request for permission to accompany the expedition had not been granted, and on the day following its departure I received and immediately complied with, the following :

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 15, 1898.

MAJOR-GENERAL MILES,
Tampa, Fla.,

Important business requires your presence here ; report at once. Answer.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

In a chapter like this, it is impossible to enter into the details of this expedition ; nor is it necessary, since it is all very fully described by others in the foregoing chapters, and I will content myself with merely repeating the belief which I entertained from the first and stated officially to the Department, that we could secure the surrender of the Spanish army in the Island of Cuba without any great loss of life. I know of no reason at present to revise that opinion. There is, however, a duty which I owe to the Cuban patriots before leaving this part of my subject, and that is to make clear the fact of the co-operation received from their governmental and military authorities. While at Tampa, on the 9th, and again on the 12th of June, I received cheering news by cable from the Cuban patriots in response to my communications to General Garcia on the 2d. These were in the form of suggestions and requests, but they were heartily accepted as commands. Nothing could have been more convincing of the hearty good will of the Cubans toward the American people and American government at that time than the alacrity with which this response was made and the instructions followed out. So anxious was General Garcia to assure us of the readiness of the patriot armies and people to co-operate that his response was hurried forward through different channels, in order that in case one should miscarry, another

might reach its destination. In that response he was careful to add that he would take measures at once to carry out my recommendations, regarding them as orders, and that he would immediately proceed to concentrate forces at the points indicated; that he would march without delay; that already he had put forces in motion to intercept aid going from Holguin and other points to Santiago; that, repeating every assurance of good will, he desired to second our plans.

It was on the sixth of June that Colonel Hernandez, on board the steamer *Gloucester*, had arrived in the harbor of Banes. Proceeding ashore at once, he delivered my communication to General Garcia, who had recently come into possession of that port. It conveyed to General Garcia the first information regarding the proposed expedition to Santiago, and he immediately gave orders for the concentration suggested in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba. The difficulties in his way were very great, but were overcome, one after another, until on the 19th, at 7:30 A. M., he reached Aserradero and placed himself in communication with Admiral Sampson. Invited by the latter on board his flagship, the two proceeded to concert a plan of attack preparatory to the expected arrival of General Shafter's expedition. It should not be forgotten that in his attitude toward the military authorities of our government General Garcia was not acting simply on his own authority, but in obedience to orders that he had previously received from the Council of the Cuban Government, to obey and respect the orders and instructions of the commanders of the American Army whenever they should commence operations in the territory under his command. General Shafter, on arrival of his expedition off Santiago Bay, with Admiral Sampson, visited General Garcia at his headquarters at Aserradero to confer with him in regard to the attack by land. The result of this conference was that it was determined to make the landing of the American forces east instead of west of the Bay of Santiago, and Cuban troops were placed on board American transports to reinforce the brigade of General Ramon, already in position to protect the landing of the American forces. These reinforcements landed at Sigua and advanced at once on Daiquiri, the united commands being

under General Castillo. The Spanish troops at Daiquiri hastily abandoned their position at that place, which was at once occupied by the Cubans; and when the American Navy bombarded the hills in the vicinity of that town, preparatory to the landing of the forces of General Shafter, the result of such bombardment was the spilling of Cuban blood only. From that time until the close of the campaign the Cubans were always in the vanguard, whether at Firmeza and Siboney, or Las Guasimas and El Caney.

On the 1st of July, under orders from General Shafter, General Garcia, with his 4,000 Cubans, began at 5:30 in the morning, his march toward Marianajo, and at 7 o'clock occupied the positions allotted to him at that point. Marianajo lies between El Caney and San Juan Hill, and it was part of the duty assigned him to protect both El Caney and San Juan Hill should the enemy come out from Santiago to reinforce either place during the battle. This duty was effectively performed. All the Cubans were under the enemy's fire, and their loss amounted to about one hundred. After the conclusion of this day's action, under orders from General Shafter, General Garcia, at the head of his forces, made a night march to the extreme right flank. At dawn of the 2d he was north of the city in a strong position, with his vanguard in close proximity to the city, and during the 2d drove the enemy from the villages of Cuabitas and Boniato and captured several fortified positions, closing in on San Vicente. During this day the Cubans suffered ten casualties, the skirmishing continuing all day. From this time General Garcia continued to advance and extend his right until his men scouted, picketed and occupied the ground between the coast and the Bay of Santiago, and at the same time strong commands were covering the roads leading from Holguin and other Spanish garrisons to Santiago.

Upon the surrender of the city of Santiago, General Garcia, commanding the Cuban forces, was debarred from any co-operation in the enjoyment of the honors or fruits of the victory.

On the 26th of June I received a formal order to organize an expedition for operation against the enemy in Cuba and

Puerto Rico, with which I proceeded at once to comply. The limits of the space of this chapter will not permit me to go into the details of these preparations; nor of various subsidiary military enterprises which I had advised, such as the capture of the Isle of Pines and the harbor of Nipe; nor of the provisions I recommended against the spread of the yellow fever which had broken out in the southern portion of our own country. A clear understanding of the course of events cannot be obtained, however, with the omission of either of the following self-explanatory dispatches:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 3, 1898.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington*:

We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character and the defences so strong it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about 5 miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies to a large extent by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate a thousand, but list has not yet been made; but little sickness outside of exhaustion from intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday and the almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon road to the rear is kept up with some difficulty on account of rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably have to go to the rear to-day. General Young also very ill, confined to his bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot. During sortie enemy made last night, which was handsomely repulsed, the behavior of the regular troops was magnificent. I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor, and will have a consultation with him this morning. He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General Garcia reported he holds the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and has burned a bridge and removed some rails; also that General Pando has arrived at Palma, and that the French consul with about four hundred French citizens came into his lines yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with every courtesy possible.

11:44 A. M.

SHAFTER, *Major-General*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 3, 1898.

GENERAL SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba* :

Accept my hearty congratulations on the record made of magnificent fortitude, gallantry and sacrifice displayed in the desperate fighting of the troops before Santiago. I realize the hardships, difficulties and sufferings, and am proud that amid those terrible scenes the troops illustrated such fearless and patriotic devotion to the welfare of our common country and flag. Whatever the results to follow their unsurpassed deeds of valor, the past is already a gratifying chapter of history. I expect to be with you within one week with strong reinforcements.

MILES, *Major-General Commanding*.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
NEAR SANTIAGO, PLAYA, July 4, 1898.

MAJ.-GEN. NELSON A. MILES :

Commanding the Army of the United States, Washington :

I thank you in the name of the gallant men I have the honor to command for splendid tribute of praise which you have accorded them. They bore themselves as American soldiers always have. Your telegram will be published at the head of the regiments in the morning. I feel that I am master of the situation and can hold the enemy for any length of time. I am delighted to know that you are coming that you may see for yourself the obstacles which this army had to overcome. My only regret is the great number of gallant souls who have given their lives for our country's cause.

SHAFTER.

I left Washington for Charleston, S. C., on the evening of July 7, and, on board the steamer *Yale*, loaded with 1,500 troops, and accompanied by the steamer *Columbia*, also conveying troops, I arrived off Santiago harbor on the morning of July 11, and, the bombardment being in progress, notified Admiral Sampson, commanding the fleet, of my purpose to land the troops I had brought with me within a little harbor called Cabañas, two and one-half miles from the entrance of Santiago harbor, preparatory to a prompt advance against the Spanish position. The Admiral at once came on board the *Yale*, and I explained to him more fully the purpose of my presence and my plan of operations, and received his very cordial acquies-

cence in the plan and assurance of his readiness to co-operate. I then went on shore and opened communication with General Shafter, between whom and Washington the following dispatches had been exchanged :

SIBONEY, VIA HAITI.

RECEIVED WASHINGTON, July 10, 1898—5:55 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, *Washington* :

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 10.—I have just received letter from General Toral declining unconditional surrender. Bombardment by the Army and Navy will begin at as near 4 P. M. to-day as possible.

SHAFTER, *Major General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 10, 1898.

GENERAL SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Santiago, Cuba* :

Should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally and wish to return to Spain, they will be sent back direct at the expense of the United States Government.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

At 12:45 P. M., July 11, General Shafter signaled to Admiral Sampson :

Please continue firing with heavy guns until 11 o'clock, and then cease firing until further orders.

At 4:45 P. M., the *Brooklyn* reported to the flagship :

General Shafter states that fire from ships very accurate, shells falling in city; lines have been advanced. Flag of truce went forward to demand unconditional surrender. Will communicate with you fully directly to Aguadores as to time of firing and result of truce.

On July 12, as stated by the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report, the Admiral received a dispatch from General Shafter stating :

My lines are now complete to the bay north of Santiago. Your shots can be observed from here perfectly, at least those that fall in the town. Flames followed several shots fired to-day.

On that morning I rode from Siboney to the headquarters of General Shafter. After consulting with him, he sent a communication to General Toral, saying that the Command-

ing General of the American Army had arrived in his camp with reinforcements, and that we desired to meet him between the lines at any time agreeable to him. He replied that he would see us at 12 o'clock next day. The interview was held, after which I rode along the trenches from right to left, examining the entire position, during the progress of which I received the following in reply to a telegram I had sent the night before :

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1898 (Received 2:45 P. M.).

MAJOR-GENERAL MILES :

You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the officers retaining their side arms. The officers and men after parole to return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not accepted, then assault, unless in your judgment an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson and pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matter should be settled promptly.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

Just before the time appointed for a second meeting with the Spanish Commander between the lines, a letter was received of which the following was the translation :

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 14, 1898.

HONORED SIR :

His excellency the general in chief of the army of the Island of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 P. M. the following: "Believing the business of such importance as the capitulation of that place should be known and decided upon by the Government of His Majesty, I give you notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking an immediate answer and enabling you also to show this to the General of the American army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the Government, which can not be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by way of Bermuda is more slow than by Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the General of the American army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of repatriation [returning to Spain]." I have the honor to transmit this to you, in case you may [consider] the foregoing satisfactory, that we may designate persons in representation of himself, who, with those in my name, agree to clauses of the capitulation upon the basis

of the return to Spain, accepted already in the beginning by the general in chief of this army.

Awaiting a reply, I am, very respectfully, your servant,
 JOSÉ TORAL, ETC.
 GENERAL IN CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.

My reply was made verbally at the interview which immediately followed, and which resulted in a definite surrender not only of the Spanish garrison at Santiago, but of all the troops in the eastern end of Cuba. This was largely due to the action of General Garcia and his troops. It is set forth in the following self-explanatory telegram :

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY.

BEFORE SANTIAGO, CUBA, July 14, 1898—12:55 P. M.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.* :

General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army corps and division of Santiago on the terms and understanding that his troops would be returned to Spain. General Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw up the conditions of arrangement for carrying out the terms of surrender. This is very gratifying, and General Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit for their tenacity and fortitude in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles which they have encountered. A portion of the army has been infected with yellow fever, and efforts will be made to separate those who are infected and those free from it, and to keep those who are still on board ship separated from those on shore. Arrangements will be immediately made for carrying out the further instructions of the President and yourself.

MILES, *Major-General, Commanding the Army.*

Directing General Shafter to appoint the Commissioners provided for in the terms of the surrender, in a letter of instructions, and in other written communications instructing him to take immediate measures for the protection of the health of the troops, I returned to Siboney to push forward preparations for an immediate descent upon Puerto Rico. While these preparations were in progress, I visited and inspected Daiquiri and other stations, and on the 17th of June concentrated transports at Guantanamo Bay, in order to take on water, coal, etc., having immediately after the agreement to

surrender asked Admiral Sampson to supply me with naval convoy.

By 3 o'clock of that day, July 21, the ships of the flotilla were heaving anchors, and presently thereafter were majestically plowing the waters of the deep in the direction of Puerto Rico. So important did I consider the necessity of moving the troops away from the yellow fever and malarial camps, that I had given orders for them to move to the sea shore or the mountains, and just before departure, a final telegram was sent to the Secretary of War :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ON BOARD U. S. S. YALE,
GUANTANAMO BAY, July 21, 1898.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C. :*

* * * * *

There is not a single regiment of regulars or volunteers with General Shafter's command that is not infected with yellow fever, from one case in the Eighth Ohio to thirty-six in the Thirty-third Michigan.

After consulting with best medical authorities, it is my opinion that the best mode of ridding the troops of the fever will be as I have directed, namely, the troops to go up as high into the mountains as possible, selecting fresh camps every day. If this does not check the spread of the disease, the only way of saving a large portion of the command will be to put them on transports and ship them to the New England coast to some point to be designated by the Surgeon-General.

MILES, *Major-General Commanding.*

We were moving with an effective force of 3,314 men against an enemy over 17,000 strong. The convoy under Captain Higginson consisted of the battleship *Massachusetts* and two smaller vessels. The *Yale* and *Columbia*, though armed ships, were loaded with troops and therefore available only as transports. The long and anxiously looked for tugs, launches and lighters, that had been ordered from Santiago, Washington and Tampa, were expected at any moment to heave in sight, and the hope of meeting them was not given up until the entire Windward Passage had been traversed. Then, beyond the possibility of further cable communication

with the government, I signaled to the commander of the convoy to halt long enough to send him by a boat lowered for the purpose the following :

ON BOARD U. S. S. YALE,
EN ROUTE TO PUERTO RICO, July 22, 1898.

SIR: Our objective point has been Pt. Fajardo or Cape San Juan, but so much time has occurred since the movement was decided in that direction and such publicity has been given the enterprise, that the enemy has undoubtedly become apprised of our purpose. While it is advisable to make a demonstration near the harbor of San Juan near Pt. Fajardo or Pt. Figueroa, I am not decided as to the advisability of landing at either of these places, as we may find them well occupied by strong Spanish forces. If we draw them to that vicinity, we might find it judicious to quickly move to Puerto Guanica, where there is deep water near the shore— $4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms—and good facilities for landing. We can move from Cape San Juan to that point in twelve hours (one night), and it would be impossible for the Spanish to concentrate their forces there before we will be reinforced. I am also informed that there are a large number of strong lighters in the harbors at Ponce and Guanica, as well as several sailing vessels, which would be useful. As it is always advisable not to do what your enemy expects you to do, I think it advisable, after going around the northeast corner of Puerto Rico, to go immediately to Guanica and land this force and move on Ponce, which is the largest city in Puerto Rico. After or before this is accomplished, we will receive large reinforcements, which will enable us to move in any direction or occupy any portion of the island of Puerto Rico.

Your strong vessels can cover our landing, and capture any vessels in the harbor of Ponce, Guanica, or the ports on the southern coast; one light vessel can remain at Cape San Juan to notify transports that will arrive where we have landed and another could scout off the northwest corner of Puerto Rico to intercept others and direct them where to find us.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General, Commanding United States Army.

CAPT. FRANCIS J. HIGGINSON,
Commanding United States Naval Convoy.

Two days later, in pursuance of understanding with Captain

Higginson, arrived at by means of signaling, another halt was made, while Captain Whitney of my staff visited Captain Higginson, with his maps and reports, under instructions to give him all the information it was possible to give as to the result of his late secret explorations on the island of Puerto Rico.

The design of this chapter will not admit of any detailed reference to an impressive burial at sea, and other incidents of the voyage, nor to the subsequent campaign, the history thereof being already given by another participant and in another chapter. Enough that the voyage ended off Guanica, at daylight, July 25, the harbor being entered without serious opposition, and the landing speedily effected, the resistance overcome after a short skirmish, and the flag of the United States at once hoisted over Puerto Rican soil. The day following, the town of Yauco was occupied after a spirited engagement by troops under General Garretson, giving us possession of the railroad and highway to the city of Ponce.

The day following the spirited engagements at Guanica and Yauco, the villagers who had fled during the affairs came back. Among the number who crowded about our horses, as we sat watching the movements of the troops and the return of the excited villagers, was a tall, slender, black-eyed Ethiopian, whom I observed coming close up to my horse. Looking me full in the face with the most intense earnestness, he secured my attention. I spoke to him kindly and asked him what he wanted. He said in good English: "Is this General Miles?" and he repeated the question after being answered in the affirmative. I reassured him of the fact; when he took a letter which had been sewed inside of his shirt, written on fine French notepaper, in the Spanish language, and handed it to me, the translation of which is as follows:

To the Chief of Operations of the Invading Army of the
American Union.

CITIZEN:

Not knowing exactly how I ought to guide myself in entering into a direct communication with your camp, I direct this to the Chief of Operations to express to you my duty in these historical moments and that trust in the power

of a strong conscience and in the valor of arms as they pertain to the great issues of liberty and of patriotism in this island. An absolute military censorship shuts out from the city the means of obtaining the news, and I wish that you and your companions may know the true feeling of our municipality. Here we wait with impatience American occupation that comes to break the chain that has been forged constantly during four centuries of infamous spoliation, of torpid despotism and shameful moral slavery. When the rudders of the American ships entered the waters of the coast of Guanica to bear to this country political revolution, great confidence was born again, again was awakened the ideal of sleeping patriotism in our consciences and the lullaby of perfidious promises which have never been fulfilled. An entire city, with the exception of those who live under the shadow of pretense and official immunity, is prepared to solemnize the glorious triumph of civilization and offers its blood as a holocaust to such a grand proposition. Let this message bear to you notice that our municipal conscience does not sleep and wait. Here you can count on the great masses who are prepared to second your gigantic strength. All the districts of this jurisdiction are prepared for combat. The districts of the city are also prepared. Men of intrepid heart surround me ready for the struggle. The only thing that prevents the manifestation of unity is an absolute need of the elements of war. On the other hand, we have already driven from the town our eternal enemies to the rights of Puerto Ricans. I do not wish to impose upon my ideas of patriotism the grave responsibility of directing my men upon the enemy without capacity to maintain the struggle. In this moment of activity may this communication serve to dispose you to embrace an opportunity to utilize the services that I offer. Before closing, I wish to warn you that at the entrance to this city, on the roads of Adjuntas and Canas, the Spanish government is actively engaged in constructing several trenches to foolishly obstruct the march of the army of liberty, and they are concealing themselves in the small neighboring hills and difficult passes in the canyons in order to carry out this resistance. With many wishes for your health and much appreciation of the great triumph of America,

I am, your humble servant,

FELIX MATO BERNIER.

July 26, 1898. (PONCE, P. R.)

The above illustrates the sentiment of the intelligent portion of the people of Puerto Rico, as well as the courage that

would prompt a man to write a letter of that kind and send it through the Spanish lines, thereby running the risk of death, if not torture, in case of discovery. In fact, the atrocities that were perpetrated upon men holding such sentiments within our own time would better become the people of the dark ages than of the 19th century under a so-called civilized government. There are men who exhibit hands the joints of which have been crushed by the blows of a hammer, or feet the soles of which have been shaved off and they afterwards compelled to walk on the gravel road between Ponce and San Juan. They can show other scars and mutilations by which they have been tortured, when their only offence was love of liberty and hope of freedom. People possessing such sentiments as are indicated in the above letter, and the courage to write them under such circumstances, are richly deserving of their liberty. To such a people it was my pleasure to issue the following proclamation :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
PONCE, PUERTO RICO, July 28, 1898.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO :

In the prosecution of the war against the Kingdom of Spain by the people of the United States in the cause of Liberty, Justice and Humanity, its military forces have come to occupy the Island of Puerto Rico. They come bearing the banner of Freedom, inspired by a noble purpose to seek the enemies of our country and yours, and to destroy or capture all who are in armed resistance. They bring you the fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in its Justice and Humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release from your former political relations, and it is hoped a cheerful acceptance of the government of the United States.

The chief object of the American military forces will be to overthrow the armed authority of Spain and to give to the people of your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty consistent with this military occupation. We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring protection, not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your prosperity and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our government. It is not our

purpose to interfere with any existing laws and customs that are wholesome and beneficial to your people so long as they conform to the rules of military administration of order and justice.

This is not a war of devastation, but one to give to all within the control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization.

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General, Commanding United States Army.

This was seed sown on good ground, and a bountiful and speedy harvest of patriotic sentiment was the result. The sentiment spread like magic over the island. It caused a large number of volunteers immediately to desert the cause and colors of Spain. They returned to their homes, surrendered their arms and equipments, and took the oath of allegiance to the United States; and this had a discouraging and demoralizing effect upon the regular troops of the Spanish government, which greatly aided us in the conquest of the island.

On the 27th of July reinforcements arrived under Major-General Wilson, and that night the expedition started from the Bay of Guanica, timed to reach that of Ponce at daylight. The combined movement resulted as planned, to the letter, and the American flag waved over the public buildings of the port and the city founded by Ponce de Leon. Still further reinforcements arrived under Brigadier-General Schwan on the last day of July. The movements of the different columns and short engagements have been described by another, and the results were most gratifying. On the 13th of August I received notification from the War Department that the President had signed preliminaries of peace, and instructed a cessation of hostilities. With the utmost dispatch of wire and horsemanship, I called a halt on the four columns pressing the island with the prospect that within a few days the entire island would have been in our possession, including the capital city of San Juan. Four of these columns had been in actual contact with the enemy, and two were in the very act of opening battle, when the messages of instruction arrived on foaming horses, putting an end to further bloodshed. The balance of our main force had already passed

around the mountains or over the mountain trails to the north side of the island in spite of every and all opposition of the Spaniards, and our forces were then in such a position as to make that of the Spanish forces, outside of the garrison at San Juan, utterly untenable. The Spaniards had been defeated, or captured, in six different engagements, and driven from every position they had taken up to that time. The number of troops then in Puerto Rico on our side did not exceed 14,365, only 6,342 of whom had actually engaged the enemy; and I had advised the Secretary of War that no more of the large force which had been designed by the Department for this expedition need be sent.

When the protocol was signed at 4:23 P. M., the bombardment of Manzanillo had been in progress for an hour, and it continued until the next morning, when the news of the cessation of hostilities arrived and put an end to the bombardment. Captain Goodrich commanded the attacking squadron, which consisted of the *Newark*, *Hist*, *Suwanee*, *Osceola* and *Alvarado*. On that same morning hostilities were renewed at Manila, where the war had so gloriously opened on the 1st of May. The attack upon that city by Dewey and Merritt began as previously planned, as it was impossible to get news of the signing of preliminaries of peace much within a week. A division of the naval squadron shelled the forts on the south side of the city, while the trenches were occupied by the land forces under command of General Merritt. The squadron had no casualties; no vessels were injured, and the losses among our troops were only five men killed. General Merritt's men followed the retreating Spaniards into the walled city, where their commander agreed upon terms of capitulation. It will thus be seen that on the morning of August 13 actual fighting was in progress between the Spanish and American armed forces in Puerto Rico and in the Philippines—an extreme distance of 175 degrees of longitude, about 12,500 miles. At the same time preparations were in an advanced stage of progress for a demonstration upon the Spanish coasts and the islands of Spain, in the Mediterranean as well as in the Atlantic, and a state of hostilities would undoubtedly have been in operation there within a very few

weeks at the furthest had not the preliminary terms of peace been agreed upon.

It is plain now to all, as it was to a few at the beginning, that grand strategy required the seizure of Puerto Rico immediately upon the commencement of hostilities. That island, having enjoyed a long period of peace, was then totally unprepared to resist any considerable attacking force, either naval or military. That island in our possession, reinforcements of Cuba, naval or military, would have been out of the question; that is to say, any attempt to reinforce or re-provision the Spanish forces in Cuba would have resulted in failure.

What are the lessons that have been taught by our recent war with one of the ancient powers? The history of the downfall of Spain should be a warning to the enlightened nations of the earth that they cannot successfully rule a people by tyranny and cruelty; that past achievements, military and naval glory and renown, count as naught in a crisis where intelligence, skill, enterprise and thorough knowledge of modern appliances of war determine the fate of a nation. The theory that we can remain indifferent to the progress that is being made every day in the art of war, that we can rely upon the enthusiasm of the hour, the uprising of the patriotic yeomanry, and that our people will rush to arms and in a short time achieve victories, is a dangerous illusion. When our forefathers were accustomed to keep their hunting rifles on the antlers, ready to kill wild beasts or encounter a savage foe skilled in the land-crafts and the essential knowledge of the woodman and the hunter, they constituted an irregular force that was irresistible and unconquerable in the sparsely populated timber country of one hundred years ago. So in our great war, when the national capital was in danger, it is our pride and glory to point to the fact that tens of thousands of men suddenly left their farms and counting-houses, their workshops and colleges, and rushed to the defence of the national capital. Yet in the Ball's Bluffs, the Bull Runs and the Shilohs, it was the result of one irregular, sparsely equipped, undrilled and undisciplined force against another in the same condition, and with the same amount of spirit; enterprise

and American courage. The success gained by a mass of such physical forces against another of the same character is no proof that such a force could stand against a well-disciplined, well-drilled military body, armed with the destructive appliances of modern warfare.

The two great wars that preceded our recent one demonstrated this fact, that the pride and glory of the greatest military nation of modern times, shouting "On to Berlin!" soon met its Sedan, and witnessed the triumphant occupation of the city of Paris by the more skilled and better equipped German forces. The vast hordes of brave Chinese were no match for the skillful Japanese, though they outnumbered the latter twelve to one. While we, in the last war, raised the great force of 278,000 men, it is perfectly well known to all military men that some of the appliances were obsolete and insufficient, either for effective service or to protect the lives and health of the heroic men who had volunteered in their country's service. From the days of Valley Forge to the present, the suffering and death of large numbers of men can be traced directly to the want of thorough and proper system, of efficient organization, of rigid responsibility and accountability on the part of all officials, added to the fact that the conduct of military affairs has not been in the hands of military men whose experience and record for efficiency and integrity has been demonstrated by years of service. If thousands of men are mustered into service when there is not sufficient clothing, camp equipage and garrison equipage, tentage, transportation and proper supplies of quartermaster's, commissary, and medical stores to furnish them the requirements and necessities of life, they cannot be considered an efficient army or army corps. They are simply so many men employed and kept or bound to service by the sanctity of their oath of enlistment. Inferior, insufficient and conspicuous white canvas, inferior clothing material, inferior and unsuitable food, inferior artillery, short-range, single-breechloading rifles, black powder, are things obsolete, and should be classed with the spear, the bow and arrow, the pike, the flint-lock, the smooth-bore, and other implements of the past. This is the age of progress in the art of war, as well as in all the other arts and sciences. It

is the day of the long range, low trajectory, wonderfully penetrating, smokeless powder rifle. It is the age of the rapid-fire machine gun, capable of throwing from 400 to 700 projectiles per minute; the enormous 100-ton gun, capable of throwing a projectile weighing one ton 14 miles; the day of dynamite guns, throwing from 10 to 500 pounds of high explosives; the day of the range finder and plotting-board; of well-directed and well-controlled military balloons; of the electric telegraph and telephone; steam power—all utilized in modern appliances, the most destructive in warfare.

The achievements of our Army in 100 days, notwithstanding all its defects and embarrassments, have added a chapter of glory to the military history of the United States. Her sons have exhibited the grandest patriotism, heroism, fortitude and sacrifice. The campaign was offensive from start to finish. There was scarcely a check. There was not a single reverse or disaster or retreat. Not an inch of ground was lost, not a soldier captured. It was one series of successes, notwithstanding the trials and difficulties and obstacles to be surmounted. Nearly twelve millions of people have been liberated from the cruel despotism of a monarchical government and admitted to the sunlight of freedom, where justice and independence and liberty are assured. The territory acquired is of enormous area, although portions of it may yet be given to the native occupants. Yet the island of Puerto Rico alone, which will remain as part of the territory of the United States, is valued at more millions than the entire cost of the war with Spain, and we may well greet our noble sailors and soldiers with the cheerful welcome, "Hail and well done."

Wm. H. Miles



Prof. J. A. Crockett

ADDENDUM.

CONDITION OF CUBA UNDER SPANISH MISRULE.

SPEECH OF

HON. REDFIELD PROCTOR

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MARCH 17, 1898.

Mr. President, more importance seems to be attached by others to my recent visit to Cuba than I have given it, and it has been suggested that I make a public statement of what I saw and how the situation impressed me. This I do on account of the public interest in all that concerns Cuba, and to correct some inaccuracies that have, not unnaturally, appeared in reported interviews with me.

My trip was entirely unofficial and of my own motion, not suggested by any one. The only mention I made of it to the President was to say to him that I contemplated such a trip and to ask him if there was any objection to it; to which he replied that he could see none. No one but myself, therefore, is responsible for anything in this statement. Judge Day gave me a brief note of introduction to General Lee, and I had letters of introduction from business friends at the North to bankers and other business men at Habana, and they in turn gave me letters to their correspondents in other cities. These letters to business men were very useful, as one of the principal purposes of my visit was to ascertain the views of practical men of affairs upon the situation.

Of General Lee I need say little. His valuable services to his country in his trying position are too well known to all his countrymen to require mention. Besides his ability, high character and courage, he possesses the important requisites of unflinching tact and courtesy, and, withal, his military education and training and his soldierly qualities are invaluable adjuncts in the equipment of our representative in a country so completely under military rules as is Cuba. General Lee kindly invited us to sit at

his table at the hotel during our stay in Habana, and this opportunity for frequent informal talks with him was of great help to me.

In addition to the information he voluntarily gave me, it furnished a convenient opportunity to ask him the many questions that suggested themselves in explanation of things seen and heard on our trips through the country. I also met and spent considerable time with Consul Brice at Matanzas, and with Captain Barker, a staunch ex-Confederate soldier, the consul at Sagua la Grande. None of our representatives whom I met in Cuba are of my political faith, but there is a broader faith, not bounded by party lines. They are all three true Americans, and have done excellent service.

THE MAINE.

It has been stated that I said there was no doubt the *Maine* was blown up from the outside. This is a mistake. I may have said that such was the general impression among Americans in Habana. In fact, I have no opinion about it myself, and carefully avoided forming one. I gave no attention to these outside surmises. I met the members of the court on their boat, but would as soon approach our Supreme Court in regard to a pending cause as that board. They are as competent and trustworthy within the lines of their duty as any court in the land, and their report, when made, will carry conviction to all the people that the exact truth has been stated just as far as it is possible to ascertain it. Until then surmise and conjecture are idle and unprofitable. Let us calmly wait for the report.

SECTIONS VISITED.

There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception of Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and having about an equal sea front on the north and south borders. Matanzas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its southwest corner, being separated from it elsewhere by a narrow peninsula of Santa Clara Province. The provinces are named, beginning at the west, Pinar del Rio, Habana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. My observations were confined to the four western provinces, which constitute about one-half of the island. The two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the insurgents, except the few fortified towns. These two large provinces are spoken of to-day as "Cuba Libre."

Habana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the eyes of the Spaniards and many Cubans, all Cuba, as much as Paris is France. But having visited it in more peaceful times and seen its sights, the tomb of Columbus, the forts—Cabana and Morro Castle, etc.—I did not care to repeat this, preferring trips in the country. Everything seems to go on much as usual in Habana. Quiet prevails, and except for the frequent squads of soldiers marching to guard and police duty and their abounding presence in all public places, one sees few signs of war.

Outside Habana all is changed. It is not peace nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a "trocha" (trench), a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown up on the inside and a barbed-wire fence on the outer side of the trench. These trochas have at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called forts, but which are really small blockhouses, many of them more like large sentry boxes, loopholed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each.

The purpose of these trochas is to keep the reconcentrados in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people have been driven in to these fortified towns and held there to subsist as they can. They are virtually prison yards, and not unlike one in general appearance, except that the walls are not so high and strong; but they suffice, where every point is in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children.

Every railroad station is within one of these trochas and has an armed guard. Every train has an armored freight car, loopholed for musketry and filled with soldiers, and with, as I observed usually, and was informed is always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There are frequent blockhouses inclosed by a trocha and with a guard along the railroad track. With this exception there is no human life or habitation between these fortified towns and villages, and throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among the hills where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings. I saw no house or hut in the 400 miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio Province in the west across the full width of Habana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua La Grande on the north shore, and to

Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas.

There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures except such as are under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards hold in these four western provinces just what their army sits on. Every man, woman and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their columns have reached, is under guard and within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is concentration and desolation. This is the "pacified" condition of the four western provinces.

West of Habana is mainly the rich tobacco country; east, so far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills are destroyed between Habana and Sagua. Two or three were standing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running, surrounded, as are the villages, by trochas and "forts" or palisades of the royal palm, and fully guarded. Toward and near Cienfuegos there were more mills running, but all with the same protection. It is said that the owners of these mills near Cienfuegos have been able to obtain special favors of the Spanish Government in the way of a large force of soldiers, but that they also, as well as all the railroads, pay taxes to the Cubans for immunity. I had no means of verifying this. It is the common talk among those who have better means of knowledge.

THE RECONCENTRADOS—THE COUNTRY PEOPLE.

All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns when Weyler's order was made were driven into these towns, and these are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry, many of them farmers, some landowners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches; and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family.

It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people was very different from what prevails in this country. Their standard of comfort and prosperity was not high measured by ours. But according to their standards and requirements their conditions of life were satisfactory.

They lived mostly in cabins made of palms or in wooden

houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls of which are all that remain to show the country was ever inhabited.

The first clause of Weyler's order reads as follows :

I ORDER AND COMMAND

"First. All the inhabitants of the country or outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such."

The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions from one town to another without permission of the military authority, direct the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns, prescribe that the eight days shall be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal district, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use of, it will serve as a "recommendation."

Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the guerrillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases the torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When they reached the towns, they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and left to live, if they could.

Their huts are about 10 by 15 feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, no furniture, and, after a year's wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize; and with large families, or more than one, in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved? A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless.

Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that they have been found dead about the markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market surrounded by food. Before Weyler's order, these people were independent and self-supporting. They are not beggars even now. There are plenty of professional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger than words.

THE HOSPITALS.

Of these I need not speak. Others have described their condition far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents, and that they had given free play to a strong, natural and highly cultivated imagination.

Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet published by the *Christian Herald*, with cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these must be rare specimens, got up to make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad and worse; many that should not be photographed and shown.

I could not believe that out of a population of 1,600,000, two hundred thousand had died within these Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past from actual starvation and diseases caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of our medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be seen with one's own eyes to be realized.

The Los Pasos Hospital, in Habana, has been recently described by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I cannot say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile pen

could not do that. But he visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss Barton's very able and efficient assistants, had renovated it and put in cots. I saw it when 400 women and children were lying on the floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of rags—and such rags!—sick children, naked as they came into the world; and the conditions in the other cities are even worse.

MISS BARTON AND HER WORK.

Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. I had known and esteemed her for many years, but had not half appreciated her capability and devotion to her work. I specially looked into her business methods, fearing that here would be the greatest danger of mistake, that there might be want of system and waste and extravagance, but found she could teach me on these points. I visited the warehouse where the supplies are received and distributed; saw the methods of checking; visited the hospitals established or organized and supplied by her; saw the food distributions in several cities and towns, and everything seems to me to be conducted in the best manner possible. The ample, fine warehouse in Habana, owned by a Cuban firm, is given, with a gang of laborers free of charge to unload and reship supplies.

The Children's Hospital in Habana, a very large, fine private residence, is hired at a cost of less than \$100 per month, not a fifth of what it would command in this city. It is under the admirable management of Mrs. Dr. Lesser, of New York, a German lady and trained nurse. I saw the rapid improvement of the first children taken there. All Miss Barton's assistants seem excellently fitted for their duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticize, but everything to commend. The American people may be assured that their bounty will reach the sufferers with the least possible cost and in the best manner in every respect. If our people could see a small fraction of the need, they would pour more "freely from their liberal stores" than ever before for any cause.

When will the need for this help end? Not until peace comes and the reconcentrados can go back to the country, rebuild their homes, reclaim their tillage plots, which quickly run up to brush in that wonderful soil and clime, and until they can be free from danger of molestation in so doing. Until then the American people must in the main care for them. It is true that the alcaldes, other local authorities, and the relief committees are now

trying to do something, and desire, I believe, to do the best they can. But the problem is beyond their means and capacity, and the work is one to which they are not accustomed.

General Blanco's order of November 13 last somewhat modifies the Weyler order, but is of little or no practical benefit. Its application is limited to farms "properly defended" and the owners are obliged to build "centers of defense." Its execution is completely in the discretion of the local military authorities, and they know the terrible military efficiency of Weyler's order in stripping the country of all possible shelter, food or source of information for an insurgent, and will be slow to surrender this advantage. In fact, though the order was issued four months ago, I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning.

I do not impugn General Blanco's motives, and believe him to be an amiable gentleman, and that he would be glad to relieve the condition of the reconcentrados if he could do so without loss of any military advantage; but he knows that all Cubans are insurgents at heart, and none now under military control will be allowed to go out from under it.

I wish I might speak of the country—of its surpassing richness. I have never seen one to compare with it. On this point I agree with Columbus, that this is the "most rich and beautiful that ever human eye beheld," and believe every one between his time and mine must be of the same opinion. It is indeed a land—

"Where every prospect pleases
And only man is vile."

THE SPANIARD.

I had little time to study the race question, and have read nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said that there are nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a total population of 1,600,000. They live principally in the towns and cities. The small shopkeepers in the towns and their clerks are mostly Spaniards. Much of the larger business, too, and of the property in the cities, and in a less degree in the country, is in their hands. They have an eye to thrift, and as everything possible in the way of trade and legalized monopolies, in which the country abounds, is given to them by the Government, many of them acquire property. I did not learn that the Spanish residents of the island had contributed largely in blood or treasure to suppress the insurrection.

THE CUBAN.

There are, or were before the war, about 1,000,000 Cubans on the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in Spain), and less than half a million of negroes and mixed bloods. The Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood and, like the Spaniards, dark in complexion, but oftener light or blond, so far as I noticed. The percentage of colored to white has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, and is not now over 25 per cent of the total. In fact, the number of colored people has been actually diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and laborer is by nature peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted and improvident.

There is a proverb among the Cubans that "Spanish bulls can not be bred in Cuba"—that is, the Cubans, though they are of Spanish blood, are less excitable and of a quieter temperament. Many Cubans whom I met spoke in strong terms against the bull fights; that it was a brutal institution, introduced and mainly patronized by the Spaniards. One thing that was new to me was to learn the superiority of the well-to-do Cuban over the Spaniard in the matter of education. Among those in good circumstances there can be no doubt that the Cuban is far superior in this respect. And the reason of it is easy to see. They have been educated in England, France, or this country, while the Spaniard has such education as his own country furnishes.

THE NEGRO.

The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal mentally and physically of the race in this country. Certainly physically they are by far the larger and stronger race on the island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this has doubtless been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five years ago there were one-half as many free negroes as slaves, and this proportion slowly increased until emancipation.

THE MILITARY SITUATION.

It is said that there are about 60,000 Spanish soldiers now in Cuba fit for duty out of the more than 200,000 that have been sent there. The rest have died, have been sent home sick, or are in hospitals, and some have been killed, notwithstanding the official reports. They are conscripts, many of them very young, and generally small men. One hundred and thirty pounds is a fair estimate of their average weight. They are quiet and obe-

dient, and if well drilled and led, I believe would fight fairly well, but not at all equal to our men. Much more would depend on the leadership than with us. The officer must lead well and be one in whom they have confidence, and this applies to both sides alike. As I saw no drills or regular formation, I inquired about them of many persons, and was informed that they had never seen a drill. I saw perhaps 10,000 Spanish troops, but not a piece of artillery or a tent. They live in barracks in the towns, and are seldom out for more than the day, returning to town at night.

They have little or no equipment for supply trains or for a field campaign such as we have. Their cavalry horses are scrubby little native ponies, weighing not over 800 pounds, tough and hardy, but for the most part in wretched condition, reminding one of the mount of Don Quixote. Some of the officers, however, have good horses, mostly American, I think. On both sides cavalry is considered the favorite and the dangerous fighting arm. The tactics of the Spanish, as described to me by eye-witnesses and participants in some of their battles, is for the infantry, when threatened by insurgent cavalry, to form a hollow square and fire away *ad libitum*, and without ceasing until time to march back to town.

It does not seem to have entered the minds of either side that a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse anywhere an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there are everywhere positions where cavalry would be at a disadvantage.

Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco and received his courteous call in return, I could not with propriety seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of offers of safe conduct to Gomez's camp, and was told that if I would write him, an answer would be returned safely within ten days at most.

I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and was sought out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the best information received as to the insurgent force. His statements were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he was entirely reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about 30,000 men now in the field, some in every province, but mostly in the two eastern provinces and eastern Santa Clara, and this statement was corroborated from other good sources. They have a force all the time in Habana Province itself, organized in four small brigades and operating in small bands. Ruiz was taken, tried and shot within about a mile and a half of the railroad and about fifteen

miles out of Habana, on the road to Matanzas, a road more traveled than any other, and which I went over four times.

Arranguren was killed about three miles the other side of the road and about the same distance, fifteen or twenty miles, from Habana. The Cubans are well armed, but very poorly supplied with ammunition. They are not allowed to carry many cartridges ; sometimes not more than one or two. The infantry, especially, are poorly clad. Two small squads of prisoners which I saw, however, one of half-a-dozen in the streets of Habana, and one of three on the cars, wore better clothes than the average Spanish soldier.

Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards, was bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all tied together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of the amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban army are colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry furnished their own horses.

This field officer, an American from a Southern State, spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored soldiers ; that they were as good fighters and had more endurance than the whites ; could keep up with the cavalry on a long march and come in fresh at night.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

The dividing lines between parties are the straightest and clearest cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The division in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It is Cuban against Spaniard. It is practically the entire Cuban population on one side and the Spanish army and Spanish citizens on the other.

I do not count the autonomists in this division, as they are so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth counting. General Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had been autonomists and were still classed as such. But the march of events had satisfied most of them that the chance for autonomy came too late.

It falls as talk of compromise would have fallen the last year or two of our war. If it succeeds, it can only be by armed force, by the triumph of the Spanish army, and the success of Spanish arms would be easier by Weyler's policy and method, for in that the Spanish army and people believe.

There is no doubt that General Blanco is acting in entire good faith ; that he desires to give the Cubans a fair measure of autonomy, as Campos did at the close of the ten-year war. He has, of

course, a few personal followers, but the army and the Spanish citizens do not want genuine autonomy, for that means government by the Cuban people. And it is not strange that the Cubans say it comes too late.

I have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Cuban Junta in this country or any of its members, nor did I have with any of the juntas which exist in every city and large town of Cuba. None of the calls I made were upon parties of whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except that I knew some of them were classed as autonomists.

Most of my informants were business men, who had taken no sides and rarely expressed themselves. I had no means of guessing in advance what their answers would be, and was in most cases greatly surprised at their frankness.

I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and men as prominent in business as any in the cities of Habana, Matanzas, and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers and autonomist officials, some of them Spanish born but Cuban bred, one prominent Englishman, several of them known as autonomists, and several of them telling me they were still believers in autonomy if practicable, but without exception they replied that it was "too late" for that.

Some favored a United States protectorate, some annexation, some free Cuba; not one has been counted favoring the insurrection at first. They were business men and wanted peace, but said it was too late for peace under Spanish sovereignty. They characterized Weyler's order in far stronger terms than I can. I could not but conclude that you do not have to scratch an autonomist very deep to find a Cuban. There is soon to be an election, but every polling place must be inside a fortified town. Such elections ought to be safe for the "ins."

I have endeavored to state in not intemperate mood what I saw and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but leave every one to draw his own conclusions. To me the strongest appeal is not the barbarity practiced by Weyler nor the loss of the *Maine*, if our worst fears should prove true, terrible as are both of these incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge. But whether our action ought to be influenced by any one or all these things, and, if so, how far, is another question.

I am not in favor of annexation ; not because I would apprehend any particular trouble from it, but because it is not wise policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and training, and without any strong guiding American element. The fear that if free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so well founded as has been supposed, and the conditions for good self-government are far more favorable. The large number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they have endured, the peaceable temperament of the people, whites and blacks, the wonderful prosperity that would surely come with peace and good home rule, the large influx of American and English immigration and money, would all be strong factors for stable institutions.

But it is not my purpose at this time, nor do I consider it my province, to suggest any plan. I merely speak of the symptoms as I saw them, but do not undertake to prescribe. Such remedial steps as may be required may safely be left to an American President and the American people.

Wm. L. G. Procter

APPENDIX.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONGRESS
ON THE
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO SPAIN
BY REASON OF
WARFARE IN THE ISLAND OF CUBA.

To the Congress of the United States :

Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands the President to give from time to time to the Congress information of the state of the Union and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba.

I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the state of our own Union and the grave relation the course which it is now incumbent upon the nation to adopt must needs bear to the traditional policy of our Government if it is to accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the Republic and religiously observed by succeeding Administrations to the present day.

The present revolution is but the successor of other similar insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress, has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.

Since the present revolution began, in February, 1895, this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequalled in the history of the island and rarely paralleled as to the numbers of the com-

batants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution of modern times where a dependent people striving to be free have been opposed by the power of the sovereign state.

Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves constrained, in the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin, and which the law of nations commands, to police our own waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans.

Our trade has suffered ; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens which has inevitably found its expression from time to time in the National Legislature, so that issues wholly external to our own body politic engross attention and stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes a self-contained commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has, indeed, aroused the utmost concern on the part of this Government, as well during my predecessor's term as in my own.

In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this Government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed through the refusal of the Spanish Government then in power to consider any form of mediation or, indeed, any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished.

The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized Christian peoples. The policy of

devastation and concentration, inaugurated by the Captain-General's bando of October 21, 1896, in the Province of Pinar del Rio was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural interior, were driven into the garrison towns or isolated places held by the troops.

The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties and executed by all the powers at their disposal.

By the time the present administration took office a year ago, reconcentration—so called—had been made effective over the better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio.

The agricultural population to the estimated number of 300,000 or more was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad and exposed to the most unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate increased in an alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from starvation and the diseases thereto incident, exceeded 50 per centum of their total number.

No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called "zones of cultivation" established within the immediate areas of effective military control about the cities and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children, with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil without tools, seed or shelter for their own support or for the supply of the cities. Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to cut off the resources of the insurgents, worked its predestined result. As I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave.

Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone a noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that characterized the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural country, without immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and their conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset.

In this state of affairs my Administration found itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. My message of last December reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and opening the way to some form of honorable settlement. [The assassination of the prime minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain. The former administration, pledged to subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico.]

The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy, General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of the island, although not accepted to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct of hostilities. Coincidentally with these declarations, the new Government of Spain continued and completed the policy already begun by its predecessor, of testifying friendly regard for this nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that, by the end of November, not a single person entitled in any way to our national protection, remained in a Spanish prison.

While these negotiations were in progress the increasing destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the

suffering American citizens among them by the judicious expenditure through the consular agencies of the money appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last, I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people, inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York City, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community.

The efforts of that committee have been untiring and have accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba and co-operated with the Consul-General and the local authorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly \$200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers and more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if not all of the towns where suffering exists.

Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by the Spanish Government. Within a few days past the orders of General Weyler have been revoked; the reconcentrados, it is said, are to be permitted to return to their homes, and aided to resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works have been ordered to give them employment, and a sum of \$600,000 has been appropriated for their relief.

The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a condition which in effect ended the ten years war by the truce of Zanjón. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife

is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence.

Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted, on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation and correspondence, through the United States minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice until October 1 for the negotiation of peace with the good offices of the President.

In addition, I asked the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration, so as to permit the people to return to their farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief.

The reply of the Spanish cabinet was received on the night of the 31st ultimo. It offered, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the Insular Parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach a final result, it being, however, understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the Central Government are not lessened or diminished. As the Cuban Parliament does not meet until the 4th of May next, the Spanish Government would not object, for its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the insurgents from the general-in-chief, to whom it would pertain, in such case, to determine the duration and conditions of the armistice.

The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish Government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are before me, and are substantially in the language above given. The function of the Cuban Parliament in the matter of "preparing" peace and the manner of its doing so are not expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but from General Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions preceding the final conference it is understood that the Spanish Government stands ready to give the Insular Congress full powers to settle the terms of peace with the insurgents—whether by direct negotiation or indirectly by means of legislation does not appear.

With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of his effort.

In my annual message of December last I said :

Of the untried measures there remain only : Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents ; recognition of the independence of Cuba ; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.

Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives, in the light of President Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875, when after seven years of sanguinary, destructive and cruel hostilities in Cuba he reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible ; and that the recognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of belligerence which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities.

Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard ; and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerents is published, could, of itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor—the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island.

Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the present insurgent government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress, December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the independence of Texas. He said :

In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes relating to the Crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the separation of the American possessions of both from the European Governments, and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish America,

so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the action of our Government, that we have, under the most critical circumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good will in those against whom we have been by force of evidence compelled to decide.

It has thus made known to the world that the uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and eventually to recognize the authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests and views or to the merits of the original controversy.

* * * But on this, as on every other trying occasion, safety is to be found in a rigid adherence to principle.

In the contest between Spain and the revolted colonies we stood aloof, and waited not only until the ability of the new States to protect themselves was fully established, but until the danger of their being again subjugated had entirely passed away. Then, and not until then, were they recognized.

Such was our course in regard to Mexico herself. * * * It is true that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the Republic himself captured, and all present power to control the newly organized government of Texas annihilated within its confines; but, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at least, an immense disparity of physical force on the side of Texas. The Mexican Republic, under another Executive, is rallying its forces under a new leader and menacing a fresh invasion to recover its lost dominion.

Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the independence of Texas may be considered as suspended; and were there nothing peculiar in the relative situation of the United States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions.

Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that there might be imputed to the United States motives of selfish interest in view of the former claim on our part to the territory of Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in seeking recognition of independence as an incident to the incorporation of Texas in the Union, concluding thus:

Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself, or one of the great foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new government, at least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the

ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them. Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-established policy of our Government, a policy which has secured to us respect and influence abroad and inspired confidence at home.

These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson. They are evidence that the United States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted state shall "constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability," and forming *de facto*, "if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state,") has imposed for its own governance in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away.

This extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The Congress to whom President Jackson referred the question as one "probably leading to war," and therefore a proper subject for "a previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be furnished," left the matter of the recognition of Texas to the discretion of the Executive, providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when the President shall be satisfied that the Republic of Texas had become "an independent State." It was so recognized by President Van Buren, who commissioned a *chargé d'affaires* March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at the time no *bona fide* contest going on between the insurgent Province and its former Sovereign.

I said in my message of December last, "It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor." The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while, on the other hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle

upon the internal policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is not independent beyond peradventure.

Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.

When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.

There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or as the active ally of the one party or the other.

As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result, just and honorable to all interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences between us and Spain, and unstained by the blood of American citizens.

The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents where neighboring States have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to

the contest as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settlement.

The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows :

First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war-ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of inquiry on the destruction of the battleship *Maine* in the harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and

marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation.

The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the *Maine* was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed.

In any event the destruction of the *Maine*, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there.

Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, a dispatch from our Minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter of the *Maine*. The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the 10th instant, as follows :

As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views between the reports of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose decision Spain accepts in advance.

To this I have made no reply.

President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparent indefinite prolongation, said :

In such event, I am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the only remaining measures possible—mediation and intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water separating the island from the peninsula, * * * the contending parties appear to have within themselves no depository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when pas-

sion and excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of peacemaker.

In this view in the earlier days of the contest the good offices of the United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both parties, but were at the time declined by Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be indispensable. No intimation has been received that in the opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the United States and of other nations.

Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace in the island ; but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall possess and control the island to the exclusion of the other. Under these circumstances, the agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be invoked for the termination of the strife.

In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during the pending struggle, it was said :

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.

In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to this question, I said :

The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity.

Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actu-

ated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world.

The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.

Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities,

the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me.

This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contemplated action.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 11, 1898.

RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS.

Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.

WHEREAS, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.

Approved, April 20, 1898.

DECLARATION OF WAR.

An Act Declaring that war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

First. That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist, and that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April, anno Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

Second. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry this Act into effect.

Approved, April 25, 1898.

BLOCKADE.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved April 20, 1898, and communicated to the Government of Spain, it was demanded that said Government at once relinquish its authority and Government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters ; and the President of the United States was directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into effect ; and

Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of the United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba :

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, in order to enforce the said resolution, do hereby declare and proclaim that the United States of America have instituted, and will maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessel approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same, without notice or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly warned by the Commander of the blockading forces, who will endorse on her register

the fact, and the date, of such warning, where such endorsement was made ; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable.

Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establishment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this 22d day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the Independence of the United States, [SEAL] the one hundred and twenty-second.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President :

JOHN SHERMAN, *Secretary of State.*

FIRST CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the twentieth day of April, 1898, entitled "Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect," and

Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled "An Act to provide for temporarily Increasing the Military Establishment of the United States in time of war and for other purposes," approved April 22, 1898; the President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to serve in the Army of the United States :

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the purpose of the said Resolution; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities through the War Department.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-third day of April,
A. D. 1898, and of the Independence of the United
[SEAL] States the one hundred and twenty-second.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President :

JOHN SHERMAN, *Secretary of State.*

PRIVATEERING, ETC.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, by an Act of Congress approved April 25, 1898, it is declared that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, A. D. 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain; and

Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice, it has already been announced that the policy of this Government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris;

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, do hereby declare and proclaim:

1. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag.

3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective.

4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places within the United States, shall be allowed till May 21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes and departing from such ports or places; and such Spanish merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were taken on board before the expiration of the above term; Provided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be necessary for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or contraband of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish Government.

5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterward forthwith to depart without molestation ; and any such vessel, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded.

6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, on the twenty-sixth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President :

ALVEY A. ADEE, *Acting Secretary of State.*

SECOND CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, an Act of Congress was approved on the twenty-fifth day of April, 1898, entitled "An Act Declaring that war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain," and

Whereas, by an Act of Congress entitled "An Act to provide for temporarily increasing the Military Establishment of the United States in time of war and for other purposes," approved April 22, 1898; the President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to serve in the Army of the United States:

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate number of 75,000 in addition to the volunteers called forth by my proclamation of the twenty-third of April, in the present year; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The proportion of each arm and the details of enlistment and organization will be made known through the War Department.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred [SEAL] and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President:

WILLIAM R. DAY, *Secretary of State.*

EXTENDING BLOCKADE.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, for the reasons set forth in my Proclamation of April 22, 1898, a blockade of the ports on the northern coast of Cuba, from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, inclusive, and of the port of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, was declared to have been instituted; and

Whereas, it has become desirable to extend the blockade to other Spanish ports:

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, do hereby declare and proclaim that, in addition to the blockade of the ports specified in my Proclamation of April 22, 1898, the United States of America has instituted and will maintain an effective blockade of all the ports on the south coast of Cuba, from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and also of the port of San Juan, in the island of Porto Rico.

Neutral vessels lying in any of the ports to which the blockade is by the present Proclamation extended, will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom, with cargo.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-seventh day of June, A. D. 1898, and of the Independence of the [SEAL] United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President:

J. B. MOORE, *Acting Secretary of State.*

RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS.

Joint Resolution To provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

WHEREAS, the Government of the Republic of Hawaii having, in due form, signified its consent, in the manner provided by its constitution, to cede absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, and also to cede and transfer to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be, and they are hereby, annexed as a part of the territory of the United States and are subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and that all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned are vested in the United States of America.

The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands; but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition:

Provided, That all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.

Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands all the civil, judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct; and the President shall have power to remove said officers and fill the vacancies so occasioned.

The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded, between the United States and such foreign nations. The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.

Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain unchanged.

The public debt of the Republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at the date of the passage of this joint resolution, including the amounts due to depositors in the Hawaiian Postal Saving Bank, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States; but the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case exceed four million dollars. So long, however, as the existing Government and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued as hereinbefore provided said Government shall continue to pay the interest on said debt.

There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.

The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem necessary or proper.

SEC. 2. That the commissioners hereinbefore provided for shall

be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

SEC. 3. That the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and to be immediately available, to be expended at the discretion of the President of the United States of America, for the purpose of carrying this joint resolution into effect.

Approved, July 7, 1898.

[TRANSLATION.]

DON ALFONSO XIII

BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN,
AND IN HIS NAME DURING HIS MINORITY,

DONA MARIA CRISTINA,

QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM.

WHEREAS it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington a protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me to empower for that purpose a person possessing the requisite qualifications ; Therefore, I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the French Republic in the United States of America, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you to proceed, invested with the character of my plenipotentiary to negotiate and sign with the plenipotentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United States of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid protocol. And I declare, from the present moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate, and sign in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid, and I will observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and executed as if it had been done by myself, for which I give you my whole full powers in the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have caused these presents to be issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed and countersigned by the undersigned, my minister of state. Given in the palace at Madrid, August 11, 1898.

[L. s.] MARIA CRISTINA.

JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO,

Minister of State.

PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN.

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to say :

ARTICLE I.

Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

ARTICLE II.

Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrões to be selected by the United States.

ARTICLE III.

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

ARTICLE IV.

Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies ; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing

of this protocol, appoint Commissioners, and the Commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands ; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other Commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

ARTICLE V.

The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five Commissioners to treat of peace, and the Commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

ARTICLE VI.

Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by the Undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, the 12th day of August, 1898.

[SEAL]
[SEAL]

WILLIAM R. DAY.
JULES CAMBON.

SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, by a protocol concluded and signed August 12, 1898, by William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively representing for this purpose the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, the United States and Spain have formally agreed upon the terms on which negotiations for the establishment of peace between the two countries shall be undertaken ; and

Whereas, it is in said protocol agreed that upon its conclusion and signature hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and that notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces :

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, do, in accordance with the stipulations of the protocol, declare and proclaim on the part of the United States a suspension of hostilities, and do hereby command that orders be immediately given through the proper channels to the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States to abstain from all acts inconsistent with this proclamation.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this 12th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eighty hundred and [SEAL] ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President :

WILLIAM R. DAY, *Secretary of State.*

THANKSGIVING.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

A PROCLAMATION.

THE approaching November brings to mind the custom of our ancestors, hallowed by time and rooted in our most sacred traditions, of giving thanks to Almighty God for all the blessings He has vouchsafed to us during the year.

Few years in our history have afforded such cause for thanksgiving as this. We have been blessed by abundant harvests, our trade and commerce have wonderfully increased, our public credit has been improved and strengthened, all sections of our common country have been brought together and knitted into closer bonds of national purpose and unity.

The skies have been for a time darkened by the cloud of war ; but as we were compelled to take up the sword in the cause of humanity we are permitted to rejoice that the conflict has been of brief duration and the losses we have had to mourn, though grievous and important, have been so few, considering the great results accomplished, as to inspire us with gratitude and praise to the Lord of Hosts. We may laud and magnify His Holy Name that the cessation of hostilities came so soon as to spare both sides the countless sorrows and disasters that attend protracted war.

I do therefore invite all my fellow-citizens, as well those who may be at sea or sojourning in foreign lands as those at home, to set apart and observe Thursday, the twenty-fourth day of November, as a day of national thanksgiving, to come together in their several places of worship, for a service of praise and thanks to Almighty God for all the blessings of the year; for the mildness of the seasons and the fruitfulness of the soil, for the continued prosperity of the people, for the devotion and valor of our countrymen, for the glory of our victory and the hope of a righteous peace, and to pray that the Divine guidance which has brought us heretofore to safety and honor may be graciously continued in the years to come.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-eighth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President :

JOHN HAY, *Secretary of State.*

RESERVATION FOR NAVAL PURPOSES—HAWAII.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, by joint resolution "to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States," approved July 7, 1898, the cession by the government of the Republic of Hawaii to the United States of America, of all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, and the transfer to the United States of the absolute fee and ownership of all public, Government or Crown lands, public buildings, or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the government of the Hawaiian Islands, was duly accepted, ratified and confirmed, and the said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies annexed as a part of the territory of the United States and made subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned vested in the United States of America ; and

Whereas, it was further provided in said resolution that the existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition ; and

Whereas, it is deemed necessary in the public interests that certain lots and plats of land in the City of Honolulu be immediately reserved for naval purposes :

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the authority in me vested, do hereby declare, proclaim and make known that the following-described lots or plats of land be and the same are hereby reserved for naval pur-

poses until such time as the Congress of the United States shall otherwise direct, to wit :

1st. The water front lying between the Bishop Estate and the line of Richard Street including the site of prospective wharves, slips, and their approaches.

2nd. The blocks of land embracing lots No. 86 to 91, 100 to 131, including Mililani Street to the intersection of Halekualani Street ; and the Government water lots lying between the Bishop Estate and Punchbowl and Allen Streets.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this second day of November, in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-
[SEAL] eight, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President :

JOHN HAY, *Secretary of State.*

MESSAGE
FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS ON DECEMBER 10, 1898.

To the Senate of the United States :

I transmit herewith, with a view to its ratification, a treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at the city of Paris on December 10, 1898; together with the protocols and papers indicated in the list accompanying the report of the Secretary of State.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, January 4, 1899.*

To the President :

The undersigned, Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its submission to the Senate if deemed proper, a treaty of peace concluded at Paris on December 10, 1898, between the United States and Spain.

Accompanying the treaty are the protocols of the conferences of the Peace Commission at Paris, together with copies of statements made before the United States Commissioners, and other papers indicated in the inclosed list.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN HAY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Washington, January 3, 1899.*

TREATY OF PEACE
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN.

THE United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII., desiring to end the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries :

The President of the United States,

William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States ;

And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,

Don Eugenio Montero Ríos, president of the senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown ; Don José de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and associate justice of the supreme court ; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of division ;

Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles :

ARTICLE I.

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

ARTICLE II.

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.

ARTICLE III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line :

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

ARTICLE V.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers

taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.

ARTICLE VI.

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.

ARTICLE VII.

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war.

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

ARTICLE VIII.

In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to,

which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.

ARTICLE IX.

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

ARTICLE X.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

ARTICLE XI.

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear

before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

ARTICLE XII.

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:

1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out.

2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor.

3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

ARTICLE XIII.

The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

ARTICLE XIV.

Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

ARTICLE XV.

The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.

This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either Government to the other.

ARTICLE XVI.

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

ARTICLE XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratification shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.

[SEAL] WILLIAM R. DAY.

[SEAL] CUSHMAN K. DAVIS.

[SEAL] WILLIAM P. FRYE.

[SEAL] GEO. GRAY.

[SEAL] WHITELAW REID.

[SEAL] EUGENIO MONTERO RÍOS.

[SEAL] B. DE ABARZUA.

[SEAL] J. DE GARNICA.

[SEAL] W. R. DE VILLA URRUTIA.

[SEAL] RAFAEL CERERO.



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- 1898.
- JAN. 23. U. S. Fleet assembled at Key West.
- “ 24. The battleship *Maine* ordered to Havana.
- “ 25. The battleship *Maine* arrived at Havana.
- “ 26. Spain ordered the battleship *Vizcaya* to visit America.
- “ 29. Spain ordered a squadron to sail for Havana.
- FEB. 8. Translation of a letter written by the Spanish minister at Washington, speaking disparagingly of President McKinley, published by the Cuban Junta in New York.
- “ 9. The Spanish Minister at Washington recalled.
- “ 14. Spain appointed Señor Louis Polo de Bernabe to succeed Señor Dupuy de Lôme as Minister at Washington.
- “ 15. At 9 : 40 P. M., while moored to the buoy assigned her by the Government pilot in the harbor of Havana, the battleship *Maine* was destroyed by an explosion.
- “ 17. A Court of Inquiry on the *Maine* disaster appointed. The Spanish Government disavowed the reflections on President McKinley by its late Minister at Washington, Señor Dupuy de Lôme.
- “ 18. The Spanish cruiser *Vizcaya* reached New York. The remains of 135 of the crew of the *Maine* were given a public funeral in Havana, and buried in a local cemetery at the expense of the Spanish authorities.
- “ 19. The United States Government declined a request by Spanish officials for a joint examination of the *Maine* wreck.
- “ 20. Spanish officers made an examination of the *Maine* wreck.
- “ 21. The *Maine's* Court of Inquiry held its first session. The Senate directed its Naval Committee to investigate the *Maine* disaster ; voted \$200,000 for the investigation.
- “ 25. The *Vizcaya* left New York for Havana.
- “ 27. Premier Sagasta declared that no Spanish Government would arbitrate the Cuban trouble.
- MAR. 1. United States Senator Proctor arranged an investigating trip from Havana to the Cuban provinces.
- “ 2. The Navy Department decided to send two war ships to Cuba with supplies for the reconcentrados.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- MAR. 4. Spain began assembling a naval fleet at Cadiz for Cuba.
- " 6. Spain asked the recall of Consul-General Lee from Havana, and the substitution of merchant for war-vessels for the transport of relief supplies.
Both requests were refused.
- " 7. Spain withdrew her request for the recall of Consul-General Lee.
- " 8. In Congress, the House passed the \$50,000,000 National Defense Bill unanimously.
- " 9. Senator Proctor completed his tour of the Cuban provinces.
In Congress, the Senate adopted the \$50,000,000 National Defense Bill unanimously.
- " 11. In Congress, the House Naval Committee provided for three new battleships to cost \$5,000,000 each.
- " 13. A special Board was appointed to examine all vessels the U. S. Government might wish to buy or lease.
- " 16. Spain remonstrated to the United States against the presence of the White Squadron at Key West.
Speech of Senator Proctor in United States Senate on the condition of Cuba.
- " 17. The Navy Department divided Admiral Sicard's fleet and ordered a formidable squadron to Hampton Roads.
- " 19. The United States battleship *Oregon* left San Francisco for the Atlantic Station.
In Congress, the House adopted a bill to admit war supplies free.
- " 21. The Court of Inquiry on the *Maine* disaster completed its investigation and reported its inability to fix the responsibility.
- " 23. The Navy Department increased the fleet at Key West.
- " 25. The light-house tender *Mangrove* was ordered to Havana to convey to Key West all American officials excepting Consul-General Lee.
A flying squadron was organized at Hampton Roads.
- " 26. President McKinley announced his intention to ask Congress to appropriate \$500,000 for the relief of Cuban reconcentrados.
- " 29. American ultimatum on Cuban situation presented to Spain.
- APRIL 1. Spain replied to American ultimatum in unsatisfactory terms.
Spanish torpedo flotilla arrived at Cape Verde Islands.
- " 5. Consul-General Lee directed to return home.
- " 7. Representatives of the Powers at Washington presented a joint expression of a hope for peace, to the President.
- " 8. Premier Sagasta announced a termination of negotiations.
- " 11. President McKinley sent message on Cuba to Congress.

- APRIL 12. In Congress, the Foreign Committees of the two Houses practically agreed to authorize the President to intervene in Cuba, and favored a recognition of independence.
- “ 13. Spanish Cabinet declared the United States policy incompatible with Spanish sovereignty and voted a large war credit.
- “ 14. The Spanish Minister at Washington arranged to turn the Legation over to the French Ambassador.
- “ 15. The Navy Department chartered the steamships *St. Paul*, *St. Louis*, *City of Paris* and *City of New York*.
The British Government notified its officials at Jamaica that coal would be contraband of war.
- “ 16. In Congress, the Senate adopted the intervention resolution.
- “ 19. A conference committee's report on the Senate resolution for intervention, with the recognition clause stricken out, was adopted by each House of Congress.
- “ 20. President McKinley signed the intervention resolution and sent an ultimatum to Spain.
Spanish Minister at Washington demanded his passports.
- “ 21. The Spanish Government sent the United States Minister at Madrid his passports before he delivered the ultimatum.
Sampson's fleet at Key West ordered to blockade Havana.
- “ 22. President McKinley proclaimed a blockade of Havana and other Cuban ports, and the United States cruiser *Nashville* captured the first prize of war off Key West.
The United States squadron at Hong Kong, under Commodore Geo. Dewey, sailed for Manila, Philippine Islands.
- “ 23. President McKinley issued a call for 125,000 volunteers.
In Congress, the Army Reorganization Bill was adopted and a War Revenue Bill introduced, both in the House.
- “ 25. President McKinley recommended to Congress the recognition of a state of war with Spain, and a resolution declaring that war had existed since April 21, was adopted in both Houses.
John Sherman, Secretary of State, resigned and Wm. R. Day, Assistant Secretary, was appointed his successor.
- “ 27. The United States warships, *New York*, *Puritan* and *Cincinnati* shelled the batteries of Matanzas, Cuba.
- “ 29. Portugal issued a neutrality proclamation, thus forcing the Spanish squadron, under Admiral Cervera, to leave the Cape Verde Islands.
The Senate adopted conference report on Naval Appropriation Bill.
The House passed the War Revenue Bill.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- MAY 1. Commodore Dewey's squadron of six warships destroyed Spanish fleet of eleven vessels, without the loss of a ship or a man.
- " 2. In Congress, both Houses voted a war emergency appropriation of \$34,625,725.
- " 4. Admiral Sampson's fleet sailed from Key West.
- " 7. President McKinley appointed Commodore Dewey, Acting Rear-Admiral.
- " 9. Congress adopted resolutions of thanks to Admiral Dewey.
- " 11. Three United States vessels engaged the batteries at Cardenas, Cuba, and Ensign Bagley was killed. General Merritt appointed Military Governor of the Philippines.
- " 12. Admiral Sampson bombarded the fortifications of San Juan.
- " 14. The cable at Cienfuegos, Cuba, was cut by Americans.
- " 15. The Atlantic Coast Patrol Squadron went on duty. All members of the Spanish Cabinet resigned.
- " 17. In Congress, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported favorably on the annexation of Hawaii.
- " 18. Señor Sagasta formed a new Cabinet.
- " 19. Admiral Cervera's fleet reached Santiago.
- " 23. The first United States troops for the Philippines embarked.
- " 24. It was reported that the combined squadrons of Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley had securely trapped Admiral Cervera's fleet in Santiago Harbor.
- " 25. Three more transports left San Francisco for Manila. United States Government decided to seize Porto Rico. The battleship *Oregon* reached Jupiter Inlet, Fla.
- " 27. Amendments were offered to the War Revenue Bill in the Senate, providing for the annexation of Hawaii.
- " 28. General Shafter was ordered to move the army at Tampa.
- " 31. Fortifications at the entrance of Santiago Harbor bombarded.
- JUNE 2. In Congress, the House passed an Urgent Deficiency Bill.
- " 3. Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson sank the collier *Merrimac* across the entrance of Santiago Harbor.
- " 4. The Senate adopted the War Revenue Bill. Captain Charles V. Gridley, U. S. N., commander of Admiral Dewey's flagship, died in Kobe, Japan, aged 53 years.
- " 7. Fortifications at Caimanera bombarded by United States ships.
- " 9. Admiral Sampson seized Guantanamo Bay.
- " 10. A force of 600 United States Marines was landed at Caimanera. In Congress, the Senate adopted the conference report on the War Revenue Bill.

- JUNE 12. The United States Marines holding Caimanera were engaged for thirteen hours by Spanish regulars and guerrillas.
- “ 13. President McKinley signed the War Revenue Bill.
- “ 14. The Fourth Army Corps, under Major-General John J. Cop-pinger, was selected to occupy Porto Rico.
- “ 15. Captain-General Blanco received authority to treat for the exchange of Naval Constructor Hobson and his comrades. The House adopted the resolution for the annexation of Hawaii.
- “ 22. General Shafter's army began landing at Baiquiri.
- “ 24. Americans marching towards Santiago attacked by Spaniards. Rough Riders had a severe engagement at La Quasina.
- “ 27. It was decided to send a squadron under Commodore John C. Watson to attack Spanish coast cities.
- “ 29. Flying squadron merged into Admiral Sampson's fleet off Santiago.
- “ 30. Admiral Camara was requested by the Egyptian Government to withdraw from Port Said as soon as possible. The first expedition to Manila arrived at Cavité.
- JULY 1. El Caney and San Juan Hill captured by United States troops. The War Revenue Bill went into effect.
- “ 2. The army and navy resumed the attack on Santiago.
- “ 3. On orders from Spain, Cervera attempted to escape from Santiago Harbor. Fleet totally destroyed by Americans. General Shafter demanded the surrender of Santiago before July 5.
- “ 5. Admiral Camara's squadron entered Suez Canal. The threatened bombardment of Santiago was delayed.
- “ 6. Naval Constructor Hobson and his comrades were exchanged. The Senate adopted the Hawaiian Annexation Resolutions.
- “ 7. President McKinley signed the resolutions for the annexation of Hawaii. Cruiser *Philadelphia* ordered to Honolulu.
- “ 8. Admiral Camara ordered to return to Spain immediately. General Shafter informed General Toral that the attack on Santiago would be renewed if the city was not sur-rendered by noon, July 9. Congress adjourned till December 5.
- “ 9. General Toral offered to surrender Santiago on condition that his army be allowed to retreat, but General Shafter refused.
- “ 10. General Toral declined to surrender and was notified that bom-bardment by the army and navy would be opened at four P. M. A further delay however occurred.
- “ 11. General Miles landed in Cuba with additional reinforcements. All members of the Spanish Ministry resigned.

- JULY 12. General Toral was given until noon of the 14th to surrender.
- “ 14. General Toral agreed to surrender.
Popular subscriptions to the war-loan exceeded \$1,300,000,000.
- “ 17. General Toral formally surrendered to General Shafter.
- “ 18. President McKinley proclaimed temporary government for Santiago.
Advance force of the United States expedition to Porto Rico sailed.
- “ 20. General Leonard Wood appointed Military Governor of Santiago.
- “ 25. General Miles landed the Porto Rico expedition at Guanica.
- “ 26. General Merritt, the United States Governor of the Philippines, arrived at Manila with the second military expedition.
- “ 28. Orders were issued to General Shafter to send his army to the United States as soon as possible, because of the fever.
City and port of Ponce surrendered to General Miles.
- “ 30. President McKinley and Ambassador Cambon reached an agreement on a basis for peace. President demanded surrender of sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico; cession of one of the Ladrone Islands, and possession of Manila, pending disposition of the Philippines by a joint commission.
- AUG. 1. Camp Alger was ordered abandoned.
- “ 2. President McKinley made public the terms of peace.
- “ 3. Spain accepted the United States terms of peace.
Troops at Camp Alger transferred to Manassas.
- “ 5. Guayama, Porto Rico, captured by United States troops.
- “ 6. The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, Admiral Cervera's flagship, raised.
- “ 9. Spaniards made a night attack on United States troops at Malaté.
- “ 10. Peace protocol was agreed upon by Judge Day, Secretary of State, and Ambassador Cambon of France, in behalf of Spain.
A new tariff for Cuba was promulgated by the War Department.
- “ 11. The Spanish Cabinet approved the peace protocol.
- “ 12. Peace protocol signed in Washington. President immediately proclaimed an armistice, ordered cessation of hostilities and raised the blockade of Cuba, Porto Rico and Manila.
- “ 13. Ignorant of the armistice, the United States troops captured Manila.
- “ 17. The War Department promulgated a tariff for the Philippines.

- AUG. 18. The United States troops occupied all former Spanish positions at Manila.
- “ 20. New York gave a grand reception to Admiral Sampson's fleet. First mail to Spain since war opened, sent from New York.
- “ 23. Surgeon-General Sternberg recommended that all sick troops in Cuba and Porto Rico be sent north immediately. The Navy Department opened bids for the construction of twenty-eight torpedo boats and destroyers.
- “ 24. Severe fighting between Spaniards and insurgents in the Visaya Islands was reported.
- “ 25. Red Cross steamer *Comal* sailed from Tampa with 1,000,000 rations for the destitute in Havana.
- “ 26. The United States Peace Commission was completed as follows:—Wm. R. Day (President), Cushman K. Davis, Wm. P. Frye, Edw. D. White and Whitelaw Reid.
- SEPT. 3. President McKinley inspected Camp Wikoff at Montauk Point.
- “ 5. The Spanish Cortes re-assembled.
- “ 9. Associate Justice White declined appointment to the Peace Commission and Senator George Gray was selected. The United States and Spanish Military Commissions for Porto Rico held their first joint session in San Juan.
- “ 12. The United States and Spanish Military Commissions for Cuba held their first joint session in Havana.
- “ 13. The Spanish Cortes ratified the peace protocol.
- “ 16. Spain appointed the following Peace Commission:—Montero Rios (President), W. R. de Villa Urrutia, Buenaventura de Abarzuza, General R. Cerero and José de Garnica. Judge Day resigned the office of Secretary of State.
- “ 18. Admiral Montojo suspended by Spanish Council of War.
- “ 19. Spain recalls her troops remaining in the West Indies.
- “ 24. President McKinley demanded that Spaniards begin evacuation of Cuba by October 15, and complete it by December 31.
- OCT. 1. The Peace Commissioners held their first joint session.
- “ 3. Admiral Dewey was instructed to send two warships to China.
- “ 6. Rear-Admiral Howell was succeeded in the command of the North Atlantic Squadron by Commodore Philip.
- “ 7. President McKinley decided that Porto Rico must be evacuated October 18, and Cuba by December 1.
- “ 8. The Navy Department reported that during the war only seventeen sailors were killed and sixty-seven wounded. Two sessions of the Peace Commissioners were held separately. Spain insisted on the assumption of the Cuban debt by the United States.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

- OCT. 11. A Naval Board of Inquiry decided that the battle of Santiago was fought on plans originating with Rear-Admiral Sampson.
- “ 16. Captain-General Macias of Porto Rico sailed for Spain.
- “ 18. Spanish evacuation of Porto Rico was officially completed.
- “ 24. The limit for evacuation of Cuba extended to January 1, 1899.
- “ 25. Nine warships took part in the Peace Jubilee at Philadelphia.
- “ 26. Admiral Dewey released the Spanish sailors captured at Manila.
- “ 27. The Spanish Peace Commissioners accepted declaration of United States Commissioners on question of Cuban debt. Philadelphia celebrates Peace Jubilee with military parade.
- “ 31. United States Commissioners demanded whole of Philippines.
- NOV. 1. The *Infanta Maria Teresa* foundered off the Bahamas.
- “ 3. A United States Naval Reservation at Honolulu was established.
- “ 5. Secretary of State Hay made public the protocol of peace.
- “ 12. The Washington Cabinet instructed the United States Peace Commissioners that the right to consider the disposition of the Philippines would not be debated further.
- “ 13. In reply to a request for further time, the United States Government notified Spain that Cuba must be evacuated by Jan. 1.
- “ 16. At the joint meeting of the Peace Commission the Spaniards asked that the Philippine clause be submitted to arbitration.
The Navy Department abandoned the *Infanta Maria Teresa*.
- “ 18. Contracts were signed for the raising and refitting of three Spanish warships, sunk in the battle of Manila, for \$500,000.
- “ 20. Commercial bodies in Spain urged a speedy conclusion of peace.
- “ 21. The United States Peace Commissioners delivered an ultimatum rejecting the proposal for arbitration, offering \$20,000,000 for the Philippines, and insisting on resignation of all claims arising since the beginning of the Cuban insurrection.
- “ 23. The Hawaiian Commission held its first meeting in Washington.
- “ 24. British officials at Manila celebrate American Thanksgiving.
- “ 26. Marshal Blanco resigned the office of Captain-General of Cuba.
- “ 28. Spanish Peace Commissioners accepted United States ultimatum.
- DEC. 1. Filipino Independents declared that they would fight for independence before they would accept the bartering of the islands.
- “ 2. The Spanish Supreme Court at Santiago de Cuba was reorganized and installed as a United States judicial authority.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

607

- DEC. 3. John McCullagh, ex-Superintendent of Police of New York, was commissioned to reorganize the police force of Havana.
- " 6. The chief differences in the Peace Commission adjusted ; treaty to be signed in a few days.
- " 7. Hawaiian Commissioners' report sent to Congress.
- " 9. Assistant Secretary Vanderlip reported that the customs collections in Porto Rico aggregated more than \$100,000 since American occupation.
- " 10. Treaty of Peace signed by the Peace Commissioners in Paris.
- " 11. Major-General Lee left Savannah on the transport *Panama* for Havana.
Red Cross steamer *Comal* sailed for Havana with 1,250,000 rations for starving Cubans.
General Calixto Garcia, Cuban patriot, died in Washington.
General John R. Brooke appointed Military Governor of Cuba.
- " 12. General Wm. Ludlow appointed Military Governor of the city of Havana.
- " 13. *Brooklyn, Texas, Castine* and *Resolute* ordered to Havana.
- " 17. Battleships *Oregon* and *Iowa* arrived at Valparaiso, Chili, on their way to the Pacific.
- 1899.
- JAN. 1. Formal transfer by Spain to the United States of the sovereignty of Cuba.
- " 16. President appointed commission of five to study commercial and social problems of the Philippines.
- FEB. 6. Treaty of Peace ratified by the United States Senate. Yeas, 57 ; nays, 27.
- " 15. Anniversary of destruction of battleship *Maine*. Appropriate exercises held at Havana.
- " 20. Bill appropriating \$20,000,000 for payment to Spain under the provisions of the treaty of peace, passed by the House of Representatives.
- " 24. Triumphant entry into Havana of General Gomez and 500 of his troops.
- MAR. 1. Bill making Rear-Admiral Dewey an Admiral passed by the Senate.
- " 6. United States Commission to the Philippines arrived at Manila.
- " 17. Treaty of Peace signed by the Queen Regent of Spain.
- Apr. 11. Exchange of treaties of peace at Washington between Secretary of State Hay and M. Cambon, French Ambassador who acted for Spain.

094710005

2007



