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**NET MIGRATION RATE, MIGRATION STOCKS
(ORIGIN, DESTINATIONS AND GENDER) AND
GDP PER CAPITA: THE CASES OF NORWAY,
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**NET MIGRATION RATE, MIGRATION STOCKS (ORIGIN,
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RHOMIR S. YANQUILING

Overview

This paper presents a brief analysis, discussion and interpretation I formulated relative to the net migration rate, Gross Domestic Product Per Capita and migration destinations of three countries drawn from three different income categories, to wit: Norway (high-income country), the Philippines (middle-income country) and Somalia (low-income country).

The first part of this paper contains a discussion on the description, analysis and interpretation of the net migration rate, Norwegian migration origin and destinations and the Gross Domestic Products per capita (1950-2010) of Norway vis-à-vis its net migration rate. The second and third sections of the paper deal with the same pattern of discussion and presentation in the Philippines and Somalian cases respectively. Finally, the last part presents the conclusions drawn out of the data discussion, analysis and interpretation.

Highlighted in the discussion of these three countries are the discernible patterns in their net migration rates from 190-2015, the migration origin and destinations of the three subject countries and a corresponding inquiry and discussion on the rationale, motive and causes behind such origin and destinations, and the countries' GDP from 1950 to 2010 and a corresponding inquiry, discussion and interpretation into the possible correlation of the GDP into their net migration rates.

The data used in this paper are those which were provided by the United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

The Case of Norway

In my standpoint of view, Norway is a fit and apt choice to represent high-income country category for the purpose of this analysis and discussion for a good number of reasons. First, it has the 4th highest per capita income in the world. It also has the

highest Human Development Index from 2001 to 2006, and then again from 2010 to 2015. Moreover, for seven years straight, it has consistently topped the Legatum Prosperity Index. Finally, it is ranked first in the OECD Better Life Index, the Index of Public Integrity and the Democracy Index (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norway>).

(A) The Net Migration Rate of Norway (1950-2015): Analysis and Interpretation

The data in Table 1 below, which were extracted out of the MS Excel file (File MIGR/1) of the United Nations, aptly present the net migration rate of Norway from 1950-2015.

Table 1 Net Migration Rate of Norway (1950-2015)

Selected Country	Net Migration Rate (1950-2015)												
	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Norway	-0.2	-0.5	-0.1	0.7	1.5	1.0	1.2	1.8	2.2	2.7	3.0	7.3	9.3

It can be deduced from Table 1 that Norway has a negative net migration rate from 1950 to 1965. From a net migration rate of -0.2 in 1950-1955, it increased to -0.5 after five years (1955-1960). The figure again drops to -0.1 from 1960-1965.

Apparently, such negative migration rate occurred within the next two decades after the Second World War. The figures suggest that within the next ten (10) to fifteen (15) years after the war, there are more people who are leaving Norway than entering it. This can be explained by the fact that difficult times took place in Norway immediately after the war. We can assume that by the end of the war, German occupation had reduced Norway's economic capacity substantially. Moreover, we can only imagine the physical and

patrimonial toll of the war itself. Such difficulty caused some Norwegians to rethink their economic and material conditions and find a better place for themselves under the sun, much better than they were presently situated then. It is also interesting to mention here that history repeats itself in these post-war years phenomenon. Particularly in the 19th century, when economic conditions were difficult in Norway, tens of thousands of people migrated to the United States and Canada, where they could work and buy land in frontier areas.

From 1965 to 2015, Norway ceased to be a sending country. At this point in time, it has become a receiving country. Norway registered a positive net migration rate, starting with 0.7 in 1965-1970 to 9.3 in 2015. In a span of 50 years, Norway's migration rate has increased by tenfolds. This means that there are approximately ten times more people who entered Norway than who leave the country. In fact, Norway's net immigration has increased considerably and has become the major source of population increase, far exceeding that of natural increase as shown in Figure 1 below, the data of which were drawn from Table 1. Here migration has accounted for the majority of population growth over the past twenty-five years. According to *Statistics Norway*, the immigrant population constitutes 16.3 percent of the population in Norway.




Figure 1: Net Migration Rate vs Natural Increase of Population of Norway

There are several explanations behind this increase in the net migration rate of Norway starting from 1965 to the present.

The first reason is economic in nature. It has something to do with the country's impressive economic growth and development. This can be deduced from the country's performance in terms of the Gross Domestic Product per capita from 196-2015. Norway's economic conditions has started to become better from the 1960s until it reached its current strong economic prosperity which is considered to be among the best, if not the best among the OECD countries. Factors such as economic prosperity, better material welfare, high standard of living, high human development index make Norway a very attractive destinations to migrants from the different parts of the world. The wage differential component of the Neo-Classical Microeconomic theory of migration explains that such income differences between Norway and other countries have the expected impact, as do differences in income distributions. The labour market situation in Norway has also been important. Lower unemployment in Norway has resulted in higher immigration.

The second reason is policy matter in character. From 1965, Norway had a fairly liberal set of regulations on immigration. The important changes following from the Norwegian entry into the EEA agreement in 1994 is particularly important, as is the Norwegian membership in the Schengen agreement and the impact of the subsequent increased membership in the EU. From 2000 to 2010 several changes linked to the EU influenced immigration to Norway. Norway's membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) from 1994 resulted in simpler immigration procedures for citizens of non-Nordic EU member countries. The Schengen agreement of 2001 did result in higher immigration, and the 2004 enlargement of EU did increase labour immigration to Norway substantially, later also family related immigration (<http://ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/effects-of-immigration-policies-on-immigration-to-norway-1969-2010>).

It should be noted here however, that from a positive net migration rate of 1.5 in 1970-1975, the figure dropped to 1.0 in 1975-1980. This can be attributed to the passing of a restrictive immigration policy of Norway in the 1970s particularly in 1971 and 1977. In 1971, an immigration regulation was introduced which requires the immigrant had to have obtained a job and a place to live before receiving a residence permit. As a temporary measure in 1974 and permanently from 1975 an "immigration halt" was introduced. The more restrictive policies that were introduced in the 1970s did reduce immigration to Norway from 1970-1975 to 1975-1980. According to Wanner (2012), the immigration policy which defines how open a country is for immigration is particularly important in the coming decades considering Europe's current demographic development

(<http://ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/effects-of-immigration-policies-on-immigration-to-norway-1969-2010>).

The liberalisation that implicitly was implemented with Norway joining the European Economic Area in 1994 may be an important consideration or factor to a consistently increasing net migration rate. Norwegian membership of the Schengen-area increased European immigration. When the EU was enlarged in both 2004 and 2007 these events led to significantly higher immigration. Apparently, this justification affirms the proposition of the World System Theory of Migration, which according to Massey (1993), sees migration as a natural consequence of economic globalisation and markets transcending national borders.

B. Migrant and Refugee Stock By Origin and Destination

B.1. Migrant Stock by Country of Origin

It can be gleaned from Table 2 below that immigration in Norway in 2013 can be described as more of an *interregional migration* since the top five countries which immigrate to Norway are within the Schengen area, namely Poland, Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Lithuania. Notably, the migrant stock of Norway in terms of country of origin has not changed much since 1990 and through 2000.

It is interesting to note that the majority of these sending countries to Norway are likewise receiving countries. Considering that they have similar business cycles, economic structure and relative and comparable GDP per capita standing, one can safely assume that the inflow and outflow of both labour and capital among them is equal.

Table 2

Migrant stock by origin (2013)

Top 5 countries or areas of origin	Total
Poland	76 184
Sweden	53 082
Germany	30 819
Denmark	26 235
Lithuania	25 623
Total	211 943

This interregional migration is but expected for a number of reasons. First, these countries are situated within the Eurozone. Considering the geographical proximity of these countries with each other, the inflows and outflows of people is a normal migration behavioral pattern. Figure 2 below showing the Eurozone map shows how geographical proximity can be a factor to facilitate migration.



Figure 2. Map of Europe

Secondly, the free mobility of people, goods, services, ideas and investment within the European Union, of which all the five sending countries are a member of, all the more facilitate migration as a natural consequence and economic incidence of the union. This liberalization in the movement of labour makes migration an almost natural or normal occurrence within Europe.

This phenomenon further bolsters affirmation of the basic premise of the World System theory that migration is a structural consequence of an expanding global political economy. According to Wanner (2002) there are four explanatory factors for migration in Europe: (1) historical bonds, which have formed during e.g. the colonial era or for East Europe as political alliances, (2) geographic proximity, which is especially important in the Mediterranean countries and in Scandinavia, (3) a common language, and (4) immigration policy, which defines how open the country is for immigration.

If one looks into the first explanatory factor, one could easily see the historical, economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural connections for instance between and among Norway, Denmark and Sweden. If you look at these Nordic or Scandinavian countries, they are like brothers. Like brothers they get along well and have similarities but are their own individuals too. Norway and Denmark were traditionally the most closely aligned with each other. This is less noticeable for each passing decade, though. Norway and Denmark were allied (with Norway basically a Danish province) from the late Middle Ages until 1814, and the twin countries were at war with Sweden off and on for centuries. The relationship between Danes and Norwegians is mostly cordial, and the two countries have traditionally shared an envy for big brother Sweden. Lately however this pattern is fading. Norway has become the richest country, so the envy is shifting. On the other hand, trade between Norway and Sweden is booming due to the long shared border and

Norwegian demand for workers, goods and services provided by the handily neighboring Sweden. (<https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-relationships-like-between-Norway-Denmark-Sweden-and-Finland-Is-any-one-relationship-better-or-stronger-among-these>).

As regards Denmark, Norway and Sweden, there exists what we call intranordic migration. This phenomenon plays an important role in maintaining the coherence of the Nordic Region, and despite increased migration from and to countries beyond the Nordic Region, intra-Nordic migration remains a significant part of the overall migration flows.

In the case of Poland, Germany and Lithuania, their common denominators are their cultural similarities, geographical proximity as well as the existence of common belongingness in the European Union.

It is interesting to note that the Poles are the dominant immigrant minority in Norway. Their great number started to flock to Norway during the 1980 where Poles were welcomed as political refugees. Later such migration evolved into more of a labour character. As research has shown, Polish post-accession migration to Norway has been related to restructuring of labour intensive sector such as construction, and increasing informalisation and casualisation of labour relations that have traditionally been strongly regulated in Norway. A strict separation between standard and atypical forms of employment is characteristic for Norwegian labour market. Polish workers find employment mainly in two niche sectors – constructing and cleaning. These Polish workers which came to Norway in great numbers performed the migrants work, so to say. The dual labor market or segmented market theory explains this phenomenon as a natural incidence of the structure of the labor market of a developed country such as Norway, which is inevitably segmented into two---the primary sector (capital intensive, high-skilled labour) and secondary sector (labour-intensive, low-skilled labour). The need for low-

skilled workers in industries of a developed country calls for additional manpower from other countries. These migrant jobs which offer less opportunity for social mobility are shunned by the local population. Hence, these job vacancies are usually filled up by migrants not only from Poland but also from other countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Vietnam.

B.2. Migrant Stock by Destination

As shown in Table 3 below, Norwegians' top destinations include two (2) countries in the Nordic/Scandinavian region namely Sweden and Denmark; two (2) countries in Europe (United Kingdom with Northern Ireland and Spain) and another country from the North American continent (the United States of America). What could be the reasons behind these migration decisions? Apparently, the Norwegians' immigration to Sweden and Denmark is just a normal occurrence of the "intranordic migration" as previously explained in this paper. The prior and current historical, cultural, political, economic and military cooperation between these three countries as well as their geographical proximity make the movement of people an almost natural thing for them.

Table 3

Migrant stock by destination (2013)

Top 5 countries or areas of destination	Total
Sweden	43 752
United States of America	30 672
Denmark	19 767
Spain	19 099
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	17 059
Total	130 340

The Cultural Theory of migration conveniently explains these patterns of intra-migration between and among Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden and Denmark as a consequence of their cultural proximity. Cultural proximity is supposed to reduce the distance between foreigners and natives (Vourc'h et al., 1999). There is moreover a widespread assumption that the more distant the culture of the migrant is from the culture of the host country the more problems there will be (Wrench, 1999).

In the case of the migration to the United States, United Kingdom/Northern Ireland, and Spain the reason behind the Norwegians' migration may not be necessarily an economic necessity. It does not seem reasonable to assume that the emigration from Norway to these countries is one of economic necessity. For one thing, wealth in Norway is more evenly distributed than most countries and the social conditions on the whole are comparatively satisfactory. In this context, it can be assumed that when a Norwegian emigrates, it is not because his country has no use for him, or because it denies him food but because he finds it difficult at home to realize his desire and get into the strong upward current in society. And perhaps, a change of place of work, and a desire to search for one's destiny may as well be the driving force behind it.

As regards the outmigration of Norwegians to the United States of America, it is well to note that Norwegians have been immigrating to the United States even during the early 17th and 18th centuries. According to scholar Elazar, "It was the Norwegian diaspora in the United States which initiated the separation of Norway from Sweden, which led to Norwegian independence in 1905." The Norwegian-American community overwhelmingly favored independence of Norway from Sweden, and collecting money for Norwegian rifle clubs in case the conflict should become violent. Hence, this historical connection as well as the already existing Norwegian migrant

communities in the US may as well serve a good explanation why Norwegians tend to favour the USA as among its top migration destination.

B.3. Refugee Population by Country of Origin

Norway is home to some refugees, notably from Somalia, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iraq. Of these four countries, Somalia appeared to have the greatest number with 8, 870 as shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4

Refugee population by origin (end 2012)

Top 5 countries or areas of origin	Total
Somalia	8 870
Eritrea	7 129
Afghanistan	5 984
Iraq	5 727
Total	27 710

All these refugee sending countries have one thing in common: their countries are ravaged either by civil war or political instability. The push-and-pull factor theory explains that war and persecutions (political or religious) can act as push factor for people in the ravaged areas to immigrate for their safety. These refugees from Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq were commonly the internally displaced persons (known as IDP in migration parlance) who are seeking refuge to other countries for their safety and their family.

Of these, Somalia is of particular interest. Somalia is an African country which has faced lawlessness and strife during its long-decade civil war. New migrants are making their way to places like Europe and one of the hot

destination hubs of Somali refugees is Norway. The EU, Norway and Switzerland are home to 14% of the world's Somali migrant population. Since 2008, these countries have received nearly 140,000 asylum applications from Somalis, according to the EU's statistical agency Eurostat. The annual flow of Somali asylum seekers has held relatively steady since this benchmark year, but their destination countries within Europe have changed.

C. Migrant Stock in Terms of Gender

Table 5 below shows the migration stock of Norway in terms of gender. As shown in the table, it is apparent that there are more male migrants than female migrants in both 1990 and 2013.

Table 5 Migrant Stock of Norway by Gender and Age

	1990			2000			2013		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
0-4	2 799	2 541	5 340	3 502	3 478	6 980	6 474	6 525	12 999
5-9	4 857	4 694	9 551	6 556	6 402	12 958	13 027	12 911	25 938
10-14	4 659	4 770	9 429	8 101	7 792	15 893	15 134	14 628	29 762
15-19	5 407	5 431	10 838	9 291	9 450	18 741	18 091	17 378	35 469
20-24	9 675	8 880	18 555	11 936	13 072	25 008	27 539	27 488	55 027
25-29	14 394	12 056	26 450	15 831	17 405	33 236	43 804	44 332	88 136
30-34	13 657	11 188	24 845	18 650	18 648	37 298	47 761	45 487	93 248
35-39	11 318	9 126	20 444	18 797	17 407	36 204	43 429	39 191	82 620
40-44	10 007	8 015	18 022	15 300	13 855	29 155	38 970	33 350	72 320
45-49	7 731	6 556	14 287	11 869	10 690	22 559	33 602	27 631	61 233
50-54	4 503	4 338	8 841	9 401	8 436	17 837	24 991	20 558	45 549
55-59	3 239	3 550	6 789	7 282	6 921	14 203	17 080	14 460	31 540
60-64	2 694	3 650	6 344	4 008	4 807	8 815	11 037	10 922	21 959
65+	5 715	9 764	15 479	7 742	12 008	19 750	17 792	20 916	38 708
Total	100 655	94 559	195 214	148 266	150 371	298 637	358 731	335 777	694 508

However, while male migrants are a bit greater in number, the difference is almost minimal. Women migrants are greater in number than male migrants in 2000. The number seems to vacillate through the years, but women are catching with men in terms of employment opportunities in Norway as a result of feminization of workforce in industries and different sectors of the economy.

D. GDP Per Capita vis-à-vis Net Migration Rate of Norway

The GDP per capita of Norway from 1950-2010 shows an upward trend as shown in Figure 3 below (likewise shown tabular form in Appendix A):




Figure 3 GDP Per Capita of Norway

Similarly, the net migration rate of Norway likewise shows an upward and constantly increasing trend since the 1960s.

It can be commented that there appears a relationship between the growth of GDP per capita and the net migration rate of Norway, that is to say, an increase in GDP per capita carries with it an observable increase in its net

migration rate. The reason is that the high wage level in Norway in comparison to other countries in Europe as well as in the other parts of the world makes it as an attractive hub for human capital, both skilled and unskilled. This wage differential according to the Classical Economic Theory of Migration serves as a push or incentivizing factor for a migrant to work or stay in developed countries like Norway. The high GDP per capita of Norway facilitates immigration for sending countries towards Norway but does not necessarily affect or facilitate emigration of Norway towards other countries.

The Case of the Philippines

The Philippines is an emerging market and a developing economy. It is classified under the middle-income country category. The Philippines is an interesting subject of this analysis because apart from the fact that it is my country of origin, it has a culture of immigration and emigration. Table 7 shows the net migration of the Philippines from 190-2015. Apparently, there appears no data about the country's net migration rate from 1950 to 1960.

A. Net Migration Rate in the Philippines (1950-2015)

Table 6 below shows the net migration rate of the Philippines from 1950-2015. In the main, the Philippines can be considered more as a sending country than a receiving country. Translated in different expressions, the outflows of migrants in the Philippines are much higher than its inflows.

Table 6 Net Migration of the Philippines (1950-2015)

Selected Country	Net Migration Over Period												
	1950-1955	1955-1960	1960-1965	1965-1970	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015

Philippines	0.0	0.0	0.0	-1.6	-1.2	-1.4	-0.7	-1.0	-1.5	-2.1	-2.7	-4.1	-1.4
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It can be gleaned from Table 7 that from 1950 to 1965, the Philippines has balanced migration rate as the net migration rate registered at 0.0. This period can be considered as a period of migration equilibrium,” so to say. From 1960 to 2015, the Philippines has been consistently more of a sending country. However, it can be noted that the figures of negative net migration oscillated from 1965-1990. There appear some fluctuations in the net migration rate as evidenced by the following figures: from -1.6 (1965-1970) to -1.2 (1970-1975), to -1.4 in 1980-1985.

From 1985 to 2010, the negative net migration rate was almost quadrupled from -1.0 in 1985 to -4.0 in 2010, which means that the outflows of migrants had steadily increased four times than it was in 1985-1990. This rather erratic migration pattern or trend in the Philippines is aptly captured in this graph (See Figure 4) below:




Figure 4. Net Migration Rate of the Philippines (1955-2015)

The rise of net migration rate from 0.01 in 1960 to -1.63 can be attributed to two main explanatory factors. First, the United States of America, which served as the top destination of most Filipinos after the Second World War, struck its restrictive legislations for foreigners in the USA. During that point in time, the Filipinos constitute among the greatest minorities in the US soil. Explaining these circumstances in the context of historical-structural theory of migration, it should be mentioned here that the Philippines was a former colony of the US. Because the Philippines was a U.S. colony, the movement of Filipinos to the United States was considered internal migration and Filipino migrants were "nationals" (but not citizens). It was not until the passage of the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Law (also known as the Philippines Independence Act of 1934), which provided for the granting of Philippine independence in 10 years' time, that the Philippines became subject to immigration quotas. The 1934 law limited the Philippines to 50 visas per year, and migration dropped off dramatically (<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/philippines-culture-migration>).

But even so, there was an exception clause: in case of a labor shortage, the governor of Hawaii was authorized to hire Filipino workers. As nationals, Filipinos were entitled to American passports and could enter and leave the country freely. World War II intervened and further migration to the United States stalled. Between 1946 and the mid 1960s, about 10,000 to 12,000 Filipinos came to Hawaii as workers, military personnel, and war brides. Many more Filipinos were employed on American army bases in Vietnam, Thailand and Guam during the Indochina war. (<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/philippines-culture-migration>).

It was not until the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, when nationality-based restrictions were struck down, that Filipino immigration grew and

diversified (<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/philippines-culture-migration>).

Another reason for the increase in the aforementioned period is that Filipinos have started to look into other non-traditional destinations such as Japan and Germany. At the start of the 1970s Filipinos also migrated to Iran and Iraq to work as engineers and technicians. At this point in time, the Middle East region started to become a destination hotspot for the Filipinos.

The slight decline in the net migration rate in 1970-1975 from -1.6 in 1965-1970 to -1.2 in 1970-1975 can be attributed to oil crises in the Middle East region in 1973.

From 1980 to 2010, the net migration rate surged to an unprecedented increase which can be explained by a host of factors which are more or less premised on the push and pull factors theory of migration.

The first justification is anchored on some economic reasons. The economic growth could not keep up with population growth. High unemployment and poor living standards combined with a government policy of emigration encouraged thousands of Filipinos to seek employment overseas. The country was hard pressed to provide jobs and decent wages and had severe balance of payment problems. In 1972, former President Marcos imposed Martial Law leading to the exile of political opponents. The political, social and economic uncertainty under martial law rule of President Marcos pushed opponents and middle class Filipinos to leave the country. The absence of sustained economic development, political instability, a growing population, double-digit unemployment levels, and low wages continue to compel people to look abroad---these are push factors. The pull factors include the massive need of the Gulf region for workers to develop its burgeoning infrastructure industry. The oil-rich Gulf countries needed workers to realize their ambitious infrastructure projects. The continuing demand for

workers in the Gulf countries and the opening of new labor markets in other regions, especially in East and Southeast Asia, fueled further migration.

The second rationale has something to do with the government policies which aided and facilitated immigration. In the 1970s former President Ferdinand Marcos institutionalized a policy to encourage emigration to stimulate the economy. With supply and demand factors converging, the Philippines was ripe for large-scale labor migration, an opportunity the Marcos government recognized. The framework for what became the government's overseas employment program was established with the passage of the Labor Code of the Philippines in 1974. While these policies were aimed to be of temporary nature, labor migration has been steadily increasing since.

Interestingly however, the trend changed from 2010 to 2015 as the net migration rate was reduced from -4.1 in 1990-2010 to -1.4 in 2015, which is very notable considering the marked decline in the outflows of migrants from the country. These can be attributed to certain crises in host countries--- to date, policies such as the Nitaqat or Saudization, stricter immigration policies and criminalization and deportation of millions of undocumented Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW). A "reverse migration," so to speak has somewhat occurred in 2010 onwards. Since 2010, thousands upon thousands of OFWs in distress have been deported or forcibly repatriated back to the country due to civil unrests, calamities, economic instabilities and other similar factors in migrant-receiving countries.

These reverse migration phenomenon in the Philippines can have an adverse impact to its economy considering that the country is dependent to the foreign remittances from Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). In the Philippines, the OFWs are hailed as modern-day heroes for their significant contribution to the Philippine economy. That labor migration can have an impact to the economy of the country is supported by a number of experts.

International migration may have an impact upon the economic development of sending countries if migrant workers remit part of their earnings home to support their family. If labour outflow and consequently remittances experience great ups and downs, the economy of sending countries faces considerable adaptation, i.e., difficulties like inflation or “Dutch disease” (Knerr, 1993). The term “Dutch disease” is used when a country’s apparent good economic fortune ultimately proves to have a net detrimental effect (O’Toole, 1998). On the other hand, apart from the “Dutch disease” or “migrant syndrome” perspective, Taylor (1999) also distinguishes the “developmentalist” perspective, according to which remittances have a positive effect on economic development in sending countries.

B. Migrant Stock by Country of Origin and Destination and Gender

B.1. Migrant Stock of the Philippines by Country of Origin

It can be gleaned in Table 7 below that the country has a total of 103, 437 inflows coming mainly from Asian countries such as China, Japan, India and the Republic of Korea. The only non-Asian country that sends migrants to the Philippines is the United States of America.

Table 7

Migrant stock by origin (2013)

Top 5 countries or areas of origin	Total
China	36 171
United States of America	35 779
Japan	13 834
India	10 705
Republic of Korea	6 948
Total	103 437

Both China and the Philippines have historical and cultural connections in the past. These connections continue to provide bridge between two countries by means of the existing network of migrants of Chinese community in the Philippines. The Chinese migrants are considered the most dominant and largest migrant minority in the Philippines. In fact, most of the Filipino business and political elites can trace their bloodline to the early Chinese settlers in the Philippines during the Spanish period as well as even during the pre-Spanish era. These historical and cultural connections (World System theory and Historic-Cultural Theory of migration) as well as the existing networks of migrants (Network Migrant Theory and Social Capital Theory of Migration) stimulate and facilitate more immigration of Chinese in the Philippines.

As regards the United States of America and Japan, the immigration of these two countries to the Philippines is but expected since the Philippines has been a former US colony, and has been briefly occupied by Japan during the Second World War. The Philippines has been under the US for almost half a century (49 years to be exact). It trained the Filipinos about government and democracy, left them the legacy of public education and taught them to speak English. The influence of the Americans to the Filipinos politically, economically, culturally, linguistically and diplomatically is deep-rooted. They have a longstanding special relationship for the past more than 100 years already. The World System Theory would agree on this point of my analysis that the American hegemony to the country extends until the present time. Hence, the Americans consider the Philippines as a welcoming host and ally.

Japan occupied the Philippines for three years during the Second World War and annexed it in its military empire. After the war, Japan has been one of the closest political and economic partners of the Philippines. Japan is the top aid giver and donor through Official Development Assistance of Japan as well as Japan's JICA.

These prior historical, cultural, political and linguistic links and current diplomatic and economic partnerships, as Massey (2012) would argue make migration of the Americans and Japanese in the Philippines easier.

As regards India and Republic of Korea, the motivation behind their immigration is more of the business and educational aspects of migration. A number of Indians and Koreans come to the Philippines to engage in business and study in Philippine universities to study various courses or study English.

Apart from the foregoing reasons, China, Japan, Korea and India are geographical neighbours of the Philippines. The map below (Figure 5) shows that migration of these people to the Philippines is intra-continental or interregional in character.



Figure 5. Map of Asia

B.2. Migration Stock by Country of Destination

One can deduce in Table 8 that all of the target destinations of Filipino migrants are either developed and/or industrialized states and nations where there exists high GDP per capita. These include the United States of America, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Canada and Japan. One can deduce from this fact safely that Filipino immigrants to these countries are economic migrants who are in search for a greener pasture which may not be available in the Philippines. For instance, Filipino immigrants in USA, Japan and Canada are mostly employed in the food industry, service industry, and medical and hospitality industries. They fill up the manpower needs of these developed nations. In the case of Filipino immigrants in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, it can be commented that most of the Filipino immigrants in these countries are labor migrants who provide the labor needs in construction, medical and/or hospitality industries. More often than not, they perform the migrants' job in the segmented labour market of these high-income nations, those jobs which according to the segmented labour market theory are typically not being applied for employment by the host population for they are less prestigious, unskilled and offer no opportunities for social mobility. It can be commented that there exists unequal relations in terms of balance between labour and capital mobility between the Philippines and its top country destinations (US, Saudi Arabia and UAE) inasmuch as while the Philippines export massive cheap labour, they export capital to the Philippines in the form of foreign direct investments which according to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is in insignificant or negligible amount. This phenomenon makes labour-capital segmented (World System Theory).

It is interesting to note that of these five countries, both USA and Japan are likewise migration exchange partners of the Philippines as mentioned in

the previous discussion of this paper, owing to the prior historical, political and cultural links between these countries.

Table 8

Top 5 countries or areas of destination	Total
United States of America	1 998 932
Saudi Arabia	1 028 802
United Arab Emirates	477 139
Canada	363 805
Japan	226 179
Total	4 094 857

The great number of Filipinos in America which almost hit the 2 million mark is of special interest in this analysis. The figure represents around 4% of the total population of the Philippines. And looking into the historical data of Philippines migration in the last 50 years, the USA always topped the destination list of the Filipinos. Apart from the previous explanations supplied by the World System Theory, i.e, hegemonic power (colonial master) and the former colony relationship, there are other explanations why the great outflow of Filipino migrants in the USA. One of these rationalizations is anchored upon the social capital theory or migrant networks theory of migration. For much of the 20th century, "international migration" for Filipinos meant going to the United States and its Pacific territories. The first batch of Filipino workers arrived in the U.S. territory of Hawaii on December 20, 1906 to work on sugarcane and pineapple plantations. These acts of immigration were perpetuated and furthered until the present time. Such early establishment of Filipino migrant communities in the US provides stimulus for further migration for the relatives of the Filipino-

Americans in the Philippines. Such a network eases the integration of the new migrant to the US soil and makes it less expensive for them to get integrated by providing them the information needed to the target country. If the immigrant knows people in a new country, the search costs for accommodation and work can be lower, making it easier to build up a social network. Massey (2002) points out that the concentration of immigrants in certain destination areas creates a 'family and friends' effect that channels immigrants to the same places and facilitates their arrival and incorporation. The macro and microstructures are interconnected (Castles & Miller, 1993). These networks have a tendency to grow over time as they reduce the costs and risks for new immigrants and, at the same time, contribute to providing a market for knowledge and experience of earlier immigrants. Once immigration reaches a certain level the network itself will generate the social structure that is necessary for the migration to be self-generating (Massey et al. 1993, School 1995). Once they become self-generating, these migrant networks are difficult for governments to control as they are completely outside the control of the State. Changes in legislation therefore have little effect on migration (Massey et al. 1993).

B. 3. Migrant Stock of the Philippines in Terms of Gender

In terms of gender, it can be gleaned in Table 9, there are more male migrants than female migrants. These can be attributed to two reasons. First, in traditional family setting, the father, being the patriarch figure, is considered to be the breadwinner of the family, the provider who takes care of the provision of the family. Second, the growing feminization of industries and workplace in the country which provides more work opportunities for women than men as a consequence of inflow of foreign direct investment (World System Theory) affects the work opportunities of men, which created the

impetus for them to migrate and look for job opportunities abroad to increase their prestige and status in relation to their female counterpart and maximize their resources for the family.

Table 9

	1990			2000			2013		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
0-4	8 857	8 938	17 795	20 105	19 308	39 413	11 926	10 985	22 911
5-9	7 151	7 179	14 330	20 346	19 393	39 739	11 499	10 603	22 102
10-14	7 291	7 374	14 665	18 088	17 170	35 258	10 500	9 719	20 219
15-19	7 196	7 135	14 331	16 261	16 036	32 297	10 578	10 036	20 614
20-24	8 665	8 396	17 061	14 339	14 640	28 979	9 985	9 699	19 684
25-29	6 500	5 919	12 419	12 554	12 742	25 296	9 499	9 159	18 658
30-34	6 811	5 811	12 622	11 875	11 439	23 314	8 759	8 146	16 905
35-39	5 803	4 606	10 409	11 227	10 344	21 571	7 721	6 903	14 624
40-44	5 111	3 956	9 067	9 747	8 793	18 540	6 806	5 977	12 783
45-49	3 995	3 079	7 074	7 368	6 724	14 092	6 024	5 284	11 308
50-54	3 531	2 751	6 282	6 195	5 654	11 849	5 101	4 518	9 619
55-59	2 820	2 305	5 125	4 472	4 173	8 645	3 951	3 597	7 548
60-64	2 886	2 270	5 156	3 780	3 761	7 541	3 223	3 111	6 334
65+	7 509	5 585	13 094	7 770	8 363	16 133	4 849	4 992	9 841
Total	84 126	75 304	159 430	164 127	158 540	322 667	110 421	102 729	213 150

C. GDP Per Capita vis-à-vis Net Migration Rate in the Philippines

The GDP per capita of the Philippines from 1950 to 2015 is one of an increasing trend as shown in Appendix A of this paper.

To allow us to visualize this trend, Figure 6 below aptly shows this trend from 1980-2015.



Figure 6. GDP Per Capita of the Philippines

This increasing trend does not exactly mirror the corresponding trend in the net migration rate of the country which is more or less oscillating from point A to point B. This data suggest that the GDP per capita increase does not necessarily translate into decreased outflows of Filipino migrants because of better job opportunities in the local job market. Rather, the figures appear to suggest that the increase in migration outflows at a certain period from 1985 until 2010 is a result of perceived better economic opportunities in the receiving countries by the Filipino migrants based on the increase of GDP per capita in the destination or receiving countries such as the USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Canada and Japan and these facts are verifiable in the GDP per capita of these countries, where indeed a marked soar in their respective GDP per capita can be observed.

The Somalia Case Study

Somalia is classified by the United Nations as a least developed country. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Somalia, as of 2012 the country

had some of the lowest development indicators in the world, and a "strikingly low" Human Development Index (HDI) value of 0.285. This would rank amongst the lowest in the world if comparable data were available, and when adjusted for the significant inequality that exists in Somalia, its HDI is even lower. The UNDP notes that "inequalities across different social groups, a major driver of conflict, have been widening" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Somalia).

A. Net Migration Rate of Somalia

As shown in Table 10 hereunder, the net migration rate of Somalia from 1950 to 2015 in general is one which is marked with instability, lack of balance and equilibrium and one where an atmosphere of unpredictability always looms in the corner (see Figure 7). The unstable and problematic trend in the net migration rate of Somalia, more or less, both metaphorically and literally reflects the political instability, civil war and insurgencies of the nation in the past fifty years or so.

While it can be noted that from 1950 to 1975, the net migration rate as a whole is more or less stable, with some slight digressions, remaining period from 1975 to 2015 speaks a language of instability and lack of equilibrium as shown in Table 10 below:

Table 10

Selected Country	Net Migration Rate (1955-2015)												
	1950-1955	1955-1960	1960-1965	1965-1970	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015
Somalia	0	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0	63.7	27.4	20.4	28.2	-2.9	-5.0	-7.8	-7.9

However what is very notable and noticeable is the sudden sharp increase in the inflows of migrants from 0.0 in 1970-1975 to an astonishing 63.7 during 1975-1980 period. This sharp rise in positive net migration rate cannot escape the eye of a keen migration observer. This fact is accentuated in the following graph (Figure 7 below):




Figure 7. Net Migration Rate of Somalia (1955-2015)

This means that during 1975-1980 Somalia has been more of a receiving country as opposed to the general belief that Somalia is more of a sending country, specifically of refugees. The sudden sharp increase in positive net migration (63.7 in 1975-1980) can be attributed to the aftermath of the failed Ogaden invasion. The Ogaden War is a Somali military offensive between July 1977 and March 1978 over the disputed Ethiopian region Ogaden starting with the Somali Democratic Republic's invasion of Ethiopia. The war ended when the Armed Forces of Somali retreated back across the border and a truce was declared (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ogaden_War). As a result of this war, up to 1.5 million refugees went to Somalia (Bradbury, 1997). In 1980 Somalia was said to host more than a million refugees (Øberg & Slottved, 1980), resulting in a situation, described by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Poul Hartling, as “the worst refugee problem in the world” (quoted in Anglo-Somali Society Newsletter, 1980). The number of refugees remained very high until 1990, when it fell dramatically as the civil

war unfolded and Somalia became a place from which people fled if they could (UNHCR, 1998, table 13; UNHCR, 1999).

From 1985-2000, migration in Somalia is more of outflows than inflows. But such outflows of migrants do not manifest a consistent increase. It was rather fluctuating from one period to another. Starting from 2000 to 2015, the negative net migration rate surged from -2.91 in 2000 to -7.86 in 2015, which gives us a stabilizing impression in the outflows of people from Somalia to their destination countries.

There are several assumptions that may explain these seemingly erratic figures in the net migration rate of Somalia from the 1980s onwards. In 1988, the Somali and Ethiopian governments signed a peace accord to end hostility between the two countries. The peace accord recognised Ethiopian control over the Haud areas, meaning that a larger number of Somali refugees were forced to go to Somalia. Civil war was a reality and more than 600,000 people fled to Ethiopia (UNDP, 2001; Republic of Somaliland, 1994). During the next two years, civil war spread to the rest of the country and in the beginning of 1991. It is estimated that by the end of 1992, half a million people had lost their lives due to violence and hunger, and an even bigger number of people had fled the country – estimated between 800,000 (UNDP, 2001, 59) and up to 1.5 million (Bradbury, 1997). This chain of events created uncertainty to the population, which in turn, were confused as to their safety; hence, such a condition created a scenario of unpredictability in terms of mobility.

B. Migrant and Refugee Stock of Somalia by Country of Origin, Destination and Gender

B.1. Migrant Stock by Somalia by Country of Origin

Inasmuch as Somalia is not much of a receiving country, save of an unusual situation when its neighbouring country were likewise under civil war,

where it became at one time, between 1975-1980, a dominant refugee receiving country. In the 2013 data, only 2, 092 migrants came to Somalia. Most of this inflow movement to Somalia came from its neighbouring countries notably Ethiopia which constituted more than 95% of this figure as shown in Table 11 below. There are negligible numbers coming from Eritrea, Yemen and Democratic Republic of Congo and Bangladesh.

Table 11

Migrant stock by origin (2013)

Top 5 countries or areas of origin	Total
Ethiopia	2 046
Eritrea	34
Yemen	5
Bangladesh	4
Democratic Republic of the Congo	3
Total	2 092

The foregoing data imply that seldom could you find migrants from the other parts of the world who wanted to go to Somalia for some reasons---lack of public order and public safety, lack of economic opportunities, existence of political and civil unrest, and other related circumstances that will deter a potential migrant to go to Somalia. The more than two thousand migrants from Ethiopia who came to Somalia in 2013 might have been an exception rather than the rule. We can assume two reasons for this: one is that these migrants might have been the relatives of some Somalian-Ethiopian families near the border who wanted to reunite with their families, after having been separated by the civil war or political unrest in Somalia a few years back; second, the geographical proximity of the two countries has facilitated the crossing of the border of these Ethiopians for some reasons

such as but not limited to family reunification, and some limited economic or educational undertakings.

B.2. Migrant Stock by Country of Destination

It can be gleaned in Table 12 that Somali immigration is at large a form interregional immigration, i.e., Somalis migrate to countries which are within their borders or near their immediate geographical location. Among the top destinations include Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Djibouti.

Table 12

Migrant stock by destination (2013)

Top 5 countries or areas of destination	Total
Kenya	517 666
Ethiopia	457 483
Yemen	219 888
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	102 471
Djibouti	102 305
Total	1 399 813



Figure 8 Map of Africa

There are similar interesting observations to the Somalian immigration as the first two countries analyzed in this paper: first, the small number of migrants within the borders of Somalia coming from Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti; and second the stark contrast in the number of Somalian outflows within their immediate borders where their inflow of migrants are coming from such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Combining the two, one can arrive at the conclusion that while the outflow of Somalian migrants to its immediate border like Ethiopia and Kenya is intensive and constantly increasing, the inflow of migrants to Somalia coming from these countries is insignificant. One can assume explanations of this phenomenon based on historical antecedence. Both Ethiopia and Kenya still occupy territories which belong to Somalia and there are so many historical documents confirming the Somalia's claim to those territories. Somalians have that notions that certain territories occupied by Ethiopia (the Ogaden region, for instance) remains a Somalian territory; hence they have the right to stay there. Another reason is that the poor and miserable economic conditions coupled by violence and lack of political

stability in Somalia forced a great number of their people to cross their immediate border.

B.3. Refugee Population by Destination

As of 2013, more than one (1) million Somalians can be counted as refugee population that is spread across different countries. As shown in Table 13 below, the greatest number of Somali refugees can be found in Kenya which is more than half a million, followed by Yemen, Ethiopia, Sweden and Uganda. Notably, around 97% of the total number of the Somali refugees sought refuge to their neighbouring African countries. Sweden is the only non-African country where Somalians sought refugee status.

Table 13

Refugee population by destination (end 2012)

Top 5 countries or areas of destination	Total
Kenya	512 069
Yemen	226 909
Ethiopia	223 031
Sweden	19 416
Uganda	19 000
Total	1 000 425

Apparently Somalia's refugee population destination pattern similarly follows its immigration pattern as previously discussed. It is more convenient if not easier for Somalians to seek refuge to Kenya or Ethiopia for reason of geographical proximity as shown in the map than in more distant neighboring African countries or the remote European countries. Apparently, both Ethiopia and Kenya are willing recipients of Somali refugees for one reason or

another. It should be mentioned here that both Ethiopia and Kenya have a history of political and territorial conflict with Somalia.

Sweden being a receiving European country for Somalia is an exception, which by the way, has a liberal refugee policy similar to that of Germany.

B.4. Migrant Stock of Somalia by Gender

A close look at Table 14 reveals that there are more male migrants than female migrants in Somalia. While the male migrants are greater in number than female migrants, the difference between the sexes is not very substantial as to conclude that males are the dominant migrant figure in Somalian migration.

Table 14

International migrant stock by age and sex

	1990			2000			2013		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
0-4	39 437	48 355	87 792	1 322	1 604	2 926	1 476	1 549	3 025
5-9	28 084	34 502	62 586	901	1 094	1 995	1 253	1 473	2 726
10-14	22 349	27 720	50 069	676	829	1 505	937	1 087	2 024
15-19	16 455	20 983	37 438	625	789	1 414	865	940	1 805
20-24	17 133	20 576	37 709	802	954	1 756	887	885	1 772
25-29	22 878	21 824	44 702	1 084	1 024	2 108	1 063	1 002	2 065
30-34	24 583	17 569	42 152	1 200	849	2 049	1 248	1 019	2 267
35-39	23 448	13 925	37 373	1 216	716	1 932	1 329	877	2 206
40-44	17 890	9 501	27 391	998	525	1 523	1 250	715	1 965
45-49	11 430	6 229	17 659	685	369	1 054	1 042	554	1 596
50-54	8 298	4 622	12 920	378	207	585	807	438	1 245
55-59	4 699	2 802	7 501	294	173	467	543	300	843
60-64	4 012	2 715	6 727	246	163	409	355	215	570
65+	3 505	2 770	6 275	195	169	364	273	211	484
Total	244 201	234 093	478 294	10 622	9 465	20 087	13 328	11 265	24 593

C. GDP Per Capita vis-à-vis Net Migration Rate of Somalia

As shown in Appendix A, it can be deduced that the GDP per capita of Somalia from 1950 to 1991 reached the US\$ 1,000 mark, and the noticeable trend is that this GDP per capita growth is not stable within the next 40 years from 1950, with some oscillation of increase and decrease of the figures from

time to time. From 1991 onwards, the GDP per capita growth looks bleak in the Somalian economy. The figures merely revolved within the US\$ 800-US\$ 900 range, which is quite unusual. One thing is certain: these bleak economic conditions in Somalia carry with it the corresponding outmigration of Somalians to its better economically situated neighbours like Ethiopia or Kenya. This economically slumped state has been all the more put to difficult situations owing to its unstable political machinery which has been torn and ravaged by civil war, territorial disputes with its neighbouring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya and other factors which prevent it from redeeming itself economically and politically.

Conclusions

On the basis of the foregoing discussions, the following recommendations are advanced:

- (1) There are more inflows than outflows of migrants in a high-income country like Norway; whereas the reverse is true with middle-income country like the Philippines and low-income country like Somalia;
- (2) The inflow of migrants to Norway are mostly from within its Nordic or Scandinavian neighbours like Sweden and Denmark and immediately situated European neighbours in the Eurozone countries like Poland and Germany; whereas its outmigration tend to favour its Nordic brothers in Sweden and Denmark as well as its old country destination, the United States of America;
- (3) High-income country like Norway and middle-income country like the Philippines usually migrate to developed regions. Somalians migrate to its immediate neighboring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia, which are

- considered as lower middle income and low-income country categories respectively.
- (4) Norway's outmigrants are not necessarily economic migrants, which is the case for a middle-income country like the Philippines and a low-middle income country like Somalia.
 - (5) In all three countries from the different income country categories, there are more male migrants than female migrants;
 - (6) Norway is a refugee receiving country; whereas, Somalia is refugee sending country;
 - (7) GDP per capita does not necessarily have correlation with net migration rate to both Norway (high-income category) and the Philippines (middle-income category); whereas the reverse may be true to a low-income country like Somalia; and
 - (8) Reasons for migration are varied across the three countries.

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APPENDIX A

GDP PER CAPITA OF NORWAY, PHILIPPINES AND SOMALIA

Year	Selected Countries		
	Norway	Philippines	Somalia
1950	5,430	1,070	1,057
1951	5,670	1,151	1,098
1952	5,814	1,186	1,112
1953	5,985	1,254	1,132
1954	6,226	1,308	1,175
1955	6,301	1,358	1,191
1956	6,575	1,410	1,211
1957	6,711	1,442	1,232
1958	6,652	1,448	1,241
1959	6,874	1,501	1,287
1960	7,204	1,476	1,277
1961	7,595	1,512	1,311
1962	7,746	1,537	1,341
1963	7,982	1,595	1,364
1964	8,316	1,600	1,191
1965	8,690	1,633	1,088
1966	8,945	1,654	1,216
1967	9,423	1,690	1,258
1968	9,551	1,722	1,252

1969	9,899	1,750	1,071
1970	10,027	1,764	1,138
1971	10,472	1,808	1,141
1972	10,922	1,853	1,228
1973	11,324	1,964	1,176
1974	11,726	1,979	914
1975	12,271	2,033	1,202
1976	12,930	2,152	1,166
1977	13,425	2,211	1,420
1978	13,840	2,262	1,389
1979	14,411	2,323	1,181
1980	15,076	2,376	1,036
1981	15,169	2,396	1,112
1982	15,145	2,421	1,151
1983	15,636	2,407	1,015
1984	16,513	2,176	1,014
1985	17,320	1,967	1,055
1986	17,882	1,983	1,051
1987	18,164	2,019	1,068
1988	18,059	2,105	1,064
1989	18,157	2,184	1,086
1990	18,466	2,197	1,081
1991	18,951	2,136	1,006

**NET MIGRATION RATE, MIGRATION STOCKS
(ORIGIN, DESTINATIONS AND GENDER) AND
GDP PER CAPITA: THE CASES OF NORWAY,
PHILIPPINES AND SOMALIA**

1992	19,506	2,099	905
1993	19,931	2,099	907
1994	20,818	2,144	910
1995	21,578	2,193	917
1996	22,564	2,267	920
1997	23,649	2,331	895
1998	24,135	2,267	868
1999	24,455	2,287	858
2000	25,088	2,336	848
2001	25,458	2,349	835
2002	25,724	2,382	848
2003	25,864	2,448	861
2004	26,776	2,557	879
2005	27,358	2,625	897
2006	27,921	2,708	918
2007	28,556	2,829	950
2008	28,464	2,888	978
2009	27,893	2,864	
2010	27,987	3,024	