

Nasty Stuff

About

Russia

Compiled and Edited by

Michael Erbschloe

Connect with Michael on LinkedIn



©2018 Michael Erbschloe

Table of Contents

Section	Page Number
About the Editor	2
Introduction	4
U.S.-Russia Relations	5
U.S, Department of State Press Statements	13
U.S. 2018 National Defense Strategy Excerpts on Russia	22
Russia Travel Advisory January 2018	23
Russia Military Power: Building a Military To Support Great Power Aspirations	25
The Arctic Region Security Environment	27
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies “The Hinge of History”	31
USAID in Russia	38
Sanctions Against Persons Contributing To The Situation In Ukraine	41
Appendix A: Russia at a Glance	48

About the Editor

Michael Erbschloe has worked for over 30 years performing analysis of the economics of information technology, public policy relating to technology, and utilizing technology in reengineering organization processes. He has authored several books on social and management issues of information technology that were published by McGraw Hill and other major publishers. He has also taught at several universities and developed technology-related curriculum. His career has focused on several interrelated areas:

- Technology strategy, analysis, and forecasting
- Teaching and curriculum development
- Writing books and articles
- Publishing and editing
- Public policy analysis and program evaluation

Books by Michael Erbschloe

Threat Level Red: Cybersecurity Research Programs of the
U.S. Government (CRC Press)

Social Media Warfare: Equal Weapons for All (Auerbach Publications)

Walling Out the Insiders: Controlling Access to Improve Organizational
Security (Auerbach Publications)

Physical Security for IT (Elsevier Science)

Trojans, Worms, and Spyware (Butterworth-Heinemann)

Implementing Homeland Security in Enterprise IT (Digital Press)

Guide to Disaster Recovery (Course Technology)

Socially Responsible IT Management (Digital Press)

Information Warfare: How to Survive Cyber Attacks (McGraw Hill)

The Executive's Guide to Privacy Management (McGraw Hill)

Net Privacy: A Guide to Developing & Implementing an e-business
Privacy Plan (McGraw Hill)

Introduction

The Soviet economy and society stagnated in the decades following Stalin's rule, until General Secretary Mikhail GORBACHEV (1985-91) introduced glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) in an attempt to modernize communism, but his initiatives inadvertently released forces that by December 1991 splintered the USSR into Russia and 14 other independent republics.

Following economic and political turmoil during President Boris YELTSIN's term (1991-99), Russia shifted toward a centralized authoritarian state under the leadership of President Vladimir PUTIN (2000-2008, 2012-present) in which the regime seeks to legitimize its rule through managed elections, populist appeals, a foreign policy focused on enhancing the country's geopolitical influence, and commodity-based economic growth. Russia faces a largely subdued rebel movement in Chechnya and some other surrounding regions, although violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus.

Founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy was able to emerge from over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th-15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new ROMANOV Dynasty continued this policy of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific. Under PETER I (ruled 1682-1725), hegemony was extended to the Baltic Sea and the country was renamed the Russian Empire. During the 19th century, more territorial acquisitions were made in Europe and Asia. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 contributed to the Revolution of 1905, which resulted in the formation of a parliament and other reforms.

Repeated devastating defeats of the Russian army in World War I led to widespread rioting in the major cities of the Russian Empire and to the overthrow in 1917 of the imperial household. The communists under Vladimir LENIN seized power soon after and formed the USSR. The brutal rule of Josif STALIN (1928-53) strengthened communist rule and Russian dominance of the Soviet Union at a cost of tens of millions of lives. After defeating Germany in World War II as part of an alliance with the US (1939-1945), the USSR expanded its territory and influence in Eastern Europe and emerged as a global power. The USSR was the principal adversary of the US during the Cold War (1947-1991).

Military expenditures (country comparison to the world: 16):

5.4% of GDP (2016)

4.86% of GDP (2015)

4.1% of GDP (2014)

3.96% of GDP (2013)

3.75% of GDP (2012)

Military branches: Ground Troops (Sukhoputnyye Voyskia, SV), Navy (Voyenno-Morskoy Flot, VMF), Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily, VKS); Airborne Troops (Vozdushno-Desantnyye Voyska, VDV) and Missile Troops of Strategic Purpose (Raketnyye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya, RVSN) referred to commonly as Strategic Rocket Forces, are independent "combat arms," not subordinate to any of the three branches (2017)

Military service age and obligation: 18-27 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service; males are registered for the draft at 17 years of age; 1-year service obligation (conscripts can only be sent to combat zones after 6 months of training); reserve obligation for non-officers to age 50; enrollment in military schools from the age of 16, cadets classified as members of the armed forces note: the chief of the General Staff Mobilization Directorate announced in March 2015 that for health reasons, only 76% of draftees called up during the spring 2015 draft campaign were fit for military service (2015).

Source: The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency

U.S.-Russia Relations

Russia recognized the United States on October 28, 1803, and diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia were formally established in 1809. Diplomatic relations were interrupted following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. On December 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson instructed all American diplomatic representatives in Russia to refrain from any direct communication with representatives of the Bolshevik Government. Although diplomatic relations were never formally severed, the United States refused to recognize or have any formal relations with the Bolshevik/Soviet governments until 1933. Normal diplomatic relations were resumed on November 16, 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt informed Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov that the United States recognized the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and wished to re-establish normal diplomatic relations. On December 25, 1991, the United States recognized the Russian Federation as the successor to the Soviet Union, when President George H.W. Bush announced the decision in an address to the nation. President Bush also announced that the Embassy in Moscow would remain in place as the American Embassy to the Russian Federation. The United States and the Russian Federation established diplomatic relations on December 31, 1991.

The United States has long sought a full and constructive relationship with Russia. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States adopted a bipartisan strategy to facilitate cooperation on global issues and promote foreign investment and trade. The United States supported Russia's integration into European and global institutions and a deepened bilateral partnership in security cooperation to reinforce the foundations of stability and predictability. In response to the Russian violation in 2014 of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, however, the United States downgraded the bilateral political and military relationship and suspended the Bilateral Presidential Commission, a body jointly founded in 2009 by the United States and Russia to promote cooperation between the two countries. In addition to aggressive acts in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has also sought to use information operations which appear to be designed to weaken core institutions in the West such as NATO and the EU, and to cast doubt on the integrity of our democratic systems. Russia's method is not to advance ideas to compete with ours, but to undermine and question all narratives, creating confusion and diverting attention from Moscow's own actions. The United States has sought to deter further Russian intervention through the projection of strength and unity with U.S. allies, and by building resilience and reducing vulnerability among allies facing Russian pressure and coercion. The United States maintains cooperation with Russia to address pressing global challenges in areas where U.S. core national security interests align, including nonproliferation, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) security, preventing atrocities and humanitarian crises, and combatting violent extremism and terrorism. The long-term goal of the

United States is to see Russia become a constructive stakeholder in the global community. The United States seeks to nurture historically strong ties with the Russian people and civil society.

Bilateral Economic Relations

In response to Russia's ongoing violations of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, the United States has suspended most bilateral engagement with the Russian government on economic issues. The United States continues to investigate allegations of mistreatment of or discrimination against U.S. investors in Russia and to urge Russia to improve its investment climate, adherence to the rule of law, and transparency. In Russia, the U.S. Commercial Service continues to assist U.S. firms interested in developing market opportunities that do not violate sanctions.

In 2014, the United States and our European and G-7 partners imposed sanctions on Russia for its intervention in eastern Ukraine and occupation of Crimea. Sectoral sanctions have reduced Russia's ability to access financing in the financial, energy, and defense sectors, as well as limited its access to certain technologies in those sectors.

A combination of low oil prices, structural limitations, and sanctions pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with the economy contracting by four percent. The economy was expected to contract by nearly one percent in 2016 as well. In response, Russia has imposed a number of counter sanctions on U.S. and European goods, most notably in the agricultural sector.

Russia's Membership in International Organizations

Russia is one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council. It lost a re-election bid to the UN Human Rights Council in a competitive race in 2016. Russia's participation in the G8 (now G-7) was suspended in March 2014 in response to its attempted annexation of Crimea. For the same reason, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) stripped Russia of its voting rights in that body in April 2014. Since then, Russia has opted not to send Duma delegations to PACE sessions even though it was welcomed to continue to participate in debate. Russia remains a member state in the Council of Europe. Russia is a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and East Asia Summit (EAS), and an observer state to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The country participates in the Quartet on the Middle East and the Six-party Talks with North Korea.

Russia also takes part in a number of regional organizations including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Source: U.S. Department of State

Russia - Market Overview

Discusses key economic indicators and trade statistics, which countries are dominant in the market, the U.S. market share, the political situation if relevant, the top reasons why U.S. companies should consider exporting to this country, and other issues that affect trade, e.g., terrorism, currency devaluations, trade agreements. Last Published: 8/11/2017

Russia presents both significant challenges and opportunities for experienced American exporters. Russia's 2014-2016 economic downturn, driven by low oil prices and the lack of structural economic reform, squeezed both Russian corporations and the average consumer. While targeted American and European economic sanctions remain in place, there is no overall trade embargo on Russia. On the back of a tight fiscal and monetary policy, coupled with higher oil prices, Russia should return to limited economic growth of 1-2% in 2017. Over 1,000 American firms of all sizes continued to do business in Russia, given its 142 million consumers, \$27k+ GDP per capita (as measured in purchasing power parity), a growing middle class and highly educated and trained workforce.

There are two broad considerations when considering business prospects in Russia: geopolitics and market dynamics. Russia's continued aggression in Ukraine and Syria and interference in the 2016 U.S. elections have raised tensions with the United States and its allies. Targeted U.S. and European economic sanctions instituted in 2014 remain firmly in place and are not expected to be lifted for the foreseeable future. Restrictions on offshore, Arctic and shale oil and gas, the financial sector and the defense industry continue. For the past three years, U.S. agricultural exporters have been hit with Russian countersanctions. In addition, a number of Russian entities and individuals are also subject to sanctions, requiring American firms to do careful due diligence on potential business. Increasing state dominance of the economy, high costs of borrowing and a lack of broad economic reform constrain growth. Both large, publicly-traded U.S. multinationals and small and medium size enterprises continue to carefully monitor the overall business climate in Russia, balancing opportunity and risk.

As for market-based considerations, both Western and Russian firms approach 2017-8 with cautious optimism. Stable oil prices, a less volatile ruble and a return to growth in some sectors will likely lift the Russian economy in 2017. Indeed, Western and Russian firms report year-on-year growth in large industrial equipment in the mining, energy, and heavy construction sector. The retail and residential construction sectors remain weak. Early in 2017, Standard & Poors and Moody's upgraded their ratings to BB+, a step below investment grade. A Treaty on the Avoidance of Dual Taxation and Russia's WTO accession in 2012 have helped create new opportunities for American trade and investment through more certain and predictable access to the market across tariff, trade rules, and dispute resolution platforms. Despite the need for deeper economic reform, most analysts doubt any major policy changes prior to the March 2018 Russian presidential elections. For more on U.S.-Russia trade, read Ambassador John Tefft's article on "Why U.S.-Russia Trade Still Matters".

U.S.-Russia trade reached over \$20 billion in 2016, well off its peak of \$38 billion in 2013. American investment in Russia was about \$9 billion in 2015 (latest data available). These figures are low and conservative, as they do not include third country trade and investment flows of U.S. origin and reinvested earnings from subsidiaries of American parent corporations. Numbers aside, American firms view the Russian market as a long-term, strategic play, given its population, natural resources, growing consumer class and access to a low-cost labor force.

Source: Prepared by our U.S. Embassies abroad.

2017 U.S. trade in goods with Russia

NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding. Table reflects only those months for which there was trade.

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 2017	314.4	1,221.5	-907.1
February 2017	427.7	1,022.0	-594.3
March 2017	538.6	1,697.9	-1,159.2
April 2017	667.0	1,347.1	-680.1

May 2017	480.6	1,414.7	-934.1
June 2017	785.9	1,502.6	-716.8
July 2017	454.8	1,499.8	-1,045.0
August 2017	689.9	1,512.0	-822.1
September 2017	744.5	1,441.6	-697.1
October 2017	591.0	1,481.9	-891.0
November 2017	683.1	1,456.5	-773.3
TOTAL 2017	6,377.5	15,597.7	-9,220.1

Source: Census.gov › Business & Industry › Foreign Trade › U.S. International Trade Data

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has assessed the Russia Government as being in compliance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) safety standards for oversight of Russia air carriers operations.

The majority of domestic airlines offer on-line ticket sales, which makes it convenient for travelers to order tickets in advance. Some flights can be canceled, if more than 30% of the seats remain unsold. However, this does not happen very often. Travelers should have their passport with them at all times. Air travel within western Russia generally stays on schedule; the quality of service continues to improve. Flights within the Russian Far East are sometimes delayed or cancelled in winter months due to snow or fog. International Russian carriers, such as Aeroflot and S7 Airlines, usually use Western equipment and meet higher customer service standards than other domestic carriers.

Moscow has three major airports (Sheremetyevo, Domodedovo and Vnukovo); the fourth airport Bykovo deals primarily with cargo and emergency flights. The VIP terminals of Sheremetyevo (Terminal A), Domodedovo (Domodedovo Business Aviation Center) and Vnukovo (Vnukovo-3) offer customized service to VIP clients on a regular basis. International flights generally enter Moscow through Sheremetyevo and Domodedovo. Most international flights arrive in Sheremetyevo-2 (renamed SVO-F in December 2009) while Sheremetyevo-1 (renamed SVO-B in March 2010) handles most domestic traffic. With the opening of Terminal C (SVO-C) in

March 2007 and the opening of Terminal D (SVO-D) in November 2009, some international and domestic travel has been diverted to these facilities. Terminal E (SVO-E) provides convenient access between SVO-D and SVO-F, offering high speed movement systems (elevators, escalators and moving walkways) and other amenities for travelers.

Travelers may continue to other Russian cities from Sheremetyevo, Vnukovo or Domodedovo airports. However, travel time between airports or to the city center can take as much as three hours, and ample time must be allowed for passport control, customs clearance and baggage retrieval. The introduction of Aeroexpress trains that provide a high-speed direct connection from each of the airports to the city center (35-45 minutes travel time) has greatly alleviated this problem in recent years. St. Petersburg's airport has two terminals: Pulkovo-1 (domestic flights) and Pulkovo-2 (international flights).

Train travel in Russia is generally reliable and convenient as stations are located in the city center. From St. Petersburg to Moscow, travelers often ride overnight trains, although unaccompanied passengers are reminded to keep an eye on their valuables and lock their doors at night (if in a sleeping compartment), as some incidents of pick-pocketing have been reported. For quicker train connections between Moscow and St. Petersburg, travelers can take the high-speed SAPSAN train, which takes approximately four hours.

Inclement weather, erratic maintenance and a culture of aggressive driving make road conditions throughout Russia highly variable. Drivers and pedestrians should exercise extreme caution to avoid accidents. Traffic police sometimes stop motorists to levy cash "fines", but the scope of this problem has declined in recent years. Criminals occasionally prey on travelers, especially in isolated areas. At the same time, the Moscow's Committee for Tourism and Hotel Industry reported a low crime rate against foreign tourists in 2016.

In Moscow and St. Petersburg, the metro (subway) can be an efficient and inexpensive means of transportation. However, for non-Russian speakers, it can be difficult without researching the route in advance. Be sure to carry a metro map with you and learning the Cyrillic alphabet is useful. The Yandex metro map application is very helpful.

Marked taxis are prevalent in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and as noted online ride hailing applications, such as Uber and GetTaxi, are used widely in major cities. Short-term business travelers may wish to consider renting a car and driver for extensive excursions, or hire taxis

through their hotels for shorter trips. Car rentals are another option that has become available recently, although driving in Russia can be difficult for the uninitiated.

The Russian railway complex is of particular strategic importance to the Russian government, contributing about 0.2- 0.3% to the country's GDP and employing more than 800,000 workers. Third largest in size, after the United States and China, the Russian railway network expands over 85,200 kilometers, of which 43,300 kilometers are electrified. The fleet of the rolling stock comprises 11,100 freight locomotives (diesel and electric), 6,100 diesel switching locomotives and 3,100 passenger locomotives (diesel and electric). The number of freight railcars is estimated at 1,218,169 (2015). A considerable portion of the rolling stock is outdated and is in need of either decommissioning or renewal.

The majority of the country's rail infrastructure network and the locomotive fleets are owned by OAO Russian Railways (RZD), a state-owned-enterprise, operating freight and passenger railway services. Supported and funded by the Russian government, RZD has been pursuing a comprehensive reform process since 2001, to achieve greater efficiency and competitive advantage in the domestic and global markets.

Besides RZD, the Russian railway complex also comprises operations of private rail companies and industrial enterprises that have their own fleets of locomotives and railcars, and their own networks of rail tracks. Compared to RZD, their share of locomotives is rather insignificant (1,163 versus 20,300), while the share of freight railcars is much greater (1,123,012 versus 95,157). (Analysis was prepared by U.S. Embassies abroad.)

U.S. Department of State Press Statements

Unsafe Russian Military Practices

Heather Nauert

Department Spokesperson

Washington, DC

January 29, 2018

The United States notes with the highest level of concern the latest incident of unsafe Russian military practices, over the Black Sea on January 29. As confirmed by U.S. Naval Forces Europe, a Russian SU-27 engaged in an unsafe interaction with a U.S. EP-3 in international airspace, with the Russia pilot closing to within 5 feet and crossing directly in front of the EP-3's flight path. While the U.S. aircraft was operating under international law, the Russian side was flagrantly violating existing agreements and international law, in this case the 1972 Agreement for the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA). This is but the latest example of Russian military activities disregarding international norms and agreements. We call on Russia to cease these unsafe actions that increase the risk of miscalculation, danger to aircrew on both sides, and midair collisions.

Russia's Violations of Georgian Sovereignty

Heather Nauert

Department Spokesperson

Washington, DC

January 26, 2018

The United States condemns the Russian Federation's ratification of an agreement with the de facto leaders in Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia regarding a joint military force. We do not recognize the legitimacy of this so-called "treaty," which does not constitute a valid international agreement.

The United States' position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia is unwavering: The United States fully supports Georgia's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

The United States views ratification of this agreement as inconsistent with the principles underlying the Geneva International Discussions, to which Russia is a participant. The United States urges Russia to withdraw its forces to pre-war positions per the 2008 ceasefire agreement and reverse its recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Remarks on Russia's Responsibility for the Ongoing Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria

Rex W. Tillerson

Secretary of State

Paris, France

January 23, 2018

SECRETARY TILLERSON: Again, I want to thank Foreign Minister Le Drian for hosting today's signing ceremony for the launch of the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.

This meeting was about two things: stopping chemical weapons attacks and denying impunity to those who use or enable the use of such weapons. For an indication of what these weapons can do to humans, one need look no further than East Ghouta in Syria. Only yesterday more than 20 civilians, most of them children, were victims of an apparent chlorine gas attack.

The recent attacks in East Ghouta raise serious concerns that Bashar al-Assad's Syrian regime may be continuing its use of chemical weapons against its own people. Whoever conducted the attacks, Russia ultimately bears responsibility for the victims in East Ghouta and countless other Syrians targeted with chemical weapons since Russia became involved in Syria.

In September 2013, Russia pressed for, negotiated and agreed to the framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons – a diplomatic understanding between the United States and Russia requiring the verifiable destruction of Syria’s entire chemical weapons stockpile.

In so doing, Russia assumed responsibility as guarantor for ensuring that its Syrian allies cease all use of chemical weapons and fully declare its chemical weapons stockpile for destruction under international oversight.

The U.S.-Russia diplomatic framework was legally anchored by the United States and Russia in a decision of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Resolution 2118 of the UN Security Council.

In addition, in March 2015, Russia supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2209, which emphasized that those responsible for the use of any toxic chemical as a weapon, including chlorine, must be held to account.

Russia has not lived up to these commitments. Since two thousand – April 2014, there has been mounting evidence that Syria continues to illicitly possess chemical weapons and use them against its own people.

The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission has confirmed multiple incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria, including the use of the toxic industrial chemical chlorine as a weapon. Some of these incidents, including the April 4th sarin attack, were later attributed to Syria by the OPCW UN Joint Investigative Mechanism, an independent panel of impartial experts established in August 2015 by the UN Security Council’s Resolution 2235, with the full support of Russia.

There is simply no denying that Russia, by shielding its Syrian ally, has breached its commitments to the United States as a framework guarantor. It has betrayed the Chemical Weapons Convention and UN Security Council Resolution 2218[1], and on these occasions has twice[2] vetoed UN Security Council resolutions to enforce the Joint Investigative Mechanism and continue its mandate.

Russia’s failure to resolve the chemical weapons issue in Syria calls into question its relevance to the resolution to the overall crisis. At a bare minimum, Russia must stop vetoing and at least abstain from future Security Council votes on this issue.

Over 25 like-minded countries are here today to ensure that those who use chemical weapons will be held accountable. France, the UK, Germany, Turkey, and many others are here today to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention and its vision of a world free of these heinous weapons.

We will use this Partnership to facilitate greater information sharing about chemical weapons use, including sanctions information to collect and preserve such information and to strengthen the capacity of states to hold responsible parties accountable. This initiative puts those who

ordered and carried out chemical weapons attacks on notice. You will face a day of reckoning for your crimes against humanity and your victims will see justice done.

We call on the community of responsible and civilized nations to put the use of chemical weapons to an end. The choice is yours. The people of East Ghouta are watching and the rest of the world is watching as well.

Thank you.

Russia's Restrictive Media-Focused Legislation

Heather Nauert

Department Spokesperson

Washington, DC

November 28, 2017

New Russian legislation that allows the Ministry of Justice to label media outlets as “foreign agents” and to monitor or block certain internet activity presents yet another threat to free media in Russia. Freedom of expression—including speech and media which a government may find inconvenient—is a universal human rights obligation Russia has pledged to uphold.

The United States has previously highlighted the threat posed by Russia’s Foreign Agents Law, which has been used to justify a constant stream of raids, harassment, and legal proceedings that effectively obstruct non-governmental organizations from doing their work. Expanding the Foreign Agents Law to include media outlets opens the door to onerous requirements that could further stifle freedom of speech and editorial independence in Russia.

The United States urges the Russian government not to use this legislation to further restrict the operation of media outlets or freedom of expression.

Furthermore, the Russian Government’s attempt to justify new, media-focused legislation as a response to the transparency requirements in the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) is disingenuous and inappropriate. FARA does not police the content of information disseminated, does not limit the publication of information or advocacy materials, and does not restrict an organization’s ability to operate.

Joint Statement by the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

November 11, 2017

President Trump and President Putin today, meeting on the margins of the APEC conference in Da Nang, Vietnam, confirmed their determination to defeat ISIS in Syria. They expressed their satisfaction with successful U.S.-Russia enhanced de-confliction efforts between U.S. and Russian military professionals that have dramatically accelerated ISIS's losses on the battlefield in recent months.

The Presidents agreed to maintain open military channels of communication between military professionals to help ensure the safety of both U.S. and Russian forces and de-confliction of partnered forces engaged in the fight against ISIS. They confirmed these efforts will be continued until the final defeat of ISIS is achieved.

The Presidents agreed that there is no military solution to the conflict in Syria. They confirmed that the ultimate political solution to the conflict must be forged through the Geneva process pursuant to UNSCR 2254. They also took note of President Asad's recent commitment to the Geneva process and constitutional reform and elections as called for under UNSCR 2254.

The two Presidents affirmed that these steps must include full implementation of UNSCR 2254, including constitutional reform and free and fair elections under UN supervision, held to the highest international standards of transparency, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate. The Presidents affirmed their commitment to Syria's sovereignty, unity, independence, territorial integrity, and non-sectarian character, as defined in UNSCR 2254, and urged all Syrian parties to participate actively in the Geneva political process and to support efforts to ensure its success.

Finally President Trump and President Putin confirmed the importance of de-escalation areas as an interim step to reduce violence in Syria, enforce ceasefire agreements, facilitate unhindered humanitarian access, and set the conditions for the ultimate political solution to the conflict. They reviewed progress on the ceasefire in southwest Syria that was finalized the last time the two Presidents met in Hamburg, Germany on July 7, 2017.

The two presidents, today, welcomed the Memorandum of Principles concluded in Amman, Jordan, on November 8, 2017, between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America. This Memorandum reinforces the success of the ceasefire initiative, to include the reduction, and ultimate elimination, of foreign forces and foreign fighters from the area to ensure a more sustainable peace. Monitoring this ceasefire arrangement will continue to take place through the Amman Monitoring Center, with participation by expert teams from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Russian Federation, and the United States.

The two Presidents discussed the ongoing need to reduce human suffering in Syria and called on all UN member states to increase their contributions to address these humanitarian needs over the coming months.

In addition, President Trump noted that he had a good meeting with President Putin. He further noted that the successful implementation of the agreements announced today will save thousands of lives.

Respecting Religious Freedom in Russia

Heather Nauert

Department Spokesperson

Washington, DC

July 19, 2017

The Russian Supreme Court's decision this week against the Jehovah's Witnesses is the latest in a disturbing trend of persecution of religious minorities in Russia. We urge the Russian authorities to lift the ban on Jehovah's Witnesses' activities in Russia, to reverse the closing of the Jehovah's Witnesses Administrative Center, and to release any members of religious minorities that continue to be unjustly detained for so-called "extremist" activities.

We further urge Russia to respect the right of all to exercise the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. All religious minorities should be able to enjoy freedom of religion and assembly without interference, as guaranteed by the Russian Federation's constitution.

Statement on Russia, Turkey, and Iran's De-Escalation Zones Plan for Syria

Heather Nauert

Department Spokesperson

Washington, DC

May 4, 2017

Russia, Turkey, and Iran, at the conference in Astana, announced agreement today on an effort to reduce the violence in certain areas of Syria. The United States was represented at the Astana conference by Acting Assistant Secretary Stuart Jones. We were not a direct participant in the negotiations and are not, at this point, a party to the agreement.

The United States supports any effort that can genuinely de-escalate the violence in Syria, ensure unhindered humanitarian access, focus energies on the defeat of ISIS and other terrorists, and create the conditions for a credible political resolution of the conflict.

We appreciate the efforts of Turkey and the Russian Federation to pursue this agreement and have encouraged the Syrian opposition to participate actively in the discussions despite the difficult conditions on the ground.

We continue to have concerns about the Astana agreement, including the involvement of Iran as a so-called “guarantor.” Iran’s activities in Syria have only contributed to the violence, not stopped it, and Iran’s unquestioning support for the Assad regime has perpetuated the misery of ordinary Syrians.

In light of the failures of past agreements, we have reason to be cautious. We expect the regime to stop all attacks on civilians and opposition forces, something they have never done. We expect Russia to ensure regime compliance.

The opposition must also live up to its commitments, with Turkey as the guarantor, to separate from designated terrorist groups, including al-Nusra Front, which continue to hijack the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for a representative and accountable government.

We nonetheless hope that this arrangement can contribute to a de-escalation of violence, end the suffering of the Syrian people, and set the stage for a political settlement of the conflict. We look forward to continuing our dialogue with the Russian Federation on efforts to that can responsibly end the Syria conflict. We continue to strongly support the UN-led process in Geneva, under the stewardship of Staffan de Mistura, as the center of international efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement.

The United States Concerned by Reports of Detentions and Deaths of LGBTI Individuals in Chechnya, Russia

Mark C. Toner

Acting Spokesperson

Washington, DC

April 7, 2017

We are increasingly concerned about the situation in the Republic of Chechnya, where there have been numerous credible reports indicating the detention of at least 100 men on the basis of their sexual orientation. Some reports indicate many of those arrested have been tortured, in some cases leading to death. We categorically condemn the persecution of individuals based on their sexual orientation or any other basis.

We are deeply disturbed by recent public statements by Chechen authorities that condone and incite violence against LGBTI persons. We urge Russian federal authorities to speak out against such practices, take steps to ensure the release of anyone wrongfully detained, conduct an independent and credible investigation into these reports and hold any perpetrators responsible.

On the Protests in Russia

Mark C. Toner

Acting Spokesperson

Washington, DC

March 26, 2017

The United States strongly condemns the detention of hundreds of peaceful protesters throughout Russia on Sunday. Detaining peaceful protesters, human rights observers, and journalists is an affront to core democratic values. We were troubled to hear of the arrest of opposition figure

Alexei Navalny upon arrival at the demonstration, as well as the police raids on the anti-corruption organization he heads.

The United States will monitor this situation, and we call on the government of Russia to immediately release all peaceful protesters. The Russian people, like people everywhere, deserve a government that supports an open marketplace of ideas, transparent and accountable governance, equal treatment under the law, and the ability to exercise their rights without fear of retribution.

U.S. 2018 National Defense Strategy Excerpts on Russia

Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding. We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security. China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea. Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors.

As well, North Korea's outlaw actions and reckless rhetoric continue despite United Nation's censure and sanctions. Iran continues to sow violence and remains the most significant challenge to Middle East stability. Despite the defeat of ISIS's physical caliphate, threats to stability remain as terrorist groups with long reach continue to murder the innocent and threaten peace more broadly. (page 3)

Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the challenge is clear.

Another change to the strategic environment is a resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international order. In the decades after fascism's defeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partners constructed a free and open international order to better safeguard their liberty and people from aggression and coercion. Although this system has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security. China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and "rules of the road." (page 4)

Source: <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

Russia Travel Advisory

Travel Advisory

January 10, 2018

Russia – Level 3: Reconsider travel

O T

Reconsider travel to Russia due to **terrorism and harassment**. Some areas have increased risk. Read the entire Travel Advisory

Do not travel to:

- The north Caucasus, including Chechnya and Mount Elbrus, due to **civil unrest and terrorism**.
- Crimea due to **foreign occupation and abuses by occupying authorities**.

Terrorist groups continue plotting possible attacks in Russia. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets/shopping malls, and local government facilities. Bomb threats against public venues are common.

U.S. citizens are often victims of harassment, mistreatment, and extortion by law-enforcement and other officials. U.S. consular assistance to detained individuals is often unreasonably delayed by Russian officials. Russia also enforces special restrictions on dual U.S.-Russian nationals. Due to the Russian government-imposed reduction on U.S. diplomatic personnel in Russia, the U.S. government has reduced ability to provide services to U.S. citizens.

Read the Safety and Security section on the [country information page](#).

If you decide to travel to Russia:

- Avoid demonstrations.
- Monitor local media for breaking events and adjust your plans based on news information.
- Stay alert in locations frequented by Westerners.
- Have travel documents up to date and easily accessible.
- Visit our website for [Travel to High-Risk Areas](#).
- Enroll in the [Smart Traveler Enrollment Program \(STEP\)](#) to receive Alerts and make it easier to locate you in an emergency.
- Follow the Department of State on [Facebook](#) and [Twitter](#).
- Review the [Crime and Safety Reports](#) for Russia.
- U.S. citizens who travel abroad should always have a contingency plan for emergency situations. Review the [Traveler's Checklist](#).

North Caucasus (including Chechnya and Mount Elbrus)

Civil unrest and terrorist attacks continue throughout the North Caucasus region including in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Stavropol, Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, and Kabardino-Balkariya. Local gangs have kidnapped U.S. citizens and other foreigners for ransom.

There have been credible reports of arrest, torture, and extrajudicial killing of gay men in Chechnya allegedly conducted by Chechen regional authorities.

Do not attempt to climb Mount Elbrus, as travelers must pass close to volatile and insecure areas of the North Caucasus region.

The U.S. government is unable to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens traveling in the North Caucasus region, including Mount Elbrus, as U.S. government employees are prohibited from traveling to the region.

Visit our website for [Travel to High-Risk Areas](#).

Crimea

There is extensive Russian Federation military presence in Crimea. The Russian Federation is likely to take further military actions in Crimea as part of its occupation of this part of Ukraine. The international community, including the United States and Ukraine, does not recognize Russia's purported annexation of Crimea. There are continuing abuses against foreigners and the local population by the occupation authorities in Crimea, particularly against those who are seen as challenging their authority on the peninsula.

The U.S. government is unable to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens traveling in Crimea as U.S. government employees are prohibited from traveling to Crimea.

Visit our website for [Travel to High-Risk Areas](#).

Russia Military Power: Building a Military To Support Great Power Aspirations

Agency Publisher: [Department of Defense \(DOD\) Defense Intelligence Agency \(DIA\)](#)

Format: Paperback

USA Price: \$21.00

GPO Stock Number: 008-000-01272-5

ISBN: 9780160939716

This report examines a resurgent Russia's military power to foster a deeper understanding of its core capabilities, goals, and aspirations in the 21st Century.

Excerpt:

"In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union's military strength. The purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a complete and accurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public for the first time.

Today, we are faced with a complexity of intelligence challenges from multiple threats that we cannot afford to misunderstand. In the spirit of Soviet Military Power, DIA is proud to produce an unclassified defense intelligence overview of the military capabilities associated with the challenges we face—beginning with Russia."

Related products:

Russia & the Soviet Union resources collection can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/russia-soviet-union>

Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge, 1977-1981 can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/harold-brown-offsetting-soviet-military-challenge-1977-1981>

International and Foreign Affairs collection is here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/international-foreign-affairs>

Arms & Weapons collection is here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/arms-weapons>

Defense & National Security resources can be found

here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/defense-national-security>

Product Details

Availability Details: In Stock

USA Price: \$21.00

International Price: \$29.40

Publisher: Defense Dept., Defense Intelligence Agency

Year/Pages: 2017: 116 p.; ill.

Key Phrases:

- DIA 11 1704 161
- Building a Military To Support Great Power Aspirations
- Russia

Weight: 0.5625

The Arctic Region Security Environment

The Arctic generally remains an area of cooperation, ranging from scientific, environmental, and economic collaboration under the auspices of the Arctic Council to military and coast guard cooperation to enhance maritime domain awareness and improve search and rescue (SAR) capabilities, exercise sovereignty, conduct bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and develop Arctic transportation.

Friction points, however, do exist. The most significant disagreements from the United States' perspective are the way that Canada and Russia regulate navigation in Arctic waters claimed under their jurisdiction. Canada claims all waters within the Canadian Arctic islands as historic internal waters, requiring Canada's permission to transit, including the waters of the Northwest Passage (NWP), which the United States views as an international strait. Canada also claims authority, through regulations referred to as "NORDREGs," to deny entry to the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) beyond the outer Canadian Arctic islands of ships that do not report in advance to the Canadian Coast Guard.

Russia makes a similar historic internal water claim about three international straits along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Further, Russia's NSR regulations require permits for ships, including sovereign immune vessels, to transit the NSR, which includes all of the territorial sea and EEZ of Russia's claimed Arctic waters. The United States has protested these excessive maritime claims as inconsistent with international law and does not recognize them. This will likely remain an issue on which the United States and a number of other nations will continue to disagree with Canada and Russia.

NATO created Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOPs) at the Wales Summit in 2014. EOPs are more involved in NATO decision-making by participating in earlier and higher-level political consultations. NATO's five EOPs are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden.

Diminishing sea ice will give rise to new economic opportunities in the region while simultaneously increasing concerns about human safety and protection of a unique ecosystem that many indigenous communities rely on for subsistence. In the near term, the increasing rate of coastal erosion similarly will threaten DoD's Arctic coastal infrastructure. In the mid- to far-term, as ice recedes and resource extraction technology improves, competition for economic advantage and a desire to exert influence over an area of increasing geostrategic importance could lead to increased tension. These economic and security concerns may increase the risk of disputes between Arctic and non-Arctic nations over access to Arctic shipping lanes and natural resources.

Recent Russian strategy documents emphasize the importance of the Arctic region to Russia and its national economy. Primary sources of revenue for Russia are generated through the energy and transportation sectors located in the northwestern region of the country. More than 20 percent of Russia's landmass lies above the Arctic Circle. Moscow has identified four main

national interests in the Arctic: to use Russia's Arctic region as a national strategic resource base to support the country's socio-economic development; to preserve the region as a zone of peace and cooperation; to protect the environment; and to develop the NSR for transportation. Russian strategy documents also outline top priorities, which include: defense, continental shelf delimitation, and improving Arctic transportation and communication infrastructure.

Intensifying Russian cooperation with Arctic nations and international organizations, including the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, is one of Russia's strategic priorities. Russia delivered a partial revised extended continental shelf (ECS) submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2015. In making its formal submission to the CLCS, Russia followed the appropriate procedure under the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf. As of this writing, the CLCS is reviewing the data and analysis submitted by Russia and will make recommendations on the outer limits of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic. This technical step is a part of the recognized process by which coastal States secure legal certainty in their sovereign rights and jurisdiction with respect to continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. It is important to note that Russia's submission does not include any areas where the United States may in the future establish its extended continental shelf. Although the United States has not acceded to the LOSC, the United States respects this process, which has facilitated an orderly and rules-based approach to delineating the extent of the continental shelf for countries around the world.

Canada views itself as a maritime nation with unique responsibilities, opportunities, and benefits due to its extensive Arctic coastline and maritime territory. Canada maintains that the NWP, which consists of a series of routes between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Canadian archipelago, has the status of historical internal waters, a view not shared by the United States, the European Union (EU), or other nations. Canada also claims authority to deny transit through the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone beyond its northern Arctic islands of ships that do not report in advance to the Canadian Coast Guard.

The Kingdom of Denmark is an Arctic nation by virtue of its historical ties to Greenland and the Faroe Islands and its current responsibilities for foreign affairs and defense on behalf of Greenland. The Kingdom of Denmark and Russia have overlapping ECS submissions to the CLCS, which has no authority to determine maritime boundaries; it is up to nations to resolve boundary disputes diplomatically. In 2013, the Ministry of Defense in Copenhagen established a Joint Arctic Command, which maintains a working-level liaison relationship with Thule Air Base, and the Joint Rescue Coordination Center in Greenland. Both entities maintain small permanent staffs to provide search and rescue service and patrols, marine environmental protection, and support to civilian authorities.

The Kingdom of Denmark has limited domain awareness and response capacity due to the vastness of the region and a comparative lack of assets, infrastructure, and investment. Although

stating that regional maritime security is a priority, in 2016 the Danish government cautioned commercial shipping and cruise lines about the harsh operating conditions and limited SAR assets in the region, implying that Danish defense forces may not be available for emergency assistance.

In June 2016, the Kingdom of Denmark released its Arctic Strategy. Citing the need for improved domain awareness; improved command, control and communication; and more operational capacity, Denmark has budgeted approximately \$18 million per year over the next decade for Arctic-specific defense investments. Funds will be used for an additional naval patrol vessel, an increase in Joint Arctic Command staff, and assets for domain awareness, including potential commercial satellite coverage and unmanned aircraft solutions.

Finland does not have a coastline on the Arctic Ocean; however, nearly one-third of its territory lies north of the Arctic Circle. All of Finland's Baltic Sea ports require icebreaking services in the winter. Finland is a leader in icebreaking technology and ice-capable ship construction and in extreme cold weather operations. Finland is also an EOP with NATO.

Iceland views Arctic issues as vital to its national identity and foreign policy. It is important to note that the small island of Grimsey located 40 kilometers north of the main island is the basis for Iceland's claim as an Arctic nation. The Arctic Circle passes through this five square kilometer island with fewer than 100 inhabitants. As a small nation with no military of its own, Iceland relies on NATO guarantees for territorial defense.

Norway views the Arctic as a top foreign and domestic policy priority. With one-third of its landmass, more than 10 percent of its population, and 80 percent of its territorial sea and EEZ lying above the Arctic Circle, Norway views Arctic development and stability as critical to both its security and its economy. Melting sea ice has increased the economic potential for the development of the Norwegian Arctic, including commercial shipping and oil and gas extraction. Norway emphasizes predictability and transparency as important for maintaining its "High North—low tension" policy.

Sweden does not have a coastline on the Arctic Ocean, but almost one-third of its territory lies north of the Arctic Circle. Some of Sweden's ports in the Gulf of Bothnia require icebreaker service in the winter. Sweden's Arctic Strategy identifies three main priorities: climate and the environment, with an emphasis on biodiversity protection; economic development in the Arctic and Barents Sea region; and the human dimension, which includes the preservation of Saami language and culture. Like Finland, Sweden is a NATO EOP.

Non-Arctic States, particularly those with robust maritime sectors, have sought to increase their influence in the region and safeguard their ability to access potential resources and transit routes. Arctic Council Observers include France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India. The EU released an Arctic Strategy

in 2013, reiterating its commitment to playing a bigger role in facilitating research, promoting climate change policies, and fostering cooperation.

Source: <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-for-release.pdf>

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies “The Hinge of History”

Secretary of Defense Speech

Remarks By Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, June 28, 2017

Thank you Keith, old friend.

Minister von der Leyen, there’s probably no one who I would rather be here with today than my esteemed fellow minister, the first minister to call on me after I had the surprise of being assigned to this job, I might add.

Thank you again for making the trip to Washington. But I would also say that there’s a connection between us: we did not sit down and write our speeches together, yet as I was listening to her and nodding to myself I thought, ‘My gosh, I’m going to bore everybody with the same themes you just heard.’

But Madam Mayor, thank you for all of the hospitality that all of us receive when we come to this beautiful corner of the world. It is absolutely a stunning place to visit.

And Ladies and Gentlemen, it is wonderful to be back in Germany once again:

- To pay my respects to an ally that is 100 percent committed to freedom and to the dignity of human beings; and
- To show America's solidarity with the German people and standing up for Western values for which we are unapologetic.

I cannot come to Germany, however, without expressing my deep respect for this country's troops...for their professionalism, for their courage and for their sacrifices on shared battlefields in Afghanistan and against ISIS or any other agents of terror and all the world.

Because for the German military, and for you here today from the German military, I would just say that your ethical performance is a model for all others and we, in the United States Department of Defense, are grateful for our strong alliance with the German military.

Minister von de Leyen and I just completed the inaugural Strategic Dialogue, as you heard, between Germany and the United States. We charted our shared security priorities for the coming year in this perfect locale for that...in the finest spirit of what George Marshall stood for. We talked about Afghanistan, the enhanced Forward Presence in Eastern Europe, and our national security strategies, and I would just cite that regardless of any news reports to the contrary, the transatlantic bond between our two countries remain strong.

Germany and the United States stand together, allied against threats to the peace and security of this continent, Canada, and the United States...and the disruption of harmony elsewhere.

The U.S. commitment to our NATO Article V security guarantee is ironclad, as demonstrated over decades by our steadfastness and given voice more recently by President Trump before the American people in the Rose Garden with NATO ally, Romanian President Iohannis, standing at his side and certainly, it was given voice by the United States Senate just a short couple of days ago in a unanimous resolution, 100 to zero.

All of this transatlantic bond is represented in this room here today. And 70 years ago, as Minister von de Leyen noted, on a picturesque campus in Cambridge, Massachusetts, an American diplomat gave the commencement address at Harvard University. I need not remind this audience again of what George Marshall said that day, for we can see today across Europe the realization of what became a shared vision – a peaceful, industrious and prosperous continent, free from tyranny, possessing the military strength to defend itself from aggression.

Sometimes, it is necessary to pause and recall first principles. We can kind of take things for granted after a while if we do not. We need to remind ourselves of why we initially embarked on a path...of why free people of Europe, Canada, and the United States made a conscious decision to codify our transatlantic partnership and dare to bind our nations by treaty to collective defense.

All these nations' democracies...anyone of them could have opted out with the wish of avoiding danger, yet they united together:

- In the North Atlantic Treaty Article V, the parties stated that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all.”
- And in the North Atlantic Article III, we bound ourselves to share the burden of defense saying, “that parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

So, ladies and gentlemen, how did a man named George Marshall come to give a speech that so eloquently articulated the principles underpinning today's international order? Why does the international center here today bear his name, still 70 years later?

And the simple answer is that he lived at the hinge of history.

Having joined the Army, George Marshall was sent off to fight in a catastrophic conflict, World War I, in which 1.2 million doughboys came to pay America's debt to Lafayette. He lived war and he lived all of its injustices.

When the armistice came, Marshall went home to America and lived through the Great Depression, seeing grown men and women with despair in their eyes. For 20 years, he learned and he matured, watching the storm clouds gather again over the continent he had left behind.

When the storm broke in 1939, he witnessed the failed peace of 1918: fourteen percent of Europe's pre-war population was killed or displaced during the Second World War.

Our nations experienced the horrors that can only happen when freedom is imperiled, when peaceful pursuits of civilized life are suspended, when deterrence fails and our societies are engulfed in total war. When at enormous cost, the force of arms had restored peace to this continent, the peoples of our nations gazed on the destruction.

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, not yet the Secretary, but coming home, a young officer who had served in our World War II Pacific Campaign, he spoke for a generation when he said that they “Looked back on world wars, a generation that saw 61 million killed, that saw the depression and they said to themselves, ‘What a crummy world and we are part of it whether we like it or not.’”

Longing for a safer future, the Greatest Generation, as we call them, saw their own security in the security of others. They had the courage to recognize:

- All collective efforts had to be taken to avoid repeating mistakes that opened the door to war; and
- Should freedom be threatened and war truly unavoidable, then all efforts had to be taken to bring war to a decisive end as swiftly as possible.

They also had the courage to act, not just to look at it, not just to talk about it...to make the necessary sacrifices and to make genuine commitments to keep the peace. That generation, schooled by life's cruelties, by severe economic deprivation and the death of friends and family members, stood face-to-face with the competitive, zero sum side of life.

The vileness of the Second World War, waged on a scale unimagined perhaps other than by those with memories of having lived through it, nevertheless left the generation aware that there is more to life than war and competition alone.

In 1947, Europe lay in ruins...starvation, poverty, desperation and chaos clamored to dictate the future. Enter Marshall, who saw his generation's moment and transcribed its lessons.

“It is logical,” he said, “that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist and return of normal economic health in the world. Without which, there can be no political stability and no assured peace.”

Under the Marshall Plan, the United States provided billions in aid to Europe after the war, as part of a larger effort to rebuild and secure the continent.

Marshall knew history swings on a hinge. And the Marshall Plan permitted hundreds of millions to keep their humanity, confident of the basic social order: from food to security, rule of law and

essential political freedom. Twenty years after the plan took effect, the per capital gross domestic product of UK, France, Italy and Germany had more than doubled.

But to keep the peace, a resuscitated Europe had to become a partner in it. As Marshall said, and as Minister von de Leyen just pointed out, “It is neither fitting nor efficacious for the U.S. government to draw up unilaterally a program to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative must come from Europe.”

As Marshall told the UN General Assembly in Paris in 1948, “International organizations cannot take the place of national and personal effort or of local and individual imagination; international action cannot replace self-help.”

And so out of destruction and unified by that notion, our peoples built a grand new world, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marshall's generation built these tools to help underwrite stability and prosperity. The last seventy years have proven the value of these institutions and the wisdom of that generation.

Europe transformed from a security consumer into a security provider, something Marshall ardently desired for he never envisioned that America would carry the burden alone. He knew from experience it had to be shared, both its benefits and its burdens. Since World War II, European allies have contributed to large scale U.S. led global operations. At peak contributions, 39,000 Allies fought with the United States in Afghanistan and 59,000 Allies fought with us in Iraq.

We must not allow the years passed since 1947 to blind us to the reality of today. For those of us who grew up with freedom from fear, from starvation, and the burden of World War, we cannot turn away from the responsibility to pass these same freedoms intact to the next generation.

Allies stick together, as we did 69 years ago this week when the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin and the United States refused to abandon it.

U.S. Air Force Captain Billy Phelps flew 167 flights into that stranded city, bringing food to save its inhabitants from starvation and bitter cold. Captain Phelps was 26 years old the night his cargo plane crashed a mile from the end of the runway. A German boy named Wolfgang Samuel saw it happen.

Wolf wrote, "They fell like a rock out of the sky. The two pilots were killed." And then the child had a flash of insight. He said, "Only three years ago, they were fighting against my country and now, they were dying for us."

“I wondered,” he said, “what made these people do the things they did.”

Captain Phelps knew he owed future generations the same freedom he had. And what young Wolfgang, a little German kid saw that cold December night in 1948, we can see clearly today in 2017:

- We can see foreigners putting their lives on the line for others, whether Captain Billy Phelps or the Berlin Airlift or the men and women of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence under German leadership in the Lithuanian woods right now;
- We can see U.S. support for NATO's enhanced Forward Presence extended out to 2020 for the security of the United States and all NATO nations; and
- We can see the \$4.8 billion requested by President Trump last month for the European Reassurance Initiative, an increase over our commitment last year.

Beyond any words in the newspapers, you can judge America by such actions. This is who we are. America, Germany, Europe, the West. We risk life so a child in Berlin can eat. We hunt terrorists in the dark so that they cannot murder innocent at concerts. And our nations stand together – democratic islands of stability in a world awash with change.

The Marshall Center embodies this cooperative mission. It is the only one of the U.S. Defense Department's five regional centers to operate jointly with a foreign government. It is one of many tangible manifestations of the enduring alliance between Germany and America.

In October last year, Germany and the United States signed a Memorandum of Agreement and reinforced the strong U.S.-German partnership here as Germany assumed an even greater role in the operation of this highly influential security study center.

As the Minister noted, over the years, over 12,000 individuals – civilian and military – from more than 150 countries have come to Garmisch to transcribe the lessons of history and apply them to today's challenges, from organized crime to terrorism, cybersecurity and regional threats.

The Marshall Center alumni comprise a network of thought leaders and practitioners serving as resources to one another and decision makers worldwide recognizing that no nation alone can provide for its security.

In 2014, for example, Romanian and Greek alumni contributed together to one of Europe's largest drug seizures, preventing \$220 million in heroin from poisoning children and families across this continent.

The Marshall Center faculty have also assisted Albania and Moldova in drafting their first ever national security strategy documents, critical for enabling security integration and contributing to regional stability.

The Center's faculty, staff, students, and alumni carry the legacy of this Center's namesake and for you students here today, when you return home, you have a golden opportunity to operate

history's hinge, as well, just like George Marshall did...to close the door to war, exercising your moral authority and your generation's responsibility to protect freedom.

Western values, respect for a rules based order and for national sovereignty, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the dignity of the human person, these are values worth defending.

Marshall said, "Ideals have power to inspire," and he also said "Discouraged people are in sore need of the inspiration of great principles" – principles represented today by you in this room.

I will conclude with a message to the nation choosing to challenge this secure and peaceful order.

The United States seeks to engage with Russia and so does the NATO alliance. Russia must know both what we stand for and equally, what we will not tolerate. We stand for freedom and we will never surrender the freedom of our people or the values of our alliance that we hold dear.

I mentioned a moment ago that discouraged people are in need of inspiration and there are millions of people like that who live today in Russia. Their leader making mischief beyond Russian borders will not restore their fortunes or rekindle their hope.

And while we will meet with any aggression with what Danish Defense Minister Claus Hjort Frederiksen said was, "Determination, deterrence and purpose," we will also watch for a Russia that honors its people enough to abide by international law and so wins for them peace the we all offer.

NATO's troops are deployed right now as we speak in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. And they demonstrate NATO's resolve. I am grateful to those host nations as well as to the framework nations, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and of course, Germany for sending their fine troops to lead in this wholly defensive mission, augmented by troops from ten other NATO nations.

This is a profound example of a United NATO. Our alliance has long been a stabilizing force in Europe. It helps preserve the rules based international order today. And it serves again now to keep the peace and defend the shared values that grew out of the enlightenment.

In closing, ladies and gentlemen, in 1961, a young academic and German immigrant to America, one who had served in the U.S. Army and was a veteran of World War II, paid a visit to the Missouri home of former President Harry Truman. The president was in his late 70's and long since retired.

The academic was none other than Henry Kissinger and he asked Truman, what in his presidency had made him the most proud. Without a moment's hesitation, President Truman said to him that "we defeated our enemies and then brought them back to the community of nations as equals."

Today, we make our adversaries the same promise. Enemies of freedom will be frustrated or defeated. Supporters of international law will be brought into our community as equals. Our hands rest purposely on history's door and it depends on us to push it in the right direction.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

USAID in Russia

Over the past two decades, The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided assistance that has helped the Russian people improve public health and combat infectious diseases, protect the environment, develop a stronger civil society, and modernize their economy. As Russia has grown into a middle income country, the nature of USAID's work has evolved beyond primarily providing technical assistance with a large focus on collaboration. By 2012, the majority of USAID's engagement revolved around the promotion of an open and innovative society in Russia and a strengthened partnership between the U.S. and Russia. The work led to many breakthroughs and transformations described below.

USAID-supported projects helped introduce internationally recognized approaches in diagnostics and treatment of tuberculosis enabling the national TB program to decrease transmission and improve treatment success rates. Russia ranks 11th among 22 highest TB burden countries and the third among priority multi-drug resistant (MDR) and extensively drug resistant (XDR) TB countries worldwide.

USAID's child welfare program has provided over 80,000 at-risk children and their parents with innovative services designed to reduce abandonment, resulting in a 33% increase in family reunification and an 85% increase in the number of foster families in target regions.

USAID's health programs have dramatically helped raise awareness among Russian citizens of their health-related rights and responsibilities and strengthened an array of NGOs, including more than 200 which work on HIV/AIDS.

Russia is experiencing a concentrated HIV/AIDS epidemic fueled by injection drug use. Together with the Global Fund, UNAIDS, other international organizations and an array of Russian NGOs, local regional and national authorities, USAID is supporting dissemination and institutionalization of best practices for prevention, care and treatment.

USAID also has supported Russia's reemerging efforts as a global donor and partnered with Russia to address health issues in third countries and globally. In the last two years, the U.S. and Russia have signed protocols of intent to work together on the global effort to eradicate polio and to control malaria.

USAID has been a proud supporter of Russia's oldest human rights organizations that have been pivotal in promoting support for democratic values throughout Russia.

As a world-wide movement for open government has developed, USAID has supported civic watchdog groups in Russia that have provided non-partisan oversight over electoral processes including through innovative uses of technology.

USAID supports civil society organizations whose number and influence has grown from 40 registered organizations in 1987 to approximately 300,000 today, not including state-funded public organizations. These organizations contribute to Russia's economic, political and social life in numerous ways and provide opportunities for citizens to help create better communities and elevate their voices.

USAID has helped foster the development of skills and relationships that have generated a more resilient information environment, especially as technology has evolved. Since 1992, USAID has supported the development of professional relationships between Russian and American journalists, publishers, electronic media managers, designers, content developers, advertising specialists and new media practitioners. In recent years, USAID media programs have worked to encourage convergence between traditional and new, innovative digital media.

USAID-funded Rule of Law implementers helped draft the Russian Constitution, Part I of the Russian Civil Code, and the Russian Tax Code.

USAID assistance led directly to the adoption of the 2001 Land Code which provided the right to buy, sell, and own urban and rural land in Russia.

Since 2001, the Government of Russia and the World Bank collaborated to implement two multi-billion-dollar judicial reform programs. These programs were built on models and best practices introduced to Russia by USAID programs in 1992-2008, which were related to improvements in court administration, justices of the peace, and jury trials. Russia increased its court administration budget thirty-three times between 2001 and 2010. The number of judges and their salaries were increased as well. Justices of the Peace and jury trials were reintroduced into the Russian justice system.

Over 5,000 Russian and U.S. judicial officials have taken part in exchanges and events resulting in strong partnerships between Russian judicial bodies and U.S. counterparts.

The U.S. Russia Investment Fund (TUSRIF), founded with a 1995 grant of \$329 million from the US Government, promoted the development of a free market economy in Russia by providing investment capital to well-conceived, potentially high-growth entrepreneurial companies. TUSRIF generated in excess of \$350 million in investment proceeds, and attracted \$1.2 billion in outside equity, debt and co-investments.

Through microfinance, USAID supported the development of the small business sector, which in Russia still accounts for only about 12% of the economy as compared with 50-70% of the U.S. and European economies.

The Russian electricity sector has successfully undergone substantial restructuring and reform since 1992. Early USAID assistance focused on restructuring and particularly the

design of the future competitive electricity market. These principles and design guide today's electricity market as implemented by the Government, the electric utility system companies and their advisors. In 2012, USAID has been helping Russia develop a smart grid and improve energy efficiency.

In September 2012 Russia's Foreign Ministry has asked the Obama administration to end all USAID programs in Russia and to recall the 13 American diplomats working here for USAID by Oct. 1. In Washington, the State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland issued a statement Tuesday saying that USAID's presence in Russia will end, but that U.S. diplomats "look forward to continuing cooperation with Russian non-governmental organizations."

In Moscow, a senior U.S. administration official said the Obama administration will not change its human rights policy with respect to Russia. He said Washington will look "for new ways to achieve those ends." Russian President Vladimir Putin has enacted a series of restrictive laws since returning to office in May. He and the country's state-run media also have been sharply critical of the United States.

Source: <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/usaid-russia>

Sanctions Against Persons Contributing To The Situation In Ukraine And Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect To The Crimea Region Of Ukraine

This document is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662, 13685, applicable laws, and the implementing regulations pertaining to Ukraine (31 C.F.R. part 589) contain the legally binding provisions governing the sanctions. This document does not supplement or modify the Executive orders or the Regulations.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions program implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) began on March 6, 2014, when the President, in Executive Order (E.O.) 13660, declared a national emergency to deal with the threat posed by the actions and policies of certain persons who had undermined democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threatened the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine; and contributed to the misappropriation of Ukraine's assets. In further response to the actions and policies of the Government of the Russian Federation, including the purported annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine, the President issued three subsequent Executive orders that expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in E.O. 13660. Together, these orders authorize, among other things, the imposition of sanctions against persons responsible for or complicit in certain activities with respect to Ukraine; against officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; against persons operating in the arms or related materiel sector of the Russian Federation; and against individuals and entities operating in the Crimea region of Ukraine. E.O. 13662 also authorizes the imposition of sanctions on certain entities operating in specified sectors of the Russian Federation economy. Finally, E.O. 13685 also prohibits the importation or exportation of goods, services, or technology to or from the Crimea region of Ukraine, as well as new investment in the Crimea region of Ukraine by a United States person, wherever located.

II. OVERVIEW OF AUTHORITIES

On March 6, 2014, the President issued E.O. 13660 pursuant to, inter alia, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.) (NEA).

On March 16, 2014, the President issued E.O. 13661 pursuant to, inter alia, IEEPA and the NEA to expand the scope of the national emergency declared in E.O. 13660 of March 6, 2014.

On March 20, 2014, the President issued E.O. 13662 pursuant to, inter alia, IEEPA and the NEA to further expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014, and expanded by Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014.

On May 8, 2014, OFAC issued a set of regulations to implement E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, and E.O. 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 26365, May 8, 2014). See 31 C.F.R. part 589, Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations (the "Regulations") for details.

On July 16, 2014, the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination that section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13662 shall apply to the financial services and energy sectors of the Russian Federation economy.

On September 12, 2014, the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination that section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13662 shall also apply to the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

On December 19, 2014, the President issued E.O. 13685 pursuant to, inter alia, IEEPA and NEA to take additional steps to address the Russian occupation of the Crimea region of Ukraine. E.O. 13685 prohibits the exportation or importation of any goods, services, or technology to or from the Crimea region of Ukraine, and prohibits new investment in the Crimea region of Ukraine by a U.S. person, wherever located.

Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions also block the property and interests in property of individuals and entities listed in the Annex to E.O. 13661 or of those determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, to meet the criteria in E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, or E.O. 13685, including those determined:

1. To be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, any of the following:
2. Actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Ukraine;
3. Actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine; or
4. Misappropriation of state assets of Ukraine or of an economically significant entity in Ukraine;
5. To have asserted governmental authority over any part or region of Ukraine without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine;
6. To be a leader of an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in any activity described in E.O. 13660 or of an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13660;
7. To be an official of the Government of the Russian Federation;
8. To operate in the arms or related materiel sector in the Russian Federation;
9. To operate in such sectors of the Russian Federation economy as may be determined by the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State;
10. To operate in the Crimea region of Ukraine;

11. To be a leader of an entity operating in the Crimea region of Ukraine;
12. To be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation; or a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, or E.O. 13685; or
13. To have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation; activity described in subsections a(i) or a(ii) of E.O. 13660; or a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, or E.O. 13685.

This fact sheet is a broad summary of the sanctions currently in place. For an updated list of authorities and sanctions please refer to the OFAC's website at:

<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/ukraine.aspx>.

III. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS

Sanctions with respect to the Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions program fall into the following three broad categories, as set forth in greater detail below:

- (1) Blocking sanctions against individuals and entities designated pursuant to E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, or E.O. 13685 and listed on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List);
- (2) Sectoral sanctions against entities operating in sectors of the Russian economy identified by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13662 and listed on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification List (SSI List); and
- (3) A new investment ban and prohibition on the exportation or importation of goods, technology, or services to or from the Crimea region of Ukraine.

Blocking sanctions

Unless otherwise authorized or exempt, transactions by U.S. persons or in the United States are prohibited if they involve transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing, or otherwise dealing in the property or interests in property of an entity or individual listed on OFAC's SDN List. The property and interests in property of an entity that is 50 percent or more owned, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by one or more persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any part of 31 C.F.R. chapter V are also blocked, regardless of whether the entity itself is listed. For details please see: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/licensing_guidance.pdf.

Sectoral sanctions

The sectoral sanctions imposed on specified persons operating in the Russian economy identified by the Secretary of the Treasury were implemented under E.O. 13662 through Directives issued by OFAC pursuant to its delegated authorities. Those Directives impose prohibitions on U.S. persons and within the United States for certain specified transactions with entities made subject to the relevant Directive, as identified on the SSI List. The property and interests in property of an entity that is 50 percent or more owned, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by one or more sanctioned persons are also sanctioned, regardless of whether the entity itself is listed on the SSI List. The property and interests in property of these persons are not blocked, nor are transactions with them prohibited beyond these restrictions.

1. Directive 1, as amended, prohibits the following transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States: (1) all transactions in, provisions of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new equity of persons determined to be subject to Directive 1, their property, or their interests in property; and (2) all activities related to debt or equity issued before September 12, 2014, that would have been prohibited by the prior version of Directive 1 (which extended to activities involving debt of longer than 90 days maturity or equity if that debt or equity was issued on or after the date a person was determined to be subject to Directive 1).
2. Directive 2, as amended, prohibits the following transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of the persons subject to Directive 2, their property, or their interests in property.
3. Directive 3 prohibits the following transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of the persons subject to Directive 3, their property, or their interests in property.
4. Directive 4 prohibits the following transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States: providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for deep-water, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in maritime area claimed by the Russian Federation and extending from its territory, and that involve any person subject to Directive 4, its property, or its interests in property.

The names of those persons and entities listed in an Annex to, or designated pursuant to, E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, and E.O. 13685, whose property and interests in property are blocked, are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into OFAC's SDN List with the prefix "UKRAINE" in the program tag associated with each listing. The names of those entities that are subject to Directives 1, 2, 3, or 4, pursuant to E.O. 13662, are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into OFAC's SSI List with the prefix "UKRAINE-EO 13662" in the program tag associated with each listings. The consolidated SDN and SSI Lists are available on OFAC's website at <http://www.treasury.gov/sdn>.

- New investment ban and trade embargo the following transactions involving the Crimea region of Ukraine are generally prohibited:
- New investment in the Crimea region of Ukraine by a U.S. person, wherever located;

The importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, services, or technology from the Crimea region of Ukraine;

- The exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a U.S. person, wherever located, of any goods, services, or technology to the Crimea region of Ukraine; and
- Any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States.

III. AUTHORIZED TRANSACTIONS

GENERAL LICENSES

OFAC may authorize certain types or categories of activities and transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under the Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions program by issuing a general license. General licenses may be published in the Regulations or on OFAC's website. For example, certain transactions related to derivative products under Directives 1, 2, and 3 of Executive Order 13662 are authorized where the underlying asset would constitute new debt or equity subject to those directives.

Additionally, certain transactions which would otherwise be prohibited pursuant to E.O. 13685 are authorized by general license, including:

- The exportation or reexportation of certain agricultural commodities, medicine, medical supplies, and replacement parts from the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located, to the Crimea region of Ukraine;
- Noncommercial, personal remittances by U.S. persons to or from the Crimea region of Ukraine, or for or on behalf of a person ordinarily resident in the Crimea region of Ukraine;
- The operation of certain accounts in a U.S. financial institution for an individual ordinarily resident in the Crimea region of Ukraine;
- Certain transactions with respect to the receipt and transmission of telecommunications and mail involving the Crimea region of Ukraine; and
- The exportation or reexportation of certain services and software from the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located, to the Crimea region of Ukraine.

For a current list of all general licenses relating to the Ukraine sanctions program, please see 31 C.F.R. part 589 subpart E and visit <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/ukraine.aspx>.

SPECIFIC LICENSES

On a case-by-case basis OFAC considers applications for specific licenses to authorize transactions that are neither exempt nor covered by a general license. Requests for a specific license must be submitted to OFAC's Licensing Division. License requests may be submitted using any of the below methods:

Online: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/licensing.aspx>

Fax: (202) 622-1657

U.S. mail: Assistant Director for Licensing, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Freedman Bank
Building, Washington, DC 20220

V. PENALTIES

Civil monetary penalties of up to the greater of \$250,000 or twice the amount of the underlying transaction may be imposed administratively against any person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, E.O. 13685, or the Regulations. Upon conviction, criminal penalties of up to \$1,000,000, imprisonment for up to 20 years, or both, may be imposed on any person who willfully commits or attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of a violation of E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, E.O. 13685, or the Regulations.

This document is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. Please see particularly Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685, the Regulations, and other applicable laws and regulations for legally binding provisions governing the sanctions. This document does not supplement or modify the Executive orders, laws or regulations.

OFAC administers a number of U.S. economic sanctions programs. OFAC sanctions programs can range from being comprehensive in nature, such as a program that blocks the entire government of a country and includes broad geographically-based trade restrictions, to being fairly limited, such as a program that targets only specific individuals and entities. Some programs both target particular individuals and entities and prohibit types of transactions.

It is therefore important to review the details of any given sanctions program to understand its scope. It is also important to note that although a program may be targeted, the prohibitions in such programs on dealings with individuals and entities whose property and interests in property are blocked are very broad, and they apply regardless of where the targeted person is located. The names of individuals and entities that are designated or identified as blocked by OFAC are

incorporated into OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List), which includes over 6,000 names of persons whose property and interests in property are blocked.

Note, however, that the SDN List is not a comprehensive list of all such entities and individuals. The property and interests in property of an entity that is 50 percent or more owned, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by one or more sanctioned persons are also sanctioned, regardless of whether the entity itself is listed on the SDN or SSI Lists.

Please note that OFAC maintains other sanctions lists that may have different prohibitions associated with them. See the "Sanctions Programs and Country Information" page for information on specific programs and other Treasury sanctions lists). Because OFAC's programs are constantly changing, it is very important to check OFAC's website on a regular basis. You may also wish to sign up for updates via OFAC's Email Notification System, to receive notifications regarding changes to OFAC's sanctions programs. For additional information about these programs or about sanctions involving Ukraine and Russia please contact:

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

U.S. Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Freedman Bank Building
Washington, DC 20220
www.treasury.gov/ofac
(202) 622-2490

Source: <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ukraine.txt>

Appendix A: Russia at a Glance

Geographic coordinates: 60 00 N, 100 00 E

Area:

total: 17,098,242 sq km

land: 16,377,742 sq km

water: 720,500 sq km

country comparison to the world: 1

Area - comparative: approximately 1.8 times the size of the US

Land boundaries: total: 22,408 km

Border countries (14): Azerbaijan 338 km, Belarus 1,312 km, China (southeast) 4,133 km, China (south) 46 km, Estonia 324 km, Finland 1,309 km, Georgia 894 km, Kazakhstan 7,644 km, North Korea 18 km, Latvia 332 km, Lithuania (Kaliningrad Oblast) 261 km, Mongolia 3,452 km, Norway 191 km, Poland (Kaliningrad Oblast) 210 km, Ukraine 1,944 km

Coastline: 37,653 km

Maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm, contiguous zone: 24 nm, exclusive economic zone: 200 nm, continental shelf: 200-m depth or to the depth of exploitation

Climate: ranges from steppes in the south through humid continental in much of European Russia; subarctic in Siberia to tundra climate in the polar north; winters vary from cool along Black Sea coast to frigid in Siberia; summers vary from warm in the steppes to cool along Arctic coast

Terrain: broad plain with low hills west of Urals; vast coniferous forest and tundra in Siberia; uplands and mountains along southern border regions

Elevation: mean elevation: 600 m elevation extremes: lowest point: Caspian Sea -28 m highest point: Gora El'brus 5,642 m (highest point in Europe)

Natural resources: wide natural resource base including major deposits of oil, natural gas, coal, and many strategic minerals, reserves of rare earth elements, timber, note: formidable obstacles of climate, terrain, and distance hinder exploitation of natural resources

Land use:

agricultural land 13.1%

arable land 7.3%; permanent crops 0.1%; permanent pasture 5.7%

forest: 49.4%

other: 37.5% (2011 est.)

Irrigated land: 43,000 sq km (2012)

Population - distribution: population is heavily concentrated in the westernmost fifth of the country extending from the Baltic Sea, south to the Caspian Sea, and eastward parallel to the Kazakh border; elsewhere, sizeable pockets are isolated and generally found in the south

Natural hazards

permafrost over much of Siberia is a major impediment to development; volcanic activity in the Kuril Islands; volcanoes and earthquakes on the Kamchatka Peninsula; spring floods and summer/autumn forest fires throughout Siberia and parts of European Russia

volcanism: significant volcanic activity on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Kuril Islands; the peninsula alone is home to some 29 historically active volcanoes, with dozens more in the Kuril Islands; Kliuchevskoi (4,835 m), which erupted in 2007 and 2010, is Kamchatka's most active volcano; Avachinsky and Koryaksky volcanoes, which pose a threat to the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, have been deemed Decade Volcanoes by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to their explosive history and close proximity to human populations; other notable historically active volcanoes include Bezymianny, Chikurachki, Ebeko, Gorely, Grozny, Karymsky, Ketoi, Kronotsky, Ksudach, Medvezhia, Mutnovsky, Sarychev Peak, Shiveluch, Tiatia, Tolbachik, and Zheltovsky

Environment - current issues: air pollution from heavy industry, emissions of coal-fired electric plants, and transportation in major cities; industrial, municipal, and agricultural pollution of inland waterways and seacoasts; deforestation; soil erosion; soil contamination from improper application of agricultural chemicals; scattered areas of sometimes intense radioactive contamination; groundwater contamination from toxic waste; urban solid waste management; abandoned stocks of obsolete pesticides

Environment - international agreements: party to: Air Pollution, Air Pollution-Nitrogen Oxides, Air Pollution-Sulfur 85, Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Seals, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Wetlands, Whaling signed, but not ratified: Air Pollution-Sulfur 94

Geography - note: largest country in the world in terms of area but unfavorably located in relation to major sea lanes of the world; despite its size, much of the country lacks proper soils and climates (either too cold or too dry) for agriculture; Mount El'brus is Europe's tallest peak; Lake Baikal, the deepest lake in the world, is estimated to hold one fifth of the world's fresh water

Population: 142,257,519 (July 2017 est.) country comparison to the world: 9

Nationality: noun: Russian(s) adjective: Russian

Ethnic groups: Russian 77.7%, Tatar 3.7%, Ukrainian 1.4%, Bashkir 1.1%, Chuvash 1%, Chechen 1%, other 10.2%, unspecified 3.9% (note: nearly 200 national and/or ethnic groups are represented in Russia's 2010 census (2010 est.)

Languages: Russian (official) 85.7%, Tatar 3.2%, Chechen 1%, other 10.1%

Religions: Russian Orthodox 15-20%, Muslim 10-15%, other Christian 2% (2006 est.) note: estimates are of practicing worshipers; Russia has large populations of non-practicing believers and non-believers, a legacy of over seven decades of Soviet rule; Russia officially recognizes Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as traditional religions

Age structure:

0-14 years: 17.12% (male 12,509,563/female 11,843,254)

15-24 years: 9.46% (male 6,881,880/female 6,572,191)

25-54 years: 44.71% (male 31,220,990/female 32,375,489)

55-64 years: 14.44% (male 8,849,707/female 11,693,131)

65 years and over: 14.28% (male 6,352,557/female 13,958,757) (2017 est.)

Dependency ratios: total dependency ratio: 43.5, youth dependency ratio: 24.2, elderly dependency ratio: 19.4, potential support ratio: 5.2 (2015 est.)

Median age:

total: 39.6 years

male: 36.6 years

female: 42.5 years (2017 est.)

country comparison to the world: 53

Population growth rate: -0.08% (2017 est.) country comparison to the world: 205

Birth rate: 11 births/1,000 population (2017 est.) country comparison to the world: 178

Death rate: 13.5 deaths/1,000 population (2017 est.) country comparison to the world: 9

Net migration rate: 1.7 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2017 est.) country comparison to the world: 52

Population distribution: population is heavily concentrated in the westernmost fifth of the country extending from the Baltic Sea, south to the Caspian Sea, and eastward parallel to the Kazakh border; elsewhere, sizeable pockets are isolated and generally found in the south

Urbanization: urban population: 74.2% of total population (2017)

Major urban areas - population: MOSCOW (capital) 12.166 million; Saint Petersburg 4.993 million; Novosibirsk 1.497 million; Yekaterinburg 1.379 million; Nizhniy Novgorod 1.212 million; Samara 1.164 million (2015)

Sex ratio:

at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female

0-14 years: 1.06 male(s)/female

15-24 years: 1.05 male(s)/female

25-54 years: 0.96 male(s)/female

55-64 years: 0.75 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.45 male(s)/female

total population: 0.86 male(s)/female (2016 est.)

Life and Death

Mother's mean age at first birth: 24.6 years (2009 est.)

Maternal mortality ratio: 25 deaths/100,000 live births (2015 est.) country comparison to the world: 122

Infant mortality rate: total: 6.8 deaths/1,000 live births

male: 7.6 deaths/1,000 live births

female: 5.9 deaths/1,000 live births (2017 est.)

country comparison to the world: 163

Life expectancy at birth:

total population: 71 years

male: 65.3 years

female: 77.1 years (2017 est.)

country comparison to the world: 154

Total fertility rate:

1.61 children born/woman (2017 est.)

country comparison to the world: 179

Contraceptive prevalence rate:

68%

note: percent of women aged 15-44 (2011)

Health expenditures:

7.1% of GDP (2014)

country comparison to the world: 80

Physicians density:

3.31 physicians/1,000 population (2014)

Hospital bed density:

9.7 beds/1,000 population (2006)

Drinking water source:

improved:

urban: 98.9% of population

rural: 91.2% of population

total: 96.9% of population

unimproved:

urban: 1.1% of population

rural: 8.8% of population

total: 3.1% of population (2015 est.)

Sanitation facility access:

improved:

urban: 77% of population

rural: 58.7% of population

total: 72.2% of population

unimproved:

urban: 23% of population

rural: 41.3% of population

total: 27.8% of population (2015 est.)

Major infectious diseases:

degree of risk: intermediate

food or waterborne diseases: bacterial diarrhea

vectorborne disease: tickborne encephalitis (2016)

Obesity - adult prevalence rate: 23.1% (2016)

country comparison to the world: 70

Education expenditures: 3.9% of GDP (2012) country comparison to the world: 110

Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 99.7%

male: 99.7%

female: 99.6% (2015 est.)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):

total: 15 years

male: 15 years

female: 15 years (2014)

Unemployment, youth ages 15-24:

total: 16%

male: 15.3%

female: 16.9% (2015 est.)

country comparison to the world: 78

Source: The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency