

ATLANTICA

**The Legislative History of the Atlantic Union
Movement in the U.S. Congress and Beyond
(1939 - 1980)**

Updated 7/27/2019

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Introduction

This publication documents a legislative attempt to transform the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into an Atlantic Union based on federalist principles from 1949 to 1980. It also explores an attempt to transform the United Nations (UN) into a world federation. You cannot understand American foreign policy today without knowing the history of these movements.

Chapter 1 – The Roosevelt Years

Before Clarence K. Streit penned *Union Now* he was a journalist by education and trade. He covered the failing League of Nations for *The New York Times* in the 1930s after studying at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. Streit was no stranger to war and peace issues. He volunteered for service with the 8th Railway Engineers in France at the start of World War I, and later transferred to the U.S. Army intelligence service at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He was uniquely positioned to see the politics behind the Treaty of Versailles. According the Streit –

I had access there to many highly secretive official documents, not only the daily record of the secret meetings of Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, etc., but daily dispatches between the President and American generals on all fronts, our diplomats, and Washington (on the home and Senate situation). I was in an unusual position to see daily what was really happening, and how little the press or public knew of this, and to see, too, from the inside how propaganda was being handled abroad and at home (*Union Now*, 1939).

Over time, Streit grew tired of reporting on the failures of the League to contain Nazi Germany. Unwilling to wait for the world to change, he decided to hang up his journalism career and become a political activist. In 1939, Streit proposed the Atlantic Union idea in *Union Now* to defend and extend the blessings of individual liberty as the sine qua non of world peace –

The way through is Union now of the democracies that the North Atlantic and a thousand other things already unite – Union of these few peoples in a great federal republic built on and for the thing they share most, their common democratic principle of government for the sake of individual freedom.

This Union would be designed (a) to provide effective common government in our democratic world in those fields where such common government will clearly serve man's freedom better than separate governments, (b) to maintain independent national governments in all other fields where such government will best serve man's freedom, and (c) to create by its constitution a nucleus world government capable of growing into universal world government peacefully and as rapidly as such growth will best serve man's freedom.

By (a) I mean the Union of the North Atlantic democracies in these five fields:

- a union government and citizenship
- a union defense force
- a union customs-free economy
- a union money
- a union postal and communications system.

By (b) I mean the Union government shall guarantee against all enemies, foreign and domestic, not only those rights of man that are common to all democracies, but every existing national or local right that is not clearly incompatible with effective union government in the five named fields. The Union would guarantee the right of each democracy in it to govern independently all its home affairs and practice democracy at home in its own tongue, according to its own customs and in its own way, whether by republic or kingdom, presidential, cabinet or other form of government, capitalist, socialist or other economic system.

By (c) I mean the founder democracies shall so constitute The Union as to encourage the nations outside it and the colonies inside it to seek to unite with it instead of against it. Admission to The Union and to all its tremendous advantages for the individual man and woman would from the outset be open equally to every democracy, now or to come, that guarantees its citizens The Union's minimum Bill of Rights.

The Great Republic would be organized with a view to its spreading peacefully round the earth as nations grow ripe for it. Its Constitution would aim clearly at achieving eventually by this peaceful, ripening, natural method the goal millions have dreamed of individually, but never sought to get by deliberately planning and patiently working together to achieve it. That goal would be achieved by The Union when every individual of our species would be a citizen of it, a citizen of a disarmed world enjoying world free trade, a world money and a world communications system. Then Man's vast future would begin.

After *Union Now* was published by Harper & Brothers in March of 1939, Streit set up a nonprofit organization called Federal Union, Inc., and launched the *Atlantic Union Bulletin*—which later evolved into *Freedom & Union: Magazine of the Democratic World*. He initially focused on educating the public on the principles of individual freedom and federal union. He then proceeded to convince President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to call an Atlantic constitutional convention.

Streit believed that the federal convention approach used by America's Founding Fathers was the best way to establish an Atlantic Union. He suggested that the President invite other civil liberty democracies to send representatives to the convention to draft a transatlantic constitution based on federalist principles. Participating nations would then ratify it in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

Streit argued that the American people needed to exercise their sovereignty rather than surrender it. He interpreted the American Declaration of Independence to mean that individuals were sovereign, regardless of where they were born. He argued that nations were no more sovereign than kings, or the free and independent States predating the Constitution of the United States. He believed that the individual was the basic unit of federalism, not states.

A sense of urgency inspired Streit to call on the President to take the lead. He hoped that an Atlantic Union could be established in time to contain Nazi Germany—but he was obviously too late. World War Two started months after *Union Now* was first published. There still was time, however, to save Western Europe if the United States entered the war sooner rather than later. Naturally, many Americans were suspicious of his motives.

On October 3, 1940, Senator Rush Holt of West Virginia exposed Streit on the floor of the Senate as a member of a Rhodesian conspiracy to save the British Empire. The Atlantic Union idea, after all, was popular among Rhodes Scholars seeking Anglo-American reunification. Senator Holt cited media reports that Streit enjoyed private conversations with President Roosevelt about an eventual alliance with Great Britain. Streit would later reveal that Roosevelt expressed interest in the Atlantic Union idea during these conversations.

Other British elites favored the Atlantic Union idea as well. Phillip Kerr (Lord Lothian), for example, endorsed *Union Now* in 1939. He was a Secretary of the Rhodes Trust and an advocate of British Imperial Federation. When Lothian endorsed Streit's book, he was the British Ambassador to the United States (June of 1939 until his death in December of 1940). The British desperately needed the United States to either enter the war, or sell, lend, or lease them military aid.

Roosevelt opted for lend-lease rather than Atlantic Union. It was far easier to convince Congress to reverse neutrality laws than betray the parting wisdom of President George Washington on entangling alliances. American companies were anxiously waiting for the opportunity to sell war

goods and services to the British – and to the Russians for that matter.

Across the Atlantic, British elites were already familiar with the concept of international federal union. From the late 1800s to the early 1900s, British Imperial Federalists called for the consolidation of the British Empire into a superstate based on federalist principles. They would later embrace the vision of Benjamin Franklin Trueblood and the World Federation League of the New York Peace Society in 1910. Thirty years later, British elites hoped that a European union of sorts could save Britain from Nazi Germany.

Union Now inspired the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, to propose Anglo-French Union in June of 1940 at the suggestion of Jean Monnet. With the full endorsement of the French Undersecretary of War, Charles de Gaulle, Churchill proposed the following idea to the Prime Minister of France, Paul Reynaud –

At this most fateful moment in the history of the modern world the Governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic make this declaration of indissoluble union and unyielding resolution in their common defence of justice and freedom, against subjection to a system which reduces mankind to a life of robots and slaves.

The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations but one Franco-British Union. The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial, and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France.

Both countries will share responsibility for the repair the devastation of war, wherever it occurs in their territories, and the resources of both shall be equally, and as one, applied to that purpose.

During the war there shall be a single war Cabinet, and all the forces of Britain and France, whether on land, sea, or in the air, will be placed under its direction. It will govern from wherever it best can. The two Parliaments will be formally associated.

The nations of the British Empire are already forming new armies. France will keep her available forces in the field, on the sea, and in the air.

The Union appeals to the United States to fortify the economic resources of the Allies and to bring her powerful material aid to the common cause.

The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy no matter where the battle may be. And thus

we shall conquer.

General de Gaulle delivered Churchill's proposal to Reynaud who then presented it to the French cabinet. They refused to federate with a corpse. Anglo-French Union was rejected with prejudice. General de Gaulle would later become the leader of the Free French Forces during the Nazi occupation of France – after he was court-martialed for treason!

After France fell, Streit released another version of his book entitled *Union Now with Britain* in 1941. Great Britain, the mother of America, had to be saved. His book helped President Roosevelt overcome the patriotic lore of the American Revolution – and the War of 1812 – in preparation for an emerging Anglo-American rapprochement.

President Roosevelt convinced the U.S. Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act in 1941. They reversed America's neutrality laws at the behest of Churchill and Stalin. Conservative anti-interventionists, such as Senator Robert A. Taft, opposed lend-lease. They suspected it was only a matter of time before the United States would be forced to enter the war. This is, after all, how the United States got sucked into the First World War.

The Lend-Lease Act was quickly followed by the signing of the Atlantic Charter in August of 1941. President Roosevelt sent a clear message that if the United States entered the war, an Anglo-American world order would follow Allied victory. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to the following eight principles –

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the

means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. **Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential.** They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

The Atlantic Charter translated into free trade and world economic development, national disarmament, and the establishment of a new security architecture to keep the peace. The race was on to shape the new world order. It would either be formed by Nazi or Soviet conquest or Western consent. To get a seat at the drafting table, America needed to enter the war.

After the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, it was up to Streit to make his case that the Atlantic Union idea could deliver on the goals of the Atlantic Charter. Streit, however, had to share the stage with other proponents of world federation who placed their emphasis on world law and national disarmament. He was at a major disadvantage because his initial focus was placed on advancing individual freedom rather than disarmament.

To advance their cause, Streit and company advertised the Atlantic Union idea in leading newspapers. For example, in January of 1942, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts joined Streit in cosigning a petition published in the *Washington Evening Star* calling on President Roosevelt to establish a "World United States." Notable cosigners included Robert Woods Bliss, Grenville Clark, Russell W. Davenport, John Foster Dulles, Harold L. Ickes, and Donald C. Roper.

With these politically-connected elites in his corner, Streit was uniquely positioned to influence American foreign policy after the war. The Atlantic Union idea, however, was inconsistent with President Roosevelt's decision to work with Stalin. Allied victory, after all, was ultimately dependent on Soviet contributions to the war effort.

In 1944, President Roosevelt pursued the Bretton Woods and United

Nations (UN) systems. Atlantic Union was too risky given the circumstances of the war and the emergence of weapons of mass destruction. The last thing he wanted to do was antagonize Stalin. Ultimately, the nation-state system proved to be extremely resilient—at the insistence of the Soviet Union.

At Bretton Woods in July, Britain and the United States fell way short of establishing a sound world currency. They opted for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) instead. An International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IRBD) and an International Development Association (IDA) was set up to reconstruct Europe and provide economic assistance to developing nations. Together they are known as the World Bank.

Moving on to Dumbarton Oaks held in August and September of 1944, a charter for a collective security organization was drafted. The proposed charter would establish a Security Council (SC) and a General Assembly (GC). In theory, the Security Council would keep and maintain the peace after nations disarmed, and the General Assembly would serve as a world forum. Proponents of world government were not impressed.

President Roosevelt passed away on April 12, 1945, months before the United Nations was realized. Power was now in the hands of Harry S. Truman. It was his responsibility to oversee the conclusion of the Second World War, and the ratification and implementation of the United Nations Charter. Standing in his way were conservative anti-interventionists in the Senate.

Chapter 2 – The Truman Years

In August of 1945, President Truman decided to drop two atomic bombs on Imperial Japan. The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki finally ended World War Two. The level of destruction, suffering, and fear caused by the war is hard for Americans to imagine today. It was estimated that over 60 million people were killed—many of them were civilians. During the war, Nazi Germany exterminated millions of Jews as if they were subhuman. Imperial Japan tortured and raped its way through parts of China, Korea, and South-East Asia. The Soviet Union systematically murdered millions who opposed them. Back in the United States, American's longed for the return of their sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers.

President Truman's decision to publicly display the horrific power of atomic warfare made the ratification of the United Nations (UN) Charter a *fait accompli*. Nationalists and anti-interventionists in the Senate were unable to prevent its ratification. The American people were terrified of the prospect of a third world war. They believed it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union would develop its own weapons of mass destruction. The United States Congress was ripe for the world government movement.

On the same day the United Nations was established, October 24, 1945, Senator Glenn Taylor of Idaho introduced a world government resolution at the behest of the Committee to Frame a World Constitution (CFWC). The CFWC was led by Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago. Other members included G.A. Borgese, Mortimer J. Adler, Stringfellow Bar, Robert Redfield, and Rexford G. Tugwell. These presumptuous intellectuals set out to draft a sample constitution for the world. They later published monthly articles on world government in their magazine—*Common Cause: Journal of One World*.

The CFWC was known for their comprehensive, or maximalist, approach to world government. They were out of touch with political reality. Grenville Clark and Robert Lee Humber suggested that the United States pursue a more limited, or minimalist, world federation instead. Clark previously called for a "World United States" with Clarence Streit in 1942, and Humber was known for his campaign to convince state legislatures to adopt world government resolutions with considerable success.¹ As an implementation strategy, world federalists favored transforming the UN

¹ See Baratta, Preston. *The Politics of World Federation*

into a world federation with defined and limited powers in the field of war prevention.

The world federalist idea was a non-starter because the United States had to work with Russia to achieve it. Ironically, Stalin was unwilling to play along because he refused to share power with anyone. The Soviets knew that only a handful of world federalists in the United States were communist sympathizers – the rest were Keynesian capitalists. Like Lenin, Stalin was probably not a fan of so-called “fellow travelers” in the peace movement. He likely viewed them as “false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing).”² Of course, Stalin despised the Atlantic Union idea as well.

The Atlantica strain of the world federalist movement had a much easier path to follow. The Soviet Union could not veto the establishment of an Atlantic Union, and Stalin was in no position to use preemptive war to prevent Atlantic unification. The United States, after all, held an atomic monopoly at the time, and the Soviet Union was too weak to wage war.

Two parallel paths toward world federation thus emerged in 1945. Grenville Clark placed his emphasis on strengthening the United Nations into a world federation, and Streit continued to advance the Atlantic Union idea as a liberating approach to democratic world federation. Stalin viewed both movements as expressions of American imperialism.

In February of 1946, George Kennan made it clear in his famous “long telegram” that the Soviet Union was not going to cooperate with the Anglo-American design of the Bretton Woods and United Nations systems. Stalin had a world order strategy of his own. He feared capitalist encirclement as much as the United States feared the spread of communism.

To prevent another European war and prevent the spread of communism, Winston Churchill called for the establishment of a United States of Europe in September of 1946. Now there were three international federalist proposals to contend with: United States of Europe, Atlantic Union, and world federation. On March 21, 1947, Senators Fulbright and Thomas endorsed Churchill’s call for a federal Europe –

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That the Congress favors the creation of a United States of Europe,
within the framework of the United Nations.*

The Senate did not pass the above resolution, but it eventually became a

² George Kennan, *The Long-Telegram*, 1946

guiding principle of the Marshall Plan and American foreign policy.

Demand for a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and an International Trade Organization (ITO) to oversee it, intensified as a result of the Cold War. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton was actively involved in negotiating the GATT. He also spearheaded the ITO project inspired by the UN Economic and Social Committee in 1946. After the GATT was signed in October of 1947, Clayton would later shape the Marshall Plan.

While President Truman was advancing free trade, proponents of world federation were trying to prevent another world war. In February of 1947, Grenville Clark and Robert Lee Humber consolidated world federalist groups around the country into the United World Federalists (UWF). In November of 1947, the UWF proposed that a world federation should have the following principles and powers –

St. Louis, Mo., November 1-2, 1947

Resolved, That a world federal government must initially be based upon the following principles and include the following powers:

PRINCIPLES

1. Membership: Participation in the world federal government should be open at all times to all nations without the right of secession.

2. Reservation of powers: All powers not delegated to the world federal government should be reserved to the nations and their peoples in order to guarantee to each nation its right to maintain its own domestic, political, economic, social, and religious institutions.

3. Enforcement of world law: World law should be enforceable directly upon individuals.

4. Balanced representation: Representation in the legislative body should be determined upon a just formula recognizing population, economic development, educational level and other relevant factors; each representative to vote as an individual.

5. Bill of rights: The world constitution should include a bill of rights assuring equal and adequate protection to persons affected by the constitution and laws of the world federal government.

6. Revenue: The world federal government should have authority to raise dependable revenue under a carefully defined and limited but direct taxing power independent of national taxation.

7. Amendments: Reasonable provisions should be made for amendment of the Constitution.

POWERS

Such legislative, executive, and judicial powers as may be found necessary to the preservation of peace should be delegated to the world federal government. These should certainly include at least the following provisions which should be incorporated in the world constitution itself:

1. Provisions prohibiting the possession by any nation of armaments and forces beyond an approved level required for internal policing.

2. Provisions requiring control by the world federal government of the dangerous aspects of atomic energy development and of other scientific developments easily diverted to mass destruction.

3. Provisions requiring such world inspection, police and armed forces as may be necessary to enforce world law and provide world security.

4. Other powers: We recognize that although some world federalists believe that such limited powers would be sufficient as a beginning, others are convinced that any world organization to be effective, even at the start, must have broader powers to bring about peaceful change in the direction of a free and prosperous world community. Such differences as exist among world federalists on this point are mainly questions of timing. There is full agreement that we should move as rapidly as possible to a world federal government with authority and power to legislate on other basic causes of international conflict.

The UWF later convinced the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct hearings on the *Structure of the United Nations* in May of 1948. The purpose of the hearing was to explore –

how to the strengthen the United Nations so that it can become what the war-weary, disillusioned and apprehensive peoples of the world believed it was and want it to be, namely, a mechanism whereby disputes between nations can be settled equitably, with sufficient moral and military force to prevent aggression and maintain peace.

The committee invited Cord Meyer, Jr., Thomas Finletter, and W.T.

Holliday testify on behalf of the UWF. Although focus was placed on the United Nations, Streit and company were invited to present the Atlantic Union idea.

During the hearings, Streit made his first jaw-dropping speech before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. He argued that the Atlantic Union idea was more aligned with the realities of the Cold War than the world federalist proposal. He also made sure the committee understood that the eagle does not nibble and gnaw –

None of us would take the mouse as our national emblem. Why, then, do so many Americans tackle momentous matters as a mouse does a piece of cheese, beginning with a nibble, and when that proves too little, taking another nibble, and another – until the trap springs shut?

Cash-and-carry, selective service, 47 destroyers, lend-lease – never a measure bold enough to achieve the difficult feat of winning by measures short of war. Fulbright resolution, United Nations, British loan, Cabinet members testifying in January we must spend billions either on European recovery or on a restored draft, and already the draft is up for resurrection, and we are asked to double defense expenditure, prop up the Charter with amendments and alliances, prepare for military lend-lease. Again the policy of nibble and gnaw, when the only possible way to win without war is to be bold.

The American emblem, after all, is the eagle. The eagle sees from afar, lives by strokes that are bold. We are not mice; we are men. We have made ourselves jaws that grind mountains to powder; we measure out bites in tons. What we have done mechanically we can do morally, and by so doing add greater glory to the meaning of man. I propose that we rise to this occasion.

Streit further stressed that the purpose of world organization should be to safeguard freedom –

At first glance, peace seems to be the main objective, but, I submit, this will not bear second thought. Peace we all desire, but we shall not get peace by deluding ourselves and the rest of the world into believing that peace is our main objective. There is something – as Mr. Dulles said earlier today in answering this question – that Americans desire more even than that and that is equal individual freedom.

Of course, Streit concluded that Atlantic Union was the best way to

ensure that freedom comes first—

If we have the courage of our convictions, our problems come down to this threefold how: (1) How to develop more freedom in the world? (2) How to make sure the bulk of the world's armed power is governed by freedom? (3) How to put more power, particularly productive power, behind freedom? To each of these questions I find this one answer:

Federate the freest fraction of mankind in a great union of the free, and thereafter extend this federal relationship to other nations as rapidly as this proves practicable until the whole world is thus governed by freedom.

After his testimony, Streit and company submitted the following outline of the federal union plan—

The federal union plan would secure freedom, recovery, and peace by uniting the United States and other civil liberty democracies in a federal union of the free, modeled on the United States Constitution. This new republic would be the nucleus for a world government. That is, it would be designed to grow by federating with other nations as this became practicable, much as the United States grew from 13 to 48 States. Pending its growth into a government of, by, and for all people on earth, it would be a member of the UN.

Civil liberty democracies are those nations that have proved most capable of assuring the individual freedom of speech, press, and other basic liberties covered by our term, bill of rights. They include the United States, Canada, Britain, Eire, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, the Union of South Africa. You might add a few more. As the free peoples center mainly on the Atlantic, their union is often called a trans-Atlantic union.

A federal union of the free is an interstate government so made as to keep you, the citizen, free and sovereign. In the union, as in your nation or state, you elect the lawmakers, and their laws are enforced on you individually. Power is divided between the union and your national government with a view to advancing thereby your liberty, prosperity, peace. The division of powers between the union and the national governments, and the character of the union's executive, legislative, and judicial departments, would be decided by a constitutional convention, subject to ratification by each democracy.

The union's powers should include the sole right to conduct foreign relations, maintain armed forces, issue currency, regulate commerce and communications between member nations, grant union citizenship. It should, of course, have the power to tax, and to uphold the bill of rights.

The first federal union of the free was formed by the United States. The Swiss, Canadians, and South Africans have made successful multilanguage federal unions. Freedom for all men equally through an ever-growing federal union of the free—that, in short, is the federal-union plan.

The State Department was skeptical of the Atlantic Union idea because it could undermine their efforts to inspire a federal Europe as well as destroy the United Nations. At the time, the United Nations was the only organization keeping the peace. Secretary of State George C. Marshall stressed the continued importance of working with the Soviet Union—

suggestions that a revised United Nations, or some form of world government, should be achieved, if necessary, without those nations which would be unwilling to join, deserves special attention. Such a procedure would likely destroy the present United Nations organization.

After the hearings, Streit and company decided to pursue a more effective congressional strategy. Their new goal was to convince Congress to pass a resolution calling on the President to convene an Atlantic constitutional convention. Their plan was suspect considering that the American people never granted Congress or the President the power to establish an Atlantic Union. Such power is reserved to the people under the 10th Amendment.

Streit was now sailing in uncharted waters as Federal Union was not structured to lobby Congress. A new skipper was needed for this initiative. Will Clayton volunteered after the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan) passed and the Senate rejected his International Trade Organization (ITO) initiative in 1948.

After leaving government service, Clayton endorsed the Atlantic Union idea. He wanted to create a fair international economic order. For example, Article 7, Section 1 of the proposed ITO Charter was designed to address potential regulatory bottom feeding—

The Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take fully into account the rights of workers

under inter-governmental declarations, conventions and agreements. They recognize that all countries have a common interest in the achievement and maintenance of fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the improvement of wages and working conditions as productivity may permit. The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and, accordingly, in each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.

Clayton likely endorsed federal trade because free trade between free and unfree people was unfair. Under the federal union plan, a Texan could eventually trade with a German the same way he would trade with a Californian. The Atlantic Union idea promised free and fair trade for all – not just MNCs.

In January of 1949, Clayton teamed up with Streit, Justice Roberts, and former Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to form the Atlantic Union Committee (AUC). They rattled the State Department by announcing their agenda months before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed. Inspired by *Union Now*, the AUC set out to enlist public support –

for a resolution to be introduced in Congress inviting other democracies with whom the U.S. is contemplating an alliance, to meet with American delegates in a federal convention to explore the possibilities of uniting them in a Federal Union of the Free.

On February 11, Clayton and Justice Roberts met privately with President Truman. He was sympathetic to the Atlantic Union idea but refused to instruct Secretary of State Acheson to give them the green light. State favored the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) followed by a united Europe augmented by an Atlantic partnership. The Atlantic Union Committee (AUC) set out to change their mind.

The AUC recruited Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee to introduce an Atlantic Union resolution in the Senate. Representative James Wadsworth of New York volunteered to introduce it in the House of Representatives. The resolution offered an alternative to the world federalist resolution already circulating in the halls of Congress. The Atlantic Union resolution had a series of hurdles in its way.

The establishment of NATO was its first major hurdle. AUC had no

choice but to support it on the condition that it would serve as a stepping stone toward Atlantic Union. Senator Kefauver validated this approach on July 11, 1949 when he told his fellow Senators –

I shall vote for its ratification, without reservation, but I consent only because I see it as a necessary interim measure, a measure that will gain the time needed to explore in peace a far more promising prospect – the possibility of eventually uniting the democracies of the North Atlantic by our own basic Federal principles into a great Atlantic Union of the Free.

Days after the Atlantic Pact was ratified, Kefauver introduced the first Atlantic Union resolution in the Senate on behalf of 20 other Senators –

Whereas the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have declared themselves "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law," and "resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security"; and

Whereas they have agreed in article 2 of that treaty to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being" and to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them" and

Whereas the principles on which our American freedom is founded are those of federal union, which were applied for the first time in history in the United States Constitution; and

Whereas our Federal Convention of 1787 worked out these principles of union as a means of safeguarding the individual liberty and common heritage of the people of the thirteen sovereign States, strengthening their free institutions, uniting their defensive efforts, encouraging their economic collaboration, and severally attaining the aims that the democracies of the North Atlantic have set for themselves in the aforesaid treaty; and

Whereas these federal union principles have succeeded impressively in advancing such aims in the United States, Canada, Switzerland, and wherever other free peoples have applied them; and

Whereas the United States, together with the other signatories to the treaty, has promised to bring about a better understanding of these federal principles and has, as their most extensive practitioner and greatest beneficiary, a unique moral

obligation to make this contribution to peace; and

Whereas the United States and the other six democracies which sponsored the treaty have, by their success in drafting it and extending it to others, established a precedent for united action toward the attainment of these aims, and the creation of a free and lasting union: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That the President is requested to invite the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principle political parties, to meet with delegates of the United States in a Federal Convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of federal union.

Notable cosponsors included Senators J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and Guy M. Gillette of Ohio. Senator Fulbright's endorsement softened up the federal Europe first crowd, and Senator Gillette and others would later inspire the creation of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference—now known as the NATO Parliamentarians Assembly (NATO PA). Regardless of its bipartisan support, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations failed to hold hearings on the Atlantic Union resolution in 1949. Too much focus was placed on world government.

A new sense of urgency to strengthen the UN emerged after the Soviet Union successfully detonated its first atomic bomb in August of 1949. Alan Cranston and the United World Federalists seized the moment. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs opted to hold hearings in October on a resolution designed *To Seek Transformation of the United Nations into a World Federation*. The world federalist resolution read—

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate Concurring),
That it is the sense of the Congress that it should be the fundamental objective of the United States to support and to strengthen the United Nations and to seek its development into a world federation open to all nations with defined and limited powers adequate to preserve peace and prevent aggression through the enactment, interpretation and enforcement of world law.

Over 100 members of Congress, including Representatives Christian A. Herter of Massachusetts, Gerald R. Ford of Michigan, and John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts cosponsored the above resolution. Streit would

later convince many of these politicians to endorse the Atlantic Union idea after the Soviet Union blocked UN Charter revision as predicted. Think about, roughly a fourth of the House was willing to work with Russia to establish a world government!

A few months later, in January of 1950, the Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings exclusively on resolutions relating to *Atlantic Union*. Will Clayton used this opportunity to warn members of the committee that “the United States could not long exist as an island of democracy and free enterprise, surrounded by a sea of socialism and communism.” He advanced the Atlantic Union idea as a capitalist alternative to European socialism and Soviet communism.

Clayton argued that free enterprise would crush European socialism if a transatlantic free trade area was established. Critics argued, however, that an Atlantic Union could also be used to impose socialist policies, even communism, on the United States. A so-called union of the free could easily transform into a union of tyranny if Fabian socialists exploited its federalist structure. Of course, this logic applied to the world federalist approach as well.

Streit used some of his time before the subcommittee to clarify the similarities between the Atlantic Union and world federalist resolutions. He wanted to reassure members of Congress that the Atlantic Union idea was a liberating approach to world federation. He went as far as proposing the following addition to Atlantic Union resolution –

2. That the Atlantic Federal Convention be called as the next step in strengthening the United Nations and in attaining a more distant goal which in the Congress, should be a fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the United States – namely, the development of a free world federation open to all nations willing and able to maintain its principles of free, representative government, and capable of effectively safeguarding individual liberty, preventing aggression and preserving peace by its defined and limited powers to enact, interpret, amend and enforce world law.

By February of 1950, world government resolutions of all types were introduced in the U.S. Senate and hearings were scheduled. All eyes were on the influential Committee on Foreign Relations. At the *Revision of the United Nations Charter* hearings, the committee heard testimony, for and against, resolutions relating to world federation, Atlantic Union, and other world order strategies. Senator Claude Pepper of Florida opened the hearings with the following statement –

Due largely to the excessive use of the veto and to the general unwillingness of the Soviet Union to cooperate except on its own terms, the United Nations has not functioned as satisfactorily as we had hoped it would. As a result of this fact, a great national debate is now taking place with respect to various proposals ranging all the way from strengthening the United Nations to the establishment of a world government. The issues involved in this debate are manifested in a number of specific resolutions which have been introduced into the Senate. The occurrence of this debate represents the working of the great American democracy in its best traditional form ... It is my intention, through the work of this subcommittee, to prepare an authoritative report showing exactly where we stand with respect to this matter of international organization and just what is involved for the American people in the various suggestions that have been made for the further development of international organization. At the conclusion of the hearings, such a report will be available for every interested citizen who might wish to use it as an authoritative reference volume.

A plethora of proponents of world government testified. Enjoying pole position were Alan Cranston of United World Federalists and Clarence Streit of the Atlantic Union Committee. Both delivered signature testimony outlining their cases. Congress also invited the executive branch to make their case for or against the proposals under consideration.

The State Department sent over Assistant Secretary of State John D. Hickerson to dampen the mood in the Senate. They were unwilling to endorse any world order strategies that conflicted with their own. Hickerson rejected both the world federalist (Exhibit 1) and Atlantic Union (Exhibit 2) proposals. The only resolution State showed some level of interest in was the Fulbright-Thomas resolution that simply declared that Congress favored the political federation of Europe. The unification of Europe, after all, was already declared a goal of the Marshall Plan.

Further complicating the matter, the Atlantic Union Committee had to contend with another hurdle—nationalism. The American Coalition, Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) voiced their opposition to world government schemes. Omar Ketchum, for example, advised Senators that the VFW was “unalterably opposed to any program which would entail the surrender of any part of the sovereignty of the United States of America in favor of a world government.”

Only months after the hearings ended, the VFW had an opportunity

to recruit new members once the Korean War started in June of 1950. Americans discovered that Streit was right when he questioned the ability of the UN to prevent war. Curiously, William Stueck argued in *Rethinking the Korean War* (Princeton, 2002) that Stalin lured the United States into the conflict to entangle America in the Koreans.

In July of 1950, the Committee on Foreign Relations released its *Revision of the United Nations Report on Resolutions Relative to the United Nations Charter, Atlantic Union, World Federation, and Similar Proposals*. For each resolution considered, the report offered arguments for and against world federation, as presented by the witnesses. See Exhibits 1 and 2. In the end, the Committee on Foreign Relations was unwilling to release a favorable report based on the following reasoning —

The committee would have liked to report out a resolution which would give a clear expression of the views of the American people and the Senate toward the proposals before the committee. Such a resolution would undoubtedly be of assistance to the Department of State in formulating a policy with respect to the United Nations and the strengthening of that organization.

This is not possible at this time. For the most part the proposals before the committee involved serious constitutional questions. It would not be proper for the committee to take a position on propositions as fundamental as proposals for world federation or a more limited federation which would involve extensive amendments of the United States Constitution until the issues have been debated, discussed, and understood the length and the breadth of this land. The committee hopes this report and the hearings that have been held will encourage that debate. But the report and the hearings cannot be a substitute for that debate.

Another aspect of the resolutions that the committee cannot overlook is the fact that fundamentally these constitutional questions are raised by the conduct of the Soviet Union. While the committee realizes this statement tends to oversimplify a situation in a world of atomic power, colonial unrest, and the robot man the committee questions whether the proposals pending before it would receive serious and extensive support if the east-west conflict were to abate. If the United Nations were able to function as it was intended to do or as it functioned in the early days of the Korean crisis, it is doubtful whether there would be any extensive demands at this time to strengthen that organization.

The fundamental issue of the day is the east-west conflict, not the question of the nature and extent of international organization. The result is that any serious proposals to strengthen

the United Nations, to create a world federation, or to create an Atlantic union soon become inextricably related to the effect the proposals will have on the east-west conflict. This, of course, is no excuse for ignoring proposals to strengthen international organization. But the existence of the east-west conflict must be recognized and considered in connection with any proposals for strengthening international organizations. Proponents of the various resolutions should consider, for example, not only what effect their proposals might have on the east-west conflict, but also whether if the east-west conflict were settled in some way other than that envisaged by their proposals they would have created an organization in which the United States would still wish to participate.

The committee was partly influenced in its decision not to submit a resolution at this time by the great divergence of views that prevailed among the witnesses. On such fundamental questions as to who should be members of an international organization, what powers should be delegated to it, whether it should be within or without the United Nations, whether it should be open or closed to the Soviet Union, there was no general consensus of opinion.

There was no evidence that one proposal rather than another had such extensive support as to warrant the committee in concluding that a particular course of action should be advocated.

Finally, the committee felt that the Korean crisis and the reaction of the United Nations to that crisis showed that the United Nations had a life and vitality that many witnesses did not think existed. It is still too early, however, to evaluate the effect of the Korean situation on the thinking of the American people about international organization.

The Korean situation does not mean that the people of the United States can now forget about proposals to strengthen international organization. If anything, it makes that problem more real. It poses more acutely than ever problems of international organization such as whether threats to the peace are now so serious that a collective self-defense pact, under article 51 is essential or whether the United Nations should seek to reorganize itself without the Soviet Union as a member.

It is the hope of the committee that this report has set forth objectively the elements of the various proposals and that it may serve to inform the American people and Congress of some of the fundamental issues involved. It hopes that the Executive will encourage the discussion of these issues and that as more and more of the American people become familiar with the proposals, that there may develop a consensus of opinion that will make it possible

for the Executive or the Congress to propose a course of action that will be generally acceptable to the American people as the one most likely to lead to peace and freedom.

Although the Committee on Foreign Relations failed to report favorably on the Atlantic Union resolution, they encouraged further exploration. In January of the 1951, Senator Kefauver reintroduced the Atlantic Union resolution in the Senate with 27 cosponsors—including Senators Richard M. Nixon of California and Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota. Representative Christian A. Herter of Massachusetts led the Atlantic Union charge in the House with over 50 promising supporters.

To overcome the State Department hurdle, Senator Kefauver and the Atlantic Union Committee decided to generate international pressure. Dirk U. Stikker of the Netherlands and Lester B. Pearson of Canada advanced the Atlantic Union idea at the Ottawa meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers. Senator Gillette then capitalized on their endorsement by calling for the creation of a North Atlantic Assembly (NATO Parliamentarians Conference) in November of 1951.

The Atlantic Union and world federalist movements were picking up steam until Senator Bricker and Frank Holman of the American Bar Association sounded the alarm. They warned American patriots that proponents of world government could potentially use the treaty-making power to achieve their subversive aims. In February of 1952, Senator Bricker introduced a constitutional amendment to curb the treaty-making power. The Bricker controversy was fueled in April when John Foster Dulles told an assembly of the American Bar Association that —

The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power liable to abuse. Treaties make international law and also they make domestic law. Under our constitution treaties become the supreme law of the land. They are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty laws can override the Constitution. Treaties, for example can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the President; they can take powers from the State and give them to the Federal Government or to some international body and they can cut across the rights given the people by the constitutional Bill of Rights.

A presidential election year, the introduction of the Bricker amendment electrified patriotic organizations who later passed resolutions favoring its adoption. Many of them rallied behind the presidential candidacy of Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. He was a nationalistic

conservative who opposed Roosevelt's New Deal, U.S. entry into the Second World War, the United Nations, and NATO. He was the Donald Trump of his time.

Republican internationalists recruited General Dwight D. Eisenhower to run against him in the primaries. Eisenhower narrowly secured the Republican nomination. Some feel that Eisenhower used parliamentary trickery to win. During the convention the Eisenhower campaign accused Taft of stealing delegates and then convinced the convention to implement a so-called "Fair Play" rule that ultimately favored Eisenhower. The convention later selected Senator Richard M. Nixon, a former cosponsor of the Atlantic Union resolution, as his running mate. Nationalists were furious.

Shenanigans affected the outcome of the Democratic Party nomination as well. The leading proponent of the Atlantic Union idea, Senator Kefauver, almost secured the nomination after decisively defeating Adlai Stevenson in the primaries. Rather than listen to the will of their base, party bosses nominated Adlai Stevenson, and then selected Senator John Sparkman, a cosponsor of the Atlantic Union resolution, as his running mate. They apparently disliked Senator Kefauver because of his past investigations into organized crime.

Eisenhower later crushed Governor Stevenson in the presidential election. A known cosponsor of the Atlantic Union resolution, Richard Nixon, was elected Vice President of the United States. Nationalists were convinced that the sovereignty of the United States was in jeopardy. Senator Bricker was readied his amendment to make sure progressive internationalists would not use treaties and executive agreements to undermine the Bill of Rights.

Chapter 3 – The Eisenhower Years

Clarence K. Streit was elated that General Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President of the United States. It was only fitting that the first supreme commander of NATO forces could soon have an opportunity to sign an Atlantic Union resolution. American patriots believed Eisenhower was specially selected and elected to establish an Atlantic Union.

Before Eisenhower was sworn in, Senator Bricker reintroduced the Bricker Amendment on January 7, 1953. It read as follows –

1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.
2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in absence of treaty.
3. Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.

Frank Holman described it as –

a symbol or a line of demarcation dividing those who believe that the American concept of government and individual rights should not be sacrificed to international plans and purposes, and those who believe that such a sacrifice should be made in the interest of so-called international cooperation.

Veterans and patriotic groups continued to rally behind the amendment. It was already known that the Soviet Union was using the UN General Assembly and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to facilitate communist propaganda. Now a known proponent of the Atlantic Union idea had the President's ear, and a General Conference of the Members of the United Nations was on the table per Article 109 of the Charter –

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be

held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

The Bricker movement failed to discourage President Eisenhower from pursuing his internationalist agenda. After ending the Korean War by threatening to use nuclear weapons in 1953, Eisenhower signaled his support for UN reform efforts. The U.S. Senate then passed Senate Resolution 126, originally introduced by Senator Gillette, which authorized a senatorial “study of proposals for a modification of existing international peace and security organizations.”

In anticipation of a Charter Review Conference, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations launched a series of public hearings around the country in January of 1954 on the *Review of the United Nations Charter*. The Committee on Foreign Relations invited proponents--and opponents--of world government to testify in the following cities--

1954

- (Jan) – Part I - Washington, D.C.
- (Feb) – Part II – Akron, OH
- (Apr) – Part III – Madison, WI
- (May) – Part IV – Greensboro, NC
- (Jun) – Part V – Louisville, KY
- (Jun) – Part VI – Des Moines, IA
- (Jul) – Part VII – Minneapolis, MN

1955

- (Mar) – Part VIII – Atlanta, GA
- (Mar) – Part IV – Miami, FL
- (Apr) – Part X – San Francisco, CA

(Apr) – Part XI – Denver, CO

(Apr-May) – Part XII – Washington

While the Subcommittee on the UN Charter of the Committee on Foreign Relations was on its world order tour, the Bricker amendment almost passed in February of 1954. Senator Bricker blamed Eisenhower for its 42 to 50 defeat. Bricker reintroduced it in January of 1955, and additional hearings were held, but it failed to reach the floor for another vote. Senator Bricker anxiously awaited the Subcommittee on the UN Charter's recommendation on holding a general review conference. In August of 1955, the subcommittee issued its *Second Interim Report on UN Charter Review* –

The requirement that the Assembly consider this fall the calling of a review conference does not mean that the conference must be scheduled to meet in 1955, or even in 1956. The subcommittee has received little evidence that other governments have given as much attention to the problem of charter review as has the United States Government. It would caution, therefore, against the convening of a review conference until the most thoroughgoing preparations have been undertaken by member states as well as by the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Later in November, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 992(x) declaring "that a General Conference to review the Charter shall be held at an appropriate time." Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against resolution. In December, the UN Security Council concurred with the General Assembly by a vote of 9 to 1. The Soviet Union voted against holding a general review conference – and curiously, France abstained. Ironically, Senator Bricker and his followers were saved by the Soviet Union.

Backing up a bit, while the Senate was exploring ways to strengthen the UN between 1954 and 1955, Streit and company broadened their support after European integration efforts started to unravel. In August of 1954, ratification efforts for the European Defense Community were defeated, and European leaders abandoned their quest to create a European Political Community. A renewed sense of urgency emerged to advance Atlantic unity. The Atlantic Union Committee (AUC) seized the opportunity.

The AUC continued to push for the creation of a transatlantic, representative body as another stepping stone toward Atlantic Union. Their

efforts were aided in October of 1954 by the Declaration of Atlantic Unity (DAU) group composed of 169 eminent citizens from eight NATO nations. Within their declaration was a call for “an advisory Atlantic Assembly.” By November, high-level discussions within NATO circles were ongoing.

The challenge presented to Streit and company by the DAU group was displayed in its name. These Atlanticists declared a need for Atlantic “unity” rather than “federal union.” Streit disliked the gradualist, or functionalist, approach to Atlantic unification. Gradualists, after all, behave like mice; nibble and gnawing their way to imperfect unions, confederations, alliances, and agreements. Americans like to sit down at the table and get the job done – and they demand checks and balances.

In the end, the AUC decided to appease the members of the DAU group. On February 9, 1955, Senator Kefauver introduced a watered-down version of the original Atlantic Union resolution called the Resolution for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention. Gone was Streit’s insistence on federal union as the end goal. The AUC significantly broadened its support by downplaying federalism. Their mission changed to inspiring an Atlantic Convention to promote Atlantic unity, federal or otherwise, to contain communism and the Soviet Union.

Later in May, former Secretary of State General Marshall joined Clayton on the Atlantic Union Committee. Marshall had huge shoes to fill after Justice Roberts passed away during the same month. Perhaps the reality of mortality inspired another sense of urgency within the AUC to get the process of Atlantic integration moving.

In July of 1955, the AUC and the DAU group finally convinced NATO leaders to establish the NATO Parliamentarians Conference (NATO PC). It was set up as an annual meeting where legislators from NATO nations could discuss and make recommendations on transatlantic relations. A few days after the NATO PC was established, the Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings *Relating to the Calling of an Atlantic Exploratory Convention*. Senator Kefauver was ready to make a deal –

I believe that my fellow sponsors would also join me in urging the committee to make any changes in the language of the resolution which you deem necessary in order to better define and make more precise its purposes. For instance, it is my understanding that the executive departments concerned may propose that the language be changed to have the invitation of the President issued on behalf of the Congress. Such a change would certainly be satisfactory with me and is, in fact, in keeping with our constitutional history.

Below is the submitted text of the Atlantic Exploratory Convention resolution as introduced and considered by the committee in 1955—

Whereas the preservation of democratic institutions everywhere demands united action by the world's leading democracies; and

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty has already committed its members to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions," and to "encourage economic collaboration between any of them"; and

Whereas it is essential to determine by what means the democracies can further unify their efforts in the military, political and economic fields to achieve these objectives; and

Whereas the Nine Power agreement to extend the North Atlantic Treaty and defense system to include the German Federal Republic makes such exploration still more timely; and

Whereas it is desirable that this problem be considered by delegates who would act in accordance with their individual convictions and make a public report of their joint findings and recommendations; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), that the President is requested to invite the other democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, including members of their principal political parties, to meet in a convention with similarly appointed delegates from the United States and from such other democracies as the convention may invite, to explore and to report to what extent their peoples might further unite within the framework of the United Nations, and agree to form, federally or otherwise, a defense, economic and political union.

During the hearings, Senator Kefauver quoted Mr. Robert Schuman, French Minister of Justice, to prove that exploring Atlantic federation would not derail efforts to unite Europe. He quoted him as saying—

I have long been an ardent partisan of a European Federation to be integrated itself in the Atlantic Community. But certain European nations have hesitated to advance far in this direction as long as the United States, Canada, and Great Britain were not disposed to explore in common with them an eventual political, economic, and military union.

After citing support from other European leaders in NATO circles,

Senator Kefauver brought up the NATO PC—

And I would call your attention also that in Paris just a few days ago at the NATO parliamentary meeting, which a number of our House Members attended, but unfortunately because of the great work here in the Senate I believe no Senators had the opportunity of attending, they passed a resolution calling upon members of NATO countries to try to find other means of bringing about better working arrangements, unity, looking toward unified action.

To further pressure members of the committee, the Atlantic Union Committee submitted its impressive membership roster. See Exhibit 3. It included influential members of the mainstream media, academia, and industry willing to hoist an Atlantic Union flag above Old Glory. Keep in mind that a list of establishment elites interested in exploring Atlantic unity and resolve would be much larger. Regardless of their impressive support, a green light from the State Department was still missing.

To put even more pressure on State to reverse its position on the Atlantic Union idea, former President Truman joined General Marshall on the Advisory Council of the Atlantic Union Committee. Truman and Marshall inspired the federal Europe first policy and had since changed their minds on the benefits of holding an Atlantic Convention. With Truman on board, the Atlantic Union Committee began tightening the political screws.

The Atlantic Union movement resumed in the Senate in July of 1956 when the Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings *Relating to the Calling of an Atlantic Exploratory Convention, Part II*. Even with NATO's Committee of Three—Halvard Lange of Norway, Lester Pearson of Canada, and Gaetano Martino of Italy—endorsing the Atlantic Union idea, Secretary Dulles refused to endorse it. Overcoming the objections of America's foreign policy establishment remained a formidable hurdle—until a transatlantic crisis occurred the Middle East.

After the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal in July of 1956, France teamed up with Britain and Israel to retake it and remove him from power. The Suez Crisis weakened the Atlantic Alliance when President Eisenhower sided with the Soviet Union and then used political and economic pressure to force Britain and France to withdraw their troops under UN auspices. American intervention in the Suez Crisis had a chilling effect on transatlantic relations.

President de Gaulle was furious at Great Britain for caving to the Americans. It became clear to him that France could not rely on the United

States to protect its regional interests. He was unwilling to play the role of a pawn in an Anglo-American grand design. France would later opt to pursue a foreign policy of independence and grandeur.

In 1957, Senator Kefauver and others convinced the 3rd NATO Parliamentarians to call for an Atlantic Congress to be held in 1959 in preparation for the tenth anniversary of North Atlantic Treaty. The fate of the Atlantic Alliance was on the line. Article 12 of Treaty states –

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

According to the NATO Committee on Information and Cultural Relations in August of 1958 –

The purpose and intention of the Atlantic Congress was to bring together the most distinguished and able citizens representative of the principal aspects of the NATO countries - Industry, Commerce, Finance, Labour, Politics, Education, Mass Media - to consider ways and means of developing, in the fields of political, economic and cultural as well as military affairs: (a) close co-operation between North American and European member countries of NATO; (b) close co-operation between member countries of NATO and those countries lying outside the area of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Streit and company capitalized on the proposed Atlantic Congress. He organized the International Movement for Atlantic Union (IMAU) on its heels. In September of 1958, the IMAU was launched with impressive leadership: General Pierre Billotte, former Defense Minister of France, was elected Chairman; Sir Hartley Shawcross was elected Vice Chairman; Clarence K. Streit was elected President; Franz Van Cauwelaert and Senator Wishart McL. Robertson were elected Vice Presidents; Count Robert De Dempierre was elected Secretary-Treasurer; and Mrs. Chase Osborn was elected Secretary of North America. Other members of the board included: Herbert Agar; Maurice Allais; P.F. Brundage; Air Marshall Sir Lawrance Darvall; Augusto De Castro Sampaio Corte Real; Dr. Alexander Johannesson; Baron W. Michiels Van Kessenich; Alfred Max; Walden Moore; Patrick Nicholson; H.A. Van Nierop; Melvin Ryder; A.W. Schmidt;

Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe; Maitre Lucile Tinayre-Grenaudier; and Dr. Rudolf Wagner.

While Streit organized the IMAU, Grenville Clark re-energized world federalists by coauthoring *World Peace through World Law* with Louis B. Sohn in 1958. Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania later set up the Members of Congress for Peace through Law (MCPL) in 1959. Members of the MCPL were proponents of world federation. By this time, proponents of Atlantic Union and world federation were practically working in concert.

Well organized and positioned, Streit and company launched a full court press on Congress. On March 17, 1959, Senators Kefauver and Humphrey reintroduced the Atlantic Convention resolution. The new purpose of the Atlantic Convention was changed –

to explore and to report to what extent their peoples might, within the framework of the United Nations and in accord with the basic principles of the Constitution of the United States, achieve more effective unity in advancing their common economic and political affairs, their joint defense and the aims of world peace and individual freedom.

The resolution also stressed its nonbinding, unofficial nature –

That the Convention should be composed of leading representative citizens officially appointed on a non-partisan basis but free to explore the problem fully as individuals without being officially instructed or able to commit their governments.

On April 22, 1959, President Eisenhower gave the Atlantic Union Committee a huge gift. After Secretary Dulles resigned for health reasons, Eisenhower replaced him with a former cosponsor of the Atlantic Union resolution—former Representative Christian A. Herter. With Herter as Secretary of the State, the prospects for passing the Atlantic Union resolution dramatically increased. Next up was the Atlantic Congress.

In June of 1959, the Atlantic Congress, composed of 700 eminent citizens representing NATO nations, endorsed the idea of holding a “Special Conference” to explore Atlantic unification. By August, Secretary Herter endorsed the Atlantic Convention resolution subject to Congress, rather than the President, selecting the members of the U.S. delegation. Senator Kefauver and the Atlantic Union Committee finally secured the green light to proceed.

With the Atlantic Convention resolution set for passage, in January

of 1960, Senator Kefauver joined with Senators Church, Clark, Javits, Kennedy, McCarthy, and Javits to strengthen the authority of the United Nations to prevent war by introducing the following resolution —

Whereas the basic purpose of the foreign policy of the United States is to achieve a just and lasting peace; and

Whereas there can be no such peace without the development of the rule of law in the limited field of war prevention; and

Whereas peace does not rest on law today but on the delicate balance of terror of armed force; and

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly at Its fourteenth session unanimously adopted "the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" and called upon governments "to Make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem"; and

Whereas a just and lasting peace would not be assured even if nations lay down their arms unless international institutions for preventing war were strengthened; and

Whereas the United Nations constitutes an important influence for peace but needs to be strengthened to achieve the rule of law in the world community; and

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly at its tenth session resolved that "a general conference to review the charter shall be held at an appropriate time"; and appointed a "Committee consisting of all the members of the United Nations to consider, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the question of fixing a time and place for the conference, and its organization and procedures"; and

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly at its fourteenth session resolved "to keep in being the Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter, and to request the Committee to report, with recommendations, to the General Assembly not later than at Its sixteenth session";

Now, therefore, be It

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That it Is the sense of the Congress that the U.S. position at the next meeting of the Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter should be that the Committee recommends to the United Nations General Assembly that a charter review conference be held not later than December 31, 1962, and that member governments be requested to prepare recommendations and to exchange views with respect to United

Nations Charter review and revision In order to facilitate the organization of the said conference and to further the chances of its success.

SEC. 2. The President is hereby requested to initiate high-level studies in the executive branch of the Government to determine what changes should be made in the Charter of the United Nations to promote a just and lasting peace through the development of the rule of law in the limited field of war prevention. The President is further requested to report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, within twelve months after the date of approval to this resolution, the results of such studies.

SEC. 3. It is further the sense of the Congress that the United States should present specific proposals to strengthen the authority of the United Nations to prevent war, at future international conferences concerning general disarmament and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Senator Kefauver endorsed the above resolution because he wanted to remind left-wing Senators that he shared their end game—a disarmed world. General and complete disarmament under a strengthened UN system would allow an Atlantic Union to enlarge its membership without the threat of war. Capitalism, however, would eventually have to confront communism under such a strategy—and the Soviets knew it.

Regardless of the risks, in February of 1960, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved the Atlantic Convention resolution, but it was later repackaged as the “U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO” resolution. Its preamble was shortened and simplified—

JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the participation in an international convention of representative citizens from the North Atlantic Treaty nations to examine how greater political and economic cooperation among their peoples may be promoted, to provide for the appointment of United States delegates to such convention and for other purposes.

In May of 1960, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on the *Atlantic Convention Resolution*. After overcoming the State Department hurdle, the final hurdle remained—the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Daughters of the American Revolution. In order to ensure passage, members of Congress had to convince themselves, and the public,

that the Atlantic Convention was not a conspiracy to establish an Atlantic Union based on federalist principles. During the hearing, Clarence K. Streit graciously distanced himself from the Atlantic Convention –

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I support the Atlantic Convention resolution before you. This may lead to some misunderstandings because of my long identification with proposals for Atlantic Union or federation. To be fair to my supporters of this resolution who do not—yet—agree with me in those regards, and to prevent any misunderstanding, let me make two things clear at once:

My support of this convention resolution does not mean that it involves any endorsement of Atlantic federation (as did the so-called “Atlantic Union” resolution endorsed in Congress in 1940). Nor does it mean that I no longer urge federation of the free. It means simply this: I find that the security of the United States and of freedom has gone down so much since 1949 that any measure that promises, as does this resolution, to assure early consideration at least of how to unite the Atlantic allies more strongly deserves support, however short it falls of what I think is necessary.

With Streit out of the way, the next step was for State to formerly endorse the Atlantic Convention resolution before the committee. Deputy Assistant of State for European Affairs, Ivan B. White, finally gave the official green light –

The Department considers that meetings such as this resolution might well serve a good purpose. We would be in favor of any useful meetings in which the future of the Atlantic Community can be discussed realistically by thoughtful and responsible people. We in the Department of State would certainly welcome any constructive and practical ideas which might emerge from the proposed convention.

We particularly welcome the thought expressed in the resolution that the delegates to the proposed convention should be free to explore the problem fully as individuals. It appears to us that the cause of frank and constructive discussions at the proposed convention can be best served if it is clear that no government commitment is involved.

On May 24, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson cleared the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO resolution for floor debate. Senators debated the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO bill on June 15 for two hours as if Streit

never existed. Senator Kefauver implied that the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and the Atlantic Congress inspired the Atlantic Convention —

Most of us 'have long been engaged in seeking out ways to strengthen our NATO alliance. Along with a number of other Senators I sponsored the resolution which made the U.S. a member of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference. I have served as chairman of one of the major committees of the Conference.

I joined in writing and working for the resolution in the NATO Parliamentarians Association which brought about the Atlantic Congress in London last year.

Both the NATO Parliamentarians and the Atlantic Congress have strongly recommended the establishment of a smaller body which can meet for longer periods of time, and which can give intensive study to the possible means of strengthening our NATO ties.

At least Senator Thomas Dodd admitted that there was more to the story —

I have no hesitancy in saying to my colleagues that I am a world federalist. World federation at the right time and on the right basis is the answer to peace or war. I do not think world federation is now attainable because of Communist deceit and treachery and because of uncompromising Communist hostility to the free world and its institutions. But I think it is ultimately the only sensible solution to the problem of peace and war in the world.

The resolution we are considering seeks to take another step forward in that direction by at least getting people together, by getting private citizens of the NATO countries to get together to talk about common problems and to find out how we can strengthen the alliances we now have, which are not worldwide but which are really regional and founded on free world principles. We can succeed here because we start out with a broad area of shared common principles. That is all we are trying to do.

Senator Prescott Bush, George H. W. Bush's father, also admitted to knowing more about the true origins of the resolution —

The subject is one I have discussed on and off over a period of 10 years with a very distinguished citizen of my own State, Mr. Elmo Roper, who testified in support of the joint resolution before the Foreign Relations Committee. I believe that it would be well for us to pass this joint resolution today. I believe that a good case has

been made for it.

The U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO resolution was approved by the United States Senate 51 to 44 with 5 not voting. Notables voting in favor included Senators Bush, Gore, Humphrey, and Kennedy. Bush and Gore would spawn a future President and Vice President, and Humphrey later served as a Vice President. Kennedy was destined to become President of the United States. Notables voting against the Atlantic Convention included Senators Goldwater and Thurmond. Goldwater payed the political price. On to the House of Representatives.

On June 20, the resolution passed the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as written. On August 24, Representatives Hays, Judd, and Zablocki led the debate on the House floor with limited discussion of Streit and the Atlantic Union idea. Members of the House, however, were assured that the Atlantic Convention had nothing to do with Atlantic Union –

Mr. PILLION. I thank the gentleman for the very general explanation and the general statement, but, specifically, does this contemplate a political union—one government of the Atlantic nations? Is that the purpose of this resolution—to formulate a base for that type of government? Could the gentleman answer me specifically and particularly with reference to that?

Mr. FULTON. This arose originally in the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1957 not in connection with the Atlantic Union organization or the so-called union now. They unanimously recommended a conference with leading representative citizens from the NATO countries be convoked to examine this matter and make recommendations how greater cooperation and unity of purpose may best be developed.

In June 1959 the Atlantic Congress met for a week in London. I believe that various Members from this body were there. Its 650 delegates discussed a wide range of activities that could appropriately contribute to the end about which we are speaking. The Fifth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1959 reaffirmed its proposal for a citizens' meeting. So, you see, the basis of the initiation of this Commission, as well as the proposed Conference, is much broader than any particular organization or any special sponsorship. I would say to you that the goals of this Commission and Conference are not set. The proposal contains the idea that the Commission be organized for citizens to be appointed so that they will be of an advisory and not of a compelling nature to the U.S. Government, nor shall there be power to commit the United States or any other participating nation to any or all recommendations of

the Commission or the Conference.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. I think in all fairness the gentleman is entitled to an answer to his question. As chairman of the U.S. delegation, I thought I had made it clear in the Atlantic Congress resolution that that was not the purpose of it; that this commission was not to favor a union now, or anything of that kind. It was merely to explore how foreign nations could closer cooperate under article II of the NATO Charter. How they could have closer economic and cultural cooperation, as well as military cooperation. So a definitive answer to the gentleman's question is "No."

With members of Congress assured that voting for the resolution did not imply an official endorsement of the Atlantic Union idea, it passed by a vote of 289 to 103 with 39 not voting. Notable Representatives voting in favor of Atlantic Convention included Foley, Ford, O'Neil, and Wright. Foley, O'Neil and Wright would later become Speakers of the House, and Ford would serve as President of the United States after Nixon was forced to resign.

On September 7, President Eisenhower signed the U.S. Citizens Commission bill, making it Public Law 86-719—

U.S. P.L. 86-719: To authorize the participation in an international convention of representative citizens from the North Atlantic Treaty nations to examine how greater political and economic cooperation among their peoples may be promoted, to provide for the appointment of United States delegates to such convention, and for other purposes.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that

a) the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives acting jointly are hereby authorized, after consultation with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives to appoint a United States Citizens Commission on NATO, hereafter referred to as the Commission. Said Commission shall consist of not to exceed twenty United States citizens, not more than one-half of whom may be from any one political party, and who shall be appointed from private life.

(b) Vacancies in the Commission shall not effect its powers.

Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman amongst its members.

Section 2. a) It shall be the duty of such Commission, to endeavor to arrange for and to participate in such meetings and conferences with similar citizens commissions in the NATO countries as it may deem necessary in order to explore means by which greater cooperation and unity of purpose may be developed to the end that democratic freedom may be promoted by economic and political means.

b) The United States Citizens Commission on NATO is not in any way to speak for or to represent the United States Government.

Section 3. To promote the purposes set forth in section 2, the Commission is hereby authorized

a) to communicate informally the sense of this resolution to parliamentary bodies in NATO countries;

b) to seek to arrange an international convention and such other meetings and conferences as it may deem necessary;

c) to employ and fix the compensation of such temporary professional and clerical staff as it deems necessary; Provided, That the number shall not exceed ten: And provided further, That compensation shall not exceed the maximum rates authorized for committees of the Congress.

d) to submit such reports as it deems appropriate; and

e) to pay its share of such expenses as may be involved as a consequence of holding any meetings or conferences authorized by subparagraph b) above, but not in excess of \$100,000.

Section 4. Members of the Commission, who shall serve without compensation, shall be reimbursed for, or shall be furnished, travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties under this joint resolution, upon vouchers approved by the Chairman of said Committee.

Section 5. Not to exceed \$300,000 is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State to carry out the purposes of his resolution, payments to be made by voucher approved by the Chairman of the Commission subject to the laws, rules and regulations applicable to the obligation and expenditure of appropriate funds. The Commission shall make semi-annual reports to Congress accounting for all expenditures.

Section 6. The Commission shall cease to exist on January 31, 1962. Congress in 1961 extended the deadline to June 30, 1962. Congress in 1961 extended the deadline to June 30, 1962.

In the 1960 presidential election, Senator Kennedy defeated Vice President Nixon. It was a huge blow to proponents of Atlantic Union hoping for a federalist revival at the Atlantic Convention. Kennedy, after all, favored transforming the UN into a world federation. He was more inclined to pursue an Atlantic partnership than federal union.

Chapter 4 – The Kennedy Years

Elections have consequences. In 1961, the Democratic Party had full control over the composition of the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO. The Kennedy administration would also set the tone for the Atlantic Convention of 1962.

During his inaugural address in January of 1961, President Kennedy signaled his potential support for the Atlantic Union idea, federal or otherwise –

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

This much we pledge – and more.

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided there is little we can do – for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

He further called on his “fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.” This is the essence of the Atlantic Union idea.

In March of 1961, Vice President Johnson and Speaker Rayburn appointed Will Clayton and Christian Herter as chairmen of the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO. Elmo Roper was appointed vice chairman; and Richard Wallace, assistant to Senator Kefauver, was appointed as executive director. Clearly missing from the Commission was Clarence K. Streit.

The Commission’s first task was to reach out and invite other NATO nations to attend. Surprisingly, President Charles de Gaulle was one of the

first to accept the Commission's invitation to participate in the Atlantic Convention. General Billotte, chairman of the International Movement for Atlantic Union, likely played a role in President de Gaulle's decision. He was, after all, one of General de Gaulle's top aides during World War Two.

President Kennedy later visited President de Gaulle in May of 1961. He had a huge opportunity to forge a "special relationship" with France by discussing the promise of the upcoming Atlantic Convention that he in fact voted for as a Senator. Kennedy failed to even bring it up, and then flew off to meet with Khrushchev.

Streit later argued that Kennedy's decision to meet Khrushchev soon after meeting with General de Gaulle was a major blunder. His meeting with the Soviet dictator, after all, was followed by the Berlin Crisis. Streit believed President Kennedy would have been better off restoring Atlantic unity and resolve before negotiating with the Soviets.

Consistent with President Eisenhower's foreign policy approach of promoting disarmament followed by Atlantic unity and resolve, on September 25, 1961, President Kennedy called for general complete disarmament under a strengthened UN system before the General Assembly. The State Department later issued its publication, *Freedom from War: The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament*. Although Khrushchev rejected his proposal with prejudice, the Soviet Union was officially advised that the United States would explore world peace through world disarmament and law.

The Atlantic Convention was scheduled to be held roughly three months after Kennedy proposed *Freedom from War*. The citizens of NATO nations would soon discover how far their eminent citizens would be willing to go to unite the free world. They would have an opportunity to recommend a "host of cooperative ventures" for their respective governments to consider. Would the U.S. Citizens Commission propose Atlantic Union?

Chairmen Clayton and Herter hinted at the real agenda of the U.S. Citizens Commission in October of 1961 when they released their treatise called *A New Look at Foreign Economic Policy*. It was nothing more than a free trade manifesto. They essentially called for an Atlantic partnership, the elimination of all tariffs to economically engage the developing world, and "fast track" authority for President Kennedy. Free, rather than federal, trade was their goal.

Ultimately, eminent citizens from NATO nations agreed to explore the parameters of their proposed Atlantic partnership. In January of 1962, the Atlantic Convention was held in Paris, France. Eminent citizens drafted the Declaration of Paris which called for the creation of a "true Atlantic

Community.” See Exhibit 4. The U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO summed up the Atlantic Convention in their *Report* dated June 18, 1962. See Exhibit 5.

Their report, however, did not tell the entire story. Some of the proposals introduced during the Atlantic Convention were revealing and thought provoking. For example, the only national delegation to decisively propose Atlantic federation was the Turkish delegation—an Islamic nation. They submitted the following resolution for consideration—

Speaking as Turks, whose country has the longest land frontier with Russia of any NATO nation, is most directly exposed to invasion, and has special ties with Asia and Africa that make our people sympathise deeply with the aspirations of the new nations in that area;

Noting that immediate federal union of the Atlantic Community offers:

1. The most effective protection against war;
2. The surest safeguard against the divisions among the Atlantic democracies on which the Communist danger, both military and otherwise, has grown and will grow even greater; and
3. The best way of building up the moral, political and economic foundations of freedom in the underdeveloped countries, both inside and outside NATO;

Considering that half measures and continued postponement of adequate action have led to a long series of disasters since this century began, and that we should learn from the costly experiences we have already suffered;

Convinced that since an Atlantic union would be formed immediately if war began, we can and should form it now in time to prevent war;

WE THEREFORE PROPOSE that the Atlantic Convention recommend urgently to the NATO Council and governments of the NATO nations that they call without delay a Constituent Assembly to work out a Federal Constitution and submit it to the NATO peoples for ratification.

The Canadian delegation declared no globalization without representation. For all intents and purposes, they endorsement of the Atlantic Union idea—

RESOLVED, that this Convention recommend to its Governments:

1. that they together negotiate forthwith the terms upon

which they may move progressively towards a mutual expanding trade over the next ten years;

2. that they together create a democratically elected legislative and executive apparatus to supervise that trading area;

3. that they invite every like-minded democratic country to adhere to that trading area upon agreed terms;

4. that they together create a democratically elected legislative and executive apparatus to co-ordinate the defense policies of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The British delegation also proved eager to work toward an eventual Atlantic Union based on federalist principles –

The Atlantic Citizens Convention

A. 1. Convinced that

a) our survival in freedom demands the creation of a real Atlantic Community within the next decade,

b) our people are tired of more expressions of the need for Atlantic Unity and would welcome action instead of words, and

c) they would to this end accept a substantial transfer of National Sovereignty to a common Atlantic Authority.

2. Believing that

a) such a Community holds out the: not only of increased military security, but also of great advances in the material prosperity of the Atlantic Powers and of those developing nations who look to them for economic co-operation, and

b) those material advantages will, in the not so long term, far outweigh any initial sacrifices.

3. Recognizing that

a) the Atlantic Nations have during the past twelve years made great advances in the right direction by the establishment of many functional and consultative institutions – notably NATO, the OECD, the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference and EEC.

b) the course most likely to be fruitful is, not to create great new institutions, but to build upon these foundations, adapting and developing them where necessary and appropriate.

c) to try to go too far too quickly may defeat the end we have in mind, and that the task of our governments must be to steer a practical common course between inertia and Utopia,

d) anything in the form of complete Atlantic Federation is not practicable in the near future, but

e) we must be prepared to go at once beyond the concept of mere consultative association and must concede to some Atlantic Authority some of our existing national powers.

5. Feeling that, for psychological reasons, such a step towards closer integration may – however paradoxically – in fact be more likely to succeed and become permanent if membership is not irrevocable and if member states retain the right of withdrawal, on due notice, after a stated period.

B. Recommends to the NATO Governments

I. a) that they create within five years an Atlantic Economic and Political Community (hereafter referred to as "the Community") modelled on the European Economic Community.

b) to this end they appoint within six months an Atlantic Preparatory Commission (APC) to draw up a Treaty modelled on the Treaty of Rome.

c) meanwhile a first stage in the evolution of the Community should be in operation by the end of 1963 (see Section III).

II. a) the Community should initially comprise the 15 member nations of NATO.

But it must be an enduring association that must ultimately be open to the adherence of all qualified nations.

b) during the process of evolution of the Community the fullest use must be made of the institutions of NATO,

c) the ultimate aim should be to merge the E.E.C. in the Community.

d) the relations of the Community with existing institutions, notably OEDC and EMA, must be a subject of recommendations by the AFC.

e) on the establishment of the Community, NATO must continue as a Military Alliance for as long as may be necessary, its institutions being modified as appropriate.

III. that the APC be instructed to report to NATO Governments not later than the end of 1962 of recommendations for the first stage in the evolution of the Community, to be in operation by the end of 1963.

Such recommendations to include:

a) whether to set up in advance of the establishment of the Community an interim Political Directorate, or Commission or Council on the lines of those of EEC or ECSC; or whether the functions of such a Commission or Council could temporarily be performed by the North Atlantic Council.

b) the application of the principle of a weighted majority vote in the Council.

c) the nature and functions of some form of political Assembly for the Community; whether such an Assembly should be a development of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference with some responsibility – and if so what responsibility; or whether for

practical reasons it could better consist of some other form of Assembly, composed of specially qualified persons appointed by their Parliaments.

IV. that meanwhile the North Atlantic Council, or a special sub-committee of the APC, should be instructed to examine and submit recommendations on the evolution of NATO, with special reference to

a) the closer co-ordination of political and military planning, and

b) the special question of political "contrôle"³ of strategy, and the need for all NATO partners to have a share in the formulation of policy for the use of nuclear weapons.

Will Clayton, William Burden, and Elmo Roper offered the following draft Declaration –

The Atlantic Convention of the NATO nations,
Viewing its duties as those of a constituent assembly of citizens, not of nations;

Taking into consideration the successes and failures, the trials and errors, of the Atlantic nations in their efforts to assure a spacious environment of freedom and progress for themselves and for all peoples aspiring to liberty;

Realizing that the Atlantic nations remain the principal force available to resist Communist aggression throughout the world, as well as the growing Communist pressure to weaken, divide and destroy the Atlantic Alliance itself;

Gladly accepting their human responsibility to provide technical, educational, moral and economic aid to the many countries, and especially to the new nations of Africa and Asia, which are seeking to gain command of the secrets of modern wealth in circumstances of dignity and freedom;

Welcoming the heartening progress towards integration made in Europe by the six original nations of the European Economic Community, and by the important decisions of other European governments to seek membership or association in that community;

Being convinced that in the modern world, more dangerous and more interdependent than has ever before been the case in history, the safety of our peoples, and the possibility of progress for

³ "Contrôle" in the French sense means 'examination, verification and the right to criticize, as against control in the British sense meaning the physical grasp of levers and buttons.

all peoples, require a much greater degree of cohesion in the foreign policies of the Atlantic nations than has yet been achieved through the various postwar institutions of western cooperation;

CALLS UPON the peoples governments of the NATO countries to plan and to take prompt action, utilizing existing institutions, and new ones where necessary, directed to the creation of a true Atlantic Community, whose benefits should be an advantage not only to ourselves, but to all mankind. Only through the gradual course of building the democratic institutions of an Atlantic Community can we hope to achieve for the peoples of the free world a destiny worthy of the highest ideals of their common tradition.

TO THIS END, the Convention, having considered the proposals submitted to it, in the light of its debates, and the reports of its committees, recommends the following programs of immediate and long-range action:

1. The establishment of a Standing Political Commission of the Atlantic Community at the highest political level. Pursuant to appropriate procedures of consultation and decision, the Commission would anticipate, plan and concert common policies on matters of common concern to the entire Community.

2. The establishment of an Atlantic Assembly, selected in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of each nation, through which the working of Atlantic institutions can be debated and reviewed by the historic procedures of parliamentary practice, whose wisdom centuries of experience have confirmed as the best means to develop an informed public opinion on public questions.

3. The establishment, through existing or new procedures of collaboration, of an economic partnership between the United States and the European Economic Community. This partnership, the basis of an Atlantic Economic Community, should be open to all OECD countries and other qualified nations. Among the fruits of this Economic Community would be rapid increases in economic growth, with generalized and progressive reductions of tariffs and other barriers to trade until all such barriers have been eliminated; programs to help stabilize the free world's monetary system, which is gravely threatened by growing shortages of liquidity and of reserves; and ample and concerted plans to assist those non-industrialized nations of the free world which wish our help., in developing and carrying out well-conceived plans of economic development.

4. The development, through the Atlantic Institute, and through governmental and private action, of plans for the

enlargement of cultural and educational exchanges, and of cooperative programs in studies of science, the humanities and society.

5. In order further to implement the recommendation of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference of Nov. 17, 1961, that "an adequately integrated Atlantic Community be created, the Convention calls upon the governments of the NATO countries, within the earliest practicable period, to appoint representatives to a Preparatory Commission on Atlantic unity. The duty of the Commission will be to study the organization of the Atlantic Community, in the light of the recommendations of this convention and other proposals for change. Such a body should examine the adequacy of existing institutions and practices to the task of assuring that the Atlantic Community is suitably organized to meet the political, economic and military challenges of this era. It should be instructed to propose such reforms and simplifications of existing institutions, and such new institutions, as may be required to achieve that goal.

Each member of the Convention reaffirms his intention to assist in all practicable ways to carry forward the purposes of this Declaration within his own country.

Finally, Elmo Roper and Ben Regan offered a resolution that exposed their hope that the Atlantic Convention would inspire a "new government" —

RESOLVED, That this Convention recommend to their respective governments that representatives be appointed to meet at length with representatives of such other NATO nations as choose to appoint such Committees, for the purpose of developing a new form of government which will be responsible for the foreign policy of the constituent states and of the military necessary for its support and of aid to the lesser developed countries of the world, with the power to tax for those three purposes and for those three purposes alone.

Based on the visionary proposals above, the Atlantic Convention was a missed opportunity. It challenged President Kennedy to take concrete steps to forge a true Atlantic Community. It challenged President Charles de Gaulle to put the lessons of the Suez Crisis behind him. It further challenged the citizens of NATO nations to solve transatlantic problems using transatlantic institutions. Did they rise to the occasion?

President Kennedy signaled his willingness to accept the challenge

during his Declaration of Atlantic Interdependence speech on July 4, 1962. Speaking at Independence Hall, he declared –

The theory of independence is as old as man himself, and it was not invented in this hall. But it was in this hall that the theory became a practice; that the word went out to all, in Thomas Jefferson's phrase, that the God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time. And today this Nation—conceived in revolution, nurtured in liberty, maturing in independence—has no intention of abdicating its leadership in that worldwide movement for independence to any nation or society committed to systematic human oppression.

As apt and applicable as the Declaration of Independence is today, we would do well to honor that other historic document drafted in this hall—the Constitution of the United States. For it stressed not independence but interdependence—not the individual liberty of one but the indivisible liberty of all.

In most of the old colonial world, the struggle for independence is coming to an end. Even in areas behind the Curtain, that which Jefferson called the disease of liberty still appears to be infectious. With the passing of ancient empires, today less than 2 percent of the world's population lives in territories officially termed dependent. As this effort for independence, inspired by the American Declaration of Independence, now approaches a successful close, a great new effort—for interdependence—is transforming the world about us. And the spirit of that new effort is the same spirit which gave birth to the American Constitution.

That spirit is today most clearly seen across the Atlantic Ocean. The nations of Western Europe, long divided by feuds far more bitter than any which existed among the 13 colonies, are today joining together, seeking, as our forefathers sought, to find freedom in diversity and in unity, strength.

The United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic object of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great

and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.

It would be premature at this time to do more than indicate the high regard with which we view the formation of this partnership. The first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will someday make this partnership possible.

A great new edifice is not built overnight. It was 11 years from the Declaration of Independence to the writing of the Constitution. The construction of workable federal institutions required still another generation. The greatest works of our Nation's founders lay not in documents and in declarations, but in creative, determined action. The building of the new house of Europe has followed the same practical, purposeful course. Building the Atlantic partnership now will not be easily or cheaply finished.

But I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago.

All this will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is our goal.

In urging the adoption of the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton told his fellow New Yorkers to think continentally. Today Americans must learn to think intercontinentally.

Acting on our own, by ourselves, we cannot establish justice throughout the world; we cannot insure its domestic tranquility, or provide for its common defense, or promote its general welfare, or secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But joined with other free nations, we can do all this and more. We can assist the developing nations to throw off the yoke of poverty. We can balance our worldwide trade and payments at the highest possible level of growth. We can mount a deterrent powerful enough to deter any aggression. And ultimately we can help to achieve a world of law and free choice, banishing the world of war and coercion.

For the Atlantic partnership of which I speak would not look inward only, preoccupied with its own welfare and advancement. It must look outward to cooperate with all nations in meeting their common concern. It would serve as a nucleus for the eventual union of all free men--those who are now free and those who are vowing

that some day they will be free.

A couple of months after President Kennedy's speech, the United States was knee deep in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Atlantic Convention of 1962 may have played a role in Khrushchev's decision to place missiles in Cuba. Perhaps they were intimidated by the level of support for Atlantic unification. For example, in October of 1962, *Freedom & Union* boasted that the International Movement for Atlantic Union had 578 advisory members –

The 578 Advisory Council members come from these fields: 128 business executives, including 35 active or retired heads of corporations; 25 Catholic, Jewish and Protestant churchmen, including 10 archbishops and bishops; 39 from cultural activities (artists, authors, film directors, etc.); 126 educators, including 44 college and university presidents; eight heads of farm and labor organizations, such as National Grange, National Farmers Union, International Association of Machinists, 50 government officials, including 14 retired high State Department officers; eight Governors of States or Provincial Premiers; 40 judges and lawyers; 18 retired military officers, including four admirals and 11 generals; 67 organization executives; 40 members of the Press and TV (publishers, editors, columnists, etc.); 32 active or former Parliament members in various nations; 10 scientists and 34 women leaders. All are members of the Council only in their private capacity.

IMAU members included:

Theodore C. Achilles, Ambassador, NATO champion

Warren H. Atherton, Ex-National Commander, American Legion

Prince Bernhard, Netherlands, Bilderberg Group founder

Donald G. Brennan, Arms control consultant

James Bruce, Director, American Airlines

Harry Bullis, Ex-Chairman, General Mills

Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors under Dwight D. Eisenhower; Chairman of the Federal Reserve (1970-1978)

Cass Canfield, Chairman, Harper & Bros

William L. Clayton, Former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, helped shape the GATT

Gen. James M. Gavin (Ret.), Commanded 502 Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Divisions during WWII

Elliot Goodman, Author, *Soviet Design for a World State*

Christian A. Herter, Congressmen, Governor, Secretary of State, U.S. Trade Representative under JFK

Henry A. Kissinger, Academic; Secretary of State; National Security Advisor

William L. Langer, OSS, CIA, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1961-1977)

Max F. Millikan, CIA, Director of the Center for International Studies, MIT

Hans J. Morgenthau, Academic, international relations professor

Charles S. Rhyne, Author, World Peace Through Law Center

Robert Schumann, M.P. Father of Europe

Clay Shaw, Dir., International Trade Mart

James T. Shotwell, Academic, member of The Inquiry, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Gerard Swope, Jr, International Council, General Electric Company

Wayne C. Taylor, Ex-President, Export-Import Bank; Under-Secretary of Commerce (1941 - 1945)

Paul Van Zeeland, former Prime Minister of Belgium, Bilderberg Group founder

The Soviet Union viewed the establishment of an Atlantic Union as a major threat to their communist design for a world state. Their savior was

President de Gaulle who improved Franco-Soviet relations in the 1960s. The Soviets exploited his vision of a united Europe free from Anglo-American influence to disrupt Atlantic unity and resolve.

Even with Robert Schumann, the so-called Father of Europe, and General Billotte on record as favoring the Atlantic Union idea, President de Gaulle responded to President Kennedy's call for an Atlantic partnership by vetoing British membership in the European Economic Community in January of 1963. General de Gaulle was not sold by President Kennedy's lofty, noncommittal rhetoric. Kennedy decided to soften his tone. Speaking to a crowd of Germans in Frankfurt in June, President Kennedy lowered his expectations –

As we look steadily eastward in the hope and purpose of new freedom, we must also look—and evermore closely—to our trans-Atlantic ties. The Atlantic Community will not soon become a single overarching superstate. But practical steps toward stronger common purpose are well within our means. As we widen our common effort in defense, and our threefold cooperation in economics, we shall inevitably strengthen our political ties as well. Just as your current efforts for unity in Europe will produce a stronger voice in the dialog between us, so in America our current battle for the liberty and prosperity of all of our citizens can only deepen the meaning of our common historic purposes. In the far future there may be a great new union for us all. But for the present, there is plenty for all to do in building new and enduring connections.

A few months after Kennedy embraced universal union of the free as a distant goal, Senator Estes Kefauver unexpectedly passed away on August 10, 1963. Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas took over his role in the Senate, and Representative Paul Findley of Illinois volunteered to serve as the new champion of Atlantic federation in the House after he became the first sitting member of Congress to join the Federal Union Board of Directors a month earlier. Findley was no stranger to the cause, he served on the editorial board of *Freedom & Union* in the late 1940s.

A few months after Senator Kefauver passed, the Kennedy years were tragically cut short after he was assassinated on November 22, 1963. All eyes were now on Lyndon B. Johnson. Would he defend and extend the blessings of individual liberty in a peaceful, yet deliberate, manner?

Chapter 5 – The Johnson Years

The Atlantic Union idea survived the untimely death of Senator Kefauver, President Kennedy's pursuit of an Atlantic partnership, and President de Gaulle's pursuit of independence and grandeur. It was time for an Atlantic federalist revival. To the dismay of Streit and company, President Johnson remained loyal to Operation Dumbbell—the federal Europe first doctrine. This did not deter Representative Findley and Senator Carlson from reintroducing the Atlantic Union resolution in its federalist form. Streit was back, but the Atlantic Union Committee was gone.

After the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO resolution became law in 1960, the Atlantic Union Committee (AUC) disbanded and evolved into the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS). The ACUS favored a more gradual approach to Atlantic unity rather than federalism. The International Movement for Atlantic Union now served as the federalist successor of the AUC.

After Senator Frank Carlson joined Representative Findley on the Federal Union Board in June of 1965, he reintroduced the Atlantic Union resolution in the Senate. His goal was to call an Atlantic Convention to eventually establish an Atlantic federation of the free –

Whereas in 1969 any party may withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty, which was ratified in 1949 as a first rather than a last step toward unity;

Whereas since 1949 revolutionizing scientific, technological and other advance has outstripped it and made practical union of these allies imperative for prosperity, peace, and freedom;

Whereas the fragmentation of the world in new nations, now when the strongest democracies cannot live alone, also requires them to build the pilot plant needed to spread liberty and union both by example, and by admitting to their union other nations

desiring this and able to uphold its principles;

Whereas they need but unite effectively their gold and other resources behind a common currency now to assure their citizens, and the developing nations, enduring monetary stability and liquidity, and prevent their disunion from ending, as in 1931, in dictator-serving crash;

Whereas our Original States, when beset by disunion's dangers under their Confederal structure and invented federal union, which has enduringly safeguarded member States from domination by one another, equitably apportioned among their sovereign citizens voting power on common concerns—and the benefits and burdens of union—assured each State of independent government of State affairs, met other challenges facing the Atlantic allies now, and not merely worked but provided that free peoples can thus work wonders;

Whereas distant though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's transformation into a federation of the free may seem, these allies can greatly speed it now by officially declaring that federal union, within the framework of the United Nations, is their eventual goal, setting a timetable—as we did for our moon target—and providing democratic means for achieving the transition in safe time; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representative concurring),
That (1) The Congress hereby creates an Atlantic Union delegation, composed of eighteen eminent citizens, and authorized to organize and participate in a convention made up of similar delegations from such North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies as desire to join in this enterprise, to explore the possibilities of agreement on: a. A Declaration that the eventual goal of their peoples is to transform their present alliance into a Federal Union;

b. A tentative timetable for the transition to this goal; and

c. Democratic institutions to expedite the necessary stages and achieve them and the final objective in time to save their citizens from another war, depression or other man-made catastrophe, and let them enjoy, as soon as possible, the greater freedom and the higher moral and material blessings which federation has brought the free in the past. * * *

Senator Frank Church introduced another resolution designed to explore greater Atlantic unity—without referencing federalism directly—using the commission approach—

Whereas freedom, enduring peace with justice, and enhanced prosperity require progressive development of greater

unity in the free world; and

Whereas the interests of the United States require the development of greater unity of other free nations with it: Therefore be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the policy of the United States should be to achieve such unity with other nations as will best serve to safeguard the individual freedom and national values of our various peoples, and, at the same time, enable us to deal effectively with those problems with which no nation, today, can deal effectively alone, and that the President be advise of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional means, should particularly pursue the following objectives:

(1) Development by exploration and agreement with our allies, of an Atlantic Community adequate to meet the political, military, and economic challenges of this era.

(2) Such a Community to be composed of nations which share our basic ideals of freedom, democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law and as we are willing to accept the benefits and responsibilities of close political, military, and economic ties.

(3) Such a Community to be conceived and developed in the interest not only of its own peoples but of all free peoples and to be open to the admission of others as and when their governments become willing and able to assume the benefits and responsibilities of the membership.

To this end it is the sense of the Senate that the President should promptly establish a special governmental commission composed, in the first instance, of representatives of North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations to study and recommend concrete steps toward the attainment of the forgoing objectives.

In March of 1966, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations explored both proposals during their hearings on *Atlantic Union Resolutions*. Streit argued that the Atlantic Union resolution introduced by Senator Carlson was the answer to the “real Red strategy in Vietnam – that of winning not by atomic war but by brining on another great depression through the crash of the international monetary system.” He then argued that the Atlantic unity resolution (Senate Resolution 128) introduced by Senator Church was inherently flawed –

A difficulty with Senate Resolution 128 is that it speaks of an Atlantic “community” – a term that is not music likely to soothe the French President. For the Senate to choose this term instead of “federal union, when faced as it is now with a choice would tend to strengthen rather than allay suspicions that the United States aims

to disguise— though I know it is not so intended—“subordination as integration.” federal structure would ensure that one Atlantic nation did not dominate another. This is the more to be feared since this resolution does not touch otherwise on the basic problem of an equitable balance between the United States and its allies.

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leddy disagreed with both resolutions. He restored the Department of State’s original opposition to the Atlantic Union idea—

The simple, but decisive, fact is that our Atlantic allies do not wish to move forward with any type of federal political relationship with the United States, even as an objective.

The fundamental reason why there is little European interest in federal union with us at this time is, I think, self evident. It is that Europe fears that it would be swallowed by a more powerful United States.

Around three months after the hearings, the State Department had another transatlantic crisis on its hands. In June of 1966, President de Gaulle pulled French forces out of NATO’s military command. He apparently was concerned that NATO’s nuclear umbrella lacked credibility and wanted France to pursue its own nuclear capability—an expression of their *force de frappe*. After the United States resisted his approach, de Gaulle sent a clear message that France would continue to resist Anglo-American influence in continental Europe.

President Johnson’s failure to keep NATO together inspired a renewed sense of urgency to restore Atlantic unity and resolve against communism. In preparation for an upcoming hearing on Atlantic Union in the House, Representative Findley reached out to likely 1968 presidential contenders to see where they stood on Atlantic federation. All Republican hopefuls at the time—Richard M. Nixon, Barry M. Goldwater, Nelson A. Rockefeller, and George S. Romney—advised Findley in March of 1966 that they supported the exploration of Atlantic federation. Former President Eisenhower signaled his support in April.

Later in August and September of 1966, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held its hearings on *Atlantic Union*. Streit reiterated his previous testimony that Atlantic federation was necessary to avert a monetary crisis. Such a crisis could spawn a major depression and lead to war. According to Streit—

The danger to the dollar lies only partially in financial and economic factors. It lies even more in the political factor of absolute national sovereignty, which divides the Atlantic community. The currency of each nation is, like its military force and trade barriers, an arm of national sovereignty, a major means by which each government seeks to serve its national interest. It was this factor of national sovereignty among the democracies of the Atlantic that caused the 1931 crash. Communism can hope that this factor will soon bring another such disaster, notably through the growing Franco-American divergence all along the line.

Communism lacks the financial power to bring down the dollar; freedom can lose through a monetary crash only by the free continuing to allow the dogma of absolute national sovereignty to divide the Atlantic community, even as regards the medium for international trade.

The solution, according to Streit, was a transatlantic currency –

Once the NATO nations establish an Atlantic Federal Union with a common currency, no country or group of countries, Communist or non-Communist, could conceivably cause this Atlantic world money to crash. An Atlantic Union's currency would be in an infinitely strong position.

Streit later contended with the federal Europe first crowd by quoting Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson of Canada –

Finally, I believe that only the United States can give the effective lead required for Atlantic unity. That is the price, the privilege, and the responsibility of great power. Without the active participation and support of the United States, nothing in my view, can be done on the broad front which is essential. Without her leadership we will be driven back to a national or continental solution for the organization of security and for progress.

Representative Findley testified at the hearings that a broad, bipartisan coalition of Representatives and Senators continued to support the Atlantic Union resolution in its various forms –

Through several communications, Mr. Udall and I, together with others, have invited our colleagues to introduce or pledge support to this Atlantic Union delegation resolution, and the results have been very gratifying. At last count, 102, almost one-fourth of

the total membership of the House of Representatives, had either introduced the resolution or publicly pledged their support.

Thirty-three Republicans and forty-six Democrats have introduced a resolution. Seven Republicans and sixteen Democrats have pledged support. Among these are both Republicans and Democrats on the Foreign Affairs Committee. The earliest among these were Representatives Zablocki and Fraser, both Democrats, who joined with Representatives Quie, Ellsworth, and myself last October 18 in introducing the first of the resolutions.

In the Senate, Senator Carlson, a Republican, and McCarthy of Minnesota, a Democrat, both members of the Foreign Relations Committee, introduced the resolution the same day. Since then a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held 2 days of hearings.

In all, 16 Senators – 12 Democrats, and 4 Republicans – have cosponsored the resolution.

Findley would later introduce into the record letters he received from presidential candidates endorsing his efforts. Most notable was the response he received from Senator Goldwater –

Dear Paul:

The resolution that you introduced relative to the establishment of an Atlantic Union delegation is a good idea in my opinion. While I don't believe the North Atlantic unity is right around the corner, I do believe it is coming, in fact, I believe it will be a must before we can present a solid front to our communist enemies. I have been very disturbed with the lack of attention given NATO by the President and by the unfortunate remarks made about that organization by high officials in the administration.

I wish you the very best of luck in your efforts; I think you are doing a great job.

With best wishes,

BARRY GOLDWATER

Firing for effect, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Thomas Morgan of Pennsylvania, then submitted a statement into the record from former Vice President Nixon on the Atlantic Union idea –

It is fitting that the United States, the world's first truly

federal government, should be a main force behind the effort to find a basis for a broad federation of free Atlantic nations.

Although the accomplishment of the ultimate goal of the Resolution may well be impossible to attain for many years, recent events of history and the numerous scientific and technological advances of the last twenty years post the way in this direction. It would be foolish for us to ignore the fact that science and history are even now fatefully combining to accomplish the same goal. Perhaps, by anticipating the further shrinking of the world, the dialogue which this Resolution contemplates will provide a resourceful tool for coping with the problems of a world which in twenty years will have undergone even more drastic changes that have occurred since World War II.

I have been deeply disturbed as of late by the trend of events in Europe. The renewed nationalism of France has for the moment halted the pace at which the nations of Western Europe were moving toward becoming a unified and federated community. By adopting a measure such as the Atlantic Union Resolution we could give new impetus to the spirit of federalism in Western Europe.

To be sure the concept of an "Atlantica" is at present only a dream, but in the age of the rocket, dreams become reality with a speed which is difficult to imagine. The Atlantic Union Resolution is a forward-looking proposal which acknowledges the depth and breadth of incredible change which is going on in the world around us. I urge its adoption.

Of course, Secretary of State George Ball opposed the Atlantic Union Delegation resolution —

We believe that so long as Europe remains merely a continent of medium- and small-sized states there are definite limits to the degree of political unity we can achieve across the ocean. We believe, however, that if Europeans get on with the pressing business of constructing political unity in Europe, a coalescence in the relations of Europe and the United States can take place at a much more rapid pace.

Even with high-level political support, the Atlantic Union resolution failed to advance in 1966. President Johnson ignored President de Gaulle's 1965 warning of a coming monetary crisis. He ignored his call for the United States to withdraw from Vietnam and seek a political solution. Instead, President Johnson decided to maintain the monetary status quo and escalate the Vietnam War at the expense of Atlantic unity and resolve —

and thousands of American men.

In 1967, Representatives Findley and Zablocki reintroduced the Atlantic Union resolution in the House, and Senators Carlson and McCarthy in the Senate. They failed to gain traction in either chamber. That same year, *Time* conceded that a “river of aid” was flowing from the Soviet Union to North Vietnam. Streit was right. The Soviet Union was waging a proxy war of attrition against the United States hoping America would eventually borrow and spend itself to death.

After the Tet Offensive intensified the Vietnam War in 1968, Representative Findley and friends attempted once again to provide an alternative to perpetual foreign wars and interventions. Without holding hearings, on July 9, 1968, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a favorable report on creating an *Atlantic Union Delegation* with supporting and dissenting views for the following reason—

During the years which have elapsed since the Declaration of Paris, very little has been done to implement its recommendations. Concurrently, the Atlantic partnership has been undergoing subtle but profound transformation. Solidarity rooted in the requirements of mutual security and common progress has been giving way to diversity and separatist tendencies in many fields of endeavor. Western Europe and North American have been drifting apart.

The committee notes these developments with considerable regret. We continue to believe that the best interests of the North Atlantic nations would be served by increased cooperation among them, and by gradual progress toward a viable, democratic, and formally constituted community.

House Concurrent Resolution 48 aims at those objectives. The resolution does not presume to offer solutions to the issues presently confront, and frequently divide, the countries of the North Atlantic area. It simply proposes that the exploratory dialogue begun in 1963 be continued at the level of citizens’ commissions.

Representative Peter H. Frelinghuysen voiced his opposition to the resolution in the report—

The countries of Western Europe, the United States, and Canada are presently in the process of adapting the Atlantic partnership to the realities of today and the requirements of tomorrow.

During the past 18 months, a variety of undertakings aimed at that goal have been initiated in such organizations such as the

Economic Commission for Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the European Economic Communities, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and in NATO itself.

Many of these initiatives involve new forms of cultural, economic, military, or political cooperation with Europe. They must have time to be tested, to mature and to bear fruit.

In view of these developments, and for other cogent reasons, we believe the Atlantic Convention proposal should not be revived. The United States may well be advised to start playing a less active role in reshaping the Atlantic partnership.

Even with 114 bipartisan cosponsors in the House and a favorable committee report, the Atlantic Union Delegation resolution failed to reach the floor for a vote. By 1968, Streit and company longed for new presidential leadership. Fortunately, all presidential candidates—other than Ronald Reagan—endorsed the Atlantic Union resolution. Hubert Humphrey, Eugene McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Nelson Rockefeller, and Robert Kennedy were all willing to put Atlantica first. The odds were in Streit's favor.

While Nixon easily secured the Republican nomination, there was a tight race between Humphrey, McCarthy, and Kennedy to see who would face him in November. Overall, it looked good for Streit and company. Senators Humphrey and McCarthy were consistent sponsors and cosponsors of the Atlantic Union resolution, and Kennedy professed his support on April 8, 1968—

The fulfillment of which I then spoke could well take the form of a federal union of the Atlantic Nations. The Atlantic Union Resolution affords us the opportunity to study this intriguing concept. I urge the proposal's adoption.

On May 7, 1968, Vice President Humphrey reaffirmed his support for the Atlantic Union idea—

While a Senator, I was among the sponsors, from 1949 on, of all the resolutions for an Atlantic Convention to explore with NATO allies a federal union answer to the challenge of how to unite effectively and democratically the great moral and material strength of these free peoples. And so I heartily welcome the impressive support the pending resolutions to do this have gained.

Robert Kennedy was moving closer to securing the Democratic nomination until he was assassinated on June 5, 1968. Humphrey eventually secured the nomination and faced Nixon in November. Streit and company were guaranteed a federalist victory. Nixon won in a landslide.

Chapter 6 – The Nixon Years

The Atlantic Union movement picked up speed when Nixon assumed office. To set the tone in Brussels, President Nixon appointed Robert Ellsworth as Ambassador to NATO in April of 1969. Ellsworth was a former cosponsor of the Atlantic Union resolution. On July 5, Representative Findley and friends then reintroduced Atlantic Union resolutions in the House with 79 cosponsors—54 Democrats and 25 Republicans. Among the cosponsors was future Secretary of Defense Donald M. Rumsfeld. Later in September, Adolph Schmidt, a member of the original U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO, was appointed Ambassador to Canada. Finally, on December 2, 1969, Representative George H. W. Bush introduced an Atlantic Union resolution of his own.

Atlantic Union resolutions were reintroduced in 1970, but once again they failed to gain traction. The Democratic Congress placed its emphasis on domestic politics. Working with Congress, President Nixon established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). They all agreed with Congress that labor and environmental issues were best handled at the federal level. Were they also thinking the same regulatory approach could be applied on an international level?

By March of 1971, the Atlantic Union movement was back on track. The Atlantic Union resolution had 112 cosponsors in the House, but Streit and company were struggling to convince the State Department to endorse it. Establishing a federal Europe first was still their bureaucratic priority.

While the Atlantic Union resolution was gaining momentum, the junior Senator from California, Alan Cranston, introduced a concurrent resolution providing for United Nations Charter review. Senators Lloyd M. Bentson, Robert J. Dole, and Edward M. Kennedy cosponsored the

resolution. Cranston, if you recall, served as president of the United World Federalists during the height of the world government movement in the 1950s. He essentially replaced Senator Joseph Clark as the leader of the world federalist movement in Congress after he was voted out of the Senate. Clark then became the president of the United World Federalists.

Turning back to the Atlantic Union movement, to prove that European leaders were willing to explore federation with the United States, Streit and company formed the Association to Promote Public Support for a Federation of Democracies. Once again, they used the NATO Parliamentarians to foster political leverage. By July of 1971, 177 parliamentarians from 12 NATO countries publicly endorsed the Atlantic Union idea. Notable American members of the Association included –

Senators Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii, Lee Metcalf of Montana, and Robert W. Packwood of Oregon; and Representatives Edward P. Boland of Massachusetts, Ronald Dellums of California, Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts, Edward I. Koch of New York, and Charles B. Rangel of New York.

Later in July, the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on creating an *Atlantic Union Delegation*. Streit, representing the International Movement for Atlantic Union, testified before the committee –

Events since my previous appearances lead me to support the proposal before you with an even greater sense of its importance than before. This is not only for obvious reasons that the years through which it has been pending have left our country, and freedom, peace, and prosperity, facing ever-greater dangers. They have brought us nearer and nearer the inevitable deadline, when the approval of this proposal would come too late for it to help prevent another world monetary crash, another world depression, another breakthrough for Communist dictatorship, another world war – although the resolution would still serve to mitigate those catastrophes, if anything can.

Representative Frelinghuysen queried Streit on the so-called exploratory nature of the resolution –

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN, I am also puzzled as to what it [Atlantic Union resolution] is supposed to accomplish. The

convention is supposed to explore, you say, without a commitment to end results. But the resolution also suggests that the convention is to make certain recommendations which shall be submitted to Congress for action by constitutional procedure. I guess they would be beyond exploration if they are to make recommendations which are presumably to be enacted into legislation that would be binding on this country. So it is both to explore and to recommend.

Mr. STREIT. Yes.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, how would a convention composed presumably of some small countries and at least one very big country reach such a conclusion? In other words, could the European countries bind the U.S. delegates if they felt in their judgment that the United States should be bound by certain recommendations?

Mr. STREIT. Not at all.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How are you going to get a convention to reach any conclusion then? On what basis would they reach conclusions? Unanimity?

Mr. STREIT. I would hope not. I would hope that they could proceed on the basis of the convention that met in 1962. That convention made recommendations which unfortunately were pigeonholed in the State Department and got nowhere. The recommendations were unanimous although voting I think was by delegate—and this later was proposed by the American delegation.

After the hearings, the Atlantic Union Delegation resolution failed to advance. Without an Atlantic Union alternative on the horizon, President Nixon decided to prevent an international monetary crisis by ending the dollar's convertibility to gold in August of 1971. By December, the Smithsonian Agreement established a new dollar standard pegging the dollar to the currencies of the Group of Ten. Nixon later signaled that he preferred a transatlantic solution.

In March of 1972, President Nixon had an epiphany after he remembered that he was President. He instructed Secretary of State William P. Rogers to give the green light to the Atlantic Union resolution in its federalist form. The House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the resolution 22 to 9. It was then introduced in the Senate for consideration.

While the Atlantic Union resolution awaited Senate action, the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs turned their focus on strengthening the UN after the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL) renewed their call for a Charter Review Conference. In May of 1972, the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and

Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on the *Review of UN Charter and Establishment of a Commission on U.S. Participation in the United Nations*. The MCPL failed to gain traction because the Soviet Union continued to oppose UN reform.

The Atlantic Union resolution, however, continued to move forward. In September of 1972, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Springsteen cleared the resolution before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during their hearing on creating an *Atlantic Union Delegation* –

The resolution before you proposes to explore an additional means of perfecting the Atlantic community. It is an ambitious proposal which the Europeans in their current search for identity may consider premature. Nevertheless, because it is keeping with the concept of seeking better ways to improve Atlantic relations, the Department of State has no objection to its enactment.

Asked to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Representative Findley welcomed the State Department's endorsement but took issue with Springsteen describing the Atlantic Union idea as premature –

The same sentence does contain a phrase that certainly could be interpreted as negative or certainly faint of praise, stating that the Europeans may consider this premature.

This is a hardly a severe indictment in light of the negative position of the State Department in previous years. It can accurately be said that Europeans do consider this proposal premature; some do, just as some Americans do. It is not a widely known as an idea in Europe; nor it is widely known as an idea here in the United States.

Representative Findley's admission that the Atlantic Union idea was not widely known by the American people was eye opening. Of course, one could argue that the American people did not have a clue what their Founding Fathers were doing in Philadelphia in 1787 either. *The Federalist Papers*, after all, emerged after the Constitution was drafted. Streit and company were clearly following their elitist precedent.

Without an imminent doomsday scenario to sell, Streit urged members of committee not to lose faith in the Atlantic Union idea –

The situation in the world and in our country is now such that it may be truly tragic if the resolution is not enacted before this 92nd

Congress adjourns. True, surface signs lull many into believing that peace for our generation is around the corner and that even the danger of another world depression is fading away. Nevertheless, I would strongly urge that these hopes which the Peking and Moscow summits brought for peace and the Smithsonian monetary agreement last December gave the world economy are all likely to prove illusory unless the Congress supplements them this year by approving the resolutions before you. The sooner Congress authorizes the proposed convention to explore the Federal Union approach to these and other major problems, the safer we and the free Atlantic community and the world will be.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations believed Streit was right. They unanimously recommended Senate approval of the Atlantic Union Delegation resolution. On October 4, the Senate approved it by unanimous consent. President Nixon was on the verge of signing an Atlantic Union resolution until the House Rules Committee decided that there was not enough time left to take up the resolution before the House adjourned. The resolution was deferred to 1973.

Representative Findley immediately reintroduced the Atlantic Union resolution in January of 1973. The next month, President Nixon appointed Donald Rumsfeld, a former cosponsor of the Atlantic Union resolution, to serve as the Ambassador to NATO. The Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs then invited Representatives Findley and Streit back to make their case at their hearing on *Creating an Atlantic Union Delegation* in March. Representative Findley opened his testimony with impressive stats —

The Atlantic Union resolutions, House Joint Resolutions 205, 206, and 213, were introduced on January 18 with 74 cosponsors, the largest ever to join of the first day. That number continues to grow.

Among those supporting Atlantic Union is Majority Leader Thomas P. O'Neill. Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford has assured me that he will vote for it. House Republican Conference Chairman John B. Anderson is also a sponsor.

Streit delivered another jaw-dropping speech in favor of the Atlantic Union idea. He was an effective orator with statesman-like qualities. In his speech he declared the Atlantic Convention was hitched to individual liberty —

In this endeavor to find the way to win for freedom without

another war or depression, this bill would have us put our trust, as I said, from the start—in the convention itself—in the immense resources of individual liberty.

Many have long complained that political science lags dangerously behind physical science in developing the political machinery needed to govern in peace and freedom the world that science and technology are so rapidly changing.

Well, here at last, is a proposal to try to catch up by letting those who are eminent and experienced in this area tackle it with the marvelous inventiveness that individual freedom brings to bear when harnessed even to the most “impossible” or “utopian” goals.

While the Atlantic Union idea was advancing in the House, Senator Cranston and colleagues introduced a series of resolutions designed to strengthen the International Court of Justice —

SR 74: Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the submission of the United States territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice

SR 75: Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the adjudication of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of international agreements

SR 76: Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, selecting Judges of the International Court of Justice, and having the International Court of Justice consider cases outside The Hague

SR 77: Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice

SR 78: Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to access to the International Court of Justice

While Senators pondered the application of world law over American citizens, President Nixon was anxiously waiting to sign the Atlantic Union resolution. Before it could reach the floor for a vote, House Resolution 348 had to pass first —

H. RES. 348

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in

order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 205) to create an Atlantic Union delegation. After general debate, which shall be confined to the joint resolution and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the joint resolution shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the joint resolution for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the joint resolution to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution and amendments thereto to final passage Without intervening motion except one motion to recommit. After the passage of H.J. Res. 205, the Committee on Foreign Affairs shall be discharged from the further consideration of the joint resolution S.J. Res. 21, and it shall then be in order to consider the said Senate joint resolution in the House.

On April 10, 1973, the House debated the resolution. Unlike the debates in the House and Senate in 1960, members of Congress undoubtedly knew that Atlantic federation was on the table. Below are some statements from the opposition during a debate —

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I should like to call attention to the hearings held on almost an identical resolution, in 1971. One of the long-time proponents has been Clarence Streit. In answer to a question he said this:

I would strongly favor including in such a Union's powers not only the common defense but a common foreign policy, a common currency, a common market and a common system for handling such interstate matters as mail, cables, aviation, etc.

So I believe the intention and the justification for a union is quite clear. It is a transformation of present relationships into a union and the transfer of certain aspects of national sovereignty to this new supranational entity.

* * *

Mr. LATTA. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. If Members will turn to the resolution itself, on page 2, line 6, it provides

authority as follows:

to explore the possibility of agreement (a)

I emphasize this:

to transform their present relationship into a more effective unity based on Federal principles:

And this is not all. Subtitle (b) provides:

a timetable for the transition by stages to this goal;

I have not heard from any people in my district asking me to vote for legislation to surrender sovereignty and independence to some supernational government envisioned by this resolution.

* * *

Mr. RARICK—Mr. Speaker, I find it strange that the Congress would even consider such a resolution proposing Atlantic Union at this time when people across the Nation are preparing to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the American Revolution, the war which freed our people from English rule. The bill before us would create a delegation of Americans to explore entering into a union based on federal principles. Such a union could only result in restoring economic, financial, and military ties with European countries, thus placing the destiny of the United States and its people in the hands of a federation of governments in which the United States had only one vote. It is only reasonable to expect that the result of every vote taken in such a union would be favorable to European interests which could be detrimental to the United States and the interests of the American people.

On April 10, 1973, the Atlantic Union Resolution almost passed its procedural hurdle to reach the floor with a vote of 197 to 210 with 26 not voting. Notables voting to advance the resolution were—

Representatives John B. Anderson, Les Aspin, Shirley Chisholm, John Conyers, Ronald Dellums, John Dingle, Robert Drinan, Gerald Ford, Ralph Metcalfe, Thomas O'Neil, Claude Pepper, Charles Rangel, Morris Udall, and Jim Wright, Jr.

It is also notable that members of the Congressional Black Caucus

were consistent supporters of the Atlantic Union idea. Perhaps they longed for an opportunity to consent to a more perfect union? Would the establishment of an Atlantic Union improve race relations? Former Representative Charlie Rangel should answer these questions today.

Curiously, the Atlantic Union resolution might have passed in 1973 if Woodward and Bernstein never broke the Watergate story. For whatever reason, the ruling class wanted Nixon gone. Perhaps one of the reasons is associated with the quick rise of fast-track trade authority? Free, rather than federal, trade was advanced on October 3, 1973 when the Trade Reform Act was introduced in the House —

An Act to promote the development of an open, nondiscriminatory, and fair world economic system, to stimulate fair and free competition between the United States and foreign nations, to foster the economic growth of, and full employment in, the United States, and for other purposes

Shortly after the Trade Reform Act was introduced, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War started after a coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. The United States backed Israel, and the Soviet Union supported the Arab coalition. The two nuclear powers almost came to blows over the conflict. Although it only lasted six days, it had a huge impact on the future of American foreign policy.

The Arab-Israeli War shook Washington. In March of 1974, the Subcommittee on International Movements and Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on the “*Right to Peace*” Resolution introduced by 40 sponsors and cosponsors —

Resolved by the House of Representatives, (the Senate Concurring), That—

(1) a world without war is possible.

(2) In such a world nations will rely for their external protection on world institutions strong enough to stop any nation from making war, capable of assuring peaceful and just settlements of international disputes, and reliable enough to be entrusted with such powers.

(3) It is the policy of the United States to initiate and implement with other nations practical steps consistent with our commitment to the United Nations for the expeditious realization of such institutions.

Sponsors and cosponsors included —

Mr. Drinan, Ms. Abzug, Mr. Addabbo, Mr. Ashley, Mr. Badillo, Mr. Bergland, Mr. Bingham, Mr. Blatnik, Mr. Bolling, Mr. Brown of California, Mr. Conte, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Corman, Mr. Dellenback, Mr. Dellums, Mr. Eckhardt, Mr. Edwards of California, Mr. Eilberg, Mr. Fraser, Mr. Frenzel, Mr. Green of Pennsylvania, Mr. Hechler of West Virginia, Mr. Helstoski, Mr. Hungate, Mr. Kastenmeter, Mr. Lehman, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. McKinney, Mr. Matsunaga, Mr. Metealfe, Ms. Mink, Mr. Moorehead of Pennsylvania, Mr. Mosher, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Rosenthal, Mr. Seiberling, Mr. Smith of New York, Mr. Stark, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Symington, and Mr. Won Pat.

Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon had the following to say about the “Right to Peace” resolution—

Congressman Drinan and I and the World Order Strategy Committee have had responsibility for almost a year in the drafting of this resolution. Its brevity is not to be taken as any indication of lack of input. We purposely avoided getting into the specifics of what kind of international organization would have to be created—upon which different nations could rely for their protection—to promote a world without war.

We purposely did that, because we knew if we started getting into the specifics of what kind of organization should be created, we would draw 100 witnesses here who would want to chip away at each comma and period, who would want to argue over the technicalities of how the organization would function. We think that trying to argue that topic at the moment would be precipitous.

It is more important that the United States take the lead in the world and hopefully the other nations will follow us in reaching the philosophical conclusion that we want to create an international organization that has the power to prevent war. We were convinced as we discussed this that if we start with the right philosophy, we will be able to achieve an organization that can prevent war.

We want to emphasize we are not suggesting that we unilaterally disarm in the United States. None of us support that position. We do not plan to take any kind of a step that is going to jeopardize the national security or the defense of the United States, but we do think it imperative that the United States takes the lead in the world in suggesting that the time has come to pass beyond the era of détente and balance of power. Realizing that détente has been a good policy for the present, it nonetheless is not the be-all and end-all of a permanent world peace.

The “Right to Peace” resolution failed to gain traction. The Republican right-wing marginalized its sponsors and cosponsors as members of the “better Red than dead” crowd. Truth be told, the Soviet Union was still not interested in pursuing world order schemes designed to make the world safer for free trade imperialism.

Rather than focus on international organizations and law, Congress passed the Trade Reform Act in December of 1974—after President Nixon was forced to resign in shame. It provided fast track authority for the President to negotiate the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade. President Gerald R. Ford signed the Act into law in January of 1975.

Streit and company refused to give up federal trade. They knew President Ford was a former cosponsor of the Atlantic Union resolution. On July 31, 1975, Representative Findley and others reintroduced an Atlantic Convention resolution with the following preamble and purpose—

Whereas a more perfect union of the Atlantic Community consistent with the United States Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations gives promise of strengthening common defense, assuring more adequate energy resources, providing a stable currency to improve commerce of all kinds, and enhancing the economic prosperity, general welfare, and liberty of the member nations, Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United of America in Congress assembled, That—

- (1) The Congress hereby establishes a delegation, composed of eighteen eminent citizens, and authorizes it to organize and participate in a convention made up of similar delegations from such North Atlantic Treaty parliamentary democracies as desire to join in the enterprise, and other parliamentary democracies may invite, to explore the possibility of agreement on—
 - a. A declaration that it is the goal of their peoples to transform their present relationship into a more effective unity based on federal or other democratic principles ...

The Atlantic Convention resolution above introduced the language “or other democratic principles” to the end goal of the resolution. The addition of democratic principles coincided with the rise of democratic peace theory—the notion that liberal democracies rarely, if ever, fight other liberal democracies. Below are the cosponsors of like resolutions—

House Joint Resolution 606

Paul Findley, John B. Anderson, Clement J. Zablocki, Richard Bolling, Dante B. Fascell, Manuel Lujan, Jr., Robert N.C. Nix, Spark Matsunaga, Gus Yatron, Morgan F. Murphy, Michael Harrington, Claude Pepper, Leo J. Ryan, Melvin Price, Charles Wilson (Tex.), Albert H. Quie, Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Peter Rodino, Cardiss Collins, Herman T. Schneebeli, Helen Meyner, B.F. Sisk, Edward G. Biester, Jr., Leonor K. Sullivan, Brock Adams

House Joint Resolution 607

Donald M. Fraser, Yvonne B. Burke, Joseph P. Addabbo, Bob Carr, Glenn Anderson, Elford A. Cederberg, Les Aspin, Silvio Conte, Les AuCoin, James C. Corman, Herman Badillo, Lawrence Coughlin, Max Baucus, Dominick V. Daniels, Berkely Bedell, Thomas Downey, Alphonzo Bell, Robert Drinan, James J. Blanchard, Robert Duncan, Michael Blouin, Robert W. Edgar, Lindy (Mrs. Hale) Boggs, Don Edwards, Garry Brown

House Joint Resolution 608

Jim Wright, William F. Gooding, Glenn English, Willis D. Gradison, Jr., Marvin L. Esch, Gilbert Gude, Frank E. Evans, Tim L. Hall, Millicent Fenwick, Mark Hannaford, Joseph Fisher, Herbert Harris, Daniel J. Flood, Augustus F. Hawkins, Harold Ford, Philip H. Hayes, Bill Frenzel, John H. Heinz, III, Richard H. Fulton, Henry Helstoski, Robert N. Giaimo, Frank Horton, Sam Gibbons, Andrew Jacobs

House Joint Resolution 609

Allan T. Howe, Joe Moakley, Ed Jones, William S. Moorhead, William M. Ketchum, Charles Mosher, Martha Keyes, Stephen L. Neal, John J. LaFalce, Lucien N. Nedzi, Robert L. Leggett, Henry J. Nowak, William Lehman, James Oberstar, Clarence D. Long, James G. O'Hara, Paul N. McCloskey, Richardson Preyer, Matthew F. McHugh, Tom Railsback, Abner J. Mikva, Thomas M. Rees, Parren J. Mitchell, Ralph S. Regula

House Joint Resolution 610

Matthew J. Rinaldo, William A. Steiger, Theodore M. Risenhoover, Frank Thompson, Jr., Robert A. Roe, Charles Thone, Philip E. Ruppe, Morris K. Udall, James H. Scheuer, Richard F. Vander Veen, John F. Seiberling, G. William Whitehurst

In September of 1975, the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations held their last hearing on the *Atlantic Convention Resolution*. To establish context for considering the resolution, Representative Alan T. Howe of Utah outlined the causes of Atlantic disunity –

A number of factors have contributed to the strained relations between the United States and Europe.

First, the United States, caught up in an unwanted Vietnamese war, found ourselves with little support from our European allies and little energy left to deal with problems of mutual concern. Moreover, the conclusion of the U.S. role in Vietnam brought a new isolationism to our country and a push for troop reductions in Europe of compensatory payments to relieve our financial burdens for maintaining the troops.

Second, the growth of the European Economic Community generated a new strength and independence on the part of our European friends. No longer grateful recipients of American aid, the European nations, became, instead, successful economic competitors and industrial equals of the America.

Third, American initiatives to promote détente with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were taken largely without consultation with our allies and created apprehension over the possible weakening of the defense structure of Europe.

For one last time before a congressional committee, an aging Clarence K. Streit offered Atlantic Union as a solution to the dangers of Atlantic disunity. In his prepared remarks he wrote –

Chairman Fascell and Members of the Subcommittee, Thank you very warmly for inviting me again to testify on the Atlantic Convention resolution. This is—if memory serves—the 11th time I've testified on this Hill in support of this proposal. Eleven is a lucky number, as every craps shooter knows (and I was among them in my World War I years in the American Expeditionary Force in France in 1917-18). And so I am the more hopeful that this bill's enactment this year will make this the last of many appearances before you in behalf of this proposal to explore, by our Philadelphia 1787 Convention method which worked out the "miracle" of our revolutionary Federal Constitution—to explore the federal answer to the problem of how to unite, democratically, with our democratic NATO allies so as to work together effectively to advance the common aims. Those are to avert another World Depression and

another World War, and to advance morally and materially, the individual life, liberty and happiness of each of their citizens.

Consistent with the goal of preventing another world depression, Adolph Schmidt, who was a member of the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO in 1962, called for a sound, transatlantic currency to end the myth of smart people –

The U.S. decisions of August 15, 1971, not only terminated the international monetary system established at Bretton Woods, but also the principle purpose and function of the International Monetary Fund which was to regulate the fixed exchange rates between its members. Worldwide inflation has brought about floating exchange rates which are the antithesis of the fixed system and negate the purpose of the IMF.

As Keynesian theory and the new economics demonstrate their bankruptcy and as personal and corporate resources are embezzled by further inflating, the demand for a sound money will grow as the only means to carry on a viable international monetary and trading system. How else can a businessman write a contract for 5 years ahead, or trade in any article of commerce with the expectation of being paid in equivalent value to his cost?

An Atlantic convention would provide the means for exploring at this critical juncture such a concept as a merge of the Federal Reserve banks with the European central banks, and the revitalization of the International Monetary Fund as a new international central bank of issue.

The new currency would be soundly based, protected by monetary discipline and used exclusively in international transactions.

In March of 1976, the House Committee on International Relations issued a favorable report on the *Atlantic Convention* resolution. The committee provide the following justifications for calling a second Atlantic Convention –

Dividends of Calling an Atlantic Convention

It is probable that the Atlantic Community must become stronger or it will gradually become weaker. To prevent any weakening, the need is urgent for a more comprehensive goal and appropriate institutions to strengthen the common defense of our free peoples, provide for a stable currency for world trade, enhance

the welfare of the people of developing countries. There is a growing realization on both sides of the Atlantic that some more permanent, perhaps federal, solutions must be found to address common problems.

H.J. Res. 606 authorizes exploration of whether to adopt such a goal, and how to develop such institutions. Adoption of this resolution by Congress would have positive benefits, for both the Atlantic Community and the world, in several important areas.

First, American relations with Europe would be enhanced. It would reassure concerned European leaders that Atlantic Community interests rank high in U.S. priorities. It would underscore in a substantial way the importance Congress attaches to the development of even stronger institutional ties with Canada and Western Europe.

Second, it would bolster a seriously weakened international economy. It would impart new confidence in world money markets because it would demonstrate US willingness to harmonize trade relations looking toward the improvement of employment throughout all participating countries.

Third, it would begin to make good on long-awaited plans for a more effective, more equitable Atlantic partnership.

Fourth, it would serve as an inspiration to all peoples and nations facing future decades laced with seemingly intractable problems. And with democracies becoming increasingly scarce, such a move could also provide an example how cooperation based on democratic principles can promote peace and prosperity.

Finally, if the convention is able to agree upon a common goal for the Atlantic Community, and if Congress in fulfillment of its Constitutional responsibilities decides to adopt that goal, the American people can look forward to a significant improvement in the security of their liberty.

Soon after the committee issued its report, on April 1, 1976, the House considered H. Res. 1085—

H. RES. 1085

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 606) to call an Atlantic Convention. After general debate, which shall be confined to the joint resolution and shall continue not to exceed one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of

the Committee on International Relations, the joint resolution shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the joint resolution for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the joint resolution to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

Before the vote, proponents of the Atlantic Union idea attempted to soften their opposition —

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I feel somewhat awkward in appearing in opposition to the point of view expressed by my very close personal friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. KAZEN). There is not another Member of this House whose sincerity and integrity I respect more. In this instance, however, I think the gentleman's apprehensions are unfounded.

Let us read exactly what the resolution would do. It would authorize us to "participate in a convention made up of similar delegations from such North Atlantic Treaty parliamentary democracies as desire to join in the enterprise, and other parliamentary democracies the convention may invite."

Certainly in this heterogeneous world those of us who believe in the foundation principles of parliamentary democracy ought to find ways to draw together and cooperate: Is there anything wrong in that?

This convention will be authorized to "explore the possibility of agreement." Now, is there anything wrong with exploring the possibility of agreement? Surely, it does not commit us to any agreement. Why would we want to deny our country the right to join with other like-minded countries, those that believe in parliamentary democracy, to explore the possibility of agreement? S

Such an agreement might, according to the resolution, develop "more effective unity." Now, what is wrong with more effective unity among those nations of the world who embrace parliamentary democracy? It seems to me the words that follow have excited and alarmed some people. The words of the resolution describe a more effective unity "based on Federal or other democratic principles."

It seems to me that these are the scare words which cause people to see invasions of our national freedom lurking under the veil.

"Federal or other democratic principles." Perhaps some

people feel that this presages a kind of suggestion that was made during World War II by Winston Churchill when he offered to the people of France in their hour of darkest need the privileges of common citizenship and common currency with his own people. That would have been one extreme form, perhaps, of an agreement based on Federal or other democratic principles. In behalf of the people of France, their government in exile speaking through General De Gaulle, rejected that offer, so nothing came of it.

NATO itself might be considered an exercise in "Federal or other democratic principles" to achieve more effective unity in common defense. Is there anything wrong with that? Are there Members who would object to our participation in NATO for the military defense of parliamentary democracy for the Western world?

The Common Markets might be regarded as exercises in more effective unity based upon "Federal or other democratic principles" for the purpose of reducing barriers to free trade and promoting interchange of commerce between nations.

* * *

Mr. KETCHUM. Mr. Speaker, I repeat that I am not a one-worlder. I am not a Communist, but I see absolutely nothing wrong with debating this resolution, amending it if that will take away some of the fears of the Members, pass it and let us talk. I have seen a lot of people die in two wars, and I do not mean we should back down to anyone, but I would a whole lot rather talk than bleed.

* * *

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, we have all heard a great deal of talk: during the course of the debate in this legislation about how the passage of this resolution would somehow result in a surrender of sovereignty which would somehow impair the capacity of our Nation to function as an independent entity in international affairs. But I would remind my colleagues, particularly those who sit on the other side of the aisle. of a comment once made by that great American and great Republican, Wendell Wilkie, who. after returning from a trip around the world in 1944 said:

Sovereignty is not something to be hoarded but something to be used.

What is at stake here is not the abstract and academic preservation of our constitutional independence but our ability to forge a more effective partnership with the other democracies

around the world.

What I like about this resolution is that it calls for a convention not just of our NATO allies but of all the parliamentary democracies of the world so that we can collectively consult and together determine what we can do to reinvest our democratic ideology with more appeal to all the peoples of the world. The fact is that today democracy is on the retreat and the forces of dictatorship are on the advance. Unless we do something and do it soon the day will come when we will become an island of liberty in a sea of oppression and the liberty we love will have become compromised in the process.

Giving new meaning to April Fools' Day, the Atlantic Convention resolution was defeated by a vote of 164 to 194 with 73 not voting. Compared to the 1973 procedural vote, the desire to explore Atlantic Union faded as the economic interests of the establishment changed. The Trade Act of 1974—and the influence of the Trilateral Commission—shifted the focus of American foreign economic policy toward the Pacific. Japan, after all, was emerging as a major economic powerhouse and China would soon follow. The American establishment was no longer fixated on transatlantic affairs.

This shift to the Pacific was evident after Governor Jimmy Carter, a member of the Trilateral Commission, was elected President of the United States in November of 1976. Carter edged out former Democratic cosponsors of the Atlantic Union resolution during the primaries, and later defeated President Ford in the general election. For all intents and purposes, the Atlantic Union movement was over as Carter placed his emphasis on UN reform efforts.

Chapter 7 – The Carter Years

Although Vice President Walter F. Mondale was a consistent cosponsor of the Atlantic Union idea, Representative Findley and friends did not reintroduce the Atlantic Union resolution during the core years of the Carter administration. President Carter initially placed his emphasis on trying to strengthen the United Nations system, but in March of 1978, his administration conceded in its report to the Committee on Foreign Relations –

that a widescale reform of the United Nations through Charter amendment is not feasible because it is opposed by the Soviet Union and because a number of other influential countries, including the United States, have expressed preference for reforms that would not require amendment to the Charter.

Shifting to world trade issues, in January of 1979, President Carter bested former President Nixon by normalizing trade relations with the People’s Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping recognized that China had to modernize and economically engage the West to survive. America’s willingness to trade with a former communist enemy undermined the Atlantic Union idea – and undoubtedly shocked the Kremlin.

The last and final world government hearing was held in October of 1979. During the *United Nations Reform* hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations, witnesses from the Campaign for United Nations Reform, World Association of World Federalists, and the World Order Research Institute presented their world order preferences. Shortly after the

hearing, President Carter had a new enemy to contend with—radical Islam.

Following the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of Iran spawned an energy crisis and later took Americans hostage in November of 1979. A year later, the Iran-Iraq War started in September of 1980. The UN Security Council did not have the collective will to stop it—its resolutions were hollow. The Soviet Union, after all, was too busy invading Afghanistan a month later. In response, Carter boycotted the Olympics. It was obviously time to elect a new President.

Representative Findley waited until after the 1980 presidential election to reintroduce the Atlantic Convention resolution. A month after Ronald Reagan won in a landslide, on December 3, 1980, Representative Findley announced his intentions—

Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today a joint resolution to convene an Atlantic Convention of NATO and other parliamentary democracies. The purpose of this convention would be to explore the possibilities for transforming the present relationship among these nations into a more effective unity of their peoples. An Atlantic union based on democratic, federal principles would strengthen the common defense, assure adequate energy resources, and enhance the general economic prosperity of the people of the nations joining this December 3, 1980 effort. At the same time, it would preserve their welfare, liberty, and sovereignty.

It is, I believe, more important than ever, to pursue the ideal and objective of Atlantic union. We are entering a period of great challenge and enormous danger for all free peoples. Scarce energy supplies, vast economic dislocation, the growing Soviet military threat and aggression totalitarianism place our democratic way of life in jeopardy. Tragically, the West has been unable to concentrate its efforts in order to confront these challenges together. Instead, the West appears to be falling increasingly into disarray; 1980 has been a year of serious dissension within the Atlantic community. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in the Persian Gulf has stimulated divisiveness and recriminations among the United States and its allies rather than a stronger resolve to unite in opposition to common threats. There are worrisome trends in United States-European relations toward trade protectionism and reckless competition for scarce energy resources. The United States and Europe also seem to be headed toward divergent paths in East-West arms control efforts and Middle East peace initiatives.

It is critical that the people of the Atlantic community of democratic nations recognize that all will lose should their governments pursue policies antagonistic to one another rather than

joining forces to confront mutual problems. Text of resolution follows:

H.J. Res—

Joint Resolution to Call an Atlantic Convention

Whereas a more perfect union of the Atlantic Community consistent with the United States Constitution gives promise of strengthening common defense, assuring more adequate energy resources, providing a stable currency to improve commerce of all kinds, and enhancing the economic prosperity, while preserving the general welfare, liberty, and sovereignty of the people of the member nations:

Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the Congress hereby establishes a delegation, composed of United States citizens, and authorizes it to organize and participate in a convention, made up of similar delegations from such North Atlantic Treaty parliamentary democracies and other parliamentary democracies as desire to join in the enterprise, to explore the possibility of agreement on-

(1) a declaration that it is the goal of their peoples to transform their present relationship into a more effective unity based on Federal or other democratic principles;

(2) a timetable for transition by stages to this goal; and

(3) a commission or other means to facilitate this transition.

(b) The convention's recommendations will be submitted to the Congress, as part of the delegation's final report, for action under constitutional process. SEC. 2. (a) The delegation shall consist of seven members appointed as follows:

(1) Two appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, after consultation with the House leadership and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(2) Two appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, after consultation with the Senate leadership and the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(3) Three appointed by the President.

(b) The delegation shall elect, a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members.

(c) All members of the delegation shall be free from official instructions and free to speak and vote Individually.

(d) Vacancies shall not affect the delegation's powers and shall be filled in the same manner as the original selection.

(e) Members of the delegation, who shall serve without compensation, shall be reimbursed for, or shall be furnished, travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties under this joint resolution.

Sec. 3. (a) The delegation may appoint not more than ten temporary professional and clerical staff without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, who may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no individual so appointed may receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(b) The delegation may expend not to exceed \$200,000 of the funds appropriated to carry out this joint resolution for expenses incurred in conjunction with the meetings described in the first section.

Sec. 4. (a) The delegation shall report to the President and the Congress at least once each six months. Such reports shall include an accounting for all expenditures by the delegation and such other information as the delegation deems appropriate.

(b) The delegation shall submit a final report to the President and the Congress setting forth the results of the convention described in the first section of this joint resolution, including the recommendations made by the convention.

Sec. 5. Effective October 1, 1981, there is authorized to be appropriated not to exceed \$500,000 to carry out this joint resolution, payments to be made upon vouchers approved by the Chairman of the delegation.

Sec. 6. The delegation shall cease to exist at the expiration of the three-year period beginning on the date that appropriations first become available to carry out this joint resolution.

After Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in November of 1980, no one dared to cosponsor the Atlantic Union resolution. In 1983, Representative Paul Findley was voted out of office. In his book, *Speaking Out: A Congressman's Lifelong Fight Against Bigotry, Famine, and War* (2001), he primarily blamed patriotic organizations and the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) for his loss. While President Reagan abandoned the federalist aspiration of the Atlantic Union idea, he saluted Clarence K. Streit on his 90th birthday —

17, 1986

Dear Mr. Streit:

I am delighted to join your many friends in sending warm greetings on your 90th birthday.

You've lived a long life filled with more accomplishments than I could possibly recite. Nonetheless, your most noteworthy achievements are certainly the publication of *Union Now* in 1939 and your work ever since in pursuit of your goal of closer cooperation among the North Atlantic democracies. *Union Now* foreshadowed the Atlantic Alliance of World War II and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through which we and our democratic allies have resisted the spread of totalitarianism.

Today, when it is taken for granted that democratic governments must work together closely for mutual security, prosperity, and the protection of our God-given human rights, it gives me great pleasure to salute you, Clarence Streit, as an early advocate of such cooperation and a true champion of individual freedom.

Nancy joins me in sending best wishes for a happy birthday and a wonderful year. God bless you.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Clarence K. Streit passed away on July 6, 1986. His federalist legacy was conveniently forgotten by members of Congress as they shamelessly advanced globalization without representation, checks, and balances. Free trade imperialism prevailed.

Chapter 8 – Federalism Abandoned

How can we explain why the federalist aspects of the Atlantic Union Movement were abandoned in the United States Congress after Ronald Reagan became President of the United States in 1980? In the following chapter, plausible explanations will be explored ranging from the emergence of democratic peace theory to the design of the Constitution of the United States. In the end, we must all determine for ourselves whether the dearth of federalist exploration is truly in our best interest.

Democratic Peace Theory

During the height of the Cold War, the perceived necessity of world government, federal or otherwise, was driven by a political-scientific consensus among academic and establishment elites that the anarchistic structure of the international system was the root cause of war. World federalism was advanced as an applied political science inspired by the tenants of the realist school of international relations—such as Hans J. Morgenthau. This consensus was challenged after establishment leaders failed to legislatively deliver on the Atlantic Union idea

In the late 1970s, the political science behind the Atlantic Union idea was marginalized by democratic peace theory (DPT). DPT inspired politicians to once again embrace the nation-state system after it was proven empirically that liberal democracies rarely, if ever, fight other liberal democracies. DPT offered an attractive alternative to Atlantic Union and

world federation. It allowed establishment elites an opportunity to advance free trade. Globalization without representation, checks, and balances prevailed.

NATO and the Military-Industrial Complex (M/IC)

Another possible explanation for the demise of the Atlantic Union movement were the bureaucratic survival instincts of NATO and the military-industrial complex (M/IC). After President Eisenhower authorized U.S. participation in the Atlantic Convention of 1962, he warned the American people about the dangers of the M/IC during his farewell address. Bureaucratic forces within NATO—and their supporting defense contractors—likely resisted the evolution of NATO into a political and economic union to ensure their survival. An Atlantic Union could increase competition, or worse, put them all out of business. General and complete disarmament, after all, was the eventual goal of the Atlantic Union idea.

Operation Dumbbell

Another logical explanation for the fall of the Atlantic Union movement is the rise of the European Economic Community (EEC). By 1980, the EEC advanced too far for the Atlantic Union idea to be practical. Advocates of the federal Europe first school of thought in the State Department essentially won the debate. Forging an Atlantic partnership, like President Kennedy envisioned in 1962, was the most realistic option on the table after the European Parliament held its first popular election in 1979. While Europeans proved that an Atlantic Union was possible, America's window of opportunity to federate the free effectively closed.

The Islamic World and Democratic War

Radical Islam effectively derailed the Atlantic Union movement. Before the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the greater Middle East was relatively predictable and contained. Without access to affordable energy, an Atlantic Union could not defend and extend the blessings of individual liberty. Radical Islamists reject the Atlantic Union idea on religious grounds. They have their own plans for world domination. Liberal democratic world federation is not possible as long as radical Islamists hold power.

Free Trade Imperialism

Another plausible explanation for the demise of the Atlantic Union movement in the 1980s is globalization. It effectively emancipated the American ruling class from the confines of the nation-state system. Once multinational corporations shed their nationalistic identities, an Atlantic Union based on federalist principles was no longer in their best interest. A cynical aspect of the above theory is that the ruling class discovered that it could escape progressive labor and environmental regulations by moving production to the developing world at the behest of their oligarchs.

Under an Atlantic Union, and subsequent world federation, labor and environmental standards would eventually become universal. Multinational corporations would be forced to compete on a level regulatory playing field. They would no longer enjoy the competitive rewards of regulatory bottom feeding.

Globalization without representation, checks, and balances became far more attractive to the ruling class once the Trade Act of 1974 became law. It authorized the President of the United States to negotiate free trade agreements while marginalizing Congress. The ruling class placed their profits before American federalist principles.

The Legislative Process

The Atlantic Union movement was also contained by the realities of the legislative process. Atlantic Union resolutions were consistently reintroduced in Congress from 1949 to 1980. Only once did a resolution inspired by the Atlantic Union idea reach the floor for an enacting vote – and it led to the Atlantic Convention of 1962. Nationalistic members of Congress were able to block the Atlantic Union resolution year after year. The Constitution effectively controlled the dangers of domestic faction.

The Constitution of the United States

Perhaps the most compelling reason why the Atlantic Union movement failed overall is that the Constitution of the United States worked as originally intended. The Constitution is a legal expression of the American social contract enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. Progressive politicians were unable to establish a legitimate international federation using the treaty-making power. Drafting, and subsequently ratifying, a transatlantic constitution may have succeeded, however, if the American people amended the Constitution prior to exploring an Atlantic Union with their European counterparts.

Exhibit 1 – Analysis of the World Federalist Resolution

A - Testimony of the Under Secretary of State John D. Hickerson Before the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1950

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STATE DEPARTMENT CANNOT SUPPORT SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 56

But for the reasons given we cannot support this resolution.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. There was one question brought up in the discussion of this resolution which impressed, I think, all of us a great deal, and that had to do with the substitution of the rule of law for the rule of force in determining international difficulties. Now, the advocates of this approach argue that unless you look forward, at least, to some sort of a world organization and the development of some kind of world law, you will never get to the place where the rule of law will govern the affairs of men. You will still have the rule of contest and force. That is the main line that struck me as the most impressive argument advanced for this particular proposal.

Do you take the position today that we must postpone the immediate

goal, at least, of world law in the place of force? Do you think it is so out of reach, that we ought not even think in terms of it in the future?

Mr. HICKERSON. By no means do I think that, Senator. I think we should debate these measures, we should promote the widest public understanding of these measures, and I think that of course we should work toward some kind of world law. We must feel our way very cautiously, Senator, in this thing. We must recognize that since the beginning of organized society the best thought in every community has tended to be in terms of some collective system of security and some system of world law. But we must recognize the difficulties in the way.

I feel very strongly that we should continue to study, to endeavor to understand the issues involved and to explore ways and means under the Charter of the United Nations of working toward that objective.

I do feel very strong that setting our sights on and setting forth the objective of world federation is not the way to achieve that.

WORLD FEDERATION OR ORDER

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. The suggestion was made by someone, I forget who it was, in the discussion of this resolution, that if the expression in this resolution were changed from "world federation" to "world order," it might be more acceptable as an expression of an over-all ultimate goal. What is your opinion?

Mr. HICKERSON. I personally think, sir, that it would. I would still have misgivings about the advisability of passing a resolution of this sort at this time. I repeat, I think that the issues raised by this should be debated. I think that there should be the widest understanding of them and discussion of them. But I have doubts as to the advisability of passing even the amended resolution which you suggested, sir, even though that to me is an improvement.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I wanted to make it clear that I did not suggest that. It was suggested by someone at the hearing, and I am just trying to be sure we explore all of the suggestions that have come to us.

NEED FOR CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Of course, the thing that has precipitated this has been the terrible comprehension of people because of, first, the atomic bomb, and now the so-called H-bomb. They wonder whether we are going to have me to wait for anything. I realize that the world federation idea would be a long-drawn-out affair and it would not meet that immediate issue, but the people

that are advocating this and all these other are concerned. I think Senator Thomas said a little earlier day they are concerned that something be done in the light of this critical situation.

How do you feel we can deal with the H-bomb proposition? Do you think we should go on pressing for the Baruch plan, for example, or the control of atomic energy, and how H-bomb energy, or how are we going to deal with that - just go on pressing that particular approach or trying something different?

Mr. HICKERSON. Senator Smith, I can understand, of course, that comprehension. All of us share it. We would like to do something. But we must bear in mind that if this subcommittee reported that particular resolution, or any particular resolution, let's say this one, and the Senate unanimously approved it and every country in the world agreed to join this world federation, and if by some magic it could be done in the next 3 weeks, we still would not have the solution to the bomb.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I agree with that.

Mr. HICKERSON. It would not solve that.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I agree with that. As I said, this world federation idea is too far ahead of us to deal with the immediate crisis. I was leaving that and trying to see how you are thinking in terms of the immediate crisis and what you can do.

Mr. HICKERSON. As to your question on the control of atomic energy, I can say to you, sir, that all of us who have done any work on the subject have reached the conclusion that the so-called Baruch plan-it should be called, I think, in fairness to the other countries who made their contribution, the United Nations plan of control-would work. Mr. Baruch made proposals of a United States plan. They, you will recall, were discussed for a period of 2 years in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Numerous changes were made in those proposals. To the extent that they represented improvements, the representatives of the United States were happy to concur in the changes. And what came out of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was indeed a United Nations plan of control. That plan was debated at the General Assembly meeting in Paris in 1948, and by a vote of 40 to 6 was approved. The Soviet Union and those countries voting with the Soviet Union alone opposed it.

It is a good plan, Senator. I repeat, all of us who worked on the subject of atomic energy are convinced that it would work.

In the discussions since Paris, the Russians have declined to accept it, and not only have done that but have themselves advanced no alternative proposals of their own. In the discussions during the General Assembly last

year in New York, the General Assembly by a vote of 49 to 5, this time Yugoslavia deserting the Soviet Union and abstaining from voting, voted to reaffirm the principles of this. United Nations plan of control. They called upon the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Canada, to continue the consultations which had been in process since last August in an effort to find a basis for agreement. They called upon the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission to examine all concrete proposals that had been advanced during the General Assembly and elsewhere, to explore all avenues in an honest, sincere effort to find a basis for agreement.

Immediately after the ending of the General Assembly session the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission resumed their consultations. On January 19, 1950, the Soviet representatives in those consultations, at the beginning of the meeting, stated that he could not sit in these consultations with the representative of the Nationalist Government of China. He thereupon walked out, and no meetings have been held since that time.

We think that in that action over a wholly extraneous and irrelevant issue that had nothing to do with atomic energy the Soviet Union showed scant respect for the will of the General Assembly, who called upon us to try to reach a solution of this problem. We have been discussing ways and means of bridging this gap and breaking this impasse. Our position, sir, as stated by the President and the Secretary of State, is that we think the United Nations plan of control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons would work. We support it and we will continue to support it unless and until a better or equally effective plan is achieved. We do not think that human ingenuity was necessarily exhausted in that plan, and we are prepared to consider any proposals designed or calculated to produce a better or equally effective plan.

The Russians say they won't take it. They have made no new proposals, and there we are, sir. In those circumstances, what do we do? We simply, so far as we are concerned, are prepared to continue in these consultations of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, earnestly to continue, our efforts to find a basis for solution. We think it would betray ourselves and world security if we adopted proposals just for the sake of an agreement which our judgment tells us would be ineffective. And that is a description of the Soviet proposals to date. They fall far short of providing the necessary safeguards.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am glad to get that in the record just as you have stated it and as you have analyzed it. I gather that the net result of your discussion is that so far as this atomic crisis is concerned, with the

H-bomb and everything else concerned with it, these terrible weapons of destruction, there is nothing in any of the proposals that have come before this committee that would come as close to meeting it as the particular proposals you are considering in the UN, a so-called UN plan built on the original Baruch proposal.

Mr. HICKERSON. That is correct. The only place that agreement can be achieved on this problem is among the interested states. The interested states are sitting, or were sitting until the Soviets walked out on us, in those consultations. It is the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union alone, which is blocking the acceptance of an agreement on atomic energy.

During the last session of the General Assembly, the British representative, in the debate in the plenary session, I believe, made the statement: What a tragedy it was; had the Soviet Union been willing, after reasonable debate in the Atomic Energy Commission, to accept the plan acceptable to everybody else, the plan probably by now would be in force and there would not be an atomic weapon in existence.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That is assuming, of course-I do not want to get into debate about it-that we could be sure to have a method of inspection that would be watertight.

Mr. HICKERSON. That is correct, sir.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That is the \$64 issue, as I see it, because even assuming Russia agreed to inspection, as a matter of fact she has violated some of her other agreements, and unless we had a pretty strong method of inspection we would not be sure that in some of those vast wastes of Siberia there might not be violations.

Mr. HICKERSON. That is a tough proposition.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Before you leave, Mr. Hickerson, in defense of the authors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 56 and also in defense of the State Department's statement, I think we ought to stress, and question, one sentence. I am sure the sponsors of the resolution did not assume that the mere fact that they want to move into a world federation means that they are moving into a vacuum without law and without some semblance of order. But in your statement you seem to imply that that is the State Department's interpretation of the way in which the authors are thinking. "What law and what institutions would govern the world federation?" You could ask that question, of course, as to any type of government that has come into existence. When our own Government came into existence or the United Nations or the League of Nations came into existence, the structure of the Constitution itself could not in any way give respect to the law which was necessary for setting up such structures.

WORLD LAW

Now, I think there is definitely world-community law, whether we recognize it or not. There is definitely an understanding between all of the peoples of the world and all lawmakers of the world that the middle of the ocean is a place without certain jurisdictions. Land area is a place with certain jurisdictions. I think that we can make a case for a great amount of world community law that is existing.

I think the Connally resolution, which you have quoted, states one thing, and that is the fact that the world recognizes independent sovereign states. They have not made any declaration of that recognition, have they? Here you haven't any positive law on it, have you? But it is the basis of all international law. You seem to assume that first we have to get the nations of the world together and create a positive law before we can move into a discussion about a confederation. But your big point here, and I think you have not stressed it enough, is that immediately you move into a world federation status, you turn your back definitely upon the independent sovereign state idea, which is the law of the world as it exists today. You can go so far as to have an imperium and an imperio, if we may get that highbrow here, because we ourselves think that we have done that. When we had Mr. Justice Roberts before us he said that while he was on the highest Court of the land, the Court's greatest concern was to preserve the entity of the States, and we can see that we haven't destroyed independent states in moving into the United Nations. But when once you move into a federation you limit independent actions in the sphere where you delegate authority to the representative government of that federation to act. That is fundamental political science. These things which you said we haven't got, are here and we have got them.

Consciously, if we decide to have a world federation, consciously if we decide that we will change to a degree-it may be just the degree of half an inch, or it may be a degree of a whole mile, the fundamental law of the world, the notion of independence, of absolute sovereignty of the states of the world, is encroached upon.

Now, as a representative of the State Department, and we as representatives of the United States Government in the Senate, and all of us as representatives of our Government in some way or other, our first allegiance is and must be to the Government of the United States always, or else we destroy what definitely is-it has not been stated, but what definitely is-the law of the community of nations and the world today. If that were understood by all of us we would not call so many of us the bad names that

we do, because I myself realize that when we accept the obligation of being an officer or a representative, or one who takes an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States, he enters into a rather serious obligation which must be given consideration at all times.

When I say that, I do not imply that a suggestion made by anyone sponsoring these resolutions is a suggestion which is looking to the destruction of something. It is looking to the building up of something, but at the same time that does not remove the problem.

Mr. HICKERSON. Senator Thomas, I completely agree with what you have said, sir, and I want to assure you that it was far from our intention to criticize the motives of anybody in connection with this or any other of the resolutions. As to the particular question that you singled out, all we are trying to do there is to say we want further information about the law and institutions-some of these things are spelled out-so that we can agree, so the American people can agree, that this is the goal to which we can aspire.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Hickerson just one more question. There is a Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 66 which was introduced by Senator Taylor, and which is the resolution supporting the so-called Chicago Hutchins plan for a draft of a world constitution. Do I understand that your opposition to Resolution 56, which you have just been discussing, would apply to 66 also, which is just a further extension and elaboration of the world federation idea?

Mr. HICKERSON. That is correct, sir. I have a separate statement on that.

B—Pros and Cons of the World Federalist Resolution

2. SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 56 (THE TOBEY OR "WORLD FEDERALIST" RESOLUTION)

A. Essentials of resolution

This resolution declares the sense of Congress that a fundamental objective of United States foreign policy should be (1) "to support and strengthen the United Nations" and (2) "to seek its development into a world federation open to all nations with defined and limited powers adequate to preserve peace and prevent aggression through the enactment, interpretation, and enforcement of world law. This is either a relatively simple proposal with limited implications or one with vast implications. Whether it is one or the other depends upon the meaning given the words.

In the words of Senator Tobey: "It is a policy statement * * * it is a general statement of purpose * * *"

The details of implementation are left "to the wisdom of the minds of Congress and the United Nations." In answer to a question as to whether the resolution expresses a specific program, Senator Pepper answered that he was committed only to the exact words of the resolution. Senator Magnuson in a statement inserted in the record wrote that the World Federalist proposal —

contemplates a very limited deposit of sovereignty in the United Nations * * * it means that the internal functions of member states would remain untouched (hearings, p. 100).

Senator Morse in testifying in support of the resolution remarked that the resolution —

will at least give assurance that the American people are in favor of the United Nations proceeding in the direction of seeking to enact international law that will be fair and just and usable * * * (hearings, p. 103).

While this resolution was supported by the United World Federalists, Senators testifying in support of the resolution made it clear that they were supporting the resolution as drafted and not the total World Federalist program as set forth in publications of that organization. Mr. Cord Meyer, chairman of the national executive committee of the United World Federalists, gave the following views to the committee. By passing this resolution —

we in the United States would be declaring our willingness to join with other nations in transferring to the UN constitutional authority to administer and enforce law that was binding on national governments and their individual citizens (hearings, p. 121).

A specific definition of the extent of the lawmaking powers would have to wait for thorough consideration of the problem by the Congress and the executive branch of the Government. Mr. Meyer did suggest, however, that the United Nations would need to be given legal authority to prevent the use of force, to control atomic-energy development, to regulate the size and character of national armed forces, to raise revenue, and to maintain such international police forces as required to enforce this body of law. Subsequently, Mr. Philip W. Amram speaking for the United World Federalists, made it clear that the United Nations should not be given

powers, for example, in the "fields of trade, commerce, tariffs, 'currency, immigration, and so forth" (hearings, p. 134).

Mr. Alan Cranston, president of United World Federalists, submitted a statement to the committee pointing out that "there can be no withdrawal" from a strengthened United Nations. He observed, however, that the Senators and Congressmen sponsoring this resolution —

are not committed to any particular formula. This resolution lays down no precise blueprint. It demands no immediate action by our Government, nor does it present any timetable. Tactics and strategy implementation are not even suggested in the resolution. It simply declares a great purpose (hearings, p. 525).

The important thing to bear in mind in considering this resolution is that if it is adopted as a declaration of policy it will presumably require implementation. The committee is aware, of course, that the United World Federalists do leave a fairly concrete program covering such matters as representation in a legislative body, an executive body responsible to the legislative, a judiciary with jurisdiction over individuals as well as states, etc. The committee did not feel that this program was a part of the pending resolution so did not examine in detail the way the UFW would propose the resolution be implemented if passed.

B. Principal arguments in support of resolution

(See hearings, p. 73 and following.)

1. The world situation "calls upon us to propose a policy of an affirmative and courageous nature, that is capable of changing the tide of world opinion from desperate despair, to renewed hope and faith." (Senator Tobey, hearings, p. 74.) "Our policy must have a positive and affirmative answer to the challenge of communism." (Senator Pepper, hearings, p. 87.) This resolution, it is claimed, would serve those purposes.

2. The burden of an arms race "will not be eased until the United Nations in itself can guarantee the security of all nations" (Senator Magnuson, hearings, p. 100). Movement in the direction of a world federation through the United Nations would be a move toward given the United Nations strength to guarantee peace.

3. Passage of this resolution would be —

another step in the direction of informing the American people that we have to do something about setting up an international judicial system.

Furthermore, it would —

give assurance that the American people are in favor of the United Nations proceeding in the direction of seeking authority to enact international law (Senator Morse, hearings, pp. 102 and 103).

4. This proposal calls for working through the United Nations. It would not destroy the United Nations in the process of seeking a more effective international organization.

5. The resolution calls for an organization open to all nations. It would not, therefore, drive the Soviet Union out of the United Nations or seek to set up a world organization from which the Soviet would be excluded. Even if the Soviet Union should refuse to come into the world federation, the organization would always be open to her. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would find it expedient to stay out of a world federation.

6. Supranational government is the only way to end war and the threat of war. State sovereignty must be curbed. This resolution is the first step in the direction of creating world government with power sufficient to preserve peace.

7. International control over modern weapons of destruction will require limited world federal government. This means that the international government and its courts must have jurisdiction over the individual. This proposal envisages such control.

C. Principal arguments against resolution

(See hearings p. 427 and following.)

1. The constitutional issues posed by this resolution are as fundamental as any the United States has had to deal with since 1789. It is doubtful if the people of the United States have adequately considered or are now ready to place in the hands of others the power to dispose of the manpower and resources of the United States.

2. One may at least question whether a world federation based on democratic principles could prosper in a setting where —

two-thirds of the world's people live on less than adequate diet, one-half are illiterate, and only a minority live under truly democratic governments (hearings, p. 428).

3. If the United States goes into a world federation it will be necessary to compromise its way of life and institutions to some extent because it would be dangerous to assume that other nations would agree

without question that the American way of life is best.

4. Questions have been raised as to the form of parliament contemplated, whether the United States representatives would be in a minority, what assurances there would be for the protection of minorities, what changes in the Constitution of the United States would be required etc., thus indicating some doubt as to whether proponents of the resolution had considered the full implications of the proposal.

5. It has been claimed that implementation of this resolution would not strengthen the United Nations, but would in fact destroy it by substituting another organization which would be something entirely different from the United Nations. A world federation would be a government with authority to legislate and enforce its will on states as well as on individuals. The United Nations, on the other hand, is an organization of sovereign states without legislative authority and without authority to apply its mandate to individuals.

6. Any delegation of "defined and limited powers" to a world government "adequate to preserve peace and prevent aggression" would, to be effective in the world in which we live, mean, in fact, a delegation of power approximating the delegation to our Federal Government. Doubt has been expressed that even the supporters of the resolution would be willing to go this far.

7. There would be no assurance that in a true world federation Communist and Fascist parties would not, even though representing a minority of the people in the world, be able to obtain control of the world government. The proposal sponsored by the United World Federalists does not envisage any method whereby a state could withdraw from the world federation in such an eventuality.

8. A world federation could not expect by its mere existence to end the basic conflict between communism and capitalism, between totalitarianism and freedom. It would only project that conflict into a new area where more clearly than ever the stake would be world domination.

9. There is no substantial evidence that other states would be willing to join a world federation.

Exhibit 2 – Analysis of the Atlantic Union Resolution

A – Testimony of Under Secretary of State John D. Hickerson Before the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1950.

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Mr. HICKERSON. Mr. Chairman, in addressing myself to Senate Concurrent Resolution 57, calling for United States initiative in convening the participants to the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to the establishment of a free Atlantic Federal Union, I should like to point out that application of “the principles of free federal union” as between the United States and any other country or countries would involve not only basic economic and social changes but also changes in the structure of the United States Government. While all of us in the department are acutely aware of the urgency for continued study to sound, practicable action in progressing toward closer association of the free world, it is the fundamental issues which this resolution raises in terms of both the United States and other countries which I would like first to discuss.

Senator WILEY. It seems to me the basis of the resolution is simply to explore, is it not?

Senator HICKERSON. Yes, sir. I shall deal with that in the course of my comments, Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. All right.

PUBLIC REACTION TO ATLANTIC UNION

Mr. HICKERSON. What would be the reactions of our fellow Americans to the implications of such an Atlantic Federal Union?

Clearly, United States participation in such a union would involve the ceding of power by the United States Government to some new authority in many fields, such as the conduct of relations with other governments, control of our armed forces, taxation, imports, currency, exploitation of our national resources, and immigration. Are the American people prepared to do so? To what kind of authority? By what process?

Most of the powers which would be transferred would affect every American, but some powers would affect some groups more than others. What would be the effect on labor standards? Business? Agriculture?

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Presumably, amendment of the United States Constitution would be involved. What mandate from the people or the Congress would United States representatives need to negotiate with other governments on matters which would involve such changes?

Other countries proposed for membership have different forms of government than ours and different political systems. How far would the American people be prepared to go in altering our form of government? Are they prepared to have the representatives of the American people a minority in the parliament of such a union?

EFFECT ABROAD

Now let us consider the effect of this proposal on other nations of the free world. It would be difficult to establish a federal Atlantic Union without profound economic repercussions upon agriculture, industry, and labor of all participating countries. Just as in our own case, which peoples would be prepared to relinquish part of their sovereignty in such fields as imports and exports, currency, taxation, immigration, and defense?

What would be the effect of the establishment of the proposed Atlantic Union upon free countries not included in the Union upon their sense of security and upon their attitude toward the United States?

Furthermore, one of the most difficult problems in any new international arrangement is the question of membership. What other countries would be invited to participate in this Union and on what basis would they be selected? The composition of this Union or Convention would greatly affect its character. The more homogenous the group, the easier it is to make progress, but the greater the number excluded. For the present, the approach of separate arrangements for dealing with different problems, and with different membership, is valuable in preventing any sharp distinction between the "ins" and the "outs."

CLOSER ASSOCIATION NECESSARY

It is true that the acceleration of scientific development and of the impact of events in an increasingly crowded world lends urgency to the need for further developments in the field of political relationships. We believe that progressively closer association, by limited and practicable steps on the basis of common interests, and in support of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, within as much as practicable of the free world, is both necessary and desirable. The United States as a world power must accordingly participate in the process of association in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary most effectively to promote its common interests with other free nations.

In the development of such closer associations, care must be exercised not to set in motion forces which will render more difficult the maintenance of the solidarity of the free world in support of the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

In a number of countries in the Atlantic community, progress in both the national and international fields has resulted from the willingness of certain groups to accept sacrifices primarily on the basis of national interest. It will take a very long time before similar strong loyalty to a new political unit emerges. We believe that under the present North Atlantic Treaty arrangements, we are utilizing this force in the most constructive way at this stage of development in international relations. The establishment at this time of such a federation, far from providing additional strength, could be a source of weakness and greater internal divisions. Furthermore, the effective operation of democracy in some of the suggested participants is severely hampered by the system of splinter parties which might be carried over and even intensified in such a federation.

We are dealing with new problems, new at least in form, magnitude, and intensity. We need new answers. We must draw on available patterns and historical experience as far as we can, but this field involves far-reaching pioneering. New patterns, new methods, and new institutions will all be necessary, and they cannot be found, much less developed, overnight.

It is easy to overemphasize the importance of institutional changes. The basic functional problems, economic and other – such as the dollar gap, for instance – must be solved in any event. New institutional forms will undoubtedly be necessary, and work on the functional problems will help to indicate their nature more clearly. The establishment of new institutions can facilitate solution of these problems, and where that is true they should certainly be established. Their establishment, however, will not in itself solve them.

We are convinced that the Congress and the people support our working toward world conditions adequate to assure the individual the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness through both the method of seeking by all practicable means to strengthen the United Nations and the method of progressively closer association within the free world, utilizing practicable associations based on common interest.

We should continue to support such presently practicable measures as the Economic Cooperation Administration, mutual defense assistance program, operation of the North Atlantic Treaty and the inter-American system, cooperation with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, ratification of the International Trade Organization, and encouragement of such developments as Benelux and the Council of Europe. The people, the Congress, and the Executive can each play a valuable role in formulating the basis for further decisions as to what is practicable and in the United States interest, and each has a great responsibility to discharge in considering such decisions and implementing them when taken.

CONVENTION WOULD RAISE FALSE HOPES

The proposed resolution directs its attention primarily to calling a convention to explore the possibilities of Atlantic Union. We believe that if the Government should sponsor such a convention at this time, it would raise false hopes. If the convention did not succeed, it would lead to reactions unfavorable to the cause of collective security.

Under present circumstances, such a convention appears more likely to bring to light and emphasize the divisions among the proposed members

of the Atlantic Union than to lead to substantial progress in the desired direction. In view of these facts, the projected convention would seem likely to weaken rather than strengthen both the Atlantic community and the United Nations. We, therefore, feel that the convention should be called only if it is clearly evident that (1) it will advance American interests; (2) that both the convention and program have the support of the American people and other peoples concerned, with a full understanding of the implications of each; (3) that there is a reasonable chance of agreement; and (4) that it would strengthen rather than weaken both the North Atlantic community and support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

STATE DEPARTMENT CANNOT SUPPORT SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

For the reasons which I have given, the Department cannot support this particular resolution. Yet I believe that the finding of answers to the problems which have just been raised constitutes a great challenge to both official and private thoughts, and we at the State Department are devoting our best efforts toward making our contribution.

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B—Pros and Cons of the Atlantic Union Resolution Presented by the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1950

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 57 (THE KEFAUVER OR
"ATLANTIC UNION" RESOLUTION)

A. Essentials of resolution

In the light of the experience of the United States in the creation of a Federal union as a means of safeguarding the individual liberties and common heritage of the American colonies, this resolution requests the President to invite the democracies of the North Atlantic (Canada, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the United States) to name delegates representing their principle parties to meet in a federal convention "to explore how far their peoples. . .can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union." Other democracies might be invited to join the convention or come into the union, if one were established, at a later date.

The resolution calls for a convention "to explore" the possibilities of the creation of an Atlantic Union. Representation to the convention,

according to supporters of the resolution, would be roughly on a population basis; voting would be by states on the instrument the conference might produce, subject to subsequent ratification by the parties; the United States delegation might include representatives from the executive, the legislature, State officials, and private citizens. Some proponents of the resolution might envisage a constitution which would contain a bill of rights, and a frame of government including a legislature, and executive capable of enforcing law upon the citizens, and judiciary to adjudicate disputes between citizens.

Power might be divided in three ways: (1) those reserved to the people, (2) those reserved to the states, and (3) those delegated to the union. The latter might include "(1) a union defense force and foreign policy; (2) a union free market; (3) a union currency; (4) a union postal system; (5) a union citizenship in addition to national citizenship; and (6) a union power of taxation to render the union capable of implementing and exercising its delegated powers" (Mr. Justice Roberts, hearings, pp. 235 - 236).

United States participation in such a union would require amendment to the Constitution. An attempt to form such a union would not, according to its proponents, violate any provisions of the UN Charter. The union would be "totally independent" of the Charter.

The Atlantic Union proposal differs from most of the other proposals in two very important ways. In the first place, it does not contemplate any kind of open door for the Soviet Union to come in if it wishes. Secondly, while it does propose bypassing the United Nations, neither does it call for working through the United Nations.

B. Principle arguments in support of resolution

1. This is a simple resolution that asks nothing more than that the United States "explore" the possibility of applying federal union principles to unite the democracies of the North Atlantic. No one should object to exploration of this important matter at this critical time in world history.

2. This resolution contains an idea and a definite plan for strengthening the democracies in the cold war. It is realistic because it seeks to bring together peoples with a like heritage and with experience in democracy.

3. An effective Atlantic Union would reduce the danger of Soviet aggression since it would "cement the tremendous resources of these democracies" and thereby supply the only safety we can expect in this world -

"a tremendous preponderance of power..." (Justice Roberts, hearings, p. 248.). "No nation on earth would dare attack" such a union (Mr. Clayton, hearing, p. 267).

4. Passage of the resolution would quiet European fears of our possible return to isolationism.

5. This plan cannot be vetoed or delayed by the United Nations and yet it would immeasurably strengthen the United Nations by uniting those members most devoted to the UN aims of world peace, world freedom, and world justice.

6. An Atlantic Union would establish a free market 400,000,000 people. This would provide an element of stability for the people within the union as well as for people outside the union who would have to deal with it. Competition within this vast, rich, free market area would create within a few years the most efficient system of production and distribution that the world has ever known.

7. The people of the world interested in democracy and freedom would get a psychological lift from the creation of a union of the democracies. Such a union would hold forth hope to people behind the iron curtain who now see no hope of eventual liberation, as well as to backward and colonial peoples of the world who aspire to freedom and democracy. An Atlantic Union would create such preponderance of military and economic strength on the side of freedom that the Soviet Union would be willing to make agreements that might lead to world peace.

C. Principal arguments against the resolution.

1. The establishment of a federal union as between the United States and any other country or countries would involve not only basic economic and social changes but also important changes in the structure of the United States Government. It is very doubtful if the American people are ready to amend the Constitution to the extent necessary to give an Atlantic Union the powers it would need to be effective.

2. The establishment of a federal Atlantic Union would have—

profound economic repercussions upon agriculture, industry, and labor of all participating countries (hearings, p. 436).

Such a union at this time might raise more problems than it would solve and care would need to be exercised —

not to set in motion forces which will render more difficult the maintenance of the solidarity of the free world in support of the principle and purposes of the United Nations (hearings, p. 437).

Furthermore, the establishment at this time of such a federation might not provide additional strength but might instead be a source of weakness and internal divisions within the Atlantic Treaty area.

3. While it is recognized that new basic functional problems, such as the dollar gap, must be solved and new institutional forms will undoubtedly be necessary, it is early to overemphasize the importance of institutional changes. The establishment of new institutional forms will not itself solve the problems.

4. If the Government were to sponsor at this time a convention to explore the possibilities of Atlantic Union, it might raise false hopes. If the convention did not succeed, it might well lead to reactions unfavorable to the cause of collective security.

Under the present circumstances, such a convention appears more likely to bring to light and emphasize the divisions among the proposed members of the Atlantic Union than to lead to substantial progress in the desired direction (hearings, p. 438).

5. The representatives of the Department of State indicated that a convention should only be called only if it is clearly evident that

- 1) it will advance American interests;
- 2) that both the convention and program have the support of the American people and other peoples concerned, with a full understanding of the implications of each; and
- 3) that there is a reasonable chance of agreement; and
- 4) that it would strengthen rather than weaken, both the north Atlantic community and support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (hearings, p. 438).

6. An attempt by the Atlantic nations to create a preponderance of power might be construed by other nations as an attempt on the part of the democracies to dominate the world. That construction of the event would certainly be put forth by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, such a development might be construed as a surrender to the balance of power theory and might intensify the arms race.

Exhibit 3 – The Atlantic Union Committee, Inc

Submitted to Congress in 1955

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ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE, INC

1028 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C.

OFFICERS OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

President: Hon. Owen J. Roberts (deceased), former Supreme Court Justice.

Vice president: Hon. Will L. Clayton, former Under Secretary of State.

Secretary: Hon. Lithgow Osborne, former Ambassador to Norway.

Treasurer: Elmo Roper, marketing consultant and public-opinion analyst.

Chairman, executive committee: Gerald B. Henry, president, Henry & Henry, Buffalo, N.Y.

Note.—According to a public opinion survey, published in Public Opinion Quarterly in January 1954, nearly 10 million Americans believe in Atlantic Union.

The Atlantic Union Committee is composed of a national council and thousands of men and women, organized into more than 100 chapters. Similar committees exist in Canada, Britain, France, and the Netherlands.

ADDITIONS TO ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE, INC., NATIONAL COUNCIL SINCE MARCH 15, 1955

Hon. Chester Bowles, former Governor of Connecticut
The Right Reverend Richard S. Emrich, bishop of Michigan
Hon. Guy M. Gillette, former United States Senator
Hon. Rudolph Halley, former president, city council, New York
Mr. G. E. Hamilton, Democratic State committeeman for Crawford County, Meadville, Pa.
Dr. Wilbur K. Jordan, president, Radcliffe College, Massachusetts.
Nicholas Kelly, director, Chrysler Corp., New York
Gen. George C. Marshall, former Secretary of State, and General of the Army
Hon. Henry T. McIntosh, editor, Albany Daily Herald, Georgia
The Right Reverend Arthur J. Moore, Atlanta, Ga.
Richard W. Norton, Jr., oil producer, Louisiana
Milton Rosenthal, president, Nelson's of Rome, Inc., New York
Rev. Harold Paul Sloan, Jr., Michigan
Hans Christian Sonne, chairman, National Planning Association, New York
A. Van Nierop, former banker, New York
Edward S. White, attorney, Atlanta, Ga.
Harold L. Bache, senior partner, Bache & Co., New York

DELETIONS FROM ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE, INC. NATIONAL COUNCIL SINCE MARCH 15, 1955

Deceased:

Mrs. Mary McCloud Bethune, founder of National Council of Negro Women, Inc., Florida

Allen L. Billingsley, president, Fuller, Smith & Ross, Cleveland

Prof. William Y. Elliott, professor of government, Harvard Judge

John Knight, judge, United States district court

Resigned:

Stanley Pedder, attorney, California

Mrs. F. K. Weyerhaeuser, civic leader, St. Paul, Minn.

MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND BOARD OF
GOVERNORS

Alabama:

Dr. Lee Bidgood, dean, School of Commercial Business Administration, University of Alabama

James A. Simpson, attorney, Birmingham

Arizona:

Herbert Agar, historian, former editor, Louisville Courier Journal

Dr. Grady Gamage, former president, American Association of Teachers Colleges; president, Arizona State College

William A. Glassford, vice admiral, USN, retired

H.O. Hammond, mining engineer, Tucson

Hon. Richard F. Harless, former Member of Congress; attorney

Dick Jenkins, rancher

Rt. Rev. A. B. Kinsolving II, bishop of missionary district of Arizona

George F. Spaulding, Phoenix

Arkansas:

Mrs. John R. Hackett, civic leader, Little Rock

Hon. Sidney McMath, former Governor of Arkansas

California:

Paul S. Achilles, former president, the Psychological Corporation of New York

James D. Adams, attorney, San Francisco

Albert C. Agnew, former attorney, Federal Reserve bank

Warren H. Atherton, former national commander of American Legion

Dr. Robert R. Aurner, administrative consultant

Dr. Thomas Swain Barclay, professor of political science, Stanford University

Dr. Rosalind Goodrieh Bates, president, International Federation of

Women Lawyers

Admiral Andrew C. Bennett, retired naval officer

George Biddle, writer and artist

Edgar Bissantz architect, Carmel

Dr. Elliot Blackwelder, geologist; past president, Geological Society of America

William A. Boekel, attorney, San Francisco

Dr. Karl Brandt, agricultural economist, Stanford University

Frank Capra, motion-picture producer

Lyle E. Cook, attorney, Oakland

Aylette B. Cotton, attorney, San Francisco

Chester C. Davis, economist: associate director, Ford Foundation

Maj. Gen John R. Deane, USA, retired, president, Italian-Swiss Colony Wine Co.; Chief, American Military Mission to Russia, World War II

Hon. Douglas L. Edmonds, California Supreme Court Justice

Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., writer, motion-picture Actor, producer

J. R. Files, attorney, Los Angeles

Farnham P. Griffiths, attorney: president of Bohemian Club, SF

Dr. Robert Gulick, Jr., director, Teaching Institute of Economics, University of California

Prof. Morgan Harris, professor of economics

Conrad N. Hilton, president of Hilton Hotels Corp.

Arthur Hornblow, Jr., motion picture producer

Dr. Henry S. Houghton, physician: former director, Peking Union Medical College, China

George Jessel, motion picture producer, actor, author

Dr. Theodore J. Kreps, economist, writer, educator, Stanford University

Dr. Russel V. Lee. Physician; educator, Stanford University

Rev. Franklin D. Loehr, congregational minister, Los Angeles

Frank McCarthy, motion picture executive, former Assistant Secretary of State

Wiley W. Mather, attorney, professor of political science

Yehudi Menuhin, violinist

Dr. Clark B. Millikan, director. Daniel Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of Technology

Victor P. Montgomery, businessman. Montgomery Properties, Ltd.

S. F. B. Morse. chairman of board, Del Monte Properties Co.

Dr. Peter Odegard, former president, Reed College; chairman,

political science department, University of California
Lee E. Owens, publisher, Rio Grande Newspapers and Richmond
Independent
Lee E. Owens, Jr., Oakland
Mrs. Wallace T. Partch, Oakland
Donald Culross Peattie, roving editor, Reader's Digest; Botanist
Stanley Pedder, attorney, Carmel
Dr. Hubert Phillips, president, San Francisco State College
Roy Pinkerton, editor in chief, John P. Scripps Newspapers
Dr. George X Reeves, president. Chapman College
Hon. Will Rogers, Jr., newspaper publisher, former Congressman
T.W. Rolph, former president, Holophane Corp.
Ben Rust, president, California Federation of Teachers
Mrs. Clara Shirpser, Democratic national committeewoman for
California
Dr. Preston W. Slosson, former professor, University of Michigan
Adm. William H. Standley, former Ambassador to Russia, former
Chief of Naval Operations
James L. Taylor, businessman, Oakland
Dr. Lewis M. Terman, psychologist, past president American
Psychological Association
Prof. Julian Towster, political scientist and author, University of
California
Anthony Veiller, Warner Brothers Studios
Dr. John A. Vieg, professor of government
Eugene Weston, Jr., architect
Mrs. Patrick Welch, journalist, associate editor, Woman's Day
Will B. Weston, rancher
William Wright, producer, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures
Darryl F. Zanuck, producer, vice president, 20th Century Fox Film
Corp.

Colorado:

Mrs. Ira Barrows, Rollinsville
Palmer Boyt, editor and publisher, Denver Post
W. E. Sikes, professor of sociology, University of Denver

Connecticut:

George S. Armstrong, management consultant; president, Geo.
Armstrong & Co.
Hon. Raymond E. Baldwin, former Senator and Governor of
Connecticut
Robert O. Bell, Jr., attorney, Stamford

Alfred M. Bingham, attorney, New London
Dr. Brand Blanshard, professor of philosophy; writer, Yale University
John D. Briscoe, farmer
William L. Ohenery, former publisher, Collier's
Joseph S. Daltry, professor of music, Wesleyan University
John V. N. Dorr, engineer; chairman of the board, Dorr Co.
Alfred O. Fuller, chairman of the board, Fuller Brush Co.
Allen Grover, vice president, Time, Inc.
Borden Helmer, Riverside
Howard E. Houston, mayor of East Meriden
Hon. Clare Boothe Luce, former Congresswoman, Diplomat, playwright
T. C. P. Martin, Weston
William McFee, writer, Roxbury
Roy F. Steward, patent attorney, Meriden
Llewellyn A. Tobie, president, Meriden Savings Bank
Dr. Sam B. Warner, owner, Shoreline Times Publishing Co.,
Guilford Sanford B. Wendover, editor, Meriden Daily Journal
William J. Wilcox, president, Meriden Rotary Club
John Orr Young, former partner, Young & Rubicam

Delaware:

Walden Pell II, headmaster, St. Andrews School, Middletown
William Prickett, attorney, Wilmington

District of Columbia:

Mrs. Robert Low Bacon, member Republican National Committee
H.R. Baukbage, writer, lecturer, radio commentator, journalist
Ralph E. Beeker, attorney; past chairman, Young Republican National Federation
Hon. Robert Woods Bliss, former Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State
Mrs. Robert S. Brookings, philanthropist
Edward B. Burling, attorney
Nelson H. Cruikshank, director, social insurance activities, A.F. of L.
Rev. A. Powell Davies, All Souls Unitarian Church
Mrs. Dwight F. Davis, former president, Women's National Republican Club
F. Joseph Donohue, former President, Board of Commissioners, District of Columbia
Dr. Paul F. Douglass, former president, American University

Dr. Ralph C.M. Flynt, Vice Chairman, American Council on NATO
Clayton Fritchey, former editor, New Orleans Item; Democratic
National Committee
Rabbi Norman Gerstenfeld, Washington, D.C., Hebrew
Congregation
Rev. Charles Leslie Glenn, St. John's Church
Bon. Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador to Japan and former
Under Secretary of State
Dr. Walter Hager, president, Wilson Teachers College
Livingston Hartley, author and writer
A. J. Hayes, international president, International Association of
Machinists
Iris Beatty Johnson, artist, illustrator
Col. Winant Johnston, United States Army (retired), author
Adm. Emory S. Land, president, Air Transport Association of
America
Mrs. Cole McFarland, Library of Congress
Hon. Garrison Norton; former Assistant Secretary of State
Leonard H. Pasqualicchio, national deputy, Order Sons of Italy in
America.
Duncan Phillips, director, Phillips Gallery
Paul A. Porter, former Ambassador and former Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission
Stanley I. Posner, attorney
Melvin Ryder, Army Times Publishing Co., editor
Lawrence E. Spivak, radio producer, former editor, the American
Mercury
Clarence K. Streit, president, Federal Union, Inc.; author, Union Now
J. Parker Yan Zandt, president, Aviation Research Institute
Elmer Walker, vice president, International Association of Machinists
Hon. Robert N. Wilkin, United States district judge
Hon. Luther W. Youngdahl, former Governor of Minnesota

Florida:

Mrs. Mary McClond Bethune, former president, Bethune-Cookman
College; vice president, NAACP
Robert J. Bishop, attorney, Orlando; former president, National
Junior Chamber of Commerce
Hon. Doyle E. Carlton, former Governor of Florida
Hon. J. Ollie Edmunds, president, Stetson University
James E. Edwards, attorney, Fort Lauderdale
Dr. Grace C. Hardy, pediatrician, Jacksonville

Prof. Leroy Waterman, former professor, University of Michigan
Olin E. Watts, attorney, Jacksonville

Georgia:

R. E. Barinowski, president, Feedright Milling Co.
Dr. J. Whitney Bunting, president, Oglethorpe University
Hon. Robert A. Heinsohn, Thomasville
Hon. Frank Lunsford, former State senator
Lloyd A. Moll, president, Georgia Southwestern College
F. Hodge O'Neal, dean, Walter F. George Law School, Mercer University
Charles Forrest Palmer, former president, National Association of Building Owners and Manufacturers
Hon. Francis Shackelford, former Assistant Secretary of the Army
John Bell Towill, attorney, Augusta
Col. Blake R. Van Leer, president, Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Philip Weltner, former chancellor, University System of Georgia

Idaho:

James H. Hawley, Jr., political scientist, Boise
Judge W. F. McNaughton, Coeur d'Alene
Dr. G. W. Todd, former president, Northern Idaho College of Education

Illinois:

Dr. Emery W. Balduf, dean, student services, Roosevelt College
Rev. Preston Bradley, Peoples Church, Chicago
Ernest Estwing, president, Estwing Manufacturing Co., Rockford
George H. Hand, former president, Fairmont State College, W. Va.
Oliver J. Keller, former editor, Pittsburgh Gazette; president, radio station WTAX, Springfield
Prof. Abba P. Lerner, professor of economics
Laurance C. Martin, attorney, Winnetka
Col. John A. Mathews, United States Air Force
Mrs. Stewart Y. McMullen, Glencoe
F. F. McNaughton, publisher, Pekin Daily Times
Dr. Curtis W. Reece, dean, Abraham Lincoln Center
John H. Sengstacke, publisher, the Chicago Defender
John F. Schmidt, patent attorney; writer
Mrs. Sara I. Sommer, Peoria
Rev. Clarence A. Spaulding, former vice president, Presbyterian College of Christian Education
Dr. Edward Teller, atomic physicist, Chicago

Dr. Harold C. Urey, atomic chemist, Chicago
Mrs. Lynn A. Williams, Sr., civic leader, Winnetka

Indiana:

Herman D. Becker, Terre Haute
Dr. Frederick Hovde, president, Purdue University
Louis Ruthenburg, chairman of the board, Servel, Inc.
Hon. John R. Walsh, former United States Congressman
Dr. Herman B. Wells, president, Indiana University
H.F. Willkie, president, Kingan & Co.

Iowa:

Hallett Abend, foreign correspondent and lecturer, Marshalltown
Gardner Cowles, publisher, Look magazine
Mrs. Marion Gaston, president, Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
Henry Gadd Harmon, president, Drake University
Miss Anna B. Lawther, educator, Dubuque
Rev. Clement D. Loehr, Presbyterian pastor, Winterset
Harlan Miller, editor, Des Moines Register and Tribune
Arthur Sanford, Sioux City

Kansas:

Hon. Paul Aiken, former Second Assistant Postmaster General of the United States
Dean John Warren Day, dean, Grace Cathedral, Topeka
Victor Haflich, farmer, Garden City
W. B. Harrison, retired banker, Wichita
Dr. Charles W. Helsley, Congregational minister, Topeka
Dr. James A. McCain, president, Kansas State College
Dr. Franklin D. Murphy, chancellor, University of Kansas
Hon. Ralph Perkins, State senator and president, Howard National Bank
Prof. Walter E. Sandelius, political scientist, Kansas University
William L. White, editor, Emporia Gazette
Hon. Harry H. Woodring, former Secretary of War and former national commander, American Legion

Kentucky:

John B. Breckinridge, attorney, Lexington
Dr. Frank H. Caldwell, president, Louisville Presbyterian Seminary
Rt. Rev. Charles Clingman, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Kentucky
Dr. Philip Davidson, president, University of Louisville
Mrs. Mark Ethridge, writer, Kentucky
Hon. Charles.P. Farnsley, mayor of Louisville
Earle B. Fowler, attorney, Prospect

Lewis J. Gorin, Jr., Reynolds Metals Co., Louisville
Lawrence W. Hager, publisher, Messenger and Inquirer, Owensboro
Dr. Duke McCall, president, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
Lea B. McIntire, accountant, Louisville
Mark V. Marlowe, Marlowe Coal Co., Lexington
Mrs. John A. Serpell, Louisville
Robert T. Weston, Louisville

Louisiana:

Charles Edward Dunbar, Jr., attorney, New Orleans; professor of law, Tulane University
Dr. Rufus C. Harris, president. Tulane University; president of the board, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
G. W. Healy, Jr., editor, New Orleans Times Picayune
Mrs. Lucy Benjamin Lemann, New Orleans
Joe J. Mickle, president. Centenary College Shreveport
J. Raburn Monroe, attorney, New Orleans
Dr. Mary S. Sherman, orthopedic surgeon, New Orleans

Maine:

J. Seelye Bixler, president, Colby College
Miss Jessie K. Bayt, Southwest Harbor
Dr. Clarence C. Little, former president, University of Maine and University of Michigan
Edward Allen Whitney, former associate professor, Harvard University

Maryland:

Dr. Benjamin M. Baker, Jr. physician, Baltimore
Wendell Berge, former United States Assistant Attorney General
Hon. Claude T. Ellis. former Member of Congress, Arkansas
John Henry Ferguson II, president, Monumental Printing Co., Baltimore
Morris Kruger, accountant, Baltimore
David B. McCalmont, economist
Leo H. McCormick, former assistant director, Office of Price Stabilization
Hon. Theodore R. McKeldin, governor of Maryland
Thomas S. Nichols, chairman of the board, Mathieson Chemical Co., Baltimore
Mrs. Frank J. Otenasek, professor of economics, Trinity College
Brig. Gen. Harry H. Semmes, patent attorney, Rockville
E. G. Shelton, former professor of public speaking, University of

Texas

Dr. Francis A. Smith, chemist, Bureau of Standards

Dr. Theodore E. Sterne, physicist, Bell Air Massachusetts: Copley Amory, retired

Prof. Robert Braucher, professor of law, Harvard University

Prof. Alzada Comstock, professor of economics, South Hadley

Prof. William Yandell Elliot, professor of government, Harvard University

Prof. Carl J. Friedrich, professor of government, Harvard University

Carlton P. Fuller, vice president, Polaroid Corp., Cambridge

Rt. Rev. Charles K. Gilbert, former Episcopal Bishop of New York Diocese

Prof. Joseph H. Keenan, professor of engineering, MIT

William Scott Keith, banker, Durfield

Prof. James Angell MacLachlan, professor of law, Harvard University

Hon. William Phillips, former Ambassador and former Under Secretary of State

Prof. Ascher H. Shapiro, professor of engineering, MIT

Dean Robert B. Stewart, dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts College

Prof. Walter F. Whitman, professor of engineering, MIT

Michigan:

Hon. Paul Lincoln Adams, attorney, Sault Ste. Marie

Dr. Max P. Allen, college administrator, historian, Northern Michigan College of Education

Paul D. Bagwell, past president, United States Junior Chamber of Commerce

Harold D. Beaton, attorney

Dr. Alexander W. Blain, surgeon, Detroit

Hon. Prentiss M. Brown, former United States Senator and former chairman of the board, Detroit Edison Co.

John S. Coleman, president, Burroughs Corp., Detroit; president, Detroit Board of Commerce

John P. Dawson, professor of law, University of Michigan

Prof. Harold M. Dorr, political scientist, director of summer session, University of Michigan

Mrs. Margaret K. Furlong, leader in Michigan State Federation of Women's Clubs

Dr. Weimer K. Hicks, president, Kalamazoo College

Martin B. Hutchinson, president, Brown Hutchinson Iron Works

Ernest Kanzler, chairman of the board, Universal CIT Credit Corp.
Prof. Donald L. Katz, chairman, division of nuclear engineering,
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Mrs. Thomas McAllister, chairman of the board, National Consumers
League
Dr. John C. Montgomery, pediatrician, Detroit
Edgar K. Orr, president, Edgar S. Kiefer Tanning Co.
Mrs. Chase S. Osborn, author, Sault Ste. Marie
Dr. Warner G. Rice, chairman, department of English, University of
Michigan
George W. Stark, columnist, the Detroit News

Minnesota:

Hon. Joseph H. Ball, former United States Senator, Minnesota
Mrs. Margaret Culkin Banning, author, Duluth
Julius H. Barnes, president, director, American Industries, Inc.
Harry A. Bullis, chairman of the board, General Mills
Dr. Charles F. Code, physician, Mayo Foundation
Amor S. Deinard, attorney, Minneapolis
Dr. Henry F. Helmholz, former head, department of pediatrics, Mayo
Clinic
Prof. I. M. Kolthoff, professor of chemistry, University of
Minneapolis
Reginald D. Lang, professor, international relations, Carleton College
Mrs. Irvine McQuarrie, former State chairman, League of
Women Voters
Mrs. Philip W. Pillsbury, Minneapolis
Mrs. F. K. Weyerhaeuser, civic leader, St. Paul
Alfred M. Wilson, vice president, Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator
Co.

Mississippi:

Mrs. Richard Capel Beckett, Long Beach
Hodding Carter, Pulitzer prize editor, publisher Delta Democrat
Times
Col. Alexander Fitz-Hugh, retired from P.P. Williams Co.
Judge William Haralson, Hattiesburg
W. T. Wynn, attorney, Greenville

Missouri:

Hon. Orland K. Armstrong, former Congressman, Missouri
Roy B. Cbippss, secretary-treasurer, Middlewest Freightways, Inc.
J. Robertson Clagett, attorney, Kansas City

Dr. Arthur H. Compton, chancellor, Washington University, St. Louis; Nobel prize physicist

Dowdal B. Davis, president, Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, Kansas City

J. Lionberger Davis, chairman of board, Security National Bank Savings & Trust Co.

Dr. George W. Diemer, president, Central Missouri State College

Mrs. T.W. Hardy, Sr., Hardy Salt Co., St. Louis

Miss Vera Harmer, insurance broker, St. Louis

Ernest Howard, engineer, Kansas City

C. B. Hudson, professor emeritus, ethics and philosophy

Robert L. Lund, former president, NAM

Dr. Bomer P. Rainey, president, Stephens College

Edgar E. Rand, president, International Shoe Co.

Mrs. Thomas M. Sayman, president, Sayman Products Corp., St. Louis

Dr. Paul G. Steinbicker, professor of political science, St. Louis

Bollis E. Suits, president, Suits Family Laundry, St. Louis

Dr. Edgar Curtis Taylor, headmaster, the Taylor School

Montana:

Horace H. Koessler, Missoula

Prof. B. G. Merriam, chairman, division of humanities, Montana State University

Harry B. Mitchell, former chairman, United States Civil Service Commission

Dr. Roland R. Renne, president, Montana State College

J. R. Thomas, industrialist, Montana Power Co.

Nebraska:

Edmund O. Belsheim, dean, University of Nebraska, College of Law

Karl N. Louis, vice president, Brandeis & Sons, Omaha

Nevada:

George S. Franklin, Jr., attorney general of Nevada

J. E. Martie, educator, former national vice commander, American Legion

New Hampshire:

Edward Y. Blewett, dean, University of New Hampshire

Julius A. Brown, former dean, arts and sciences, American University of Beirut, Lebanon

Prof. Herbert w. Bill, chairman, History Department, Dartmouth College

Alfred O. Boyt, businessman, Walpole

Judge John R. McLane, attorney, Manchester
Robb Sagendorpb, publisher, Old Farmer's Almanac
Hon. Foster Stearns, former Member of Congress, New Hampshire
Hon. Gardner C. Turner, attorney, Keene
Dr. Arthur R. Upgren, professor, Dartmouth College
John H. Vincent, Center Sandwich

New Jersey:

Bon. Norman Armour, former Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State
Dr. Frank Aydelotte, former president, Swarthmore College
Percival F. Brundage, senior partner, Price Waterhouse & Co.
John L. Carter, businessman, Montclair
Thomas Chabrak, attorney, Perth Amboy
Dr. Robert O. Clothier, former president, Rutgers University
Wilton D. Cole, general counsel, Union Bag & Paper Corp.
Louis K. Comstock, engineer, Montclair
Thomas M. Debevoise, director, the Debevoise Co., New York
Nelson J. Edge, Jr., attorney, Jersey City
Milton S. Erlanger, businessman, Elberon
Wilfred Funk, publisher, president, and director, Kingsway Press, Inc.,

New York:

William V. Griffin, chairman, Brady Security & Realty Corp.; president, English Speaking Union
Mrs. Henry A. Horwood, Englewood, N. J.
Paul B. Hudson, executive vice president, Empire Trust Co., New York
Percy H. Johnson, former president, Chemical Bank & Trust Co., New York
Rev. Arthur Lee Kinsolving, rector, St. James Church, New York
Henry Luce III, editorial staff, Time, Inc.
Dr. Arnaud C. Marts, former president, Bucknell University
John E. Raasch, president, John Wanamaker's, Philadelphia
Gerard T. Remsen, attorney, Upper Montclair
John Q. Robinson, insurance, Glen Ridge
W. T. Rowland, insurance, Upper Montclair
Sylvester O. Smith, Jr., general counsel, Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Newark
Eugene R. Spauling, vice president, the New Yorker
Ralph Stoddard, businessman, Madison

Prof. W. Taylor Thom, Jr., Blair Professor Geology, Princeton
Hamilton M. Warren, vice president, National Carbon Co.
Donald C. West, manager, Research Laboratory
Alexander J. Williamson, educator, Atlantic City

New Mexico:

Claude W. Robinson, Tucumcari Daily News

New York:

John Harlan Amen, attorney, New York City
Dr. Max Arzt, president, Jewish Theological Seminary of America
Mrs. Frank C. Baker, civic leader, New York City
Howard Baldwin, advertising manager, the New Yorker
Hon. Joseph Clark Baldwin, former Congressman, industrialist,
journalist
Jacques Barzun, professor of history, Columbia University
Harry E. Benedict, banker, Scarborough
Hon. Augustus W. Bennet, former Member of Congress, attorney
Hon. Paxton Blair, former State supreme court justice, attorney
William E. Bohn, editor, New Leader, New York City
Hon. Orlo M. Brees, former member, State assembly, New York
Thomas Cook Brown, senior editorial writer, Buffalo Courier-Express
Arthur H. Bunker, president, Climax Molybdenum Co.
G. Forrest-Butterworth, attorney, Rye
Curtis E. Calder, chairman of the board, Electric Bond & Share Co.
Edwin F. Chinlund, vice president, R. H. Macy & Co.
Harry Cohen, retail consultant, New York City
Edward Corsi, industrial commissioner, department of labor, New
York
Philip Cortney, president, Coty's, Inc.
C. R. Cox, president, Kennecott Copper Corp.
Frank Crosswaith, chairman, Negro Labor Committee
Harry E. Crouch, former head of New York State Marketing Office
Fulton Cutting, physicist, Stevens Institute
William H. Davis, former chairman, National War Labor Board
Cornelius W. de Kiewiet, president, University of Rochester, former
provost Cornell University
Don Dennis, general manager, Foreign Policy Association
Mrs. Julie D'Estournelles, executive director, Woodrow Wilson
Foundation
Dr. J. Frederic Dewhurst, director, 20th Century Fund
Howard Dietz, vice president, MGM
Hon. Edward Jordan Dimock, Federal judge, New York City

Cleveland E. Dodge, vice president, Phelps-Dodge Corp.
Maj. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., former Under Secretary of Army
and United States Special Representative in Europe
Robert F. Duncan, president, Kersting, Brown & Co.
Max Eastman, editor, author, lecturer, New York City
Ferdinand Eberstadt, president, F. Eberstadt & Co.; former Vice
Chairman, War Production Board
Col. C. A. Edson, district manager, Social Security Administration,
Syracuse
Dr. Ralph Epstein, Consulting Economist', Buffalo
Louis Fischer, journalist, writer, New York City
Henry O. Flower, Jr., Vice president, J. Walter Thompson Co.
Marlon B. Folsom, United States Under Secretary of the Treasury;
former treasurer, Eastman Kodak
J. Russell Forgan, investment banker, New York City.
Clarence Francis, chairman of board of directors, General Foods
Corp.
Hon. Artemus L. Gates, former Under Secretary of the Navy; former
president, New York Trust Co.
Bertram B. Geyer, Geyer Advertising, Inc., New York City
Dr. Harry D. Gideonse, president. Brooklyn College
Charity Grace. artist. actress, New York City
Lester B. Granger, executive director, National Urban League
Dr. Clarence W. Hall, managing editor. the Christian Herald
Carl S. Hallauer, vice president, Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.
Chauncey J. Hamlin, president. International Council of Museums
Thomas J. Hargrave, president. Eastman Kodak Co.
E. Roland Harriman, chairman of the board, Union Pacific Railroad
Lewis G. Harrison, president. Manufactures & Traders Trust Co.,
Buffalo
Duncan Harris, chairman of the board, Brown, Harris, Stevens. Inc.
The Reverend Leland B. Henry, executive director, department of
Christian Social Relations, Diocese of New York
Prof. Sidney Hook, chairman, department of philosophy, NYU
Edward F. Hudson. vice president. Ted Bates & Co.
Wolcott J. Humphrey, Banker, Warsaw
Dr. Charles W. Hunt. former president, State Teachers College,
Oneonta
Frantz Martin Joseph, attorney, New York City
Frank E. Karelsen, Jr., attorney, New York City

Adm. Alan Goodrich Kirk, USN (retired), former Ambassador to Russia, Belgium, Luxembourg
Judge John Knight, judge United States district court
Dr. Hans Kolm. professor of history, City College of New York; author
Judge Samuel Leibowitz. county court. Brooklyn, N.Y.
Samuel L Levitas, executive editor, the New Leader.
Dr. George A. Lipskey, Council on Foreign Relations
Professor Edward H. Luehfield, dean. School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University
Deane W. Malott, President, Cornell University
Miss Beatric Mathieu, editorial staff, New Yorker
Crandall Melvin, president, Merchant National Bank & Trust Co., Syracuse
Mrs. Harold Milligan, past president, National Council of Women
Don G. Mitchell. chairman of the board, Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.
Walden Moore, educator and administrator, New York
Mrs. Victur Morawetz, New York City
Malcolm Muir, president and publisher of Newsweek
Dean Charles C. Noble, dean of the chapel, Syracuse University
Rt. Rev. G. Ashton Oldham, former bishop, the diocese of Albany
James F. O'Neil, past national commander, American Legion
Courtlandt Otis, vice president, Johnson & Higgins, Inc.
Robert C. Palmer, attorney. New York City
Kay Peterson Parker, Rochester
Mrs. Hattie May Pavio, author, lecturer, Rye
Hon. Herbert Pell, former Member of Congress, N.Y.
Rabbi Jerome M. Pines, New York City
Miss Elizabeth Robinson. attorney, New York City
Walter B. Sanders, Nunda, N.Y.
Harry Scherman, president, Book of the Month Club
Mrs. Dorothy Schiff, publisher, New York Post
Thomas N. Schroth, managing editor, Brooklyn Eagle
Larry H. Schultz, president, Blue Bus Lines, Batavia
George E. Shea, Jr., financial editor, Wall Street Journal
Carlton M. Sherwood, executive vice president, Pierce, Hedrick & Sherwood, Inc.
Prof. James T. Shotwell, president emeritus, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Theodore E. Simonton, patent attorney, Cazenovia

Spyros Skouras, president, 20th Century Fox
James N. Slee, trustee, village of Cornwall
Mrs. Margaret G. Spilsbury, New Rochelle
Ralph I. Straus, director, R. H. Macy & Co.
Herbert Bayard Swope, founder, American Society of Newspaper Editors; former editor, New York World
Joseph F. Taylor, president, Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.
Brig. Gen. Telford Taylor, former United States chief prosecutor at Nuremberg trials
George L. Todd, president, the Todd Co., Rochester
Vanderbilt Webb, attorney, New York City
Richard Whorf, motion picture actor
Wythe Williams, writer, New York City
Owen D. Young, honorary chairman of the board, General Electric Co.

North Dakota:

Hon. Albert Jacobson, State treasurer
Harold S. Pond, past grand master, Grand Lodge, A. F. & A. M.
William Stern, banker, Fargo

North Carolina:

Rev. Richard H. Baker, Greensboro
George Watts Hill, chairman of board, Durham Bank & Trust Co.
Mrs. Walter S. Hunt, civic leader, Raleigh
A. R. Keppel, president, Catawba College, Salisbury
Thomas L. Robinson, editor-publisher, the Charlotte News

Ohio:

Allen L. Billingsley, president, Fuller, Smith & Ross, Cleveland
Louis Bromfield, writer, Lucas
W. Russell Burwell, director, Brush Development Co., Cleveland
Gordon K. Chalmers, president, Kenyon College
Professor Stanton Ling Davis, professor of history, Case School of Applied Science
E. A. Emerson, president, Armco International Corp.
Rt. Rev. Henry W. Hobson, Episcopal bishop, diocese of southern Ohio
Dr. Oscar Jaszi, political scientist, Oberlin
Paul W. Litchfield, chairman of the board, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Groye Patterson, editor-in-chief, Toledo Blade
David W. Roberts, travel editor, the Cincinnati Enquirer

Mrs. Ralph S. Schmitt, Cleveland
Dr. William E. Stevenson, president, Oberlin College
Whiting Williams, writer, Cleveland

Oklahoma:

Mrs. Walter Ferguson, national newspaper columnist, Tulsa

Oregon:

Steve Anderson, attorney, Salem
Hon. James T. Brand, acting chief justice, State supreme court
Prof. Paul B. Means, former head, department of religion, University of Oregon
David C. Shaw, attorney, Gold Beach Maurice Springer, Industrialist, Eugene
Lofton L. Tatum, attorney, Portland

Pennsylvania:

Mrs. Sadie T. M. Alexander, attorney, Philadelphia
Dr. Paul R. Anderson, president, Pennsylvania College for Women
Hiland G. Batcheller, chairman of the board, Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp.
Edgar D. Bell, retired attorney, Pittsburgh
Dr. Stephen Borsody, professor, Pennsylvania College for Women
Helmuth G. Braendel, director of production and engineering, Wilkening Manufacturing Co.
Mrs. J. Gordon Claypool, Narberth
W. Edwin Collier, unitarian minister, Philadelphia
Mrs. Eric de Spoelberch, Haverford
Dr. Calvert N. Ellis; president, Juanita College, Huntington
Eugene Shedden Farley, president, Wilkes College, Wilkes-Barre
Charles Gape, general secretary, YMCA, Franklin
Clinton S. Golden, former vice president, United Steelworkers of America
Dr. Aristid V. Grosse, president, Research Institute, Temple University
Leland Hazard, director, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
Rt. Rev. John T. Heistand, Episcopal bishop, diocese of Harrisburg
David Hinshaw, public relations counselor, West Chester
Dr. Robert L. Johnson, president, Temple University
Judge Charles E. Kenworthy, Pittsburgh
Carlton G. Ketchum, president, Ketchum, Inc., Pittsburgh
D. W. LaRue, former professor of psychology, Pennsylvania State Teachers College
Stuart F. Louchheim, treasurer, Stuart F. Louchheim Co.,

Philadelphia

Frederick C. McKee, former national treasurer, AAUN, Pittsburgh

Mrs. Grenville D. Montgomery, honorary vice president, World Affairs Council of Philadelphia

Grenville D. Montgomery, retired, Haverford

Hugh Moore, chairman of the board, Dixie Cup Co.

Dr. John W. Nason, president, Foreign Policy Association; former president, Swarthmore College

Wilbur I. Newstetter, Jr., attorney, Pittsburgh

Charles B. Nutting, dean, University of Pittsburgh School of Law

Mrs. Thomas Parran, Pittsburgh

Dr. Thomas Parran, educator, ex-Surgeon General of the United States, Pittsburgh

Dr. Daniel A. Poling, chaplain, Chapel of the Four Chaplains; editor, Christian Herald

H. W. Prentis, Jr., chairman of the board, Armstrong Cork Co.

Gwilym A. Price, president, Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Alexander P. Reed, president, Fidelity Trust Co., Pittsburgh

Dr. Allan Lake Rice, professor of language, Ursinus College

Andrew W. Robertson, former chairman of the board, Westinghouse Electric Corp.

A. W. Schmidt, vice president, T. Mellon & Sons

Hon. Edward L. Sittler, Jr., former Member of Congress

Max Slepik, vice president, Pennsylvania Laundry & Star Industrial Towel Co.

Judge Sara M. Soffel, judge, court of common pleas, Allegheny County

Lt. Col. R W. Valimont, attorney

Lester B. Vernon, president, Vernon-Benshoff Co., Pittsburgh

Rhode Island:

Hon. John Nicholas Brown, former Undersecretary of the Navy

Sevellon Brown, editor and publisher, the Providence Journal and the Evening Bulletin

Judge Luigi De Pasquale, judge, district court, Providence

Mrs. M. C. Edgren, secretary, English Speaking Union, Rhode Island

Almet Jenlrs, writer, Little Compton

Albert E. Noelte, president and treasurer, Priscilla Braid Co.

A. Hamilton Rice, explorer and geographer; Newport

L. Metcalf Walling, patent attorney, Rhode Island

Adm. H. E. Yarnell, USN, retired

South Carolina:

Beverly Herbert, attorney, Columbia

South Dakota:

Hon. M. A. Brown, assistant United States attorney for South Dakota

Tennessee:

John W. Apperson, attorney, Memphis

Gordon Browning, former Governor of Tennessee

Lucius E. Burch, Jr., attorney, Collierville

Hon. Walter C. Chandler, former Member of Congress, Tennessee

Hon. James F. Corn, Cleveland

Rt. Rev. Edmund P. Dandridge, Episcopal bishop of Tennessee

H. L. Dickason, Morristown

Glen A. King, Cash Economy Wholesale Grocery Co.

George L. McInturff, public utilities commissioner, Chattanooga

Edward J. Meeman, editor, Memphis Press Scimitar

W. F. Moehlman, vice president, Tennessee Metal Culvert Co.

Edmund Orgill, president, Orgill Bros. & Co., Memphis

Joseph Orgill, Jr., secretary-treasurer, Orgill Bros. & Co., Memphis

J. Winfield Qualls, teacher, Nashville

Dr. Peyton N. Rhodes, president, Southwestern College at Memphis

Gilmer Richardson, Memphis

Mrs. Carl Stafford, Knoxville

Texas:

Mrs. George Abbott, Dallas

George Abbott, teacher, Nashville

Hon. Mark Edwin Andrews, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Paul Carrington, attorney, Dallas

Paul E. Daugherty, attorney and oil operator, Houston

E. L. De Golyer, geologist; president, Atlatl Royalty Corp.

James Frank Dobie, professor of English, University of Texas; author

Hon. W. St. John Garwood, associate justice, Supreme Court of Texas

Mrs. W. St. John Garwood, Austin

Fred L. Hillis, industrial insurance engineer, Dallas

Rt. Rev. John Hines, bishop coadjutor, Episcopal diocese of Texas

Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, United States Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

Rabbi David Jacobson, Temple Beth-El, San Antonio

Miss Betty Jameson, former women's golf champion, San Antonio

Prof. A. R. Jaqua, director, Institute of Life Insurance, SMU

Gerald C. Mann, former attorney general of Texas

Mrs. S.M. McAshan, Houston

Charles T. McCormick, professor of law, University of Texas
Maj. Gen. G. Ralph Meyer, retired, El Paso
Walter Schroeder, vice president, First National Bank, Dallas
Tom Slick, industrialist: director, Slick Airways, San Antonio
Bishop A. Frank Smith, Methodist bishop, Houston
Rev. Malcolm N. Twiss, St. Albans Episcopal Church
Marshall Webb, president, Marshall Webb Co., San Antonio

Utah:

Arthur L. Crawford, director, Utah Geological Survey
Hon. Charles R. Mabey, former Governor of Utah
Grant W. Midgley, Salt Lake City
Charles Redd, La Sal

Vermont:

Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins, chairman of the board, National Life Insurance Co.; former president, Dartmouth College
Dean Gorge V. Kidder, University of Vermont
Mrs. H. W. Norton, civic leader, Brattleboro

Virginia:

Remie L. Arnold, president, R. L. Arnold Pen Co., Inc.
Hon. Thomas H. Burke; chief, congressional liaison, CIO; former Member of Congress, Alexandria
Dr. Wilson Compton, former president, State College of Washington
Hon. Colgate W. Darden, president, University of Virginia; former Governor of Virginia
Hon. Horace H. Edwards, former mayor of Richmond
Miss Elsie Gilliam, Lynchburg
Col. Francis Pickens Miller, retired, member, board of governors, Mary Baldwin College
Mrs. Walter I. Miller, former secretary, Federal Union, Alexandria
Wayne Catfield Taylor, former Under Secretary of Commerce

Washington:

Stephen F. Chadwick, former national commander, American Legion
John M. Coffee, former Member of Congress, Washington
Kenneth Fisher, treasurer, Fisher Flouring Mills
Dr. Richard E. Fuller, president, Seattle Art Museum
Dr. David T. Hellyer, physician, Takoma
Benjamin H. Kizer, former Walker-Ames professor of international relations, University of Washington
Allan G. Paine, attorney, Spokane
Emil G. Sick, brewer; president, Seattle Baseball Club

A. Stanley Trickett, former president, Kansas Wesleyan University

Wisconsin:

Henry P. Baldwin, Madison

Don Anderson, industrialist, Wisconsin Rapids

William T. Evjue, editor, the Capitol Times, Madison

Guy R. Radley, consulting electrical engineer, Outler-Hammer, Inc.

Mrs. Thomas L. Tolan, Milwaukee

Jennie M. Turner, retired educator and writer

Charles H. Velte, attorney, Neenah

Wyoming:

Katherine Newlin Burt, author, Moran

Exhibit 4 – The Declaration of Paris

Drafted at the Atlantic Convention of 1962

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We, the citizens delegates to the Atlantic Convention of NATO

nations, meeting in Paris, January 8 - 20, 1962, are convinced that our survival as free men, and the possibility of progress for all men, demand the creation of a true Atlantic Community within the next decade, and therefore submit this declaration of our convictions:

Preamble

The Atlantic peoples are heir to a magnificent civilization whose origins include the early achievements of the Near East, the classical beauty of Greece, the juridical sagacity of Rome, the spiritual power of our religious traditions and the humanism of the Renaissance. Its latest flowering, the discoveries of modern science, allow an extraordinary mastery of the forces of nature.

While our history has too many pages of tragedy and error, it has also evolved principles transcending the vicissitudes of history, such as the supremacy of law, respect for individual rights, social justice and the duty of generosity.

Thanks to that civilization and to the common characteristics with which it stamps the development of the peoples participating in it, the nations of the West do in fact constitute a powerful cultural and moral community.

But the time has now come when the Atlantic countries must close their ranks, if they wish to guarantee the security against the Communist menace and ensure that their unlimited potentialities shall develop to the advantage of all men of good will.

A true Atlantic Community must extend to the political, military, economic, moral and cultural fields. The evolution we contemplate will contribute to the diversity of achievements and aspirations which constitute the cultural splendor and intellectual wealth of our peoples.

The Atlantic Convention, keeping this ideal constantly in view, recommends the following measures which, in its opinion, would foster the necessary cohesion of the West, would bring the final objective closer and should be adopted forthwith by the governments concerned.

Summary of Recommendations

1. To define the principles on which our common civilization is based and to consult about ways of ensuring respect for these principles.
2. To create, as an indispensable feature of a true Atlantic Community, a permanent High Council at the highest political level, to concert and

- plan, and in agreed cases to decide policy on matters of concern to the Community as a whole. Pending the establishment of the Council be strengthened through the delegation of additional responsibilities.
3. To develop the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a consultative Assembly which would review the work of all Atlantic institutions and make recommendations to them.
 4. To establish an Atlantic High Court of Justice, to decide specified legal controversies which may arise under the Treaties.
 5. To harmonize political, military and economic policy on matters affecting the Community as a whole.
 6. That the North Atlantic Council treat the development of an agreed NATO policy with respect to nuclear weapons as a matter of urgency.
 7. That it welcomes the development, progress and prospective expansion of the European economic institutions, and the spirit of President Kennedy's statement that a trade partnership be formed between the United States and the European Economic Community, the basis of an Atlantic Economic Community, open to other nations of the free world.
 8. That the Atlantic nations, acknowledging the right of every people to freedom, independence and pursuit of happiness, co-operate on a larger scale with the developing nations in their economic programs, through direct and multilateral action; through the acceleration of investments; and especially through measures which would increase both the volume and value of their exports, including special tariff concessions for their exports.
 9. That the Atlantic Community take steps to help improve all their economies, so that the proportionate economic and social potential of all will be less unequal.
 10. That the Atlantic nations, noting the destruction of the national independence and the human rights of many peoples in Eastern Central Europe, reaffirms its belief that the problem of these captive nations should be resolved in accordance with the principles of both individual liberty and national self-determination.
 11. To create an Atlantic Council for youth, education and culture in order to draw up Atlantic plans for exchanges of young people, students and teachers and for the purposes of scientific and cultural collaboration.
 12. That the NATO Governments promptly establish a Special Governmental Commission to draw up plans within two years for the creation of a true Atlantic Community, suitably organized to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era.

Resolutions

We, the delegates to the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations, in meeting assembled, taking note of the recommendations of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference of 17 November, 1961, that an organized Atlantic Community be created, have adopted the following documents:

Part I—Political and Economic Questions

A. Special Governmental Commission to Propose Organizational Changes

Call upon the Governments of the NATO countries to draw up plans within two years for the creation of an Atlantic Community suitably organized to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era. To this end they should, within the earliest practicable period, appoint members to a Special Governmental Commission on Atlantic unity. The Commission should study the organization of the Atlantic Community, particularly in the light of the recommendations of this Convention, and it should be instructed to propose such reforms and simplifications of existing institutions, and such new institutions, as may be required.

B. Institutions

1. Recommend, as an indispensable feature of a true Atlantic Community, the creation of a Permanent High Council, whose competence would extend to political, economic, military and cultural matters. Such a Council, assisted by the Secretariat, would not only prepare and concert policies on current questions and, in defined cases, decide them by a weighted, qualified majority vote, but would also undertake long-term planning and propose initiatives on matters of concern to the Community. All members of the Community would be represented on the Council.

Whether the High Council be a new institution or a development of the North Atlantic Council should be a matter of recommendation by the Special Governmental Commission. In any event, however, pending the establishment of the Atlantic Community, the members of the Convention urgently request their governments to reinforce and develop the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a political centre. To this end, the Convention recommends that the North Atlantic Council be strengthened through the delegation of

additional jurisdiction. Where authority for decision is delegated to the North Atlantic Council by governments, it should employ a weighted majority vote.

2. Propose that the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference be developed into a consultative Atlantic Assembly, to meet at stated intervals, or upon the call of its President or otherwise, to receive reports regularly transmitted to it by the Secretaries General of other Atlantic bodies; to raise questions and to consider, debate and review the work of all Atlantic institutions, and make recommendations to other Atlantic bodies and governments on questions of concern to the Atlantic community. A permanent secretariat and an annual budget should be provided for the Atlantic Assembly to insure continuity. In certain defined cases, recommendations should be by weighted majority vote. Members of the Atlantic Assembly would be selected by governments in accordance with their constitutional procedures. They need not necessarily be Parliamentarians. The members thus chosen would have the power to elect a limited number of additional members of equal status.
3. Recommend the creation of a High Court of Justice, reserved to the Atlantic Community, in order to settle legal differences between members and the organizations arising from the interpretation and application of treaties.

C. Policies

The institutions of the Atlantic Community should harmonize those policies of its members affecting the interests of the Community as a whole, and contribute to the development of Community methods in planning, considering and executing such policies.

1. A primary objective is the continuing expression through national and international action of an overriding community of national interests in political and military policy. Closer and more effective action in this field should not await the growth of Community institutions; the development of an agreed NATO policy with respect to nuclear weapons should, among other immediate problems, be treated as a matter of urgency by the North Atlantic Council.
2. A second cardinal policy objective is to realize the opportunity for economic progress available through the creation and development of the Atlantic Community. The expanding European Economic Community is an economic advantage not only for its members, but for North America and the free world as well. The Convention

welcomes the spirit of President Kennedy's recent statement that a trade partnership be formed between the United States and the European Economic Community. We hope that the negotiations envisaged by President Kennedy succeed in establishing a relationship which constitute the nucleus of an Atlantic Economic Community, with the framework of Community institutions, and open to all other qualified countries. Such a development would be of advantage to all countries, and particularly to those which participate directly in it. Among the fruits of this expanding Community would be its stimulus to competition, investment and more rapid growth in the mass markets appropriate to the modern technological age, with progressive reductions in tariffs and other barriers to trade.

3. Another important goal of the Atlantic nations is to co-operate with those developing nations which wish to do so in their efforts to overcome the burdens of poverty, which may well be that of a falling per capita income in some countries. The Convention recommends that the Atlantic Community increase its already considerable participation in development programs of this kind, through direct financial and technical measures; through increased United Nations programs; OECD programs and other multilateral efforts; and above all through policies which favor commerce with and investment in the development countries, such as the abolition of tariffs on tropical and primary products, and the reduction and, under agreed circumstances, even the eventual abolition of tariffs on their other products. The Convention also recommends that the development of equitable and agreed programs for the acceleration of investments, and for the protection of investors against political risks.
4. An important goal of the Atlantic Community's economic program should be to help raise the standard of living and economic activity of the different segments of the Atlantic Community, so that the proportional economic and social potential of all the members will be relatively less unequal.
5. In view of the hundreds of millions of hungry people alive today, and the prospect that, if the present trends continue, there will be three thousand million more people added to the population in the next generation, the Convention recommends that the Atlantic Community should address itself forthwith to the population problem.
6. Since the Soviet expansion has destroyed the effective national

independence of many peoples in Eastern and Central Europe, denying to their individual members the free exercise of their religious rights and democratic liberties—with all the attendant injurious effects upon the general climate of European security and progress, the Convention affirms its recognition of the inalienable rights of all nations to assume freely the responsibilities of self-determination and self-government, and expresses its firm belief that the problem of the captive nations of Eastern and Central Europe should be resolved in accordance with the rights and principles of both individual liberty and national self-determination.

7. As most governments of the Atlantic Community countries have accepted the obligatory clause of the Statute of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, the Convention recommends that all members of the Atlantic Community accept this obligatory clause.

Declaration of Paris: Cultural and Moral Questions

A. The Atlantic Convention of NATO nations

Declares that the basic moral and spiritual principles upon which the lives and acts of the nations forming the Atlantic Community are based are as follows:

1. The purpose of political and economic institutions is the protection and promotion of the rights, liberties and duties which enable every human being to fulfill his or her spiritual vocation;
2. Liberty is inseparable from responsibility, which implies recognition of a moral law to which men, as individuals and in groups, are subject;
3. Liberty is inseparable from the duties of men toward one another, which implies the obligation to ensure that all men gradually attain physical and moral well-being;
4. Liberty is inseparable from tolerance, which recognizes the right to free discussion of all opinions, which are not in violation of the very principles of civilization;
5. That there can be no freedom without variety, the natural result of the different peoples in all fields. But this variety should not entail disunity. On the contrary, retaining the common factors, it should become the permanent force impelling the peoples of our Western civilization to unite;
6. Freedom is inseparable from the spirit of objective truth, which must restore to words the exact meaning they have in the Free World.

And therefore *invites* member countries:

1. To defend and promote the values and principles of civilization by means of education, publications, lectures, radio, the cinema and television;
2. To uphold in their conduct with all nations the ethics and values of Western civilization and by their example to impress on others that discord and disunity result when they are not observed;
3. To defend these values and principles against intellectual and moral subversion within the Community;
4. To try to establish an atmosphere of mutual understanding between the members of the Atlantic Community, appreciating to the full the riches of their diversity;
5. To demonstrate to all peoples that respect for these values and principles can alone make a technical civilization and instrument of improving the physical and moral well-being of mankind;

Reconstruction of the Acropolis: To decide that the Acropolis shall become the symbol of our culture and the shrine of our Alliance and to call upon governments to consider how this resolution might be given concrete form.

B. The Atlantic Convention of NATO nations:

Considering that a major obstacle to the formation of real European and Atlantic Communities is the difference in language and therefore in mentalities and ways of thinking;

Considering that this language barrier is particularly prejudicial to the scientific co-operation upon which the Western potential depends:

Invites the Governments of NATO nations, and such other countries as may be inspired by the same ideal, to convene an Atlantic Council consisting of Ministers of Education, Ministers of Scientific Affairs, cultural and educational authorities and representatives of universities and scientific research organizations, with a view to:

1. Determining the comprehensive aims of an education likely to promote the ideals and purposes of the Atlantic Community, studying ways and means of implementing the principles laid down, and periodically reviewing the results achieved;
2. Organizing: a bold Atlantic Plan for Youth and Education with the aim of furthering the study of languages and the widest possible exchange of students, teachers and youth leaders and of workers in industry and agriculture, a program of scientific co-

operation among the scientists and the scientific institutions of the countries of the Community, both of the above being financed by all participating nations.

Within the framework of the above recommendations, the Convention *draws the attention of governments* to the following points:

- a. Alongside the study and use of foreign languages, it is essential that mutual understanding be developed between men with different ways of thinking from all parts of the free world, including those of emerging nations. This program should in the first place benefit university students, as many as possible of whom should be enabled to spend at least one year of their course in a university or other advanced training establishment where teaching is in a language other than their own.

However, in the case of the most promising citizens of the emergent nations this program should have a special priority, since their intellectual hunger must be satisfied at all costs.

Steps will have to be taken to ensure that such periods spent at foreign universities or other establishments do not prejudice the career of the student concerned but rather confer advantages upon him in the form of either a degree specially created for the purpose of enabling him, for instance, to exercise his profession either in his own country or in that where he has completed one or more years of study always providing that his knowledge of the two languages is sufficient.

- b. It is to be hoped that, in the future, those who have pursued a course of training, which would subsequently be supplemented by exchanges of civil servants between Atlantic nations, will be given priority in selection for posts as officials required to take part in international negotiations.
- c. It should be made possible for teachers, and particularly university teachers, research workers and curators of museums and art galleries, either to be seconded periodically to equivalent foreign organizations, or to establish close contacts with them. Although it may not be immediately possible for all Atlantic Community countries, the introduction of the system of the "sabbatical year" for professors and research workers would be generally desirable.
- d. In the field of scientific documentation and co-operation, it would

be necessary to supplement existing organs by setting up a Scientific Documentation Centre responsible, among other things, for the translation and distribution of the principle articles, reports and other publications appearing throughout the world, and which have not yet been distributed by other agencies. The Committee considers this a most urgent matter.

- e. The “pairing-off” of universities and other advanced educational establishments of different languages within the Community should be encouraged and intensified.
- f. The establishment and exchange of comparable statistics on education and research in the Atlantic Community countries should assured.
- g. Recommends that these proposals be studied further by the Atlantic Institute to assist in the accomplishment of these tasks in co-operation with existing agencies, such as the Council for Cultural Co-operation of the Council of Europe to avoid duplication of effort.

General Resolution

The Atlantic Convention of the NATO Nations requests its President to forward the forgoing Declaration and Resolutions to the NATO Council and to the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference at the earliest possible date, and that the delegates to this Convention report the same to their representative Governments or Legislative authorities at their earliest convenience.

Exhibit 5 – Report of U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO

Submitted to Congress in June of 1962

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Part I

"We, the citizen delegates to the Atlantic Convention of NATO nations, meeting in Paris, January 8-20, 1962, are convinced that our survival as free men, and the possibility of progress for all men, demand the creation of a true Atlantic Community within the next decade, and therefore submit this declaration of our convictions."

With this statement the citizen delegates from NATO countries concluded their Convention. It is a preface to the Declaration of Paris, which embodied their common convictions. The words of this preface deserve analysis. They reflect both the spirit which guided the convention in its deliberations and the text of the Declaration.

* * *

"We, the citizen delegates to the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations ... are convinced ..."

Ninety representatives from the NATO nations on either side of the Atlantic speaking nine different languages met and substantially agreed on matters of concern to their future. These men and women were leaders in various fields—government, journalism, education, and business to name a few.

They had been selected by their respective parliaments (the U.S. delegation of 20 had been chosen by the Vice President, acting in his capacity as President of the Senate, and by the Speaker of the House); at the Convention they spoke and voted as individuals representing their own convictions. There was no national unit rule or decision by a government. Yet there was substantial agreement on issues of transcending importance, issues which underlie the growing conscious that mountains and oceans no longer divide man from man.

Beneath all the different political styles and social customs of the free nations, there is a deep-rooted common belief in the value primacy of the individual. This belief, held by all who have grown in the climate of democracy, brings free men together today.

On such a foundation the concept of an Atlantic community has been built. The nations of the West are moving together, and not merely in response to the Communist drive. This search stems from an incredible advance in science and communications, great strides in education and

heightened understanding among peoples.

Since World War II, three major steps have been taken toward an Atlantic Community. The first was the "Marshall Plan," of American inspiration, which revived an economically prostrate Europe and laid the foundation for the current high levels of productivity and prosperity. The second was NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—a military and political alliance unprecedented in history. Finally, the European Economic Community, often referred to as "the Common Market," of European inspiration, has coordinated once rival economies of members nations into a workable plan of mutual cooperation that has already substantially increased trade and elevated standards of living throughout the area.

There is unity then among the Atlantic people, beneath the surface dissimilarities of language and custom; and this unity found vigorous expression among the NATO citizen delegates.

* * *

" ... *that our survival as free men, and the possibility of progress for all men* ..."

These words of the preface reflect the concern of the Convention with the supreme challenge of our time.

Our basic task is to unify and articulate the principles of our civilization—its spiritual values, its respect for law and the dignity of the individual.

It is also of concern that these principles take hold and grow into developing areas of world where people may lose freedom in the illusion that an autocratic government can best fulfill their aspirations. And that they can only grow in societies that have advanced beyond a subsistence level.

It is up to the industrialized free nations, therefore, by aid, by economic assistance and above all through trade policies designed to encourage productive growth, to assist those nations to develop a capital and technical knowledge needed to achieve economic self development.

Through existing machinery, the members of the Atlantic Community can increase and coordinate their development assistance. Accelerated private investment can be encouraged through abolition of tariffs on primary products and under agreed circumstances on other products of the developing area, and measures can be devised to protect

such investment from political risks. Such action taken now can decisively affect the world's destiny.

Let there be no mistake. In the interdependent life of today we will not survive on the Atlantic shores as free men unless these principles of our civilization stand firm around the world.

* * *

" ... demand the creation of a true Atlantic Community within the next decade."

These words in the preamble reflect the conviction of the delegates that the survival of free men and our ability to assist effectively the developing nations require the creation of an organized Atlantic Community.

Sovereign power—the right in man to direct his destiny—resides in every individual. In primitive societies elements of this sovereignty were vested in tribal chieftains. During the past few centuries delegated sovereign powers were increasingly transferred to nation-states, although other subdivisions within the nation framework held a share.

It was the judgment of the Convention that a measure of delegated sovereignty in the Atlantic area should be transferred to an Atlantic Community.

Of prime importance in this connection is the mass trading area—larger than that contained within national boundaries—required for the efficient use of modern technology. The comparable economics of the Atlantic nations and their common heritage in ideas make expansion with this great neighborhood singularly appropriate. They allow, too, for common military defense and common planning of assistance to developing nations with an appropriate division of the costs involved.

Accordingly, the Convention recommended that the governments of the NATO countries appoint members to a Special Governmental Commission to study the organization of the Atlantic Community with certain proposals in mind.

Of particular importance was the recommendation that a Permanent High Council be established to prepare and concert politics on political, economic, cultural and military matters and, in certain cases, decide them by a majority vote weighted to reflect population differences among the member countries.

The High Council could be a new institution or evolve by development of the North Atlantic Council. Pending its formation, however, the North Atlantic Council should be strengthened through the

delegation of additional jurisdiction.

The Convention proposed, too, the development of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a consultative Atlantic Assembly to review and debate questions of concern to the Atlantic Community and in certain cases to make recommendations by weighted majority vote to national governments and other Atlantic institutions.

Finally, a High Court of Justice was proposed to settle legal differences between members of the Atlantic Community and between members and Atlantic organizations arising from the interpretation and application of the treaties.

In addition to the foregoing institutions the Convention proposed certain policies. It welcomed the suggested trade partnership between the U.S. and the European Economic Community as the nucleus of an Atlantic Economic Community open to all qualified nations. Members of the Convention were mindful of the potential dangers of division between Europe and North America inherent in European progress towards economic and political unity unless accompanied by some corresponding progress on an Atlantic scale, and even on a larger scale.

The Convention believed that the political institutions and the programs proposed for the Atlantic Community would be increasingly effective with greater communication and understanding between peoples, without prejudice to the diversity that is a natural expression of different origins and varying achievements. It recommended that authorities in education, science, and culture be convened to determine the kind of education likely to contribute to the ideals and purposes of the Community including the study of languages and the widest feasible exchange of students, teachers, and persons of industry, agriculture, science and the arts.

In view of the hundreds of millions of hungry people living today, the Convention recommended that the Atlantic Community should address itself forthwith to the population problem. We recognize that the policies proposed above are endangered by the population explosion and by the racial prejudice that is at large in the world.

* * *

Steps must be taken to make the Atlantic Community a reality and they must be taken soon. Each new Communist thrust brings home again the lesson that democracies must unite to be a match for dictatorships. But, as history has also taught us, democracies united and aroused are a formidable force. We must then grid ourselves and find ways to create a

unity more intimate and enduring than we have known before. We must learn to grow, not as nations greedy for power and influence, but as peoples united in a concept of government both modest and liberating, based on a faith in the rewards of human life lived in freedom.

The recommendations of the Atlantic Convention, as embodied in the Declaration of Paris, are a first step in that direction. We respectfully urge that they be affirmatively and actively pursued.

Part II

The Commission is pleased to report that it has finished its task within the allotted time granted by Congress, and, in fact, will expire three weeks ahead of the legal expiration date.

The Commission also is pleased to report that it has operated well within its budget, and, in fact, will return more than \$100,000 to the Treasury of its appropriation of \$250,000. A statement of expenditures and commitments, as of May 15, is attached as Appendix A.

The U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO was appointed under terms of Public Law 86-719. It is composed of 20 members, 10 appointed by the President of the Senate and 10 by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The appointments were announced on March 21 and 22, 1961.

The membership is equally divided between the Democratic and Republican Parties.

A list of the members is attached to this report as Appendix B. As it indicates, there has been one change of membership since the original appointments. Former Senator William F. Knowland, because of business and personal reasons, resigned on January 2, 1962, and was replaced by Mr. Edward Fenner, whose appointment was made by the Vice President on January 11, 1962. Since the Convention was already under way when Mr. Fenner was appointed, he was not able to participate and does not join in this report.

The Commission met for the first time on April 8, 1961, and organized itself, electing Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, and William L. Clayton, Under Secretary of State in the Truman Administration, Co-Chairmen, and Elmo Roper, marketing consultant, Vice Chairman. Richard J. Wallace, Jr., was elected Executive Director.

The duty of the Commission was outlined in the law as follows:

"It shall be the duty of such Commission to endeavor to arrange for and to participate in such meetings and conferences with similar citizens

commissions in the NATO countries as it may deem necessary in order to explore means by which greater cooperation and unity of purpose may be developed to the end that democratic freedom may be promoted by economic and political means."

It was directed to "seek to arrange an international convention and such other meetings and conferences as it may deem necessary."

In order to be prepared to perform this duty the Commission organized itself into five committees. The membership and functions of these Committees are shown in Appendix C.

The first major task of the Commission was undertaken by the Committee on Relations With Other Nations. With the active participation of Co-Chairmen Clayton and Herter, it undertook to inform other NATO nations of the existence of the Commission and of its purpose and to bring about the appointment by other nations of similar commissions.

This task was initiated by letters to the presiding officers of the legislative bodies of the other nations. These letters were followed up by personal visits with Parliamentary and other officials of the various nations, made by the Co-Chairmen and by mission. The Commission appreciates letters from the Vice President to these presiding officers prior to these visits.

As a result of the initiative of the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO, an International Preparatory Committee was organized. This Committee met in London, on October 26 and 27, 1961. The British Government was host for the meeting.

Members of the Preparatory Committee are shown in Appendix D.

The Preparatory Committee agreed:

1. That the Convention should be held and that it should convene in Paris on January 8, 1962, for an initial session of two weeks, with the Convention itself to decide whether further sessions were necessary.
2. That the scale of representation at the Convention be based on the NATO Parliamentarian voting scale, but adjusted to suit a body of "less than 100 members." This scale is shown in Appendix E.
3. To the adoption of a budget of \$50,000, for the International Expenses of the Convention, and divided this budget among the countries according to the scale developed by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. The U.S. share was \$12,100. The full scale is shown in Appendix F.
4. To rules of procedure to propose to the Convention. They are

shown, as finally adopted by the Convention itself, in Appendix G.

The U.S. Commission, as sponsors of the Convention, undertook the international organization of the Convention. During the succeeding period of approximately two and a half months the U.S. Commission maintained contact with the appropriate officials in all the other NATO countries to this end. The U.S. Commission also took the leadership on all other international preparations for the Convention.

In the meantime, the U.S. Commission had been holding meetings of its own, in the U.S., in order to prepare itself to participate in the Convention. Various officials of the U.S. Government, including the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Honorable Thomas K. Finletter, were invited to meet with the Commission and did so. During these sessions, the economic and political problems confronting the Western alliance were thoroughly explored and discussed. Individual members of the Commission studied specific topics thoroughly and led the discussion of those topics.

The Commission also prepared a series of studies and background papers on economic and political topics. In all these papers—as well as in the discussions—it was emphasized that they were for educational and background use only. The Commission took an early decision that, in the spirit of the Act under which it was appointed, there would be no attempt to bind members to any point of view—no attempt to adopt a Commission, or U.S. position on any subject. The members were, the Commission decided, appointed to explore the problems of the Atlantic Community and, in the Convention, to speak and vote as their individual judgment and consciences dictated.

This policy was also adopted at the Convention at the initiative of the U.S. Commission, even to the extent of seating delegates alphabetically rather than by national groups to emphasize that they were there as individuals, not representing or able to bind either their countries or their delegations, but simply as representative citizens officially appointed and bringing their best judgment to bear on the issues facing the Atlantic Community.

On January 8, 1962, the Convention assembled in the International Conference Center, on the Avenue Kleber, in Paris, France. Commissions from fourteen of the 15 NATO nations were present. Portugal, although it had previously appointed a commission, sent only an observer.

The Convention elected Co-Chairman Herter, of the U.S. Commission, to the position of Chairman of the Convention. It elected Mr. Wallace to the office of Secretary General of the Convention.

For the first week, the Convention met daily in plenary sessions, morning and afternoon. During this time a total of 50 speeches were made by members. At the end of the first week, the Convention divided itself into two committees. The largest, composed of 42 members, considered resolutions and recommendations that had been filed on political and economic subjects. The second, composed of 21 members, considered cultural questions. Two U.S. members were elected to offices on the Committees, Mr. Donald G. Agger to the position of Rapporteur of Committee I—the Political and Economic Committee—and Dr. Francis S. Hutchins to the position of Vice Chairman of Committee II.

Committee sessions continued through Wednesday, January 17, and on Thursday, January 18, the Convention reconvened as a Committee of the Whole. On Friday, January 19, the Convention resumed plenary session to consider the work of the committees that was now before it.

The Convention called upon the Governments to "draw up plans within two years for the creation of an Atlantic Community suitably organized to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era." To this end they recommended the appointment "within the earliest practicable period" of a Special Government Commission on Atlantic unity, this commission to "propose such reforms and simplifications of existing institutions, and such new institutions, as may be required."

The Declaration was unanimously adopted with the exception of three abstentions. Those who abstained were Mr. Alastair Stewart, of Canada, and Mr. Ivan Matteo Lombardo and Professor Mario Montanari, both of Italy. All three abstained on the ground that the Convention did not go far enough in its recommendations, not from disagreement with the recommendations. Throughout the Convention a significant proportion of its members gave evidence of a belief that the Convention should go much further than it actually did.

The discussion leading up to the Declaration and Resolutions is contained in summaries of each day's plenary sessions on following pages of this report. These summaries of the plenary sessions, as well as a list of those who participated in the Convention, follow the full text of the Declaration and the Resolutions.

About the Editor

Rick Biondi has studied world order strategy since 1994. He earned a BA in political science from the University of Washington (1997); studied international relations at the graduate level under Dr. Jack E. Vincent at the University of Idaho (1998-2000); and holds an MA in Security Management from American Military University (2014). Biondi is a former executive consultant (2001-2002) for the Association to Unite the Democracies (AUD). Rick also served on the Board of the Ashburn Institute—which was spawned by AUD. In 2008, Biondi ran for U.S. Congress in Arizona's 6th Congressional District as a libertarian. Rick is a veteran of the U.S. Army. He served as an Airborne Ranger with the 2nd Ranger Battalion and an infantryman with other units (1989-1992). Email: rbiondi@universalu.org