Albert L. Peia, Pro Se
P.O. Box 862156
Los Angeles, CA 90086
(213)219-7649
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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Albert L. Peia, )
Plaintiff
) CASE NO.
-vs- )
)
Richard M. Coan,
Timothy Miltenberger,
)
Whitney Lewendon, Coan, Lewendon, )
Gulliver, and Miltenberger,
LLC., )
John Doe Surety 1, John Doe Insurer 2, )
John Does 3 – 10,
)
)
In Re Albert L. Peia,
Debtor/Plaintiff )
)
Chapter 7 )
Case No. 95-51862 )
)
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APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CONCURRENTLY-
FILED VERIFIED
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL;
REQUEST FOR
CRIMINAL REFERRAL OF THE DOCUMENTED
FEDERAL AMONG OTHER CRIMES HEREIN .
For all of the
foregoing reasons, and as well, as set forth in plaintiff’s concurrently filed
Verified Complaint under penalty of perjury and Exhibits appended thereto, the
Affidavit of Albert L. Peia and Exhibits
thereto, and plaintiff’s RICO Statement
and Exhibits thereto, consistent with the law and the paramount judicial
interests of truth and justice, the relief as requested should be granted or in
the alternative, considered moot in light of the filing of this well founded
and just cause consistent with the law.
Dated: April , 2005
Signed Under
Penalty of Perjury By:
________________________________________________
Albert L. Peia, Plaintiff/Debtor Pro Se
________________________
*The 1881 case of Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881),
relied upon by the corrupt court and the criminals/defendants herein for the
purported ‘leave of court requirement’, involved a plaintiff that had brought
an action for personal injuries sustained while a passenger in a train, which
railroad was currently in receivership. Said plaintiff brought the action
against the receiver without having sought leave of court from the court that
had appointed him. It is important to emphasize that there was no allegation or
even a hint of impropriety, culpability, or illegality on the part of either
the receiver or the subject court that had appointed him. Indeed, the fundamental
and underlying ratio decidendi
and policy considerations leading ineluctably to said Court’s conclusion was
that to permit such an action without leave of court would potentially impair
the (value of the) property in the hands of the receiver, to the detri- ment of
existing creditors and prior claimants. In the case sub judice, the precise opposite is true.
Moreover, there was no RICO statute extent at said time to address the endemic
and pervasive corruption that has become synonymous with America today and that
the RICO statute was enacted thwart consistent with the liberal construction to
be accorded said remedial legislation as per the Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S.
479 (1989). Specifically, plaintiff/ appellant’s action herein was to preserve
the estate which has been purposefully and consistently damaged by defendant coan consistent with a pattern of racketeering activity by
an enterprise of which defendant coan along with (or
in the alternative)U.S. Bankruptcy court that appointed him was a part. It
should further be noted a fortiori
that plaintiff/appellant’s action would inure to the benefit of the estate and
consequently, legitimate creditors and/or claimants thereof.