Courtesy of Bruce Krasting
‘Assuming that FERS was in similar financial shape (it is), this would
bring the combined unfunded amount to $10 trillion. If this number were
resolved according to the MRF deal, the Treasury would need to issue $700B more
warrants annually for the next fourteen years (not remotely possible). Total
debt would race ahead faster then its current nosebleed trajectory. The
The
two components of debt as of April 30, 201:
The
IG accounts consist of the Trust Funds (TF). The three largest funds are Social
Security (SS), the Federal Employee Retirement Fund (FERS) and the Military
Retirement Fund (MRF).
The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provided projections for these retirement
programs in its January 31, 2012 report, "The Budget and Economic
Outlook" (Link). The numbers that CBO uses
are consistent with the projections provided by SS, FERS and MRF individually
in their annual reports. The following discussion relies on the CBO's numbers.
The
basic TF arithmetic is as follows:
The
sum of (a) Tax receipts (cash
in) plus (b) Interest (non
cash), minus (c) Benefit
Payments (cash out), minus (d) Overhead
(cash out) equals Net Surplus/Benefit.
This
slide looks at the CBO's projected growth of the
retirement funds:
The
chart above shows that the MRF is expected to grow while SS and FERS remain
relatively flat. The following looks at the projected percent change in these
funds.
The MRF’s 300% increase jumps out at me, and I ask, “What’s
that about”?
The
answer is interesting.
MRF
uniquely benefits from a special law that obligates the Treasury Department to
pay MRF an annual amount equal to a portion of the unfunded obligations of MRF.
The law requires the Treasury to make the payment in “Warrants” (decidedly
non-cash). The annual amount is calculated using a complex actuarial
formula that is designed to eliminate 100% of the unfunded portion at MRS by
2026.
Over
the past few years the actuarial assumptions used in the calculation have
deteriorated. As a result, the annual cost of making the MRF whole is rising
(up 6.5% YoY). In 2010 and 2011 "we" paid
MRF $120B, but the amount of future payments we still owe fell by only $100B.
The unpaid tab now sits at $1.3 Trillion.
These
are the projected total payments to “cure” the unfunded portion from the prior
reports produced by MRF:
.
It
gets worse. The folks at MRF are understating the future liability.
MRF
invests its interest from Treasury securities. It needs a high return to offset
costs. But it can’t get a high return today, thanks to the Fed. The Board at
MRF has set a ridiculous projected interest rate on its holdings of Treasury
IOUs:
Consider
the dog meat portfolio that MRF is sitting on:
There
is no way in hell that MRF will get 5.75% in any year over the next five. I
doubt it will realize that hurdle rate anytime over the next decade. This means
that every year the unfunded portion grows and the annual warrant payment keeps
getting larger. It could easily exceed $2 trillion over the next thirteen
years.
The
5.75% hurdle rate is a significant flaw in the MRF's
assumptions. They don’t agree:
.
Some
observations regarding the projected growth of the MRF and the asymmetrical
treatment of the MRF versus FERS and SS:
+This is unfair. Those
dependent on SS or FERS do not have the legal protection that MRS has. How can
this be? As the annual cost of protecting military pensions
skyrockets over the next few years, there will have to be political fallout.
This will be an interesting war: the Retired American People versus the
+Turn this around. What if SS
and FERS had the same deal that MRS has? The 2012 SS report to Congress
established that the unfunded amount over the next 75 years is $8.6 trillion.
.
Assuming
that FERS was in similar financial shape (it is), this would bring the combined
unfunded amount to $10 trillion. If this number were resolved according to the
MRF deal, the Treasury would need to issue $700B more warrants annually for the
next fourteen years (not remotely possible). Total debt would race ahead faster
then its current nosebleed trajectory. The
+Warrants are easy for Treasury to issue. It doesn't
have to find a new bond holder to make these payments. It just writes scrip
IOUs. But the scrip comes due just the same as regular Treasury bonds. The IOUs
owing to the TFs must be paid in cash. So the back
end of the process hurts.
+The Disability Fund is cashing in its
IOUs like mad. The Old Age Fund started the process a few years ago,
but at a more modest rate. The retirement fund will have very big redemptions
for the next twenty years. FERS will be hocking its IOUs at the same pace as
SS. In about ten years, FERS and SS will be forcing the Treasury to issue
mountains of extra Debt to the Public to meet the redemptions. At about that
time, MRF will be sticking its hand out for another few trillion that the
Treasury will have to borrow.
This
is not about something that might happen in the distant future. It is written
in stone, and coming in less than eight years.’