Albert L. Peia, Pro Se
P.O. Box 862156
Los Angeles, CA 90086
(213) 219-7649
________________________________________
In
re: Richard M. Coan 3:09GP
18 AVC
________________________________________
If only Respondent Coan’s fairy tale
version of the facts were true, he wouldn’t have needed nor felt compelled to
bring the subject action before The Honorable Robert N. Chatigny, Chief Judge,
U.S.D.C., District of Connecticut, to preclude me from suing him without leave
of court. This intent to sue defendant Coan for damages arising from his
illegal acts in the context of his purported role as trustee of my Chapter 7
estate in bankruptcy was clearly articulated and subsumed in the proceeding
before Judge Chatigny and included his past, current and anticipated future
illegal acts [ie., the Swann matter, the still unaccounted for Judgment
entered in my favor by The Honorable Alvin W. Thompson, U.S.D.C.J. (Dist.Conn)] violative of RICO and other federal law.
Specifically, in Judge Chatigny’s own concluding words in pertinent part,
‘On the existing record, a “leave of court”
requirement should not (emphasis
supplied) be
imposed on Peia with regard to any (emphasis supplied) future legal action he might
bring
against plaintiff Coan………………If Peia
does sue Coan, and the complaint proves to be
frivolous, appropriate sanctions can be imposed by
the judge who gets that complaint,
including an order prohibiting Peia from filing
another action without leave of court.’
212 B.R. 217, 220 (D.Conn.1997).
Additionally,
in his own sworn testimony before Judge Chatigny, Coan acknowledged his
fiduciary duty to debtor’s estate and debtor thereby (Exhibit B), which duty he purposefully, in
the alternative, negligently breached. Reciting the 1951 case of Mosser
v.Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 71 S.Ct. 680, 95 L.Ed. 927 (1951), the Court in
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. V. Universal Ins. Cos., 838 F.2d 612 (1st Cir.
1988), sets forth the words of the Supreme Court as are apposite here and
provided in pertinent part, “a trusteeship is serious business and is not to be
undertaken lightly or so discharged. The most effective sanction for good
administration is personal liability for the consequences of forbidden acts……”,
Id. at 621, and hence, respondent Coan’s personal liability herein,
having been sued individually herein. Indeed, said Court in Conn. Gen. Life
Ins., supra, continues stating that federal courts have uniformly held that
bankruptcy trustees are subject to personal liability for the willful and
deliberate violation of their fiduciary duties, and even for negligent acts by
said trustees. Id.; see e.g., In re Gorski, 766 F.2d. 723,727
(2d.Cir.1985); In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d. 1339, 1357
(9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, the U.S. District Court has a significant interest
in overseeing and correcting the conduct of (corrupt) trustees as Coan.
THE FACTS UNDER PENALTY
OF PERJURY
Coan had
contacted me by mail in California, relating that he had been appointed Chapter
7 trustee, and further requested that I call his office. I did so, further
apprised him of the California proceeding and the numerous improprieties (RICO
predicate acts) by Shiff and (bankruptcy) court. He stated that there was a
motion to dismiss adversary proceedings, that he was reviewing same, and that
he might be inclined to abandon same. I received nothing further from him (or
the bankruptcy court) until I received a copy of the order dismissing the
adversary proceedings with prejudice which I distinctly remember inasmuch as I
quipped to my landlord that he, Coan, had just cost me a lot of money. In the
meanwhile, I had faxed copies of the papers to the FBI fax number that had been
given to me. The interim months included the use of the mails by Shiff relative
to the California Chapter 7 proceeding, perpetuating the lie/fraud by Shiff
regarding the date of dismissal by Shiff of a proceeding over which he presided
(dismissed) upon which he predicated a spurious contempt proceeding which as
borne out by counsel on my behalf, Robert Sullivan, Esq., who filed papers
revealing the case had actually been dismissed with prejudice at the hearing
before Shiff on 6-3-92, in which I among other creditors was in attendance, and
not the date of October 8, 1992, upon which he based his spurious contempt
proceeding which under color of right extorted a sum of money from me,
wrongfully threatening me with jail (Attorney Sullivan also asserted with cited
authority that the Shiff Bankruptcy Court was without jurisdiction to bring
such a contempt proceeding). Although I was in California, I hadn’t given up
residency in Connecticut and the U.S. Attorney’s Office should have set forth
the fact that the date of dismissal was 6-3-92 at the Shiff hearing as
confirmed by counsel on my behalf, Robert Sullivan of Westport, Connecticut. I
had indicated to the Hartford Division (I filed there, though transferred to
Shiff/venue) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court by correspondence delivered by
courier that I would file and seek transfer of the case to another jurisdiction
(the California, 1996 case) absent other than Shiff’s wrongful conduct of the
case. It is noteworthy in Coan’s Exhibit A, that Shiff does not mention the
September, 1989 Virginia Chapter 7 proceeding which should have resolved all
legal/property issues but was never consummated according to law (which would
have made unnecessary the subsequent filings for paper trail).
A close
examination of the ORDER OF DISMISSAL (with prejudice), Exhibit
A, sets forth that the court ordered on May 31, 1996 that the adversary
proceedings would be subject to dismissal (only) if Interim Trustee Coan failed
to submit a filing by June 18, 1996; that at a hearing held on June 25, 1996
the court determined that Interim Trustee Coan had submitted no filing and
dismissed as to all defendants with prejudice.
THE LAW
Reciting the 1951 case of Mosser
v.Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 71 S.Ct. 680, 95 L.Ed. 927 (1951), the Court in
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. V. Universal Ins. Cos., 838 F.2d 612 (1st Cir.
1988), sets forth the words of the Supreme Court as are apposite here and
provided in pertinent part, “a trusteeship is serious business and is not to be
undertaken lightly or so discharged. The most effective sanction for good
administration is personal liability for the consequences of forbidden acts……”,
Id. at 621, and hence, defendant coan’s personal liability herein, having been
sued individually herein. Indeed, said Court in Conn. Gen. Life Ins., supra,
continues stating that federal courts have uniformly held that bankruptcy
trustees are subject to personal liability for the willful and deliberate
violation of their fiduciary duties, and even for negligent acts by said
trustees. Id.; see e.g., In re Gorski, 766 F.2d. 723,727
(2d.Cir.1985); In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d. 1339, 1357
(9th Cir. 1983). Business judgment as alluded to by Coan? What business
judgment (other than that akin to the likes of AIG, CITIBANK, among other wall
street fraudsters/banksters, etc., which despite the multi-trillion dollar
securities fraud, there has been as here yet not one prosecution for which
disgorgement is appropriate)? Is that supposed to be a joke as is his
disingenuous portrayal of himself as the “grieved”? In his own sworn testimony Coan has admitted he had a
fiduciary duty to the Chapter 7 estate, that he contacted neither the FBI nor
the Chapter 13 Trustee, that without investigation he summarily concluded my
true sworn statements unbelievable concerning mafia/drug-crazed individual
(Swann), and has mischaracterized my limited references to corrupt Judges Trump
Barry and Shiff along with the corrupt Deidre Martini (to somehow by leap refer
to all judges and officials). Exhibit B.
Rather than being complicit as Coan would ask this Committee to be, the U.S.
District Court has a significant interest in overseeing and correcting the
conduct of (corrupt) trustees as Coan herein. See generally, In re Lehal
Realty Associates, In re Lehal Associates, 101 F.3d 272, 275-277
(2nd Cir. 1996) (distinguishable from the instant case inasmuch as the trustee
in that case had benefited the estate through his actions, as opposed to Coan
who has purposefully, wrongfully, and illegally damaged the estate). There is
applicable insurance/surety coverage.
Parenthetically, I invite this Committee’s attention to the fact that
RICO is a criminal statute with a civil money damages remedy purportedly to
vindicate the law for which preponderance of evidence is the evidentiary
standard and for which there are no immunities (nobody being above the law,
including Coan).
THE 1881 CASE OF BARTON V. BARBOUR IS NOT
APPOSITE, RELEVANT,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE IS MOOT IN LIGHT OF CLOSURE OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CASE ON OCTOBER 20,
2004, FINAL REPORT SUPPOSEDLY RENDERED, THE DAMAGE TO DEBTOR CONSUMATED BY
DEFENDANT COAN AT SAID POINT IN TIME
(NO NOTICE TO EITHER PLAINTIFF OR CREDITORS).
The 1881 case of Barton v. Barbour,
104 U.S. 126 (1881), involved a plaintiff that had brought an action for
injuries sustained while a passenger in a train, which railroad was currently
in receivership. Said plaintiff brought the action against the receiver without
having sought leave of court from the court that had appointed him. It is important to emphasize that there was no
allegation nor even a hint of impropriety, culpability, or illegality on the
part of either the receiver or the subject court that had appointed him.
Indeed, the fundamental and underlying ratio decidendi and policy
considerations leading ineluctably to said Court’s conclusion was that to
permit such an action without leave of court would potentially impair the
(value of the) property in the hands of the receiver, to the detriment of
existing creditors and prior claimants. Id.,127-129. In the case sub
judice, the precise opposite is true where respondent Coan has through his
wrongful acts/conduct /negligence impaired the (value of the) property in to
the detriment of existing creditors and prior claimants. Moreover, there was no
RICO statute extent at said time to address the endemic and pervasive
corruption that has become synonymous with America today and that the RICO
statute was enacted thwart consistent with the liberal construction to be
accorded said remedial legislation as per the Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1989). Specifically, complainant’s action
herein has been to preserve the estate which has been purposefully and
consistently damaged by defendant Coan, consistent with a pattern of
racketeering activity by an associated-in-fact enterprise of which defendant
Coan along with the U.S. Bankruptcy court that appointed him was a part. It
should further be noted a fortiori that complainant’s action would inure
to the benefit of the estate and consequently, legitimate creditors and/or
claimants thereof. It further is true that at the evidentiary hearing before
Judge Chatigny, on cross examination by complainant and repeated in follow-up
questioning by Judge Chatigny, defendant Coan admitted he did not know of any
legal way a real property as complainant’s could have been sold during the
pendancy of the automatic stay [and the consequent fraud concerning surplus funds among other
causes/predicate violations, etc., and those ripe for the entry of default
(/judgment)], nor how without violating fiduciary duty the September, 1989
Virginia Chapter 7 proceeding which should have resolved all legal/property
issues was never consummated according to law (which would have made
unnecessary the subsequent filings for paper trail), etc.. Exhibit B. Moreover, in said sworn
testimony Coan also confirmed he had considered abandoning said proceedings.
It should be noted that a cause of action
under RICO is fundamentally recognized for losses (to ie., creditors, the
debtor, lienholders, etc.) caused by sales of a debtor’s assets in bankruptcy
proceedings at submarket prices. See, e.g., Bivens Gardens Office Bldg.,
Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Fla., 140 F.3d 898,908(11th Cir. 1998). In the instant case, defendant Coan’s
acts are even more egregious (and within the ambit of RICO) inasmuch as he has
at all times relevant hereto purposefully, wrongfully, negligently, and
flagrantly damaged assets of debtor’s estate, purposefully, wrongfully,
alternatively negligently causing dismissal of adversary proceedings involving
RICO claims ripe for entry of default (judgment) Exhibit
A, Exhibit “A“ RICO Verified
Complaint, Exhibit “B“ Affidavit,
Exhibit “A“ RICO Statement, obstructing
justice thereby, damaging plaintiff (debtor, as well as, ie., creditors,
lienholders, etc.) , while concomitantly benefiting RICO co-conspirators, and
committing a fraud upon the estate of debtor and creditors/lienholders thereby
(violations of Sections 1513, 102 and that concerning extortion would also have
been appropriate). The same violations apply to the adversary proceeding where
the Trustee was named as a party plaintiff concerning junkie and thief, David George
Swann (DOB 4-6-60; three guilty pleas to theft in less than 5 years residence
in California) who stole (bankruptcy) estate among other assets of plaintiff
and against whom default (judgment) was ripe for entry. Coan neither abandoned
nor re-brought same, violating Section 1503 and (defrauding) damaging
complainant thereby, and consistent with his defalcation of duty ab initio.
It is preposterous for Coan to assert (falsely) to this Committee that I would
fly in for the hearing concerning the relatively small Swann matter, and the
subsequent hearing before The Honorable Robert N. Chatigny, Chief Judge,
U.S.D.C., District of Connecticut, yet ignore the adversary proceedings
integral to the value of the Chapter 7 Estate.
The foregoing statements made by me are
true under penalty of perjury pursuant to the
laws of the
United States of America.
Dated:
4-22-09
Respectfully
Submitted and Signed by: _______________________
Albert L. Peia, Pro Se
P.O. Box 862156
Los Angeles, CA 90086
(213) 219-7649
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I, Albert L. Peia, hereby certify that
copies of the within, including Autorun DVD with relevant (PDF formatted)
documents, as set forth therein including the foregoing instant document
designated by date as 4-22-09 Complainant’s Reply to Response of Respondent Coan
(42209complainantreply.pdf) were served
by way of regular first class mail, postage pre-paid on this ______day of
April, 2009, upon the following:
MEMBERS OF
THE FEDERAL GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE as set forth in the Federal Grievance Committee
Service List (As Updated March 24, 2009 – 14 Members) which is appended
immediately hereto.
Richard M.
Coan,
Coan,
Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger , LLC.,
495 Orange
St.,
New Haven, Ct. 06511
Walter W.
Grattan, Jr., Supervisory Special Agent
Kimberly K.
Mertz, Special Agent in Charge
Federal
Bureau of Investigation
600 State
Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06511
Dated:
4- -09
Signed:______________________________
Albert
L. Peia
P.O. Box 862156
Los
Angeles, CA 90086
(213) 219-7649
4-22-09 Complainant’s Reply
to Response by Respondent Coan
Albert L. Peia, Pro Se
P.O. Box 862156
Los Angeles, CA 90086
(213) 219-7649
_________________________________________
In re: Richard M. Coan 3:09GP 18 AVC
Defendant Coan, as Chapter 7 Trustee, was ordered by the Bankruptcy
Court to submit a filing in adversary proceedings by a Court Ordered deadline
or said adversary proceedings would be subject to dismissal. Defendant Coan
failed to file anything whatsoever and said adversary proceedings were dismissed with prejudice causing this complainant (and legitimate
creditors) substantial damages.
A client had been referred to me
regarding the concerns of two shareholder/owners over third shareholder
/owner’s ever more integral involvement with the mob, which concerns were
assuaged and problem solved by me by way of a voting trust edging out the third
partner (see Plaintiff’s (5 page)
RICO Summary Under Penalty of Perjury provided to the FBI at their request,
reiterated and filed herein, nunc pro tunc, for more detailed
account). I deferred some fees consistent with vagaries/difficulties of the
client’s business and was owed a substantial
sum by said client. There came a point in time when it was obvious there was
illegal activity (illegal/drug money laundering, including through the Trump
casinos) on the part of said client and in seeking funds owed to me I was told
by the remaining shareholder /owner, Dilena, that assuming my compliance (and
hence complicity), I would be paid. I filed a RICO Action and the case was
assigned to newly appointed federal judge Maryanne Trump Barry, Donald Trump’s
sister. I moved to recuse her for the obvious conflict – hundreds of thousands
per month of revenue to her brother’s casinos from defendant Dilena /companies,
which motion she personally heard and denied. I personally met with District of
N.J. Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathon Lacey, provided him with documentary
evidence of the illegal money laundering, and explained the various illegal
activities to him, and in the context of my pending RICO Case. About a month or
so later I inquired as to his progress and was told Lacey was no longer with the
U.S. Attorney’s office, no further information available, and that the file
could not be located. I thereupon delivered by hand another set of copies of
the documents to U.S. Attorney Sam Alito with the federal employee receiving
same assuring the package addressed to Alito would go directly to him. Upon
inquiry not long thereafter I was informed Alito was no longer with the office
of the U.S. Attorney and the file/documents could not be located (Alito was
appointed to the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals and amazingly, now is a U.S.
Supreme Court Justice. Many people have served prison time for far less than
his crime, ie., Martha Stewart, etc. Maryanne Trump Barry also sits on 3rd
Circuit Court of Appeals where they sat together). In the meantime, I was constrained
to file under Chapter 11 of Title 11, U.S.C., and sought by way of personal
meeting with U.S. Trustee Hugh Leonard that he join in my motion to recuse
Trump Barry which he refused to do but he did leave his position as U.S.
Trustee, upon information, for a position as partner at Cole, Shotz, et als, on
retainer with Dilena and companies as central clients. I had moved to
Connecticut where I filed a Chapter 13 proceeding which should have
crystallized the legal/property aspects of the case if not for improprieties by
Alan Shiff of the bankruptcy court in Connecticut, when I finally, in light of
the corrupt processes, filed a Chapter 7 in Virginia where I maintained an
office seeking an orderly liquidation of my properties/assets, payment of
creditors, and in light of the substantial equity in my real properties a
substantial sum even at substantially reduced prices, the RICO action being the
primary thorn in the side of said court and again the matter
wrongfully/illegally handled and never consummated according to law which
otherwise would have concluded all matters except for, by inference, the RICO
action]. [Former FBI Agent Richard M. Taus
attests by affidavit to drug money laundering endemic to this 2nd Circuit
(equally applicable to 3rd Circuit, ie., Atlantic City, etc., and crime
families) and former CIA Agent Dois Gene Tatum
attests by sworn declaration to high level government involvement in such
illegal drug related crimes ].
In light
of defendant Coan’s wrongful/illegal conduct damaging me and benefitting other RICO co-conspirators /defendants, I
made no secret of my intent to utilize the judicial process to seek damages
against defendant Coan for his intentional and illegal acts damaging me, and
coincidentally, any legitimate creditors of my estate. Parenthetically, it is
reasonably inferred that it was defendant Coan’s knowledge of his own
illegal/wrongful acts damaging me and constituting a fraud under Title 11
U.S.C. and a RICO violation thereby that did prompt Coan’s subject action
before Judge Chatigny to preclude me from suing him without leave of court. It
is noteworthy that the action brought by defendant Coan and heard at the
subject hearing before The Honorable Robert N. Chatigny, Chief Judge, USDC
(Dist.Conn) had the subject bankruptcy court case reference, viz., Bankruptcy
No. 95-51862, No. 3:97-CV1165(RNC) for which I flew in from California, gave
testimony and had occasion to cross-examine
Coan . The Honorable Robert N. Chatigny, Chief Judge, USDC (Dist.Conn)
denied Coan’s relief as to Coan but granted same as to Shiff. On or about April
28, 2005, I received a call from a person named Sandra who identified herself
as an employee of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Bridgeport Division, who stated
that the subject bankruptcy case had been closed on October 20, 2004 and a
final report filed, the details of which I set forth in my affidavit dated
5-2-05, filed with the court on 5-4-05, and referenced in my motion/application
to withdraw as moot the application for leave to file the complaint I had
sought to file in light of same, which was granted by Judge Kravitz without
prejudice while denying the request for criminal refer-ral except as to the
local police which I delivered by hand to LAPD, Attention:LAPD Chief Bratton.
The
documents filed by me in this RICO litigation have been filed under penalty of
perjury [RICO Verified Complaint, RICO Statement, Affidavit in Support of RICO Verified Complaint, Addendum, 6-6-05 Addendum ,
Plaintiff’s Opposition papers set forth below, etc., just dismissed by Janet
Hall, U.S.D.C.J., for lack of jurisdiction.].It should be noted as set forth in
Plaintiff’s (5 page) RICO
Summary Under Penalty of Perjury provided to the FBI attheir request, reiterated and filed herein, nunc
pro tunc, as Addendum to Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support of RICO
VerifiedComplaint, the prior filed RICO
Action was stayed by Judge Gilroy Daley (he had previously presided over cases
of prosecutions involving organized crime but passed away which then resulted
in the transfer of the RICO case first to Judge Thompson, and then to Judge
Arterton, U.S.D.C.J., who dismissed the case without prejudice stating in her
Order her incorrect presumption that the case was being resolved in bankruptcy
court although the adversary proceedings which had the same defendants /causes
of action had just been dismissed
with prejudice by Alan Shiff, U.S.B.C.J. owing to Richard M. Coan’s
illegal/wrongful conduct) as the subsequent bankruptcy case/adversary
proceedings went forward providing a mechanism for assurance to and payment of
legitimate creditors, with defendant Coan’s wrongful conduct resulting in dismissal
with prejudice benefiting the RICO defendants and damaging the bankruptcy
estate, creditors, and me. There is applicable insurance/surety coverage.
The foregoing statements made by me are true under penalty of perjury
pursuant to the laws of the United States of America.
Dated:
4-5-09
Respectfully Submitted and
Signed by: _______________________
Albert L. Peia, Pro Se
CERTIFICATION OF
SERVICE
I, Albert L. Peia, hereby certify that copies of the
within, including Autorun DVD with relevant (PDF formatted) documents and
hyperlinks, as set forth therein including the foregoing instant document
designated by date as Grievance Summary Document
(4509grievancesummarydocument.pdf) were
served by way of regular first class mail, postage pre-paid on this ______day
of April, 2009, upon the following:
MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE as set
forth in the Federal Grievance Committee Service List (As Updated March 24,
2009 – 14 Members) which is appended immediately hereto.
Richard M. Coan,
Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver, and Miltenberger , LLC.,
495 Orange St., New Haven, Ct. 06511
Walter W. Grattan, Jr., Supervisory Special Agent
Kimberly K. Mertz, Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation
600 State Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06511
Dated: 4-
-09
Signed:______________________________
Albert L. Peia
4-5-09 Grievance
Summary Document
Grievance Complaint Against
Attorney Richard M. Coan
________________________________________
________________________________________
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
RICO Summary to FBI Under
Penalty of Perjury at Their Request (5 pages)
Addendum to Affidavit Dated 3-3-08
Addendum
to Affidavit Dated 6-6-05
Cross-Notice
of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Opposition
to Motion to Dismiss
Some More Recent Correspondence with the FBI
CIA Agent Affidavit Regarding Drug Trafficking
Involving High Level Government Officials
Shiff Order of Dismissal
With Prejudice on Coan’s Failure to File
Page
1 Page 2
________________________________________________
COMPLAINT AGAINST
ATTORNEY RICHARD M. COAN
Affidavit in Support of Verified Complaint
RICO Summary to FBI Under
Penalty of Perjury at Their Request (5 pages)
Addendum to Affidavit Dated 3-3-08
Addendum
to Affidavit Dated 6-6-05
Cross-Notice
of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Opposition
to Motion to Dismiss
Some More Recent Correspondence with the FBI
CIA Agent Affidavit Regarding Drug Trafficking
Involving High Level Government Officials
Shiff Order of Dismissal
With Prejudice on Coan’s Failure to File
Page 1 Page 2