Preliminary Statement


   This appeal arises from the purported decisions of the


U.S. District Court below, District of Connecticut, Dkt.


#3:00CV2310(PCD). Jurisdiction below was predicated upon


the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act


(“RICO”),18 U.S.C.Sections 1961-1968,and the Federal Tort


Claims Act,28 U.S.C.Sections 1291,1346,1402,2401,2402,2411-


2412,2671-2680, and federal questions arising thereunder.




 It is axiomatic that Section 904(a) of the Organized Crime


Control Act of 1970 expressly provided that “the provisions


of this title[RICO] shall be liberally construed to effect-


tuate its remedial purposes.” The Courts, including the


U.S. Supreme Court, See, e.g., Sedima,S.P.R.L. v. Imrex


Co.,Inc.,473 U.S. 479 (1985), have (except those involved


in the corruption set forth herein) invariably taken said


admonition to heart. I respectfully ask this Court to apply


a rule of reason consistent with the glaringly outrageous


facts of this case in contravention of the intent of the


RICO act and the liberal construction to be accorded same


in furtherance of the intent of the act as discussed infra.


Moreover, it must be emphasized that defendant USA, whose


blatently illegal acts should be accorded no greater immu-


nity than that denied to other sovereigns engaged in cri-


minal acts, has at all times controlled (corruptly) the


very processes (judicial and otherwise, including prosecu-


torial)for effecting the intent of the RICO act, fraudulen-


tly concealing and criminally thwarting clear violations


thereof, and obstructing justice thereby. Finally, the RICO


enterprise involving defendant Bankruptcy court and


defendant Coan involves, pursuant to the RICO Act, treble


damages and joint and several liability thereunder.1a


   J. Dorsey doesn’t know the Law of RICO,which is conveni-


ent considering the government’s(his employer’s) corruption


and illegal activities as involved and documented in this


case through employees,agents,contractors,and co-conspira-


tors herein. [One may reasonably surmise/infer that after a


less than stellar “legal/judicial career” J. Dorsey is


looking for that final, desperate career “boost/bribe”


(financial or otherwise) as was so with ie., Maryanne Trump


(to 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals plus continuing drug money


flows to the Trump family casinos),Sam Alito (to 3rd Circuit


Court of Appeals), Hugh Leonard (received his bribes


directly from RICO defendant Dilena and companies),


Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathon Lacey (private practice


“bribe deal”) etc., with accompanying illegal cover-up,


destruction of evidence, obstruction of justice, etc., as


set forth in Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint]View Complaint[Appellant’s


Appendix, hereinafter, “AA” at 4-5, 15-23].


                   Factual Summary


 Quite simply, this case is exactly the factual scenario


that RICO was enacted to address, viz., the “eradication of


organized crime in the United States”. Unfortunately, as


the law of RICO has evolved to meet this laudable goal, so


to has organized crime evolved and grown to include cri-


minal elements within the ranks of and as contractors for,


the U.S. government itself, viz., ie., employees thereof,


through bribes and otherwise.Click and here. The RICO predicate acts of


(illegal drug)money laundering[“AA” at 4,17,22], bankruptcy


fraud [“AA” at 4,14-21,22], obstruction of justice[“AA” at


4,14-21,22], bribery [“AA” at 5,14-21,23], retaliation


against a witness/victim/informant [“AA” at 5,14-21,23],


and racketeering [“AA” at 5,14-21,23], along with other


substantive causes sounding in (continuing)(negligence)(and


prima facie) tort and fraudulent concealment thereof  [“AA”


at 2,3,6-14], causing plaintiff/appellant substantial


damages (to property and business) thereby View RICO Statement[“AA” at     ].  

                 Summary of Argument


 The matter concerning the leave of court requirement prior


to suit against defendant Coan was already clearly decided


by Judge Chatigny and res judicata( and/or collateral


estoppel) as to same herein and as such, constitutes clear


error by J. Dorsey. The criminal acts of Shiff, Coan,


Leonard, Trump, etc.,in furtherance of and to cover-up RICO


predicate (and, incidentally other tortious) acts by reason


of which plaintiff sustained injury to his property and


business, and for which joint and several liability is


apposite, should be criminally prosecuted under RICO and


other federal law, are clearly within the ambit of the


doctrines of equitable estoppel and fraudulent concealment,


and the decisions of the court below should be reversed.



  It is important to emphasize that the action brought by


defendant Coan had a (this defendant) bankruptcy court


reference, viz., Bankruptcy No. 95-51862, No. 3:97-


CV1165(RNC). Indeed, in light of defendant Coan’s illegal


acts to damage plaintiff and to benefit other RICO co-


conspirators/defendants, I made no secret of my intent to


utilize the judicial process to seek damages against


defendant Coan for his intentional and illegal acts


damaging me, and coincidentally, any legitimate creditors


of my estate. (Parenthetically, it should once again be


emphasized that it was defendant Coan’s own knowledge of


his own illegal acts damaging me that did prompt the


subject action before Judge Chatigny to preclude me from


suing him without leave of court). This intent to sue


defendant Coan for damages arising from his illegal acts in


the context of his purported role as trustee of my Chapter


7 estate in bankruptcy was clearly articulated and subsumed


in the proceeding before Judge Chatigny And included his


past, current(, and anticipated future) illegal acts


violative of RICO and other federal law. That defendant


Coan failed to raise other legal theories therein does not


change the law of the case, res judicata effect thereof,


and he is estopped to raise said issue again as before J.


Dorsey, an appeal not having been taken by defendant Coan


thereof. Specifically, in Judge Chatigny’s own concluding


words in pertinent part,

  ‘On the existing record, a “leave of court” requirement        should not (emphasis supplied)be imposed on Peia with regard to any (emphasis supplied) future legal action he might bring against plaintiff Coan………………If Peia does sue Coan, and the complaint proves to be frivolous, appropriate sanctions can be imposed by the judge who gets that complaint, including an order prohibiting Peia from filing another action without leave of court.’ 212 B.R. 217, 220 (D.Conn.1997).1

  At the least, J. Dorsey would have had to have made such


a finding, which could not have been made without further


corruption of the process and RICO violations, since Coan’s


purposeful, illegal, and negligent acts damaging plaintiff


were clear, uncontrovertible, and indefensible. The damages


to plaintiff have been substantial Click here[“AA” at         ].


                      THE LAW

 I. The Legal Doctrines of Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Preclude Defendant Coan’s Bad Faith Efforts to Evade Ju-risdiction In This Case and Judgment is Appropriate Against Him for His Clearly Unlawful Conduct as a Matter of Law.


  “Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,


final adjudication on the merits of an action precludes the


parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were


or could have been raised in that action,“ St. Pierre v.


Dyer, 208 F.3d 394,399(2d Cir.2000)(quoting Federated Dep’t


Stores,Inc.v. Moitie,452 U.S. 394,398(1981)); Leather


v. Eyck, F.3d 420,424(2d Cir.1999)(quoting Rivet v. Regions


Bank of La.,522 U.S. 470,476(1998));see also S.E.C. v.First


Jersey Sec.,Inc.,101 F.3d 1450,1463(2d Cir.1996).


II. Defendant USA is a Proper Party Defendant in This Case.

  The case of United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Fam-


ily, 879 F.2d 20(2d Cir.1989) does not even remotely stand


for the proposition purportedly relied upon and asserted by


J. Dorsey in his speciously “reasoned” ruling. Rather, as


applies to defendant USA, the Court held the U.S. govern-


ment not to be a “person” within section 1961(3)capable of


filing a section 1964(c) claim, being separately empowered


to sue under section 1964(b), which does not afford a tre-


ble-damage remedy. Id. Additionally, the Court held an org-


anized crime family not to be a “person” under section 1961


(3) owing to its inability to hold a legal or beneficial


interest in property inasmuch as an organized crime fami-


ly’s purpose, structure and operations are wholly and in-


nately unlawful. Id. Given the unlawful conduct of defend-


ant USA in this case and generally, J. Dorsey’s confusion


is totally understandable.


 III. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Apply in This Case.

  In rejecting the assertion of Nigeria that it could nei-


ther be accused of nor held liable for “indictable” RICO


predicate acts (Foreign Sovereign Imunities Act, 28 U.S.C.


§1604 et seq.), in Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 198


F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 1999), the Court reasoned as is appo-


site herein in pertinent part:

  ‘Defendants……essentially ask us in construing RICO and the FSIA to ascribe an intent to Congress which would effectively insulate foreign states, their agents, and instrumen-talities from the scope of civil RICO. We do not believe Congress envisioned such a construction of RICO and the FSIA. Congress’ purpose in enacting the FSIA was to codify the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity……to cases involving acts of a foreign state which are sovereign or governmental in nature, as opposed to acts which are either commercial in nature or those which private persons normally perform……Meanwhile, in enacting RICO, Congress ex-

pressly instructed courts to liberally construe its provi-sions “to effectuate its remedial purpose”…… RICO’s “’reme-dial purposes’ are nowhere more evident than in the provi-sion of a private action for those injured by racketeering activity,” Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,Inc., 473 U.S. 479,

498, 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985), activity which often will be commercial in nature.’ Southway, 198 F.3d at 1216.


Surely, as set forth supra and in the case sub judice, the


RICO predicate violations of Defendant USA’s employees, a-


gents, and contractors by reason of which plaintiff/appell-


ant sustained substantial injury to his property and busin-


ess could not possibly be deemed sovereign or governmental.


  Despite strong policy reasons militating against sove-


reign immunity as set forth supra, even assuming, arguendo,


the grant of same herein, it is should be emphasized that


while federal officials may qualify for the absolute or


limited immunity available to them in all types of federal


civil litigation, they do not receive the same underlying


protection that federal agencies receive in the RICO con-


text. This important distinction which is apposite herein


was made clear in McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343,350


(5th Cir. 1993), in which the Court held that while the FDIC


as a federal agency is not chargeable, indictable or puni-


shable for state and federal criminal provisions, id., FDIC


officials could face RICO liability since individual offi-


cials can violate, as in this case, RICO’s predicate acts.


Id. Accord,see also Brown v.Nationsbank Corp.,188 F.3d 579,


587(5th Cir.1999)where even FBI agents would not be affor-


ded the grant of qualified immunity in the RICO scenario.


 IV. The Doctrines of Fraudulent Concealment, Equitable Estoppel, and Equitable Tolling Preclude Defendant USA’s Assertion of the Statute of Limitations as a Defense Herein

   While plaintiff’s claims were timely as set forth in


this case and the court below, the doctrine of fraudulent


concealment as asserted in Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint,


Counts Three, Four,and Five [“AA” at         ] was designed  


to prevent parties, such as defendants U.S.Bankruptcy Court


(“USBC”)and USA, as well as employees/officials thereof,


from concealing a fraud,or committing as has said defen-


dants (bankruptcy fraud and otherwise [“AA” at      ]) in a


manner that they concealed same,including identities of


culpable officials/employees [“AA” at    ](ie.,through cor-


ruption and control of the so-called “process”, etc., [“AA”


at         ]) until such time as the parties committing the


fraud, defendants USBC and USA herein, could plead the


statute of limitations to protect themselves. Meridien


Intern. Bank Ltd. v. Government of the Republic of Liberia,


23 F.Supp.2d 439(S.D.N.Y.). While both equitable estoppel


and equitable tolling are apposite in the present case,


said doctrines are distinct in that equitable tolling al-


lows plaintiff to avoid the bar of the limitations period


if despite due diligence he is unable to obtain vital


information bearing on the claim (ie., names of employees


of defendant(s) feloniously removing filed court documents,


precluding discovery and obstructing justice thereby,etc.),


whereas equitable estoppel prevents a defendant from as-


serting untimeliness where the defendant (as defendants USA


and USBC and “John Doe defendants”) has taken active steps


to prevent the plaintiff from litigating in time (ie., RICO


predicate acts including bankruptcy fraud, obstruction of


justice,bribery,etc.,“tying up” proceedings,[“AA” at     ].



As To Defendant Coan:

  The decision of the court below, entered contrary to the


decision of the same court by Judge Chatigny, Bankruptcy


No.95-51862, No.3:97-CV1165(RNC),212 B.R. 217(D.Conn.1997),


constitutes clear error and should be REVERSED and JUDGMENT


for the sum certain amount as demanded in plaintiff’s




     In the alternative, said decision should be REVERSED.


As To Defendant(s) U.S.Bankruptcy Court, United States of America:

   The decision of the court below, entered contrary to


meaningful law, should be REVERSED.


Dated: September  ,2002   Signed:__________________________

    Click on my name:

Albert L. Peia, Appellant Pro Se

                          P.O. Box 370434, Reseda, CA 91337       





1a [As a courtesy to the Court, I have under the hypertextlink , Plaintiff/Appellant’s Appeal, set forth the subject filings herein at the following web sites (I have included more than one inasmuch as defendant USA/operatives, “interested parties/defendant”, etc., frequently “hack” same, ie., delete my index html (or other) file(s) on the server, etc., requiring my constant attention thereto) to facilitate review thereof; viz., (preferred and current),, and ]. 



1 It should be noted that the purported chronology/record referenced by J. Dorsey and relied upon by Judge Chatigny, controlled by defendant USA contained inaccuracies favorable to defendant USA, ie., the 1989 Chapter 7 proceeding in Virginia (which followed corrupted proceedings under Ch.11 (N.J.), and Ch.13 (Conn.) and which would have resolved all matters by liquidation (3 real properties with substantial equity and the RICO action) was extent as of the date set forth, at least one creditor had received a document indicated that I had received a discharge on consummation, which was neither sought nor given inasmuch as said proceeding was not consummated according to law, etc. It should be further noted that the CIA, actively involved in the crimes of the type set forth in the RICO action (see FBI and CIA agents’ affidavits at "AA"                ), is headquartered in Virginia, and in close proximity to the subject court.